New Mexico Statutes
N.M. Stat. § 42-10-9 (2026)
Homestead exemption.
✓ current as of May 2026
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A. A person shall have a homestead exemption in a domicile or land owned by the
person that is the primary residence of the person. Such homestead is exempt from
attachment, execution or foreclosure by a judgment creditor and from any proceeding of
receivers or trustees in insolvency or bankruptcy proceedings and from executors or
administrators in probate.
B. The amount of the homestead exemption is:
(1) one hundred fifty thousand dollars ($150,000); or
(2) three hundred thousand dollars ($300,000) if the spouse of the person
claiming the exemption died within two years prior to the date of claiming the
homestead exemption and if the deceased spouse would have been able to claim the
homestead exemption had the deceased spouse survived until the date of claiming the
homestead exemption.
C. As used in this section, "domicile" means any shelter or dwelling used by the
person as a primary residence and may include a mobile home, trailer, recreational
vehicle, outbuilding or other similar shelter, regardless of whether such dwelling
complies with relevant housing or building regulations.
D. This section shall be liberally construed in favor of the person claiming a
homestead exemption.
E. The provisions of this section shall not apply to garnishment or properly perfected
liens of secured creditors.
History: 1953 Comp., § 24-6-1, enacted by Laws 1971, ch. 215, § 6; 1973, ch. 277, § 1;
1978 Comp., § 42-10-9; 1979, ch. 9, § 1; 1979, ch. 182, § 3; 1987, ch. 193, § 1; 1993,
ch. 44, § 1; 2007, ch. 95, § 1; 2023, ch. 104, § 7.
ANNOTATIONS
Repeals and reenactments. — Laws 1971, ch. 215, § 6, repealed 24-6-1, 1953
Comp., relating to family homestead exemption and inapplicability of section to
mortgages and statutory liens, and enacted a new section.
Cross references. — For municipal housing authority projects, see 3-45-1 NMSA 1978.
For exemption from execution for claims to public lands of United States, see 19-3-3
NMSA 1978.
For no exemption for property subject to quiet title suit for failure of co-owner to pay
share of suit, see 42-6-11 NMSA 1978.
For property exemption due assignments for benefit of creditors, see 56-9-44 NMSA
1978.
For rules governing garnishment and writs of execution in the district, magistrate, and
metropolitan courts, see Rules 1-065.1, 2-801, and 3-801 NMRA, respectively.
For form for claim of exemptions on executions, see Rule 4-803 NMRA.
For form for order on claim of exemption and order to pay in execution proceedings, see
Rule 4-804 NMRA.
For form for application for writ of garnishment and affidavit, see Rule 4-805 NMRA.
For form for notice of right to claim exemptions from execution, see Rule 4-808A NMRA.
For form for claim of exemption from garnishment, see Rule 4-809 NMRA.
The 2023 amendment, effective July 1, 2023, changed the homestead exemption
amounts, defined "domicile" and provided that the provisions of this section do not apply
to garnishment or properly perfected liens of secured creditors; deleted "Each person
shall have exempt a homestead in a dwelling house and land occupied by the person or
in a dwelling house occupied by the person although the dwelling is on land owned by
another, provided that the dwelling is owned, leased or being purchased by the person
claiming the exemption. Such a person has a homestead of sixty thousand dollars
($60,000) exempt from attachment, execution or foreclosure by a judgment creditor and
from any proceeding of receivers or trustees in insolvency proceedings and from
executors or administrators in probate. If the homestead is owned jointly by two
persons, each joint owner is entitled to an exemption of sixty thousand dollars
($60,000)."; and added Subsections A through E.
Applicability. — Laws 2023, ch. 104, § 13 provided that the provisions of Laws 2023,
ch. 104 apply to actions filed on or after July 1, 2023.
The 2007 amendment, effective June 15, 2007, increased the homestead exemption
from $30,000 to $60,000.
The 1993 amendment, effective July 1, 1993, deleted "spouse, widow, widower or
person who is supporting another" following "Each" in the first sentence and substituted
"thirty thousand dollars ($30,000)" for "twenty thousand dollars ($20,000)" in the second
and third sentences.
The 1987 amendment, effective June 19, 1987, substituted "Each spouse" for "A
married person" at the beginning of the section and added the last sentence.
The 1979 amendment, substituted "shall have" for "may hold" following "supporting
another person" near the beginning of the first sentence; substituted "has" for "may
claim" following "Such a person" near the beginning of the second sentence; and
substituted "twenty thousand dollars ($20,000)" for "ten thousand dollars ($10,000)"
near the beginning of the second sentence.
Purpose of homestead exemption. — The purpose of the Homestead Act exemption
statute is to "prevent families from becoming destitute as the result of misfortune
through common debts which generally are unforseen." Laughlin v. Lumbert, 1961-
NMSC-064, 68 N.M. 351, 362 P.2d 507.
Tortious conduct not intended. — Where the defendant debtor in a foreclosure action
voluntarily damages the property for the purpose of sabotaging the lawful interest of the
plaintiff, the district court has the authority to impose an equitable lien against the
debtor's homestead exemption. Coppler & Mannick v. Wakeland, 2005-NMSC-022, 138
N.M. 108, 117 P.3d 914.
Exemption statutes should be liberally construed. Laughlin v. Lumbert, 1961-
NMSC-064, 68 N.M. 351, 362 P.2d 507; McFadden v. Murray, 1927-NMSC-039, 32
N.M. 361, 257 P. 999 (decided under former law).
The homestead exemption statute is to be construed liberally to the debtor's benefit. In
re Jefferson, 163 Bankr. 204 (Bankr. D. N.M. 1993).
Life estate in residence became part of the bankruptcy estate and fell within
homestead exemption statute. — Where a chapter 7 trustee objected to debtor's
claim of a homestead exemption in her residence, asserting that debtor no longer
owned the property and it was not part of the bankruptcy estate, debtor was entitled to
the homestead exemption where the evidence established that debtor held a life estate
in her residence in which she claimed a homestead exemption, even after her execution
of a warranty deed transferring the property to a trust, but verbally agreeing with the
purchaser that debtor would live in the residence for the rest of her life and would
assume responsibility for mortgage payments, property taxes, and maintenance and
utility costs for the residence. In re Suarez, 625 B.R. 508 (Bankr. D. N.M. 2020).
Exemption under New Mexico law allows exemption against United States. — One
entitled to an exemption of homestead under the laws of New Mexico may hold the
same against the United States. United States v. Lesnet, 1897-NMSC-028, 9 N.M. 271,
50 P. 321 (decided under former law).
Constitutionality. — The postjudgment execution statutes are unconstitutional as not
providing adequate notice of allowable exemptions and the right to a hearing. Aacen v.
San Juan Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 944 F.2d 691 (10th Cir. 1991).
"Supporting another person". — This section as it read prior to the 1993 amendment
did not require the claimant of a homestead exemption to have legal custody of his
children, to be their sole supporter, or to have his children reside with him. It required
only that the claimant be "supporting" another person. Ruybalid v. Segura, 1988-NMCA-
084, 107 N.M. 660, 763 P.2d 369.
"Occupied" defined. — The word "occupied" must not be construed so narrowly as to
deprive a debtor of a homestead exemption she would be entitled to but for actual
physical occupancy. In re Wells, 132 Bankr. 966 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1991); In re Jefferson,
163 Bankr. 204 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1993).
"Hold" defined. — The word "hold" meant to keep, retain, or to preserve exempt from
sale, or judgment, or order, and did not measure the character of the occupancy of the
homestead. Corn v. Hyde, 1920-NMSC-023, 26 N.M. 36, 188 P. 1102 (decided under
former law).
Equitable as well as legal owners of real property are entitled to claim a
homestead exemption. Nesset v. Blueher Lumber Co., 33 Bankr. 326 (Bankr. D.N.M.
1983).
Homestead exemption allowed where estate was still in the process of being
administered. — Where debtor claimed a homestead exemption for an undivided
quarter interest in an inherited house that was still titled in the name of the debtor's
deceased parents, rather than the debtor, and where the neighborhood association
sued debtor in his capacity as the personal representative of his parents' estate to
collect unpaid neighborhood association assessments and objected to debtor's claimed
homestead exemption, arguing that debtor's parents' estate, rather than debtor and his
siblings, owned the homestead, the exemption was valid because the debtor had a
sufficient ownership interest in the homestead. To come within the exemption, the
dwelling must be "owned, leased or being purchased by the person claiming the
exemption," and under the Uniform Probate Code, title to a decedent's property, both
real and personal, passes immediately upon death to the decedent's devisees or heirs.
In re Archuletta, 614 B.R. 892 (Bankr. D. N.M. 2020).
Property interest in exempt property. — By creating exemptions from execution, New
Mexico granted judgment debtors a property interest in retaining their exempt property,
which is entitled to due process protection. Aacen v. San Juan Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep't, 944
F.2d 691 (10th Cir. 1991).
Homestead exemption allowed where there was no evidence of intent to defraud
creditors. — Where debtor filed a voluntary petition under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy
Code (11 U.S.C.), and where creditors asserted that debtor was not entitled to a
homestead exemption under this section because he borrowed against the cash
surrender value of a life insurance policy to make the down payment on the residence in
which he claimed a homestead exemption, debtor's homestead exemption was allowed
because he used exempt property, i.e., a portion of the cash surrender value of a life
insurance policy, to acquire other exempt property. There was no evidence that debtor
used a portion of the cash surrender value to purchase the residence with the intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud creditors. In re Bushey, 559 B.R. 766 (Bankr. D. N.M. 2016).
Right to claim exemption includes judgment debtors. — A judgment lien attaches to
the equitable interest of a purchaser of real estate under a contract; the judgment lien
may be foreclosed in the same manner as ordinary suits for the foreclosure of
mortgages; and if the land in question is the judgment debtor's homestead, he may
claim an exemption of $10,000 (now $60,000). Such a reading prevents a debtor from
placing his assets beyond his creditor's reach and precludes the possibility of fraud
being perpetrated upon the commercial community. Mutual Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Collins, 1973-NMSC-113, 85 N.M. 706, 516 P.2d 677.
Family homestead exemption was available to judgment debtors in foreclosure of a lien
of a judgment obtained in a suit on a note. Laughlin v. Lumbert, 1961-NMSC-064, 68
N.M. 351, 362 P.2d 507.
Claim of exemption under original execution did not remain effective to prevent a
sale under a second or alias execution. Meyers Co. v. Mirabal, 1921-NMSC-098, 27
N.M. 472, 202 P. 693 (decided under former law).
Waiving exemption by mortgage. — The owner of real estate can by mortgage or
other act waive his exemption. Tomson v. Lerner, 1933-NMSC-078, 37 N.M. 546, 25
P.2d 209 (decided under former law).
Sale of homestead property. — Where a mortgagee filed a foreclosure action against
the mortgagor and a judgment creditor holding a lien on the property, the mortgagor
was entitled to the homestead exemption against the judgment lien where she had
asserted the exemption in her answer to the action and obtained judicial approval of the
sale of the property to a third party during the proceedings. Morgan Keegan Mortgage
Co. v. Candelaria, 1998-NMCA-008, 124 N.M. 405, 951 P.2d 1066.
Abandonment of homestead. — Debtor, who physically moved from the property
because creditors had taken judgments against her, transcribed those judgments, and
told her she was going to lose the house, did not abandon her homestead since it was
undisputed that she intended to return to the house if allowed the exemption. In re
Wells, 132 Bankr. 966 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1991).
Occupation by claimant. — The debtor is entitled to the homestead exemption only if
the dwelling house and land were occupied by him at the time of the petition. In re
Jefferson, 163 Bankr. 204 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1993).
When mortgagors not entitled to exemption. — Mortgagors were not entitled to a
homestead exemption against junior judgment lienholders since they had an opportunity
to advance claims for such exemption in their answers to cross claims which sought
foreclosure of the liens, but failed to do so, and thereby failed to comply with Section 39-
4-15 NMSA 1978, which required that such claim be made in answer to foreclosure suit.
Nor were proceeds of sale shielded by this section from operation of writs of
garnishment. Speckner v. Riebold, 1974-NMSC-029, 86 N.M. 275, 523 P.2d 10.
When owner not entitled to exemption. — When the owner of a homestead
voluntarily sells the property, the proceeds of sale are not exempt. In re Blair, 125
Bankr. 303 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1991).
Garnishment of exemption to satisfy different judgment improper. — District court
judgment permitting a family homestead exemption was not subject to garnishment to
satisfy a judgment recovered in another New Mexico court since the first district court
had jurisdiction in the premises and did not act erroneously. Laughlin v. Lumbert, 1961-
NMSC-064, 68 N.M. 351, 362 P.2d 507).
Homestead exemption not subject to attachment. — The legislature provided that
the homestead exemption is not subject to attachment. Coppler & Mannick v.
Wakeland, 2005-NMSC-022, 138 N.M. 108, 117 P.3d 914.
Homestead exemption not subject to garnishment. — A homestead exemption is
not subject to garnishment to satisfy a separate judgment. Coppler & Mannick v.
Wakeland, 2005-NMSC-022, 138 N.M. 108, 117 P.3d 914.
"Attachment" as used in New Mexico homestead exemption construed. — Where
debtor filed motion to avoid a judgment lien on her house to the extent it impairs her
homestead exemption, and where the judgment creditor argued that this section
prevented a judgment lien from attaching to a homestead, that the "exempt from
attachment, execution or foreclosure by a judgment creditor" language in this section
means that his judgment lien, while attaching to the house, did not attach to the
homestead, and that the judgment lien cannot be avoided, the bankruptcy court held
that the judgment lien is subject to avoidance, because the phrase, "exempt from
attachment, execution or foreclosure by a judgment creditor" refers to the creditor
remedy of attachment, not to encumbering real property, and therefore the judgment
lien encumbers the homestead. In re Tapia, 598 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. N.M. 2019).
Effect of homestead claimant voting in different precinct. — The fact that a
homestead claimant voted in another precinct than that in which his homestead is
situated is not conclusive evidence of abandonment. Corn v. Hyde, 1920-NMSC-023,
26 N.M. 36, 188 P. 1102 (decided under former law).
Prior to 1979 amendment, exemption had to be claimed. — To be entitled to a
homestead exemption under Section 39-4-15 NMSA 1978 and this section (prior to the
1979 amendment of this section), a party had to claim the exemption in his answer to a
foreclosure action; otherwise, he could not claim it. USLife Title Ins. Co. v. Romero,
1982-NMCA-068, 98 N.M. 699, 652 P.2d 249, cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794,
and cert. quashed, 98 N.M. 762, 652 P.2d 1213 .
Increased exemption may not be claimed against lien attached prior to effective
date of increase. — A legislative increase in the amount of the homestead exemption
may not be claimed against a judgment lien that attaches prior to the effective date of
the statutory amendment increasing the exemption. Ranchers State Bank v. Vega,
1982-NMSC-131, 99 N.M. 42, 653 P.2d 873.
Applicability to trailers. — A debtor is entitled to claim a trailer used as a dwelling
house as exempt, whether it is realty or personalty. In re Jefferson, 163 Bankr. 204
(Bankr. D.N.M. 1993).
Incidental quasi-commercial use of property, in case where claimant kept two rental
trailers on his property in addition to a trailer he used as dwelling house, did not defeat
claim of exemption. In re Jefferson, 163 Bankr. 204 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1993).
Law reviews. — For article, "Attachment in New Mexico - Part I," see 1 Nat. Resources
J. 303 (1961).
For article, "Attachment in New Mexico - Part II," see 2 Nat. Resources J. 75 (1962).
For note, "Debtor Exemptions in New Mexico," see 6 Nat. Resources J. 467 (1966).
For article, "The Perils of Intestate Succession in New Mexico and Related Will
Problems," see 7 Nat. Resources J. 555 (1967).
For article, "The Community Property Act of 1973: A Commentary and Quasi-Legislative
History," see 5 N.M.L. Rev. 1 (1974).
For comment, "A Comparison of State and Federal Exemptions: 11 U.S.C. § 101-1330
(Supp. II 1978)," see 10 N.M.L. Rev. 431 (1980).
Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — 40 Am. Jur. 2d Homestead §§ 1 to 3,
27, 32, 86 to 112.
Exemption of proceeds of voluntary sale of homestead, 1 A.L.R. 483, 46 A.L.R. 814.
"Owner," scope and import of term, in homestead exemption statutes, 2 A.L.R. 793, 95
A.L.R. 1085.
Recovery of damages for breach of contract to convey homestead where only one
spouse signed contract, 5 A.L.R.4th 1310.
Imprisonment as affecting abandonment of homestead, 5 A.L.R. 259.
Validity of statute abolishing vested right of homestead exemption as against particular
classes of claims, 6 A.L.R. 1143.
Wife's right to exclude husband from possession, use or enjoyment of homestead
owned by her, 21 A.L.R. 745.
Failure of head of family to claim homestead exemption as affecting other members of
family, 33 A.L.R. 611.
Separation agreement as affecting right in homestead, 35 A.L.R. 1518, 34 A.L.R.2d
1040.
Divorce as affecting homestead, 36 A.L.R. 431, 84 A.L.R.2d 703.
Wife's loss of homestead rights through absence enforced by act of husband, 42 A.L.R.
1162, 129 A.L.R. 305.
Reformation of instrument as against wife claiming homestead, 44 A.L.R. 118, 79
A.L.R.2d 1180.
Validity and effect of alienation or encumbrance of homestead without joinder or
consent of wife, 45 A.L.R. 395.
Reconveyance or encumbrance of homestead by husband without joinder of wife, to
settle purchase-money debt, validity of, 45 A.L.R. 413.
Tax collector's bond, homestead as subject to lien of, 47 A.L.R. 512, 54 A.L.R. 1285.
Estoppel to claim homestead rights in property by failure to disclose interest, 50 A.L.R.
804.
Option, exercise of, as affecting intervening declaration of homestead, 50 A.L.R. 1329.
Insurance on homestead property, exemption of proceeds of, 63 A.L.R. 1296, 65 A.L.R.
1209.
Inclusion of different tracts or parcels in homestead, 73 A.L.R. 116.
Tax sale of property as cutting off homestead rights, 75 A.L.R. 438.
Marshaling assets, homestead law as affecting rule as to, 77 A.L.R. 371.
Cloud on title, execution sale or judgment lien affecting homestead as, 78 A.L.R. 266,
272.
Nonclaim statute as applied to homestead mortgages, 78 A.L.R. 1143.
Time as of which, and extent to which, homestead exemption attaches to property
received in exchange for homestead, 83 A.L.R. 54.
Estate or interest in real property to which a homestead claim may attach, 89 A.L.R.
511, 74 A.L.R.2d 1355.
Wife's homestead rights as affected by fact that she does not live in state, 92 A.L.R.
1054.
Impairment of obligation of contracts by homestead exemption law, 93 A.L.R. 181.
Estoppel to claim, or waiver of, homestead by direction of judgment debtor to levy on
real estate, 101 A.L.R. 851.
Specific performance of parol agreement for exchange of land where wife or plaintiff has
released her homestead rights by deed made with husband to defendant, 101 A.L.R.
1107.
Direction in will for payment of debts and expenses as subjecting exempt homestead to
their payment, 103 A.L.R. 257.
Alimony, enforcement of claim for, against homestead, 110 A.L.R. 904.
Business purposes, character of property as homestead as affected by its use for, as
well as for residence purposes, 114 A.L.R. 209.
Laborers, servants or the like, who are, within constitutional or statutory provision
subjecting homestead to claims of, 114 A.L.R. 767.
Mental incompetency of one spouse as affecting transfer or encumbrance of homestead
property, 155 A.L.R. 312.
Lien or encumbrance as affecting extent of exemption of proceeds of voluntary sale of
homestead, 161 A.L.R. 1256.
Rights of surviving spouse and children in proceeds of sale of homestead in decedent's
estate, 6 A.L.R.2d 515.
Validity of contract waiving homestead exemption, 94 A.L.R.2d 981.
Lien of judgment on excess value of homestead, 41 A.L.R.4th 292.
35 C.J.S. Exemptions §§ 1, 70, 110; 40 C.J.S. Homesteads §§ 51 to 69.Notes of Decisions
Cited in 40
cases (4 in the last 5 years), 1980–2025 · leading case: Morgan Keegan Mortg. Co. v. Candelaria, 951 P.2d 1066 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997).
Morgan Keegan Mortg. Co. v. Candelaria, 951 P.2d 1066 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997). “Applying public policy principles that we believe the legislature considered when enacting the exemption statute, NMSA 1978, Section 42-10-9 (1979, prior to 1987 amendment), we hold that the trial court did not err in allowing the exemption to Mortgagor.”
Coppler & Mannick, P.C. v. Wakeland, 117 P.3d 914 (N.M. 2005). “” NMSA 1978, § 42-10-9 (1993). In Laughlin, we addressed the question of whether “money claimed exempt from execution .”
Grygorwicz v. Trujillo, 203 P.3d 865 (N.M. 2009). “In response, Defendant asserted his right to a homestead exemption under NMSA 1978, Section 39-4-15 (1933) and NMSA 1978, Section 42-10-9 (1993, prior to the 2007 amendment).”
Ruybalid v. Segura, 763 P.2d 369 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988). “In September 1984, David filed an amended claim of exemptions specifically stating that he was supporting his two children from a previous marriage, and that he was therefore entitled to hold exempt a homestead in the amount of $20,000, pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 42-10-9…”
Muse v. Muse, 200 P.3d 104 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008). “In Ruybalid, following a divorce and property division, the husband claimed a homestead exemption under NMSA 1978, Section 42-10-9 (1987) (amended 1993 and 2007) as to his separate residence property when the wife attempted to execute based on a money judgment in her favor…”
Mannick v. Wakeland, 2005 NMCA 098 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004). “NMSA 1978, § 42-10-9 (1993); Mannick v. Wakeland, No.”
Mannick v. Wakeland, 117 P.3d 919 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005). “NMSA 1978, § 42-10-9 (1993); Mannick v. Wakeland, No.”
USLife Title Ins. Co. of Dallas v. Romero, 652 P.2d 249 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982). “Whether Robert and Margaret Romero, and James and Norene Romero, were properly allowed to claim, prior to foreclosure, $10,000 homestead exemptions pursuant to § 42-10-9, N.M.S.A.1978. We affirm the trial court on the subrogation issue.”
Huntington Nat'l Bank v. Sproul, 861 P.2d 935 (N.M. 1993). “” If the aforementioned property proves insufficient, the community debt must then be satisfied from the spouses’ residence, subject to the homestead exemption found at NMSA 1978, § 42-10-9. Section 40-3-11(A).”
In re Hamilton, 461 B.R. 878 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2011). “1978, § 42-10-9. Schedule D reflected Mr. McKinney’s judgment lien against the Prince Property *882 in the amount of the recorded transcript of judgment.”
In Re Victor, 341 B.R. 775 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2006). “00 NMSA § 42-10-9 community property/ joint no change in value Sched C not amended community no change in value exemption = $5,000.”
In Re Cisneros, 257 B.R. 332 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2000). “) On Schedule C the Debtors claimed a $60,000 homestead exemption pursuant to Section 42-10-9 N.M.S.A.1978. No objections to the exemption were filed.”
— N.M. Stat. § 42-10-9(B)(1) — 1 case
Albirio D Mirabal & Teri L Mirabal (Bankr. D.N.M. 2024).
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