(A) The driver of any emergency vehicle or public safety vehicle, when responding to an emergency call, upon approaching a red or stop signal or any stop sign shall slow down as necessary for safety to traffic, but may proceed cautiously past such red or stop sign or signal with due regard for the safety of all persons using the street or highway.
(B) Except as otherwise provided in this division, whoever violates this section is guilty of a minor misdemeanor. If, within one year of the offense, the offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to one predicate motor vehicle or traffic offense, whoever violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor of the fourth degree. If, within one year of the offense, the offender previously has been convicted of two or more predicate motor vehicle or traffic offenses, whoever violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor of the third degree.
If the offender commits the offense while distracted and the distracting activity is a contributing factor to the commission of the offense, the offender is subject to the additional fine established under section 4511.991 of the Revised Code.
A badge such as ▸ 12 cases opens the cases that cite that subsection.
The 20 cases that cite Ohio Rev. Code § 4511.03 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment.RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENBrockman v. Bell, 605 N.E.2d 445 (Ohio Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1992).
cites § 4511.03 7×cited by 66 cases
Where it cites § 4511.03
“I We address together Brockman’s first, second and third assignments of error, which, in essence, present a challenge to the entry of summary judgment for the defendants when issues of fact remain as to whether Bell was responding to an emergency call and whether Bell’s actions…”
The case’s holding
The question of whether conduct constitutes willful or wanton misconduct must be submitted to a jury when reasonable minds might differ as to the import of the evidence.
Later courts cite it for
“the failure to exercise any care toward one to whom a duty of care is owed when the failure occurs under circumstances for which the probability of harm is great and when the probability of harm is known to the tortfeasor.” · 8 citing courts
cites § 4511.03 27×subsections: (A) 4×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 4511.03
“1 1 We note that the city argued in its reply brief in support of its motion for summary judgment that appellant cannot proceed on a negligence theory that the city violated R.C. 4511.03 without allegations of willful or wanton misconduct.”
“of the Revised Code, the operation of the vehicle did not constitute willful or wanton misconduct, and the operation complies with the precautions of section 4511.03 of the Revised Code. {¶ g} "(2) Except as otherwise provided in sections 3314.”
The case’s holding
A political subdivision is immune under the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act from suits by its employees for employer intentional torts, because such torts fall outside the statutory exceptions.
“of the Revised Code, the operation of the vehicle did not constitute willful or wanton misconduct, and the operation complies with the precautions of section 4511.03 of the Revised Code. {¶ 21} Appellants implicitly acknowledge that the Sickleses’ respondeat superi- or liability…”
The case’s holding
A denial of summary judgment on a defense other than statutory immunity, such as contributory negligence, is not a final appealable order.
“24 ) and proceed through red lights or stop signals ( R.C. 4511.03 ). Because the law and current police and emergency practice clearly contemplate the necessity in some circumstances of such emergency runs, a responding officer does not create an 'unreasonable' risk of harm by…”
The case’s holding
Summary judgment on statutory immunity is improper where reasonable minds could differ on whether an officer's emergency driving was willful, wanton, or reckless.
“03(A)(6), and whether Dutcher’s conduct “constitute[d] willful or wanton misconduct” and failed to comply with the precautions of R.C. 4511.03 so as to restore liability for Elm Valley pursuant to R.”
“ivision * * *, is liable in civil damages for injury, death, or loss to persons or property that is caused by the EMT-A’s, ADV EMT-A’s, paramedic’s, or operator’s operation of an ambulance while responding to or completing a call for emergency medical care or *19 treatment,…”
The case’s holding
An emergency medical technician's subjective belief that a call is an emergency suffices for statutory immunity, and an employer cannot be liable absent liability of the employee.
Later courts cite it for
“courts have interpreted the word 'emergency' broadly as it applies to the characterization of situations to which emergency personnel respond.” · 2 citing courts
cites § 4511.03 2×subsections: (A) 2×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 4511.03
“They argue that even if Stevenson’s affidavit is taken as true — that he ran the red light — it does not create a genuine issue of material fact that he acted wantonly or recklessly because under R.C. 4511.03(A), “[t]he driver of any emergency vehicle or public safety vehicle,…”
cites § 4511.03 5×subsections: (A) 4×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 4511.03
“In its third assignment of error, the City contends that the trial court erred when it found that R.C. 4511.03 did not apply to the facts of this case because under this statute, Officer Prettyman did not have to stop at the intersection.”
“of the Revised Code, the operation of the vehicle did not constitute willful or wanton misconduct, and the operation complies with the precautions of section 4511.03 of the Revised Code. (2) Except as otherwise provided in sections 3314.”
11
GREENLipscomb v. Lewis, 619 N.E.2d 102 (Ohio Ct. App. 12th Dist. 1993).
cites § 4511.03 2×cited by 24 cases
Where it cites § 4511.03
“*103 Furthermore, because he was responding to an emergency call, Lewis was authorized by R.C. 4511.03 to proceed through the stop sign.”
The case’s holding
An ambulance operator answering an emergency call is immune from liability for failing to use sirens or lights or obey a stop sign absent willful, wanton, or reckless conduct.
Later courts cite it for
“a perverse disregard for a known risk.” · 1 citing court
“of the Revised Code, the operation of the vehicle did not constitute willful or wanton misconduct, and the operation complies with the precautions of section 4511.03 of the Revised Code. (2) Except as otherwise provided in sections 3314.”
Later courts cite it for
“to succeed on a claim of false arrest or imprisonment, a plaintiff must establish that the defendants were without legal authority to arrest and detain him and that the detention was not accomplished pursuant to accepted legal procedures.” · 3 citing courts
“24) and proceed through red lights or stop signals (R.C. 4511.03). Because the law and current police and emergency practice clearly contemplate the necessity in some circumstances of such emergency runs, a responding officer does not create an "unreasonable" risk of harm by…”
15
NEUTRALHarris v. Kennedy, 689 N.E.2d 53 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. 1996).
cites § 4511.03 6×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 4511.03
“02(B)(1)(c) provides a complete defense to a city for the negligent operation of an EMS motor vehicle if three criteria are met: (1) the employee, validly licensed to drive, is operating the vehicle in response to an emergency call; (2) the operation of that vehicle did not…”
“of the Revised Code, the operation of the vehicle did not constitute willful or wanton misconduct, and the operation complies with the precautions of section 4511.03 of the Revised Code. R.C.”
“{¶ 62} Initially, we note that because appellees were responding to an emergency call, Toles was authorized by R.C. 4511.03 to proceed through the stop sign under the following conditions: {¶ 63} “The driver of any emergency vehicle or public safety vehicle, when responding to…”
Later courts cite it for
“the high rate of speed at which the fire truck was traveling in conjunction with the claimed obstructions in the intersection that would interfere with a clear view of the whole intersection, we find that reasonable minds could find that toles and annen's actions in this case were reckless” · 1 citing court
“02(B)(1)(b)); and (3) when emergency medical service personnel respond to a call for emergency medical care, the operation is not willful or wanton and the driver complies with R.C. 4511.03 (R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)(c)). definition, the court in Colbert held that the officers’…”
“Finally, the officer in Whitley was driving a marked police cruiser, and the court analyzed his conduct under R.C. 4511.03, which permits emergency and public safety vehicles to “proceed cautiously” through a red light if the driver is responding to an emergency call.”
“041]: [(a)] Proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign but only after slowing down as may be necessary for safe operation [R.C. 4511.03.] The other policy dealt with Officer Taylor’s failure to properly maintain his equipment, relative to his cruiser being totaled in the…”
The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.
Citing cases by year
195819922026
One bar per 2 years. Tallest: 7 cases in 2010–2011. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.
By court
Ohio Ct. App.41Ohio2N.D. Ohio1
By subsection
(A)4 cases
Stevenson v. Prettyman, 951 N.E.2d 794 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. 2011).“They argue that even if Stevenson’s affidavit is taken as true — that he ran the red light — it does not create a genuine issue of material fact that he acted wantonly or recklessly because under R.C. 4511.03(A), “[t]he driver of any emergency vehicle or public safety vehicle,…”
Taylor v. Cleveland, 2012-Ohio-3369.“In its third assignment of error, the City contends that the trial court erred when it found that R.C. 4511.03 did not apply to the facts of this case because under this statute, Officer Prettyman did not have to stop at the intersection.”
Williams v. Stefka, 2012-Ohio-353.“1 1 We note that the city argued in its reply brief in support of its motion for summary judgment that appellant cannot proceed on a negligence theory that the city violated R.C. 4511.03 without allegations of willful or wanton misconduct.”
Sections that the same cases cite. The first number is counted among the 100 cases that cite § 4511.03 most heavily: how many of them are also among the other section’s own 20 leading cases.
Sections this text refers to
Enactment and amendments
Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.
Versions
Edition shown: laws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.