N.Y. Laws » CHAPTER Penal / PART Specific Offenses / TITLE Offenses Against Public Safety / ARTICLE Firearms and Other Dangerous Weapons
New York Consolidated Laws

N.Y. Penal Law § 265.15 (2026)

Presumptions of possession, unlawful intent and defacement

✓ current as of May 2026
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§ 265.15 Presumptions of possession, unlawful intent and defacement.
  1. The presence in any room, dwelling, structure or vehicle of any
machine-gun is presumptive evidence of its unlawful possession by all
persons occupying the place where such machine-gun is found.
  2. The presence in any stolen vehicle of any weapon, instrument,
appliance or substance specified in sections 265.01, 265.02, 265.03,
265.04 and 265.05 is presumptive evidence of its possession by all
persons occupying such vehicle at the time such weapon, instrument,
appliance or substance is found.
  3. The presence in an automobile, other than a stolen one or a public
omnibus, of any firearm, large capacity ammunition feeding device,
defaced firearm, defaced rifle or shotgun, defaced large capacity
ammunition feeding device, firearm silencer, explosive or incendiary
bomb, bombshell, switchblade knife, pilum ballistic knife, metal knuckle
knife, dagger, dirk, stiletto, billy, blackjack, plastic knuckles, metal
knuckles, chuka stick, sandbag, sandclub or slungshot is presumptive
evidence of its possession by all persons occupying such automobile at
the time such weapon, instrument or appliance is found, except under the
following circumstances: (a) if such weapon, instrument or appliance is
found upon the person of one of the occupants therein; (b) if such
weapon, instrument or appliance is found in an automobile which is being
operated for hire by a duly licensed driver in the due, lawful and
proper pursuit of his or her trade, then such presumption shall not
apply to the driver; or (c) if the weapon so found is a pistol or
revolver and one of the occupants, not present under duress, has in his
or her possession a valid license to have and carry concealed the same.
  4. The possession by any person of the substance as specified in
section 265.04 is presumptive evidence of possessing such substance with
intent to use the same unlawfully against the person or property of
another if such person is not licensed or otherwise authorized to
possess such substance. The possession by any person of any dagger,
dirk, stiletto, dangerous knife or any other weapon, instrument,
appliance or substance designed, made or adapted for use primarily as a
weapon, is presumptive evidence of intent to use the same unlawfully
against another.
  5. The possession by any person of a defaced machine-gun, firearm,
rifle or shotgun is presumptive evidence that such person defaced the
same.
  6. The possession of three or more firearms by any person is
presumptive evidence that such person possessed the firearms with the
intent to sell same.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 359 cases (24 in the last 5 years), 1976–2026 · leading case: United States v. White, 692 F.3d 235 (2d Cir. 2012).
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United States v. White, 692 F.3d 235 (2d Cir. 2012). · cites it 7× “” N.Y. Penal Law § 265.15 (3) (the “constructive possession provision”).”
People v. Wesley, 538 N.E.2d 76 (NY 1989). · cites it 5× “In cases where a defendant is charged with possession of a gun based on the statutory presumption found in Penal Law § 265.15 (3), which attributes possession of a gun to the passengers in an automobile simply by virtue of their presence in the car where the gun is found, we…”
People v. Galindo, 17 N.E.3d 1121 (NY 2014). · cites it 8× “The Appellate Division affirmed, stating that “the circumstances of defendant’s possession of a loaded firearm, viewed in light of the statutory presumption of unlawful intent (Penal Law § 265.15 [4]), provided legally sufficient evidence of defendant’s intent to use a weapon…”
People v. Millan, 508 N.E.2d 903 (NY 1987). · cites it 5× “The People charged defendant with criminal possession of a weapon solely on the basis of the statutory presumption of possession (Penal Law § 265.15 [3]) 1 arising from the fact that the weapon was discovered in the passenger compartment of the taxicab in which he was riding.”
Matthews v. City of New York, 889 F. Supp. 2d 418 (E.D.N.Y 2012). · cites it 3× “N.Y. Penal Law § 265.15 (3). It is well-settled under New York law that the Automobile Presumption may provide probable cause for the arrest of all occupants of a vehicle.”
Rivas v. United States, 783 A.2d 125 (D.C. 2001). · cites it 2× “) (machine gun in room, boat or vehicle); Neb.Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-1228 & § 28-1212 (Mitchie, LEXIS through 2000 legislation) (explosive materials and firearms in other than public conveyances); N.”
People v. Williams, 136 A.D.2d 132 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988). · cites it 9× “The issue presented for our consideration is the sufficiency of the instructions given to the Grand Jury concerning the statutory presumption of possession of a weapon in an automobile (Penal Law §265.15 [3]). We find that under the circumstances herein, the mere recitation of…”
People v. Verez, 638 N.E.2d 951 (NY 1994). · cites it 6× “He contended that the possession count, based on the presumption contained in Penal Law § 265.15 (3), was insufficient because, inasmuch as the gun had been seen in Sanchez's possession, the exception contained in paragraph (a) of that section applied.”
In re Darnell C., 66 A.D.3d 771 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009). · cites it 2× “Specifically, with respect to criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, contrary to the appellant’s contention, the Family Court properly applied the so-called “automobile presumption” (see Penal Law § 265.15 [3]; Matter of Jonathan V.”
People v. Burton, 848 N.E.2d 454 (NY 2006). “One “narrow exception” to the abandonment of the automatic standing doctrine has been recognized “[i]n cases where a defendant is charged with possession of a gun based on the statutory presumption found in Penal Law § 265.15 (3), which attributes possession of a gun to the…”
People v. Galak, 610 N.E.2d 362 (NY 1993). · cites it 2× “The suppression court ruled that defendant had standing under People v Millan ( 69 NY2d 514 ) and People v Wesley ( 73 NY2d 351, 360 ), which held that an automobile passenger who was otherwise a stranger to the vehicle had automatic standing when the statutory presumption of…”
Heard v. City of N.Y., 319 F. Supp. 3d 687 (S.D. Ill. 2018). · cites it 3× “See N.Y. Penal Law § 265.15 . Therefore, Officer Roche argues that the arrest of Heard was supported by probable cause.”
Show all 359 citing cases →
— N.Y. Penal Law § 265.15(3) — 10 cases
United States v. White, 692 F.3d 235 (2d Cir. 2012). “” N.Y. Penal Law § 265.15 (3) (the “constructive possession provision”).”
Samuel Allen, Raymond Hardrick & Melvin Lemmons v. Cnty. Court, Ulster Cnty. & New York Woodbourne Corr. Facility, Woodbourne, New York, 568 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1977).
People v. Hicks, 138 A.D.2d 519 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988).
United States v. Watts, 934 F. Supp. 2d 451 (E.D.N.Y 2013).
Guyton v. LeFevre, 560 F. Supp. 1237 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
— N.Y. Penal Law § 265.15(4) — 6 cases
Breitkopf v. Gentile, 41 F. Supp. 3d 220 (E.D.N.Y 2014).
People v. Rodgers, 2019 NY Slip Op 6002 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019).
People v. Burroughs (Tyshawn) (N.Y. App. Term. 2023).
People v. Acosta, 2018 NY Slip Op 3934 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018).
People v. Grasso, 2018 NY Slip Op 5488 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.