N.M. Stat. § 38-2-9.1 (2026)

lawsuits; procedures; sanctions; severability.
    A. Any action seeking money damages against a person for conduct or speech
undertaken or made in connection with a public hearing or public meeting in a quasi-
judicial proceeding before a tribunal or decision-making body of any political subdivision
of the state is subject to a special motion to dismiss, motion for judgment on the
pleadings, or motion for summary judgment that shall be considered by the court on a
priority or expedited basis to ensure the early consideration of the issues raised by the
motion and to prevent the unnecessary expense of litigation.

   B. If the rights afforded by this section are raised as an affirmative defense and if a
court grants a motion to dismiss, a motion for judgment on the pleadings or a motion for
summary judgment filed within ninety days of the filing of the moving party's answer, the
court shall award reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred by the moving party in
defending the action. If the court finds that a special motion to dismiss or motion for
summary judgment is frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay, the court
shall award costs and reasonable attorney fees to the party prevailing on the motion.

    C. Any party shall have the right to an expedited appeal from a trial court order on
the special motions described in Subsection B of this section or from a trial court's
failure to rule on the motion on an expedited basis.

    D. As used in this section, a "public meeting in a quasi-judicial proceeding" means
and includes any meeting established and held by a state or local governmental entity,
including without limitations, meetings or presentations before state, city, town or village
councils, planning commissions, review boards or commissions.

   E. Nothing in this section limits or prohibits the exercise of a right or remedy of a
party granted pursuant to another constitutional, statutory, common law or
administrative provision, including civil actions for defamation or malicious abuse of
process.

   F. If any provision of this section or the application of any provision of this section to
a person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity shall not affect other provisions or
applications of this section that can be given effect without the invalid provision or
application, and to this end the provisions of this section are severable.

History: Laws 2001, ch. 218, § 2.

                                     ANNOTATIONS
Effective dates. — Laws 2001, ch. 218 contained no effective date provision, but,
pursuant to N.M. Const., art. IV, § 23, was effective June 15, 2001, 90 days after
adjournment of the legislature.

Jurisdiction when there are pending counter-claims in district court. — Where
respondent, a Taos school board member, brought a malicious abuse of process claim
against petitioners, eighteen members of an unincorporated citizens’ association who
sought to remove respondent from office, and where the district court granted
petitioners’ motions to dismiss without addressing certain counterclaims, the appellate
court had jurisdiction over all parties under the Anti-SLAPP statute because the overall
purpose of the Anti-SLAPP statute would be thwarted by piecemeal litigation if some
petitioners were excluded from the appeal, and 38-2-9.1(C) NMSA 1978 allows any
party to bring an interlocutory appeal from a trial court order on the special motions
brought pursuant to the Anti-SLAPP statute. Cordova v. Cline, 2017-NMSC-020, rev’g
2013-NMCA-083, 308 P.3d 975.

Expedited appellate jurisdiction applies to speech-based defenses only. — The
legislature enacted the Anti-SLAPP statute with the policy goal of protecting its citizens
from lawsuits in retaliation for exercising their right to petition and to participate in quasi-
judicial proceedings. The language of subsections A, B, and C reflects the legislature's
intent that the procedural protections of the Anti-SLAPP statute apply when a defendant
has invoked speech-based defenses for speech or action connected to a quasi-judicial
proceeding or public hearing, and therefore the legislature's grant of expedited appellate
jurisdiction under subsection C applies to speech-based defenses raised and not to any
other affirmative defense. Valenzuela v. My Way Holdings, LLC, 2024-NMCA-009.

Anti-SLAPP statute applied where defendants' conduct was in connection with a
quasi-judicial proceeding. — Where the New Mexico racing commission (NMRC)
board of stewards suspended plaintiff's racehorse jockey license for five years and
imposed a $5,000 fine for using a prohibited electrical device at the Sunland Park
racetrack, and where, on appeal to an administrative hearing officer (AHO) under the
NMRC, the AHO reversed the board of stewards' decision and dismissed the
disciplinary action, citing a lack of physical evidence purported to be in plaintiff's
possession as well as inconsistent testimony from defendants, and finding that the
board of stewards failed to meet its burden of proof to show by a preponderance of the
evidence that plaintiff possessed a prohibited electrical device, and where plaintiff sued
defendants for negligent misrepresentation, fraud, negligence, civil conspiracy, tortious
interference with contract, prima facie tort, spoliation, and malicious abuse of process,
and where defendants filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's claims via special motion
under the Anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that their participation and testimony at plaintiff's
disciplinary hearings was protected speech under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, the
district court erred in determining that the Anti-SLAPP statute did not apply, because
plaintiff's complaint sought money damages for defendant's alleged negligent or
fraudulent reporting to a public agency and their subsequent testimony and presentation
of evidence to a quasi-judicial tribunal and the disciplinary proceedings were quasi-
judicial in nature because they determined whether plaintiff's license should be revoked
after a presentation of evidence, and therefore defendants' conduct was "in connection
with" a quasi-judicial proceeding and protected by § 38-2-9.1 NMSA 1978. Valenzuela
v. My Way Holdings, LLC, 2024-NMCA-009.

Analytical framework for claim under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. — To be
entitled to first amendment protection under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, the activity
must be genuine and not a mere sham. To constitute a sham, the petitioning activities
must be objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could realistically
expect success on the merits, and if the petitioning activities are objectively baseless,
the reviewing court must determine whether the subjective motivation underlying the
challenged conduct was improper. Valenzuela v. My Way Holdings, LLC, 2024-NMCA-
009.

Incident report to New Mexico racing commission was objectively baseless,
without sufficient factual or legal support, and was filed with improper
motivations. — Where the New Mexico racing commission (NMRC) board of stewards
suspended plaintiff's racehorse jockey license for five years and imposed a $5,000 fine
for using a prohibited electrical device at the Sunland Park racetrack, and where, on
appeal to an administrative hearing officer (AHO) under the NMRC, the AHO reversed
the board of stewards' decision and dismissed the disciplinary action, citing a lack of
physical evidence purported to be in plaintiff's possession as well as inconsistent
testimony from defendants, and finding that the board of stewards failed to meet its
burden of proof to show by a preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff possessed a
prohibited electrical device, and where plaintiff sued defendants for negligent
misrepresentation, fraud, negligence, civil conspiracy, tortious interference with
contract, prima facie tort, spoliation, and malicious abuse of process, and where
defendants filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's claims via special motion under the Anti-
SLAPP statute, arguing that their participation and testimony at plaintiff's disciplinary
hearings was protected speech under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, the district court
did not err in denying defendants' special motion to dismiss, because defendants had
insufficient legal or factual support to file an incident report against plaintiff to the NMRC
or testify to the same facts. Valenzuela v. My Way Holdings, LLC, 2024-NMCA-009.

The district court properly granted defendants' special motion to dismiss
plaintiff's complaint based on defendants' first amendment, Noerr-Pennington
doctrine affirmative defense. — The district court properly granted defendants' special
motion to dismiss because plaintiff failed to establish that defendants' opposition to the
Avangrid-PNMR merger was so lacking in factual or legal support that the public
comments could not meet the test for probable cause; Avangrid failed to plead facts or
present law sufficient to establish that defendants' public comments were objectively
baseless. Avangrid, Inc. v. Sec. Limits, Inc., 2025-NMCA-004, cert. denied.

Application to recall petitions. — The anti-SLAPP statute [38-2-9.1 NMSA 1978] does
not apply to a sufficiency hearing before a district court to determine the sufficiency of
the allegations in a recall petition pursuant to Section 22-7-9.1 NMSA 1978, because a
sufficiency hearing before the district court is a judicial proceeding, not a public meeting
or a quasi-judicial proceeding as defined in the anti-SLAPP statute. Cordova v. Cline,
2013-NMCA-083, cert. granted, 2013-NMCERT-007.

Where defendants filed a petition with the county clerk to recall plaintiff who was a
member and officer of a municipal school board; the county clerk filed an application for
a district court hearing on the sufficiency of the recall allegations pursuant to Section 22-
7-9.1 NMSA 1978; at the hearing, before the district court determined the sufficiency of
the petition, defendants dismissed the petition; plaintiff filed suit against defendants for
damages; and the district court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint under the anti-SLAPP
statute [38-2-9.1 NMSA 1978], the district court improperly dismissed plaintiff’s suit
because the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply to a judicial proceeding to determine the
sufficiency of the recall petition. Cordova v. Cline, 2013-NMCA-083, cert. granted, 2013-
NMCERT-007.

Plaintiff entitled to expedited appeal following district court’s denial of special
motion. — Where plaintiff filed an action in district court against defendants, plaintiff’s
former employer, for malicious abuse of process and defamation, in which she alleged
that defendants filed meritless claims against her in retaliation for her submission of
sworn declarations to the United States Department of Commerce alleging that
defendant was not representing the best interests of certain clients, and where
defendants filed several counterclaims, and where plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss (the
special motion) these counterclaims under the Anti-SLAPP statute arguing they were
made in retaliation for her declarations to the Department of Commerce, and where the
district court denied plaintiff’s special motion, concluding that the Anti-SLAPP statute
was inapplicable because her alleged speech was not directed to a state or local
government but to a federal agency, and where, on appeal to the New Mexico Court of
Appeals, defendant challenged the court of appeals jurisdiction, arguing that the Anti-
SLAPP provision authorizing immediate appeal does not apply, the court of appeals had
jurisdiction to review the district court’s denial of plaintiff’s special motion because
Subsection C of this section permits any party to one of the special motions described in
Subsection B to appeal from a trial court order on those motions. Moreover, the plain
language of Subsection C allowing for an expedited appeal does not distinguish
between decisions on the merits of the claims raised in the special motion or decisions
on the applicability of the Anti-SLAPP statute, suggesting that both types of decisions
are entitled to an expedited appeal. Ferebee v. Hume, 2021-NMCA-012.

The district court did not err in denying plaintiff’s special motion. — Where plaintiff
filed an action in district court against defendants, plaintiff’s former employer, for
malicious abuse of process and defamation, in which she alleged that defendants filed
meritless claims against her in retaliation for her submission of sworn declarations to the
United States Department of Commerce alleging that defendant was not representing
the best interests of certain clients, and where defendants filed several counterclaims,
and where plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss (the special motion) these counterclaims
under the Anti-SLAPP statute arguing they were made in retaliation for her declarations
to the Department of Commerce, and where the district court denied plaintiff’s special
motion, concluding that the Anti-SLAPP statute was inapplicable because her alleged
speech was not directed to a state or local government but to a federal agency, the
district court did not err in denying the motion, because the Anti-SLAPP statute does not
include within its protections conduct or speech undertaken or made in connection with
a public hearing or public meeting in a quasi-judicial proceeding before a tribunal or
decision-making body of the federal government. Ferebee v. Hume, 2021-NMCA-012.

Attorney fees awarded under the anti-SLAPP statute are sanctions. — The
legislature intended the provision authorizing an award of attorney fees in § 38-2-9.1(B)
NMSA 1978, to be a sanction, and not a mechanism for compensating or awarding
damages. Cordova v. Cline, 2021-NMCA-022.

Award of attorney fees apply to all stages of litigation, including appellate work.
— Where plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that when defendants signed a petition and
actively supported plaintiff's recall from the Taos school board, such acts constituted
malicious abuse of process, civil conspiracy, and prima facie tort, and where defendants
filed special motions to dismiss pursuant to § 38-2-9.1 NMSA 1978, alleging that
plaintiff's complaint infringed on defendants' first amendment rights, and where the
district court granted defendants' special motions to dismiss, finding that defendants'
support of plaintiff's recall from the Taos school board invoked the substantive
protection of the first amendment and the procedural and remedial provisions of the
anti-SLAPP statute, and where the New Mexico supreme court upheld the dismissal
and held that the defendants were statutorily entitled to an award of attorney fees, and
where, on remand, the district court granted attorney fees only for work completed while
the case was pending in the district court, the district court erred in denying defendants'
request for attorney fees for the work done on appeal, because the plain language of
the anti-SLAPP statute requires attorney fees to be awarded to a defendant who
prevails on any of the special motions provided by the statute, and such an award
applies to all stages of litigation reasonably related to the defense of the action, whether
at the trial level or on appeal. Cordova v. Cline, 2021-NMCA-022.

Prevailing party not entitled to prejudgment interest on an award of attorney fees.
— Where plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that when defendants signed a petition and
actively supported plaintiff's recall from the Taos school board, such acts constituted
malicious abuse of process, civil conspiracy, and prima facie tort, and where defendants
filed special motions to dismiss pursuant to § 38-2-9.1 NMSA 1978, alleging that
plaintiff's complaint infringed on defendants' first amendment rights, and where the
district court granted defendants' special motions to dismiss and granted defendants'
request for attorney fees, finding that defendants' support of plaintiff's recall from the
Taos school board invoked the substantive protection of the first amendment and the
procedural and remedial provisions of the anti-SLAPP statute, the district court did not
err in denying defendants' request for prejudgment interest on their award of attorney
fees, because although § 56-8-4(B)(1) NMSA 1978 provides the district court with
discretion to award prejudgment interest on damages, the attorney fees awarded under
the anti-SLAPP statute are sanctions and not a compensatory mechanism for damages.
Cordova v. Cline, 2021-NMCA-022.
Defendants' conduct or speech does not fall within the Anti-SLAPP statute's
protections. — Where plaintiff, a candidate for elected office, sued defendants for
defamation, declaratory relief, and punitive damages after defendants published and
distributed two mailers discussing child abuse that allegedly occurred on the youth
ranch operated by plaintiff, and where defendants filed a special motion to dismiss
plaintiff's defamation claims under the Anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that the statute
protects conduct or speech made during political campaigns, and where the district
court denied defendants' special motion, ruling that the statements at issue could qualify
as defamatory and that the claims arising from those statements should therefore not be
dismissed, defendants' appeal was dismissed as premature, because defendants'
statements were not made in connection with a public hearing or public meeting as
required by this section. Defendants' speech does not fall within the Anti-SLAPP
statute's protections because it was not engaged in for the purpose of petitioning or
participating in proceedings before a local or state governmental tribunal. Chandler v.
Advance N.M. Now PAC, 2021-NMCA-017, cert. denied.

Anti-SLAPP statute inapplicable in federal diversity action. — Where a lessee of
geothermal mineral rights brought an action in federal court alleging that the owner of a
portion of surface estate breached the parties' joint facility operating agreement by
objecting to their state permit applications, and where defendants filed a special motion
to dismiss pursuant to 38-2-9.1 NMSA 1978, New Mexico's legislative enactment aimed
at thwarting "strategic litigation against public participation" (SLAPP), asserting that New
Mexico's anti-SLAPP statute is a substantive state law designed to protect the
defendants from having to litigate meritless claims aimed at chilling first amendment
expression, the district court did not err in denying defendants special motion, because
New Mexico's anti-SLAPP statute is a procedural mechanism designed to expedite the
disposal of frivolous lawsuits aimed at threatening free speech rights, and thus does not
apply in federal courts as a substantive right or remedy. Los Lobos Renewable Power,
LLC v. Americulture, Inc., 885 F.3d 659 (10th Cir. 2018).

Law reviews. — For comment , "Resolving Land-use Disputes by Intimidation: SLAPP
Suits in New Mexico," see 32 N.M.L. Rev. 217 (2002).