N.Y. Penal Law § 125.26 (2026)

§ 125.26 Aggravated murder.
  A person is guilty of aggravated murder when:
  1. With intent to cause the death of another person, he or she causes
the death of such person, or of a third person who was a person
described in subparagraph (i), (ii), (ii-a) or (iii) of paragraph (a) of
this subdivision engaged at the time of the killing in the course of
performing his or her official duties; and
  (a) Either:
  (i) the intended victim was a police officer as defined in subdivision
thirty-four of section 1.20 of the criminal procedure law who was at the
time of the killing engaged in the course of performing his or her
official duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known
that the victim was a police officer; or
  (ii) the intended victim was a peace officer as defined in paragraph a
of subdivision twenty-one, subdivision twenty-three, twenty-four or
sixty-two (employees of the division for youth) of section 2.10 of the
criminal procedure law who was at the time of the killing engaged in the
course of performing his or her official duties, and the defendant knew
or reasonably should have known that the victim was such a uniformed
court officer, parole officer, probation officer, or employee of the
division for youth; or
  (ii-a) the intended victim was a firefighter, emergency medical
technician, ambulance driver, paramedic, physician or registered nurse
involved in a first response team, or any other individual who, in the
course of official duties, performs emergency response activities and
was engaged in such activities at the time of killing and the defendant
knew or reasonably should have known that the intended victim was such
firefighter, emergency medical technician, ambulance driver, paramedic,
physician or registered nurse; or
  (iii) the intended victim was an employee of a state correctional
institution or was an employee of a local correctional facility as
defined in subdivision two of section forty of the correction law, who
was at the time of the killing engaged in the course of performing his
or her official duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have
known that the victim was an employee of a state correctional
institution or a local correctional facility; and
  (b) The defendant was more than eighteen years old at the time of the
commission of the crime; or
  2. (a) With intent to cause the death of a person less than fourteen
years old, he or she causes the death of such person, and the defendant
acted in an especially cruel and wanton manner pursuant to a course of
conduct intended to inflict and inflicting torture upon the victim prior
to the victim's death. As used in this subdivision, "torture" means the
intentional and depraved infliction of extreme physical pain that is
separate and apart from the pain which otherwise would have been
associated with such cause of death; and
  (b) The defendant was more than eighteen years old at the time of the
commission of the crime.
  3. In any prosecution under subdivision one or two of this section, it
is an affirmative defense that:
  (a) (i) The defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional
disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the
reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a
person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the
defendant believed them to be. Nothing contained in this paragraph shall
constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of,
aggravated manslaughter in the first degree, manslaughter in the first
degree or any other crime except murder in the second degree. (ii) It
shall not be a "reasonable explanation or excuse" pursuant to
subparagraph (i) of this paragraph when the defendant's conduct resulted
from the discovery, knowledge or disclosure of the victim's sexual
orientation, sex, gender, gender identity, gender expression or sex
assigned at birth; or
  (b) The defendant's conduct consisted of causing or aiding, without
the use of duress or deception, another person to commit suicide.
Nothing contained in this paragraph shall constitute a defense to a
prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, aggravated manslaughter in
the second degree, manslaughter in the second degree or any other crime
except murder in the second degree.
  Aggravated murder is a class A-I felony.