New York Consolidated Laws

N.Y. Penal Law § 30.00 (2026)

Infancy

✓ text as retrieved May 2026 (this copy records no edition or section history)
Find cases: SyfertCases citing this section NY-LEGnysenate.gov Justiaon Justia CornellLII Search CasesGoogle Scholar
§ 30.00 Infancy.
  1. Except as provided in subdivisions two and three of this section, a
person less than seventeen, or commencing October first, two thousand
nineteen, a person less than eighteen years old is not criminally
responsible for conduct.
  2. A person thirteen, fourteen or, fifteen years of age is criminally
responsible for acts constituting murder in the second degree as defined
in subdivisions one and two of section 125.25 and in subdivision three
of such section provided that the underlying crime for the murder charge
is one for which such person is criminally responsible or for such
conduct as a sexually motivated felony, where authorized pursuant to
section 130.91 of this chapter; and a person fourteen or, fifteen years
of age is criminally responsible for acts constituting the crimes
defined in section 135.25 (kidnapping in the first degree); 150.20
(arson in the first degree); subdivisions one and two of section 120.10
(assault in the first degree); 125.20 (manslaughter in the first
degree); paragraphs (a) and (b) of subdivision one, paragraphs (a) and
(b) of subdivision two and paragraphs (a) and (b) of subdivision three
of section 130.35 (rape in the first degree); former subdivisions one
and two of section 130.35 (rape in the first degree); subdivisions one
and two of former section 130.50; 130.70 (aggravated sexual abuse in the
first degree); 140.30 (burglary in the first degree); subdivision one of
section 140.25 (burglary in the second degree); 150.15 (arson in the
second degree); 160.15 (robbery in the first degree); subdivision two of
section 160.10 (robbery in the second degree) of this chapter; or
section 265.03 of this chapter, where such machine gun or such firearm
is possessed on school grounds, as that phrase is defined in subdivision
fourteen of section 220.00 of this chapter; or defined in this chapter
as an attempt to commit murder in the second degree or kidnapping in the
first degree, or for such conduct as a sexually motivated felony, where
authorized pursuant to section 130.91 of this chapter.
  3. A person sixteen or commencing October first, two thousand
nineteen, seventeen years of age is criminally responsible for acts
constituting:
  (a) a felony, as defined in subdivision five of section 10.00 of this
chapter;
  (b) a traffic infraction, as defined in subdivision two of section
10.00 of this chapter;
  (c) a violation, as defined in subdivision three of section 10.00 of
this chapter;
  (d) a misdemeanor as defined in subdivision four of section 10.00 of
this chapter, but only when the charge for such misdemeanor is:
  (i) accompanied by a felony charge that is shown to have been
committed as a part of the same criminal transaction, as defined in
subdivision two of section 40.10 of the criminal procedure law;
  (ii) results from reduction or dismissal in satisfaction of a charge
for a felony offense, in accordance with a plea of guilty pursuant to
subdivision four of section 220.10 of the criminal procedure law, unless
the proceeding is removed to the family court pursuant to paragraph
(g-1) of subdivision five of section 220.10 of the criminal procedure
law; or
  (iii) a misdemeanor defined in the vehicle and traffic law.
  4. In any prosecution for an offense, lack of criminal responsibility
by reason of infancy, as defined in this section, is a defense.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 127 cases (48 in the last 5 years), 1985–2026 · leading case: People v. Roe, 542 N.E.2d 610 (N.Y. 1989).
People v. Roe, 542 N.E.2d 610 (N.Y. 1989). · cites it 5× “Preliminarily, it must be made clear that defendant does not challenge either the validity of Penal Law § 30.00 (2), or the soundness of the policy underlying the legislative judgment in making persons 13, 14, or 15 years of age criminally responsible as adults for murder in the…”
Schearer v. Fitzgerald, 217 A.D.3d 980 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2023). · cites it 4× “Prior to answering, the defendant moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) and (7) to dismiss the amended complaint on the grounds that the defense of infancy provided by Penal Law § 30.00(1) bars revival of the plaintiff's causes of action under the CVA, the CVA violates the Due…”
People v. Gray, 646 N.E.2d 444 (N.Y. 1995). · cites it 4× “2 [1]; Penal Law § 30.00). Nevertheless, the cross-examiner may bring out "the illegal or immoral acts underlying such adjudications" ( People v Greer , 42 N.”
State of Iowa v. Noah Riley Crooks, 911 N.W.2d 153 (Iowa 2018). · cites it 2× “) (age thirteen or older for discretionary waiver for specified offenses); N.Y. Penal Law § 30.00 (2) (McKinney, Westlaw through L.”
People v. Santiago, 999 N.E.2d 507 (N.Y. 2013). · cites it 4× “On appeal, defendant argued that the Pennsylvania conviction could not serve as a predicate felony conviction because he was 15 years old when convicted, and, by virtue of Penal Law § 30.00, a 15 year old cannot be prosecuted for second-degree manslaughter or any other New York…”
Green v. Montgomery, 746 N.E.2d 1036 (N.Y. 2001). · cites it 2× “With limited exceptions, a juvenile under age 16 “is not criminally responsible for conduct” (Penal Law § 30.00 [1]). Where a juvenile is charged with an offense for which he or she cannot be held criminally responsible, the Family Court has exclusive original jurisdiction over…”
United States v. Malik Driskell, Also Known as Max Del Valle, 277 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2002). · cites it 2× “N.Y. Penal Law § 30.00 (l)-(2). New York law provides for certain exceptions to this rule in cases of serious criminal conduct.”
Matter of Raymond G., 715 N.E.2d 486 (N.Y. 1999). · cites it 5× “To complement the new definition of juvenile delinquent, Penal Law § 30.00, the infancy defense, was amended to expressly exclude the availability of the defense to juvenile offenders *536 (see, Penal Law § 30.”
People v. Smith, 217 A.D.2d 221 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep't 1995). · cites it 3× “” *237 The obvious flaw in defendant’s argument is that the Legislature has displaced the common-law doctrine of doli incapax with the provisions of Penal Law § 30.00 (see, People v Ryals, 100 Misc 2d 551, 552 ).”
People v. Smith, 152 A.D.2d 56 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 1989). · cites it 5× “We find that under the circumstances, the conviction may have been premised on conduct for which the defendant, who was 15 years old when the crime was committed, could not be held criminally responsible as an adult (Penal Law § 30.00 [2]). 2 Accordingly, the defendant’s…”
Anonymous v. Castagnola, 210 A.D.3d 940 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2022). “Moreover, to the extent that the defense of infancy provided for by Penal Law § 30.00 may properly be used by Doe as a defense to this action pursuant to CPLR 214-g, this defense would be available for the benefit of Doe and not for the school defendants ( see Beardsley v…”
Anonymous v. City of Rochester, 915 N.E.2d 593 (N.Y. 2009). · cites it 2× “2 and Penal Law § 30.00 because it authorized what was indistinguishable from a warrantless arrest of a minor under the age of 16 upon an alleged violation of the curfew and created criminal responsibility for a “violation” as defined in the Penal Law (56 AD3d at 144-145).”
N.Y. Penal Law § 30.00(1): 4 cases
Schearer v. Fitzgerald, 217 A.D.3d 980 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2023). “Prior to answering, the defendant moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) and (7) to dismiss the amended complaint on the grounds that the defense of infancy provided by Penal Law § 30.00(1) bars revival of the plaintiff's causes of action under the CVA, the CVA violates the Due…”
Doe v. Wilhelmina Models, Inc., 226 A.D.3d 30 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 2024).
Doe v. Wilhelmina Models, Inc., 226 A.D.3d 30 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 2024).
Doe v. Wilhelmina Models, Inc., 229 A.D.3d 128 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 2024).
N.Y. Penal Law § 30.00(2): 1 case
People v. Evans, 241 A.D.3d 1584 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2025).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.