N.M. Stat. § 32A-2-19 (2026)

A. At the conclusion of the dispositional hearing, the court may make and include in
the dispositional judgment its findings on the following:

       (1)    the interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child's parents and
siblings and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interests;

       (2)    the child's adjustment to the child's home, school and community;

       (3)     the mental and physical health of all individuals involved, including
consideration of such factors as the child's brain development, maturity, trauma history
and disability;

       (4)    the wishes of the child as to the child's custodian;

       (5)    the wishes of the child's parents as to the child's custody;

       (6)    whether there exists a relative of the child or other individual who, after
study by the department, is found to be qualified to receive and care for the child;

       (7)    the availability of services recommended in the predisposition report; and

       (8)    the ability of the parents to care for the child in the home.

    B. If a child is found to be delinquent, the court may enter its judgment making any
of the following dispositions for the supervision, care and rehabilitation of the child:

        (1)    transfer legal custody to the department, an agency responsible for the
care and rehabilitation of delinquent children, which shall receive the child at a facility
designated by the secretary of the department as a juvenile reception facility. The
department shall thereafter determine the appropriate placement, supervision and
rehabilitation program for the child. The judge may include recommendations for
placement of the child. Commitments are subject to limitations and modifications set
forth in Section 32A-2-23 NMSA 1978. The types of commitments include:
            (a) a short-term commitment of one year in a facility for the care and
rehabilitation of adjudicated delinquent children. No more than nine months shall be
served at the facility and no less than ninety days shall be served on supervised
release, unless: 1) a petition to extend the commitment has been filed prior to the
commencement of supervised release; 2) the commitment has been extended pursuant
to Section 32A-2-23 NMSA 1978; or 3) supervised release is revoked pursuant to
Section 32A-2-25 NMSA 1978;

          (b) a long-term commitment for no more than two years in a facility for the
care and rehabilitation of adjudicated delinquent children. No more than twenty-one
months shall be served at the facility and no less than ninety days shall be served on
supervised release, unless: 1) supervised release is revoked pursuant to Section 32A-
2-25 NMSA 1978; or 2) the commitment is extended pursuant to Section 32A-2-23
NMSA 1978;

          (c) if the child is a delinquent offender who committed one of the criminal
offenses set forth in Subsection J of Section 32A-2-3 NMSA 1978, a commitment to age
twenty-one, unless sooner discharged; or

          (d) if the child is a youthful offender, a commitment to age twenty-one, unless
sooner discharged;

       (2)   place the child on probation under those conditions and limitations as the
court may prescribe;

       (3)    place the child in a local detention facility that has been certified in
accordance with the provisions of Section 32A-2-4 NMSA 1978 for a period not to
exceed fifteen days within a three hundred sixty-five day time period; or if a child is
found to be delinquent solely on the basis of Paragraph (3) of Subsection A of Section
32A-2-3 NMSA 1978, the court shall only enter a judgment placing the child on
probation or ordering restitution or both; or

        (4)   if a child is found to be delinquent solely on the basis of Paragraph (2), (3)
or (4) of Subsection A of Section 32A-2-3 NMSA 1978, the court may make any
disposition provided by this section and may enter its judgment placing the child on
probation and, as a condition of probation, transfer custody of the child to the
department for a period not to exceed six months without further order of the court;
provided that this transfer shall not be made unless the court first determines that the
department is able to provide or contract for adequate and appropriate treatment for the
child and that the treatment is likely to be beneficial.

   C. When the child is an Indian child, the Indian child's cultural needs shall be
considered in the dispositional judgment and reasonable access to cultural practices
and traditional treatment shall be provided.
    D. A child found to be delinquent shall not be committed or transferred to a penal
institution or other facility used for the execution of sentences of persons convicted of
crimes.

    E. Whenever the court vests legal custody in an agency, institution or department, it
shall transmit with the dispositional judgment copies of the clinical reports,
predisposition study and report and other information it has pertinent to the care and
treatment of the child.

   F. Prior to any child being placed in the custody of the department, the department
shall be provided with reasonable oral or written notification and an opportunity to be
heard.

   G. In addition to any other disposition pursuant to Subsection B of this section, the
court may make an abuse or neglect report for investigation and proceedings as
provided for in the Abuse and Neglect Act [Chapter 32A, Article 4 NMSA 1978]. The
report may be made to a local law enforcement agency, the department or a tribal law
enforcement or social service agency for an Indian child residing in Indian country.

    H. In addition to any other disposition pursuant to this section or any other penalty
provided by law, if a child who is fifteen years of age or older is adjudicated delinquent
on the basis of Paragraph (2), (3) or (4) of Subsection A of Section 32A-2-3 NMSA
1978, the child's driving privileges may be denied or the child's driver's license may be
revoked for a period of ninety days. For a second or a subsequent adjudication, the
child's driving privileges may be denied or the child's driver's license revoked for a
period of one year. Within twenty-four hours of the dispositional judgment, the court
may send to the motor vehicle division of the taxation and revenue department the order
adjudicating delinquency. Upon receipt of an order from the court adjudicating
delinquency, the director of the motor vehicle division of the taxation and revenue
department may revoke or deny the delinquent's driver's license or driving privileges.
Nothing in this section may prohibit the delinquent from applying for a limited driving
privilege pursuant to Section 66-5-35 NMSA 1978 or an ignition interlock license
pursuant to the Ignition Interlock Licensing Act [66-5-501 to 66-5-504 NMSA 1978], and
nothing in this section precludes the delinquent's participation in an appropriate
educational, counseling or rehabilitation program.

    I. In addition to any other disposition pursuant to this section or any other penalty
provided by law, when a child is adjudicated delinquent on the basis of Paragraph (6) of
Subsection A of Section 32A-2-3 NMSA 1978, the child shall perform the mandatory
community service set forth in Section 30-15-1.1 NMSA 1978. When a child fails to
completely perform the mandatory community service, the name and address of the
child's parent or legal guardian shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation,
accompanied by a notice that the parent or legal guardian is the parent or legal
guardian of a child adjudicated delinquent for committing graffiti.
History: 1978 Comp., § 32A-2-19, enacted by Laws 1993, ch. 77, § 48; 1995, ch. 204,
§ 3; 1995, ch. 206, § 13; 1996, ch. 85, § 4; 2003, ch. 225, § 10; 2003, ch. 239, § 5;
2005, ch. 189, § 16; 2009, ch. 239, § 20; 2021, ch. 15, § 4.

                                    ANNOTATIONS

Cross references. — For the procedure governing disciplinary hearings, see Rule 10-
246 NMRA.

For escape from custody of the children, youth and families department, see 30-22-11.1
NMSA 1978.

For aggravated escape from the custody of the children, youth and families department,
see 30-22-11.2 NMSA 1978.

Compiler's note. — Laws 2005, ch. 189 both amended and repealed Laws 2003, ch.
225, § 10. Laws 2005, ch. 189, § 77 repealed Laws 2003, ch. 225, § 10, effective June
17, 2005. Laws 2005, ch. 189, § 16 amended Laws 2003, ch. 225, § 10.

The 2021 amendment, effective June 18, 2021, eliminated the imposition of fines for
children found to be delinquent; and in Subsection B, after "the court may", deleted
"impose a fine not to exceed the fine that could be imposed if the child were an adult
and may", and in Paragraph B(3), after "ordering restitution or", deleted "imposing a fine
not to exceed the fine that could be imposed if the child were an adult or any
combination of these dispositions".

The 2009 amendment, effective July 1, 2009, in Paragraph (3) of Subsection A, after
"individuals involved", added the remainder of the sentence; and in Subparagraphs (a)
and (b) of Paragraph (1) of Subsection B, changed "parole" to "supervised release".

The 2005 amendment, effective June 17, 2005, in Subsection B(1), deleted the former
provision that the court could enter a judgment making any disposition that is authorized
for the disposition of a neglected or abused child; in Subsection B(1)(a). provided that a
commitment may include a short term commitment in a facility for the care and
rehabilitation of adjudicated delinquent children, that not more than nine months shall be
served at the facility and not less than ninety days on parole unless a petition has been
filed to extend the commitment, the commitment has been extended pursuant to a
consent decree, or parole is revoked; Subsection B(1)(b), provided that with respect to a
long term commitment may not be more than twenty one months at a facility for the care
and rehabilitation of adjudicated delinquent children and not less than ninety days on
parole unless the commitment has been extended pursuant to a consent decree or
parole is revoked; and added Subsection G, which provided that the court may make an
abuse or neglect report for investigation and proceedings to a local law enforcement
agency, the children, youth and families department, or a tribal law enforcement or
social service agency for an Indian child residing in Indian country.
The 2003 amendment, effective April 6, 2003, — added "or an ignition interlock license
pursuant to the Ignition Interlock Licensing Act" following "Section 66-5-35 NMSA 1978"
in the last sentence of Subsection G. Laws 2003, ch. 225, § 10, effective July 1, 2003,
also amended this section. The section was set out as amended by Laws 2003, ch. 239,
§ 5. See 12-1-8 NMSA 1978.

The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1996, substituted "parents" for "parent" in
Paragraphs A(1) and (5); added Subparagraph B(1)(c) and redesignated the following
subparagraph accordingly; and added Subsection H.

The 1995 amendment, effective July 1, 1995, deleted a provision regarding
commitments of six months or less in long-term care facilities from Paragraph B(2)(a),
and added Paragraph B(2)(c). Laws 1995, ch. 204, § 3, effective July 1, 1995, also
amended this section. The section was set out as amended by Laws 1995, ch. 206, §
13. See 12-1-8 NMSA 1978.

Commitment to age 21. — Subsection B(1)(c) of this section does not say that
commitment to age 21 is authorized only for children who fit the definition of youthful
offenders as set forth in Subsection I of Section 32A-2-3 NMSA 1978. State v. Indie C.,
2006-NMCA-014, 139 N.M. 80, 128 P.3d 508, cert. denied, 2006-NMCERT-001, 139
N.M. 273, 131 P.3d 660.

Children’s Code does not place limitations on type of probation conditions the
court may order. State v. Wacey C., 2004-NMCA-029, 135 N.M. 186, 86 P.3d 611.

Geographical and temporal limitations of probation condition do not bring it in the
realm of banishment. State v. Wacey C., 2004-NMCA-029, 135 N.M. 186, 86 P.3d 611.

Probation condition does not amount to banishment where child’s probation
condition does not require him to leave the state or country entirely and does not trigger
concerns about interstate or international relations, child’s restriction is limited to the
period of his probation, not to exceed two years, and the probation condition was
fashioned in response to concerns for both the child’s welfare, as residents talked about
arming themselves against the child, and the welfare of the area, as child had plans for
more serious regional criminal activity. State v. Wacey C., 2004-NMCA-029, 135 N.M.
186, 86 P.3d 611.

Finding required for adjudication as delinquent. — A finding that a child is in need of
care or rehabilitation is required in order to adjudicate the child to be a delinquent. State
v. Doe, 1980-NMCA-148, 95 N.M. 90, 619 P.2d 194, superseded by statute, State v.
Michael R., 1988-NMCA-087, 107 N.M. 794, 765 P.2d 767.

Amenability to treatment. — Section 31-18-15.3F NMSA 1978 gives the district court
the discretion to impose an adult sentence as indicated in Section 32A-2-20 NMSA
1978 based on a finding that a child is not amenable to treatment. If the district court
finds the child is amenable to treatment, then the district court should impose a juvenile
disposition in accordance with this section. State v. Muniz, 2003-NMSC-021, 134 N.M.
152, 74 P.3d 86, superseded by statute, State v. Jones, 2010-NMSC-012, 148 N.M. 1,
229 P.3d 474.

Consecutive commitments. — The children's court is not authorized to order
consecutive commitments from one dispositional hearing, regardless of the number of
petitions filed by the state. State v. Adam M., 2000-NMCA-049, 129 N.M. 146, 2 P.3d
883, cert. denied, 129 N.M. 249, 4 P.3d 1240.

Non-consecutive commitments. — The imposition of two non-consecutive
commitments based on separate petitions stemming from different underlying behavior
during one dispositional hearing is authorized by Subsection B(2)(b) (now B(1)(b))of this
section. State v. Jose S., 2005-NMCA-094, 138 N.M. 44, 116 P.3d 115, cert. denied,
2005-NMCERT-007, 138 N.M. 145, 117 P.3d 951.

Indeterminate commitment unauthorized. — The children's court has no authority,
pursuant to a plea agreement, to commit a child who has been adjudicated delinquent
to the legal custody of the children, youth and families department for an indeterminate
period up to the age of eighteen. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep't v. Paul
G., 2006-NMCA-038, 139 N.M. 258, 131 P.3d 108.

Authority to order detentions. — The children’s court had authority under its contempt
power to order detentions. State v. Steven B., 2004-NMCA-086, 136 N.M. 111, 94 P.3d
854, cert. denied, 2004-NMCERT-007, 136 N.M. 452, 99 P.3d 1164.

Children’s court may use its contempt power as an alternative to probation
revocation when the court places a child in detention for violation of grade court
program, a condition of probation. State v. Steven B., 2004-NMCA-086, 136 N.M. 111,
94 P.3d 854, cert. denied, 2004-NMCERT-007, 136 N.M. 452, 99 P.3d 1164.

The children’s court sentence of two weekends of detention, one for each of two
violations, was not an abuse of discretion. State v. Steven B., 2004-NMCA-086, 136
N.M. 111, 94 P.3d 854, cert. denied, 2004-NMCERT-007, 136 N.M. 452, 99 P.3d 1164.

Placement in a local detention facility is an alternative disposition available to the
court and is not a limitation on the conditions of probation the court may prescribe. State
v. Henry L., 1990-NMCA-030, 109 N.M. 792, 791 P.2d 67, cert. denied, 109 N.M. 704,
789 P.2d 1271.

Without adjudication of delinquency child may not be transferred to custody of
boys' school, because the school is an institution for the care and rehabilitation of
delinquent children. State v. Doe, 1980-NMCA-148, 95 N.M. 90, 619 P.2d 194.

Limited detention as condition of probation. — The language "place child on
probation under those conditions and limitations as the court may prescribe" is
sufficiently expansive to contemplate the imposition of limited detention as a condition of
probation. State v. Henry L., 1990-NMCA-030, 109 N.M. 792, 791 P.2d 67, cert. denied,
109 N.M. 704, 789 P.2d 1271.

Revocation of probation to punish for contempt. — The inherent power of the courts
to punish for contempt does not validate a children's court order incarcerating a child
found in need of supervision for contempt in violating probation, where such order
contravenes the purpose of a reasonable Children's Code provision authorizing
incarceration only after three occasions of probation violations have been found by the
court. State v. Julia S., 1986-NMCA-039, 104 N.M. 222, 719 P.2d 449.

Child is not entitled to precommitment credit for time served while on probation.
State v. Dennis F., 1986-NMCA-081, 104 N.M. 619, 725 P.2d 595.

First-degree murder. — The Delinquency Act authorizes an initial commitment to the
age of 21 of a child who has been adjudicated delinquent for first-degree murder when
the child was under 14 years of age. State v. Indie C., 2006-NMCA-014, 139 N.M. 80,
128 P.3d 508, cert. denied, 2006-NMCERT-001, 139 N.M. 273, 131 P.3d 660.

Time limitation on custody transfer void. — While the court possesses the power to
transfer legal custody of delinquent children to an agency responsible for their care and
rehabilitation, any attempt by the court to impose a time limitation on the transfer of
custody, even if well within the time limitations already authorized by statute, is void as
being in excess of the court's jurisdiction. 1979 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 79-37.

Law reviews. — For survey, "Children's Court Practice in Delinquency and Need of
Supervision Cases Under the New Rules," see 6 N.M.L. Rev. 331 (1976).

For note, "State v. Muniz: Authorizing Adult Sentences of Juveniles Absent a Conviction
that Authorizes an Adult Sentence", see 35 N.M.L. Rev. 229 (2005)

Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references.— 47 Am. Jur. 2d Juvenile Courts and
Delinquent and Dependent Children § 82 et seq.

Discrimination in punishment for same offense between juveniles and mature offenders,
3 A.L.R. 1614, 8 A.L.R. 854.

Constitutionality of statute committing child to reformatory without parents' consent, 60
A.L.R. 1342.

Notice and hearing to parent before commitment of delinquent children, 76 A.L.R. 247.

Admissibility at criminal prosecution of expert testimony on battering parent syndrome,
43 A.L.R.4th 1203.

Defense of infancy in juvenile delinquency proceedings, 83 A.L.R.4th 1135.
32A-2-20. Disposition of a youthful offender.
    A. The court has the discretion to invoke either an adult sentence or juvenile
sanctions on a youthful offender. The children's court attorney shall file a notice of
intent to invoke an adult sentence within ten working days of the filing of the petition;
provided that the court may extend the time for filing of the notice of intent to invoke an
adult sentence, for good cause shown, prior to the adjudicatory hearing. A preliminary
hearing by the court or a hearing before a grand jury shall be held, within ten days after
the filing of the intent to invoke an adult sentence, to determine whether probable cause
exists to support the allegations contained in the petition.

    B. If the children's court attorney has filed a notice of intent to invoke an adult
sentence and the child is adjudicated as a youthful offender, the court shall make the
following findings in order to invoke an adult sentence:

       (1)     the child is not amenable to treatment or rehabilitation as a child in
available facilities; and

      (2)  the child is not eligible for commitment to an institution for children with
developmental disabilities or mental disorders.

   C. In making the findings set forth in Subsection B of this section, the judge shall
consider the following factors:

       (1)    the seriousness of the alleged offense;

     (2)     whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent,
premeditated or willful manner;

       (3)    whether a firearm was used to commit the alleged offense;

       (4)   whether the alleged offense was against persons or against property,
greater weight being given to offenses against persons, especially if personal injury
resulted;

      (5)   the maturity of the child as determined by consideration of the child's
home, environmental situation, social and emotional health, pattern of living, brain
development, trauma history and disability;

       (6)    the record and previous history of the child;

       (7)    the prospects for adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of
reasonable rehabilitation of the child by the use of procedures, services and facilities
currently available; and

       (8)    any other relevant factor, provided that factor is stated on the record.
    D. If a child has previously been sentenced as an adult pursuant to the provisions of
this section, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the child is not amenable to
treatment or rehabilitation as a child in available facilities.

   E. If the court invokes an adult sentence, the court may sentence the child to less
than, but shall not exceed, the mandatory adult sentence. A youthful offender given an
adult sentence shall be treated as an adult offender and shall be transferred to the legal
custody of an agency responsible for incarceration of persons sentenced to adult
sentences. This transfer terminates the jurisdiction of the court over the child with
respect to the delinquent acts alleged in the petition. A child given an adult sentence
shall not be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of release or parole.

    F. If a juvenile disposition is appropriate, the court shall follow the provisions set
forth in Section 32A-2-19 NMSA 1978. A youthful offender may be subject to extended
commitment in the care of the department until the age of twenty-one, pursuant to the
provisions of Section 32A-2-23 NMSA 1978.

    G. A child fourteen years of age or older, charged with first degree murder, but not
convicted of first degree murder and found to have committed a youthful offender
offense as set forth in Subsection J of Section 32A-2-3 NMSA 1978, is subject to the
dispositions set forth in this section.

    H. A child fourteen years of age or older charged with first degree murder, but found
to have committed a delinquent act that is neither first degree murder nor a youthful
offender offense as set forth in Subsection J of Section 32A-2-3 NMSA 1978, shall be
adjudicated as a delinquent subject to the dispositions set forth in Section 32A-2-19
NMSA 1978.

History: 1978 Comp., § 32A-2-20, enacted by Laws 1993, ch. 77, § 49; 1995, ch. 206,
§ 14; 1996, ch. 85, § 5; 2003, ch. 225, § 11; 2005, ch. 189, § 17; 2009, ch. 239, § 21;
2023, ch. 24, § 4.

                                     ANNOTATIONS

Cross references. — For escape from custody of the children, youth and families
department, see 30-22-11.1 NMSA 1978.

For aggravated escape from the custody of the children, youth and families department,
see 30-22-11.2 NMSA 1978.

The 2023 amendment, effective June 16, 2023, prohibited the imposition of a sentence
of life without the possibility of release or parole on a child given an adult sentence; and
in Subsection E, after "delinquent acts alleged in the petition", added "A child given an
adult sentence shall not be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of
release or parole.".
Applicability. — Laws 2023, ch. 24, § 5 provided that the provisions of Laws 2023, ch.
24 apply retroactively to all offenders currently serving an adult sentence for an offense
committed as a child.

The 2009 amendment, effective July 1, 2009, in Paragraph (5) of Subsection C, at the
beginning of the sentence, before "maturity", deleted "sophistication and"; after
"environmental situation", deleted "emotional attitude and" and added "social and
emotional health"; and after "pattern of living", added "brain development, trauma
history and disability".

The 2005 amendment, effective June 17, 2005, in Subsection G, provided that a child
fourteen years of age or older, charged with first degree murder, but not convicted of
first degree murder and found to have committed a youthful offender offence is subject
to the dispositions of this section; and added Subsection H, which provided that a child
fourteen years of age or older charged with first degree murder, but found to have
committed a delinquent act that is not first degree murder or a youthful offender offence
shall be adjudicated as a delinquent subject to the dispositions of Section 32A-2-19
NMSA 1978.

The 2003 amendment, effective July 1, 2003, added present Subsection D and
redesignated Subsections D to F as Subsections E to G.

The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1996, added Paragraph C(3) and redesignated
the following paragraphs accordingly, and substituted "fourteen to eighteen" for "sixteen
or seventeen" in Subsection F.

The 1995 amendment, effective July 1, 1995, in Subsection A, substituted "court" for
"children's court judge", substituted "shall" for "must" preceding "file a notice", and
deleted "children's" preceding "court" in the last sentence; in Paragraph (5) of
Subsection C, substituted "child" for "juvenile"; in Subsection D, substituted "court" for
"judge" and made a related change; and in Subsection E, substituted "court" for "judge"
and "32A-2-19" for "32-2-19" in the first sentence and "32A-2-23" for "32-2-23" at the
end.

Untimely preliminary hearing. — Where a preliminary hearing was held twenty-four
days after the state filed notice of intent to charge the child as a youthful offender, the
court did not commit reversible error in denying the child’s motion to dismiss, because
neither Rule 10-213 NMRA nor Section 32A-2-20 NMSA 1978 provides a remedy for a
violation of the time limits for holding a preliminary hearing. State v. Leticia T., 2012-
NMCA-050, 278 P.3d 553, rev’d, 2014-NMSC-020.

Jury determination not required. — Federal law does not require that a juvenile’s
amenability to treatment and eligibility for mental health commitment be determined by a
jury. Gonzales v. Tafoya, 515 F.3d 1097 (10th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 890,
129 S. Ct. 211, 172 L. Ed . 2d 156 (2008).
Standard of proof of amenability. — Federal law does not clearly require the beyond-
a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof at the amenability hearing, and the court may
apply the less exacting (but still substantial) clear-and-convincing standard of proof in
assessing the evidence of amenability to treatment or rehabilitation. Gonzales v.
Tafoya, 515 F.3d 1097 (10th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 890, 129 S. Ct. 211, 172
L. Ed. 2d 156 (2008).

Accessory to criminal sexual penetration — The legislature intended that juveniles
adjudicated to be accessories to criminal sexual penetration be punished in the same
way as juveniles adjudicated to have committed CSP. Juveniles who are accessories to
criminal sexual penetration are youthful offenders. Section 32A-2-20 NMSA 1978 gives
the court discretion whether to impose a juvenile sanction or, if certain requirements are
met, an adult sentence. State v. Perez, 2002-NMCA-040, 132 N.M. 84, 44 P.3d 530,
cert. denied, 132 N.M. 83, 44 P.3d 529.

Amenability hearing is a condition precedent for exercising adult sentencing
authority in youthful offender cases. — Only serious youthful offenders charged with
first-degree murder can be tried in district court and automatically sentenced as adults if
convicted. All others remain in the juvenile system until after adjudication and may be
sentenced as adults only after an amenability hearing. State v. Jones, 2010-NMSC-012,
148 N.M. 1, 229 P.3d 474.

The right to an amenability hearing cannot be waived. State v. Jones, 2010-NMSC-
012, 148 N.M. 1, 229 P.3d 474.

First-degree murder charges voluntarily dismissed by the state. — If the state
voluntarily dismisses a first-degree murder charge against defendant and substitutes a
youthful offender offense, then from the moment the state drops the first-degree murder
charge, defendant is a child who is entitled to the full range of protections afforded by
the Delinquency Act and the court lacks authority to sentence defendant as an adult
without first determining defendant’s amenability to treatment or rehabilitation as a
juvenile. State v. Jones, 2010-NMSC-012, 148 N.M. 1, 229 P.3d 474.

Where defendant, who was age 17, was originally charged as a serious youthful
offender with first-degree murder of an infant child; the state subsequently voluntarily
dismissed the first-degree murder charge against defendant after recognizing that the
state lacked the evidence to prove the crime and substituted the charge of child abuse
resulting in death; defendant pled guilty to child abuse resulting in death, agreed to an
adult disposition, and received an adult sentence of 18 years imprisonment; and in
sentencing defendant, the district court did not first determine whether defendant was
amenable to treatment or rehabilitation as a juvenile, defendant was a youthful offender
when defendant entered into the plea agreement and the court erred in sentencing
defendant as a adult without first determining defendant’s amenability to treatment or
rehabilitation as a juvenile. State v. Jones, 2010-NMSC-012, 148 N.M. 1, 229 P.3d 474.
Appeal of an amenability determination is nonwaivable. — A challenge to an
amenability determination presents a challenge to the jurisdiction of the district court to
impose an adult sentence, and it may be raised on appeal notwithstanding the entry of a
valid guilty plea and appellate waiver. State v. Rodriguez, 2023-NMSC-004, rev'g A-1-
CA-37324, mem. op. (N.M. Ct. App. Nov. 27, 2019) (nonprecedential).

Youthful offender may appeal amenability determination, notwithstanding guilty
plea and appellate waiver. — Where defendant pleaded guilty to felony offenses
committed when he was sixteen years old under a plea and disposition agreement, and
following an amenability hearing, the district court imposed an adult sentence, and
where defendant appealed the amenability determination, and on its own motion, the
Court of Appeals held that under the plea and disposition agreement, defendant waived
his right to appeal, the Court of Appeals erred in its determination that defendant waived
his right to appeal, because a challenge to an amenability determination presents a
jurisdictional argument that may be raised on appeal notwithstanding the entry of a valid
guilty plea and appellate waiver. A juvenile’s guilty plea may neither waive the right to
an amenability determination, nor can a juvenile waive the right to appeal the outcome
of an amenability determination. State v. Rodriguez, 2023-NMSC-004, rev'g A-1-CA-
37324, mem. op. (N.M. Ct. App. Nov. 27, 2019) (nonprecedential).

Right to jury trial does not apply to amenability determinations. — A determination
of amenability to treatment or rehabilitation of a youthful offender pursuant to Section
32A-2-20 NMSA 1978 is not within the scope of the rule of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed.2d 435 (2000), and the sixth amendment’s
guarantee of a jury trial does not apply to amenability proceedings. State v. Rudy B.,
2010-NMSC-045, 149 N.M. 22, 243 P.3d 726, overruling 2009-NMCA-104, 147 N.M.
45, 216 P.3d 810.

Subsections B and C of Section 32A-2-20 NMSA 1978 are facially unconstitutional
under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, because they require
the trial court, not a jury, to find the additional facts necessary to impose an adult
sentence. State v. Rudy B., 2009-NMCA-104, 147 N.M. 45, 216 P.3d 810, cert. granted,
2009-NMCERT-009, overruling State v. Gonzales, 2001-NMCA-025, 130 N.M. 341, 24
P.3d 776, overruled by State v. Rudy B., 2010-NMSC-045, 149 N.M. 22, 243 P.3d 726.

Amenability to treatment. — Where defendant, who was a child offender under the
juvenile system, pled guilty to second degree murder; defendant admitted that after a
fight between the victim and defendant’s cousin had ended, defendant went to
defendant’s car, opened the trunk, removed a sawed-off shotgun, loaded the shotgun
and fired the shotgun at the victim; at the time the victim was shot, the victim was facing
defendant with the victim’s hands in the air; defendant’s prior criminal history involved a
firearm; defendant was married subsequent to the shooting; and defendant suffered
from post-traumatic stress disorder because of the incident, the evidence was sufficient
to support the court’s determination that defendant was not amenable to treatment.
State v. Trujillo, 2009-NMCA-128, 147 N.M. 334, 222 P.3d 1040, cert. quashed, 2010-
NMCERT-011, 150 N.M. 490, 262 P.3d 1143.
Amenability determination not supported by substantial evidence. — Where child
pleaded guilty to two counts of second-degree murder and three counts of intentional
child abuse resulting in death for shooting and killing his father, mother, and three
younger siblings, and where the district court found that the state failed to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that child is not amenable to treatment or rehabilitation as a
child in available facilities, the district court abused its discretion in committing child to
the custody of the New Mexico children, youth and families department until child's
twenty-first birthday, because the district court failed to consider and make findings on
all the statutorily required factors of 32A-2-20(C) NMSA 1978, based its findings in the
amendability order on a misapprehension of the law, and misunderstood, and then
arbitrarily disregarded, the uncontradicted testimony of the experts who testified
specifically about child's prospects for rehabilitation by the age of twenty-one. State v.
Nehemiah G., 2018-NMCA-034, cert. denied.

Amenability to treatment is a jury question. — The due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment requires that the determination of whether an offender is
amenable to treatment or rehabilitation or is eligible for commitment to an institution as
a condition to imposing an adult sentence be made by a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt. State v. Rudy B., 2009-NMCA-104, 147 N.M. 45, 216 P.3d 810, cert. granted,
2009-NMCERT-009, overruling State v. Gonzales, 2001-NMCA-025, 130 N.M. 341, 24
P.3d 776, overruled by State v. Rudy B., 2010-NMSC-045, 149 N.M. 22, 243 P.3d 726.

Constitutionality. — This section is not arbitrary or discriminatory and adequately
provides for the elemental due process rights of a child under the constitution. State v.
Ernesto M., 1996-NMCA-039, 121 N.M. 562, 915 P.2d 318, cert denied, 121 N.M. 444,
913 P.2d 251.

Entitlement to dispositional hearing. — No matter what kind of youthful offender
category a child falls under, that child is entitled to a dispositional hearing to determine
whether he or she will be subject to juvenile sanctions or an adult sentence. State v.
Stephen F., 2005-NMCA-048, 137 N.M. 409, 112 P.3d 270, aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
2006-NMSC-030, 140 N.M. 24, 139 P.3d 184.

Meaning of "offense less than first-degree murder." — Had the legislature intended
to limit the scope of Subsection G of this section to lesser-included offenses of first-
degree murder, it could have expressed that intent by using the phrase "lesser-included
offense". Instead, the legislature meant Subsection G to apply to all crimes other than
first-degree murder, which are "lesser crimes" in the sense that they carry lesser
penalties than life imprisonment or death. State v. Muniz, 2003-NMSC-021, 134 N.M.
152, 74 P.3d 86, superseded by statute, State v. Jones, 2010-NMSC-012, 148 N.M. 1,
229 P.3d 474.

Sentencing as adult for unlisted crime. — A juvenile who is adjudicated for any of the
offenses listed under Section 32A-2-3I NMSA 1978 (now Section 32A-2-3J NMSA) may
be subject to adult sanctions under this section for any other offense in the same case.
State v. Montano, 1995-NMCA-065, 120 N.M. 218, 900 P.2d 967, cert. denied, 120
N.M. 68, 898 P.2d 120.

District court had authority to impose an adult sentence on a juvenile who was originally
charged as a serious youthful offender, but who subsequently pled guilty only to
offenses that would not qualify for an adult sentence if brought independently. State v.
Muniz, 2003-NMSC-021, 134 N.M. 152, 74 P.3d 86, superseded by statute, State v.
Jones, 2010-NMSC-012, 148 N.M. 1, 229 P.3d 474.

Serious youthful offender not to be treated as delinquent child. — A serious
youthful offender, upon conviction for a lesser crime than first-degree murder, should
always be treated as a youthful offender, even when convicted of a crime that would
otherwise categorize the child as a delinquent child. State v. Muniz, 2003-NMSC-021,
134 N.M. 152, 74 P.3d 86, superseded by statute, State v. Jones, 2010-NMSC-012, 148
N.M. 1, 229 P.3d 474.

Disposition of a youthful offender. — Children who are not convicted of first-degree
murder and who appear to be amenable to rehabilitation have a basic and essential
right not to be sentenced as adults unless the trial court fulfills the requirements of
Subsections B and C of this section. State v. Hunter, 2001-NMCA-078, 131 N.M. 76, 33
P.3d 296.

Sentencing for non-capital felonies. — The basic sentences prescribed by Section
31-18-15 NMSA 1978 are "mandatory" within the meaning of Subsection D of this
section, while the alterations in the basic sentences allowed by Section 31-18-15.1
NMSA 1978 are discretionary and, therefore, circumscribed by the Children's Code
(Section 32A-1-1 NMSA 1978 et seq.); thus, the maximum sentence that may be
imposed upon a youthful offender convicted of a non-capital felony is the basic
sentence, plus, if applicable, the enhancements prescribed by Sections 31-18-16 and