N.M. Stat. § 41-5-13 (2026)

No claim for malpractice may be brought against a health care provider unless filed
within three years after the date that the act of malpractice occurred, except that the
times limited for the bringing of actions by minors and incapacitated persons shall be
extended so that they shall have one year from and after the age of majority or
termination of incapacity within which to commence the actions.

History: 1953 Comp., § 58-33-13, enacted by Laws 1976, ch. 2, § 13; 2021, ch. 16, §
6.

                                     ANNOTATIONS

Cross references. — For tolling of limitations period while matter under consideration
of panel, see 41-5-22 NMSA 1978.

The 2021 amendment, effective January 1, 2022, extended the statute of limitations for
minors and incapacitated persons bringing medical malpractice actions; after "No claim
for malpractice", deleted "arising out of an act of malpractice which occurred
subsequent to the effective date of the Medical Malpractice Act", and after "except that",
deleted "a minor under the full age of six years shall have until his ninth birthday in
which to file. This subsection applies to all persons regardless of minority or other legal
disability" and added the remainder of the section.

Amended application adding a new party does not relate back to the original filing
date. — The filling of an application with the medical review commission as to one
provider does not toll the limitations period as to another provider who was not named in
the original application and for whom the statutory period in which to file a cause of
action has passed. Meza v. Topalovski, 2012-NMCA-002, 268 P.3d 1284.

Where plaintiff wrongly named a health care provider in an application before the
medical review commission; plaintiff amended the application to name the correct health
care provider; and the amended application to add the correct health care provider was
filed more than three years after the date of the alleged malpractice by the correct
health care provider, the original application did not toll the statute of limitations for the
untimely application filed against the originally unnamed health care provider. Meza v.
Topalovski, 2012-NMCA-002, 268 P.3d 1284.

Section 41-5-13 NMSA 1978 is an occurrence-based statute of repose rather than a
discovery-based statute of limitations. Meza v. Topalovski, 2012-NMCA-002, 268 P.3d
1284.

Section 41-5-13 NMSA 1978 is a statute of repose and terminates the right to any
action after the specified three-year limitation period has elapsed. Christus St. Vincent
Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Duarte-Afara, 2011-NMCA-112, 267 P.3d 70.

Occurrence rule governs claims under the Medical Malpractice Act. — Where a
patient sued a medical center and a doctor who practiced at the medical center for
medical malpractice; the malpractice occurred on December 9 and 10, 2004; the three-
year limitation period expired on December 10, 2007; the patient filed the complaint on
December 4, 2007 and served the medical center on December 11, 2007, one day after
the expiration of the three-year limitation period; and the medical center filed a third
party complaint against the doctor for equitable indemnification on December 22, 2008,
the medical center’s claim for equitable indemnification was barred. Christus St. Vincent
Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Duarte-Afara, 2011-NMCA-112, 267 P.3d 70.

Dismissal without prejudice and reinstatement of complaint. — In a medical
malpractice action, where defendant performed eye surgery on plaintiff on April 28,
2003; plaintiff filed a complaint for personal injuries and medical malpractice on April 27,
2006; at the time plaintiff filed the complaint, defendant’s insurance carrier had
improperly cancelled defendant’s insurance; after defendant’s insurance company
reinstated defendant’s insurance, plaintiff and defendant stipulated to an order of
dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint; on March 20, 2008, the district court interpreted the
order of dismissal as a dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint, without prejudice, solely for the
purpose of permitting plaintiff to obtain a review of the case by the medical malpractice
commission; and reinstated plaintiff’s complaint, the district court’s interpretation of the
order of dismissal was not an abuse of discretion and plaintiff’s complaint was not
barred by the three-year limitation period provided in 41-5-13 NMSA 1978, and the
three-year limitation period provided in 37-1-8 NMSA 1978 stopped running at the time
plaintiff filed the complaint on April 27, 2006. Pacheco v. Cohen, 2009-NMCA-070, 146
N.M. 643, 213 P.3d 793, cert. denied, 2009-NMCERT-006, 146 N.M. 733, 215 P.3d 42.

Constitutionality. — This section violates neither the equal protection nor the due
process constitutional guarantees. Cummings v. X-Ray Assocs., 1996-NMSC-035, 121
N.M. 821, 918 P.2d 1321.

Due process claim. — The constitutionality of the statute of repose, which serves to
cut off a malpractice claimant's right to seek recovery, will not be evaluated under the
strict-scrutiny test; the claimant's due process claim requires only a rational-basis
analysis. Cummings v. X-Ray Assocs., 1996-NMSC-035, 121 N.M. 821, 918 P.2d 1321.

Section violates due process. — This section violates due process because it allows
medical malpractice claimants an unreasonably short period of time within which to
bring an accrued cause of action. Garcia ex rel. Garcia v. La Farge, 1995-NMSC-019,
119 N.M. 532, 893 P.2d 428.

The provision in this section that requires a minor who experienced malpractice before
the age of six to bring a claim under the Medical Malpractice Act [Chapter 41, Article 5
NMSA 1978] by his or her ninth birthday violates due process. Jaramillo v. Heaton,
2004-NMCA-123, 136 N.M. 498, 100 P.3d 204, cert. denied, 2004-NMCERT-010, 136
N.M. 541, 100 P.3d 807.

Due process exception to three-year period of repose. — Due process requires that
a plaintiff have a reasonable amount of time in which to commence suit after any late-
accruing medical malpractice claim has accrued, and therefore plaintiffs with late-
accruing medical malpractice claims, i.e., claims accruing in the last twelve months of
the three-year repose period, shall have twelve months from the time of accrual to
commence suit. Cahn v. Berryman, 2018-NMSC-002, aff’g 2015-NMCA-078, 355 P.3d
58 and overruling in part Garcia ex rel. Garcia v. LaFarge, 1995-NMSC-019, 119 N.M.
532, 893 P.2d 428.

Where plaintiff discovered that she had a medical malpractice claim against defendant
ten and one-half months before the three-year statute of repose expired, the due
process exception to 41-5-13 NMSA 1978 provided plaintiff an additional twelve months
in which to commence suit, but where twenty-one months elapsed between the accrual
date of plaintiff’s medical malpractice claim and the date she filed suit, plaintiff’s claim
was barred by 41-5-13 NMSA 1978. Cahn v. Berryman, 2018-NMSC-002, aff’g 2015-
NMCA-078, 355 P.3d 58 and overruling in part Garcia ex rel. Garcia v. LaFarge, 1995-
NMSC-019, 119 N.M. 532, 893 P.2d 428.
Due process analysis. — The legislature may impose a statutory time deadline for
commencing a cause of action as long as a reasonable time is provided for
commencing suit. If a plaintiff is left with an unconstitutionally short period of time to file
suit within the period of statute of repose, due process is violated. To fall under the due
process exception to the statute of repose, the case must be unusual and involve
exceptional circumstances resulting in an unusually short period of time within which to
file suit. Cahn v. Berryman, 2015-NMCA-078, cert. granted, 2015-NMCERT-007.

Section does not violate due process as applied. — Where plaintiff discovered she
had a malpractice claim against defendant ten and one-half months before the statute of
repose expired, and during the entire ten and one-half months period of time, the means
for discovering defendant’s identity were available and within plaintiff’s control, plaintiff’s
due process rights were not violated because the ten and one-half month period was a
constitutionally reasonable amount of time for plaintiff to bring her medical malpractice
suit against defendant; plaintiff’s claims against defendant were barred by this section
when plaintiff filed suit against defendant eleven months after the three-year statute of
repose expired. Cahn v. Berryman, 2015-NMCA-078, cert. granted, 2015-NMCERT-
007.

Section does not violate equal protection. — Where a patient sued a medical center
and a doctor who practiced at the medical center for medical malpractice; the three-year
limitation period expired on December 10, 2007; the patient filed the complaint on
December 4, 2007 and served the medical center on December 11, 2007, one day after
the expiration of the three-year limitation period; and the medical center’s third party
complaint against the doctor for equitable indemnification, which was filed on December
22, 2008, was barred, the preclusive effect of 41-5-13 NMSA 1978 did not violate the
medical center’s due process rights. Christus St. Vincent Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Duarte-
Afara, 2011-NMCA-112, 267 P.3d 70.

This section, as a statute of repose, does not implicate equal protection considerations
because it operates uniformly upon all medical malpractice plaintiffs. Garcia ex rel.
Garcia v. La Farge, 1995-NMSC-019, 119 N.M. 532, 893 P.2d 428.

Rational basis for classification. — The classification of health care providers created
by this section is supported by a rational basis. Cummings v. X-Ray Assocs., 1996-
NMSC-035, 121 N.M. 821, 918 P.2d 1321.

Assuring adequate malpractice insurance. — By offering to qualified health care
providers certain benefits that are not available to those who are not qualified, the
legislature furthers its stated goal of assuring adequate malpractice insurance coverage
in the New Mexico medical profession; this section was reasonably drafted to further a
legitimate government interest. Cummings v. X-Ray Assocs., 1996-NMSC-035, 121
N.M. 821, 918 P.2d 1321.

Section does not violate prohibition against special legislation. — This section
does not violate the prohibition against special legislation because it was within the
competence of the legislature to determine that the high costs of malpractice insurance
distinguish the class of health care providers from the class of tortfeasors generally.
Garcia ex rel. Garcia v. La Farge, 1995-NMSC-019, 119 N.M. 532, 893 P.2d 428.

Malpractice action does not implicate fundamental rights. — A malpractice claim is
an attempt by a patient to obtain something he or she does not yet possess: monetary
compensation for an injury caused by the negligence of a health care practitioner. As
such, a medical malpractice claim generally does not, for the patient, implicate any
fundamental rights such as First Amendment rights, freedom of association, voting,
interstate travel, privacy, and fairness in the deprivation of life, liberty or property.
Cummings v. X-Ray Assocs., 1996-NMSC-035, 121 N.M. 821, 918 P.2d 1321.

Section not applicable to non-qualified health care providers. — The Medical
Malpractice Act's statute of limitations does not apply to health care providers that have
not qualified under Subsection A of 41-5-5 NMSA 1978. Roberts v. Southwest Cmty.
Health Servs., 1992-NMSC-042, 114 N.M. 248, 837 P.2d 442.

Section applicable to wrongful death action based on malpractice. — The specific
inclusion of a wrongful death claim within the definition of a malpractice claim makes the
limitation period of this section applicable to a claim of malpractice resulting in wrongful
death. Armijo v. Tandysh, 1981-NMCA-098, 98 N.M. 181, 646 P.2d 1245, cert.
quashed, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (1982), and cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1016, 103 S.
Ct. 377, 74 L. Ed. 2d 510 (1982), overruled on other grounds by Roberts v. Southwest
Cmty. Health Servs., 1992-NMSC-042, 114 N.M. 248, 837 P.2d 442; Mackey v. Burke,
1984-NMCA-028, 102 N.M. 294, 694 P.2d 1359, cert. quashed, 102 N.M. 293, 694 P.2d
1358 (1985), overruled on other grounds by Chavez v. Regents of Univ. of N.M., 1985-
NMSC-114, 103 N.M. 606, 711 P.2d 883.

A parent's claim for loss of consortium in a medical malpractice case is tolled
alongside the minor's claim from which it is derived. — Where parents' minor child
sustained injuries during the course of his birth and delivery at Lea regional medical
center (LRMC) as a result of alleged negligent medical care provided by the child's
doctor, and where, approximately five years later, parents and the child's guardian ad
litem filed a complaint, asserting various claims, including claims for loss of consortium
and negligent medical care against the doctor, the doctor's employer, and LRMC
(defendants), and where the district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss
parents' loss of consortium claim, concluding that parents brought their claim outside
the three-year limitations period under both the Medical Malpractice Act's (MMA) statute
of repose, § 41-5-13 NMSA 1978, and the general statute of limitations for personal
injuries, § 37-1-8 NMSA 1978, the district court erred in granting defendants' motion to
dismiss, because a parent's loss of consortium in a medical malpractice case is tolled
alongside the minor's claim from which it is derived, pursuant to the minority tolling
provisions of § 41-5-13 and § 37-1-10 NMSA 1978. The rationale for this rule includes
protecting individuals from the burden of litigating multiple lawsuits, promoting judicial
economy, minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions, and safeguarding minors.
Garrity v. Driskill, 2022-NMCA-054, cert. denied, overruling Moncor Trust Co. ex rel.
Flynn v. Feil, 1987-NMCA-015, 105 N.M. 444, 733 P.2d 1327 and overruling in part
Armijo v. Regents of Univ. of N.M., 1984-NMCA-118, 103 N.M. 183, 704 P.2d 437.

Section inapplicable to minor beneficiaries under Wrongful Death Act. — The
tolling provisions applicable to minors under the age of nine years contained in this
section apply only to minors who suffer an alleged act of malpractice and not to minors
who are beneficiaries under the Wrongful Death Act [41-2-1 NMSA 1978]. Moncor Trust
Co. ex rel. Flynn v. Feil, 1987-NMCA-015, 105 N.M. 444, 733 P.2d 1327, cert. denied,
105 N.M. 421, 733 P.2d 869.

Construction with Tort Claims Act. — District court correctly applied the law when it
estopped the doctor from asserting the statute of limitations defense under 41-4-15
NMSA 1978 because by choosing to place the doctor at a private institution, and not
identify him as a public employee working in a public capacity, the state engaged in
conduct that conveyed the indisputable impression to persons wishing to assert a claim
that the doctor was an employee of the private institution and therefore the limitation for
private entities applied. Hagen v. Faherty, 2003-NMCA-060, 133 N.M. 605, 66 P.3d
974, cert. denied, 133 N.M. 593, 66 P.3d 962.

Occurrence rule governs claims under the Medical Malpractice Act. — The accrual
date in which a patient must file a claim for medical malpractice is the date of the act or
occurrence of the medical malpractice even if the patient is oblivious of any harm.
Christus St. Vincent Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Duarte-Afara, 2011-NMCA-112, 267 P.3d 70,
cert. granted, 2011-NMCERT-010.

When cause of action accrues. — The accrual date in which a patient must file a
claim for medical malpractice is the date of the act or occurrence of the medical
malpractice even if the patient is oblivious of any harm. Christus St. Vincent Reg’l Med.
Ctr. v. Duarte-Afara, 2011-NMCA-112, 267 P.3d 70.

In medical malpractice actions where the health care provider is not qualified under the
Medical Malpractice Act [Chapter 41, Article 5 NMSA 1978], the cause of action accrues
when the plaintiff knows or with reasonable diligence should have known of the injury
and its cause. Roberts v. Southwest Cmty. Health Servs., 1992-NMSC-042, 114 N.M.
248, 837 P.2d 442.

The triggering event of this section is determined by the occurrence rule. This event is
unrelated to the accrual date of the cause of action, and does not entail whether the
injury has even been discovered. In this sense, if, four years after the occurrence of
medical malpractice, a patient learns they have been injured, their claim is forever
barred because this section functions as a statute of repose. Cummings v. X-Ray
Assocs., 1996-NMSC-035, 121 N.M. 821, 918 P.2d 1321.

The Medical Malpractice Act's statute of repose applied to plaintiffs' loss of
consortium and wrongful death claims. — In a case involving personal injury and
wrongful death, where the family of the decedent argued that the Medical Malpractice
Act's statute of repose did not apply to their loss of consortium claims because the
plaintiffs were not the doctors' patients, the district court did not err in granting
defendants' motion for summary judgment because plaintiffs' loss of consortium claims
were predicated on the defendants' alleged negligent medical care of decedent.
Whether a claim is a medical malpractice claim is governed by the Medical Malpractice
Act depends on whether the claim is predicated on the allegation of professional
negligence by a health care practitioner, not on whether the claim is brought by the
patient or nonpatient. Grano v. Keating, 2025-NMCA-005.

Statute of repose barred wrongful death and loss of consortium claims that were
filed more than three years after the last acts of alleged malpractice. — The statute
of repose in the Medical Malpractice Act sets a three-year time limit to bring malpractice
claims against health care providers, and therefore where plaintiffs filed their personal
injury and wrongful death claims more than three years after defendant's last possible
act of alleged malpractice, the district court did not err in concluding that plaintiffs filed
their claims against defendant outside the repose period and did not err in granting
defendant's motion for summary judgment. Grano v. Keating, 2025-NMCA-005.

The due process exception as applied to plaintiffs' claims for wrongful death and
loss of consortium. — In a case involving personal injury and wrongful death, where
the family of the decedent filed their claims more than three years after the alleged act
of malpractice, but where the family argued that their wrongful death and loss of
consortium claims accrued when decedent died which was late in the three-year repose
period for each of the defendants and that the due process exception afforded them an
additional year to bring their claims against the decedent's doctors, the district court did
not err by entering summary judgment on the plaintiffs' claims for wrongful death based
on medical malpractice, which accrued when decedent discovered her injury, that is
when she discovered the potential malpractice, which was not late in the three-year
repose period, but the district court erred by entering summary judgment on plaintiffs'
claims for loss of consortium because the district court did so based on the erroneous
legal conclusion that these claims accrued when the decedent discovered her injury;
instead, each loss of consortium claim accrued when the plaintiff bringing that claim
learned of their injury and of its cause. Grano v. Keating, 2025-NMCA-005.

When cause of action for negligently prescribed medication accrues. — In a
wrongful prescription case, the term "act of malpractice" refers to the discrete act taken
by a health care provider of prescribing medication to a patient, not to any subsequent
act of the patient and the three-year statute of limitations in 41-5-13 NMSA 1978 begins
to run on the date medication is prescribed. Chavez v. Delgado, 2014-NMCA-014, cert.
denied, 2013-NMCERT-012.

Where, on November 11, 2008, the patient requested a prescription for Simvastatin and
the physician wrote the prescription; the next day, the physician called the prescription
to the patient’s pharmacy; the patient filled the prescription on December 3, 2008; on
December 8, 2008, the patient was hospitalized with drug-induced rhabdomyolysis,
purportedly caused by the interaction of Simvastatin and another medication the patient
was taking; the patient died on February 21, 2010; and plaintiffs filed suit on December
1, 2011, the three-year statue of limitations began to run on November 11, 2008, the
day the physician prescribed Simvastatin to the patient, and plaintiffs’ claims against the
physician were barred. Chavez v. Delgado, 2014-NMCA-014, cert. denied, 2013-
NMCERT-012.

Fraudulent concealment. — There is no fraudulent concealment exception to the
occurrence rule in this section; thus the statute of limitations did not toll for a plaintiff
who filed an action more than three years after the act of malpractice, where she
learned of the negligent act within the three-year period and in adequate time to file a
malpractice action within three years, exercising ordinary diligence. Tomlinson v.
George, 2003-NMCA-004, 133 N.M. 69, 61 P.3d 195, aff'd, 2005-NMSC-020, 138 N.M.
34, 116 P.3d 105.

To toll statute of limitations under doctrine of fraudulent concealment, a patient has the
burden of showing: (1) that the physician knew of the alleged wrongful act and
concealed it from the patient or had material information pertinent to its discovery which
the physician failed to disclose, and (2) that the patient did not know, or could not have
known through the exercise of reasonable diligence, of the patient's cause of action
within the statutory period. Kern ex rel. v. St. Joseph Hosp., 1985-NMSC-031, 102 N.M.
452, 697 P.2d 135.

Fraudulent concealment requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant physician
knew of the alleged negligent act and concealed the negligent act from the patient or
had material information pertinent to discovery of the negligent act which the defendant
failed to disclose. Tomlinson v. George, 2005-NMSC-020, 138 N.M. 34, 116 P.3d 105.

Fraudulent concealment requires that the plaintiff demonstrate that he or she did not
know, and could not have discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence, his
or her cause of action during the statutory period. Tomlinson v. George, 2005-NMSC-
020, 138 N.M. 34, 116 P.3d 105.

Questions for fact finder in fraudulent concealment. — The question of a
physician's knowledge of the error or concealment of pertinent facts that might have
reasonably led to the discovery of the error and the related question of the patient's due
diligence in discovering the cause of action are ordinarily for determination by the finder
of fact. Kern ex rel. v. St. Joseph Hosp., 1985-NMSC-031, 102 N.M. 452, 697 P.2d 135.

Statute tolled by nondisclosure of pertinent, not reasonably discoverable, facts.
— The statute of limitations may be tolled where a physician has knowledge of facts
relating to medical malpractice and fails to disclose such facts to the patient under
circumstances where the patient may not be reasonably expected to learn of the
improper acts. Keithley v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 1984-NMCA-104, 102 N.M. 565, 698 P.2d
435.
Proof required with allegation that statute tolled by fraud. — A plaintiff who alleges
that the statute has been tolled by fraud, either active or passive, must establish that
she did not have the means to discover the fraud. Keithley v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 1984-
NMCA-104, 102 N.M. 565, 698 P.2d 435.

Fraudulent concealment inapplicable. — If a plaintiff discovers the injury within the
time limit, fraudulent concealment does not apply because the defendant's actions have
not prevented the plaintiff from filing the claim within the time period and the equitable
remedy is not necessary. Tomlinson v. George, 2005-NMSC-020, 138 N.M. 34, 116
P.3d 105.

Statute of repose is not tolled by fraudulent concealment when the plaintiff knew of his
or her cause of action within the statutory period. Tomlinson v. George, 2005-NMSC-
020, 138 N.M. 34, 116 P.3d 105.

Metastasis of cancer not relevant trigger. — The plain language of this section
establishes the date of the act of malpractice as the only relevant factor, without any
reference to any subsequent harm; in New Mexico, the patient's awareness of
metastasis of cancer is not the trigger for purposes of the statute of limitations.
Cummings v. X-Ray Assocs., 1996-NMSC-035, 121 N.M. 821, 918 P.2d 1321.

Claim barred. — An action by an employee against the physician employed by the
employer to perform the medical examination was time barred since the examination
occurred more than three years preceding the filing of the cause of action; however, an
action against the employer was not barred since the employee was subsequently
examined by a physician's assistant at the direction of the employer within the time
period. Baer v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 1994-NMCA-124, 118 N.M. 685, 884 P.2d 841.

Business entities qualify as health care providers. — Professional corporations and
other types of professional medical organizations under which a medical professional
operates are eligible to qualify as "health care providers" under the Medical Malpractice
Act [Chapter 41, Article 5 NMSA 1978] and are entitled to the benefits of the act when
they are sued for medical malpractice as long as they employ or consist of members
who are licensed or certified by the state to provide the medical services listed in
Subsection A of 41-5-3 NMSA 1978. Baker v. Hedstrom, 2013-NMSC-043, aff’g on
other grounds, 2012-NMCA-073.

Business entities, such as professional corporations and limited liability companies, that
are involved in the medical treatment of patients and that are neither hospitals nor
outpatient health care facilities, qualify as health care providers. Baker v. Hedstrom,
2012-NMCA-073, 284 P.3d 400, cert. granted, 2012-NMCERT-007.

Evidence insufficient to toll statute of limitations. Ealy v. Sheppeck, 1983-NMCA-
049, 100 N.M. 250, 669 P.2d 259, overruled in part by Juarez v. Nelson, 2003-NMCA-
011, 133 N.M. 168, 61 P.3d 877.
The statute of limitations was not tolled by fraudulent concealment on the part of the
doctor as two different people told the individual that the doctor did not do all that he
could have for the individual's husband. Juarez v. Nelson, 2003-NMCA-011, 133 N.M.
168, 61 P.3d 877, overruled on other grounds by Tomlinson v. George, 2005-NMSC-
020, 138 N.M. 34, 116 P.3d 105.

Dismissal without prejudice. — Where the court had entered a stipulated order
staying the proceedings until 30 days after the medical review commission rendered a
decision on plaintiff's claim, and defendant filed a motion to lift the stay after plaintiff did
not file an application with the commission, because the statute of limitations had run,
the dismissal without prejudice effectively dismissed the case on a permanent basis.
Belser v. O'Cleireachain, 2005-NMCA-073, 137 N.M. 623, 114 P.3d 303, cert. denied,
2005-NMCERT-006, 137 N.M. 766, 115 P.3d 229.

Law reviews. — For article, "Medical Malpractice Legislation in New Mexico," see 7
N.M.L. Rev. 5 (1976-77).

For comment on access to the courts and the Medical Malpractice Act: Jiron v. Mahlab,
see 14 N.M.L. Rev. 503 (1984).

For survey of medical malpractice law in New Mexico, see 18 N.M.L. Rev. 469 (1988).

For note and comment, "Statutes of Limitations Applied to Minors and the New Mexico
Court of Appeals' Balance of Competing State Interests to Favor Children," see 35 N.M.
L. Rev. 535 (2005).

Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — Statute of limitations applicable to
malpractice action against physician, surgeon, dentist, or similar practitioner, 80
A.L.R.2d 320, 70 A.L.R.4th 535.

When statute of limitations commences to run against malpractice action based on
leaving foreign substance in patient's body, 70 A.L.R.3d 7.

Amendment purporting to change the nature of the action or theory of recovery made
after statute of limitations has run, as relating back to filing of original complaint, 70
A.L.R.3d 82.

Statute of limitations relating to medical malpractice actions as applicable to actions
against unlicensed practitioner, 70 A.L.R.3d 114.

When statute of limitations begins to run against malpractice action in connection with
sterilization or birth control procedures, 93 A.L.R.3d 218.

When statute of limitations begins to run in dental malpractice suits, 3 A.L.R.4th 318.
What statute of limitations governs physician's action for wrongful denial of hospital
privileges, 3 A.L.R.4th 1214.

Statute of limitations applicable to third person's action against psychiatrist,
psychologist, or other mental health practitioner, based on failure to warn persons
against whom patient expressed threats, 41 A.L.R.4th 1078.

Applicability of "foreign object" exception in medical malpractice statutes of limitations,
50 A.L.R.4th 250.

Medical malpractice statutes of limitation minority provisions, 62 A.L.R.4th 758.

Medical malpractice: statute of limitations in wrongful death action based on medical
malpractice, 70 A.L.R.4th 535.

Medical malpractice: when limitations period begins to run on claim for optometrist's
malpractice, 70 A.L.R.4th 600.

Medical malpractice: who are "health care providers," or the like, whose actions fall
within statutes specifically governing actions and damages for medical malpractice, 12
A.L.R.5th 1.

Medical malpractice statutes of limitation minority provisions, 71 A.L.R.5th 307.

70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons §§ 107, 108.