(A) No person shall purposely take the life of a child born by attempted abortion who is alive when removed from the uterus of the pregnant woman.
(B) No person who performs an abortion shall purposely fail to take the measures required by the exercise of medical judgment in light of the attending circumstances to preserve the health or life of a child who is alive when removed from the uterus of the pregnant woman.
(C)(1) Whoever violates division (A) of this section is guilty of abortion manslaughter, a felony of the first degree.
(2) Whoever violates division (B) of this section and the child dies as a result of the person's failure to take the measures described in that division is guilty of abortion manslaughter, a felony of the first degree.
(3) Whoever violates division (B) of this section and the child survives notwithstanding the person's failure to take the measures described in that division is guilty of failure to render medical care to an infant born alive, a felony of the first degree.
(D)(1) A woman on whom an abortion is performed or attempted may file a civil action for the wrongful death of the woman's child against a person who violates division (A) of this section.
(2) A woman on whom an abortion is performed or attempted may file a civil action for injury, death, or loss to person or property against a person who violates division (B) of this section.
(3) A woman who prevails in an action filed under division (D)(1) or (2) of this section shall receive both of the following from the person who committed the act:
(a) Compensatory and exemplary damages in an amount determined by the trier of fact;
(b) Court costs and reasonable attorney's fees.
Last updated January 13, 2022 at 5:37 PM
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 6
cases (3 in the last 5 years), 2003–2022 · leading case: State v. Condon, 789 N.E.2d 696 (Ohio Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2003).
State v. Condon, 789 N.E.2d 696 (Ohio Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2003). “Rather, we held in Brewer that R.C. 2919.13(B)(1) was primarily intended to target public officials and public servants who abuse their positions of public trust.”
State v. Wright, 2021-Ohio-3818, 180 N.E.3d 32. · cites it 2ד01(A)(9) and that the trial court was required to impose community control sanctions because the conditions under R.C. 2919.13(B)(1)(a) apply. However, she ignores the implication of R.”
State v. Wolfe, 2022-Ohio-117. “{¶15} R.C. 2919.13(C) provides, (C) Except as provided in division (D), (E), (F), or (G) of this section, in determining whether to impose a prison term as a sanction for a felony of the third degree or a felony drug offense that is a violation of a provision of Chapter 2925.”
State v. Washington, 2022-Ohio-625. “{¶107} R.C. 2919.13(C) provides, (C) Except as provided in division (D), (E), (F), or (G) of this section, in determining whether to impose a prison term as a sanction for a felony of Richland County, Case No.”
State v. Bales, 2013-Ohio-4957. · cites it 2ד12, division (B) of section 2919.13, or section 2919.151, 2919.”
State v. Greer, 2016-Ohio-8283. “13(A), indicates that, “[i]f the offender is being sentenced for a third degree felony OVI offense, * * * the court shall impose upon the offender a mandatory prison term of one, two, three, four, or five years if the offender also is convicted of or also pleads guilty to a…”
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.13(B)(1): 1 case
State v. Condon, 789 N.E.2d 696 (Ohio Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2003). “Rather, we held in Brewer that R.C. 2919.13(B)(1) was primarily intended to target public officials and public servants who abuse their positions of public trust.”
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.13(B)(1)(a): 1 case
State v. Wright, 2021-Ohio-3818, 180 N.E.3d 32. “01(A)(9) and that the trial court was required to impose community control sanctions because the conditions under R.C. 2919.13(B)(1)(a) apply. However, she ignores the implication of R.”
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.13(B)(1)(b): 1 case
State v. Wright, 2021-Ohio-3818, 180 N.E.3d 32. “01(A)(9) and that the trial court was required to impose community control sanctions because the conditions under R.C. 2919.13(B)(1)(a) apply. However, she ignores the implication of R.”
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.13(C): 2 cases
State v. Wolfe, 2022-Ohio-117. “{¶15} R.C. 2919.13(C) provides, (C) Except as provided in division (D), (E), (F), or (G) of this section, in determining whether to impose a prison term as a sanction for a felony of the third degree or a felony drug offense that is a violation of a provision of Chapter 2925.”
State v. Washington, 2022-Ohio-625. “{¶107} R.C. 2919.13(C) provides, (C) Except as provided in division (D), (E), (F), or (G) of this section, in determining whether to impose a prison term as a sanction for a felony of Richland County, Case No.”
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.13(G)(2): 1 case
State v. Greer, 2016-Ohio-8283. “13(A), indicates that, “[i]f the offender is being sentenced for a third degree felony OVI offense, * * * the court shall impose upon the offender a mandatory prison term of one, two, three, four, or five years if the offender also is convicted of or also pleads guilty to a…”
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