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Or. Rev. Stat. § 164.325 (2026)

Arson in the first degree

Edition and currency
laws through the 2025 session (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2025 session (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1973–2026 104citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 104 opinions since 1973, 26 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (1)(b) (12 cases).

      164.325 Arson in the first degree. (1) A person commits the crime of arson in the first degree if:

      (a) By starting a fire or causing an explosion, the person intentionally damages:

      (A) Protected property of another;

      (B) Any property, whether the property of the person or the property of another person, and such act recklessly places another person in danger of physical injury or protected property of another in danger of damage; or

      (C) Any property, whether the property of the person or the property of another person, and recklessly causes serious physical injury to a firefighter or peace officer acting in the line of duty relating to the fire; or

      (b) By knowingly engaging in the manufacture of methamphetamine, the person causes fire or causes an explosion that damages property described in paragraph (a) of this subsection.

      (2) Arson in the first degree is a Class A felony. [1971 c.743 §144; 1991 c.946 §1; 2005 c.706 §4]

 

      164.330 [Repealed by 1971 c.743 §432]

The 20 cases that cite Or. Rev. Stat. § 164.325 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENState v. Luers, 153 P.3d 688 (Or. Ct. App. 2007).
cites § 164.325 33×subsections: (1)(b) 22× (1)(c) 3× (1)(a)cited by 35 cases
Where it cites § 164.325
“Defendant was convicted of three counts of arson in the first degree, ORS 164.325; two counts of attempted arson in the first degree, ORS 161.”
The case’s holding
The mere assertion that evidence relating to some charges will influence the jury's consideration of other charges is insufficient to establish substantial prejudice requiring severance.
Later courts cite it for
“the mere assertion that evidence relating to some charges will influence the jury's consideration of other charges is insufficient” · 3 citing courts
2
GREENState v. Gonzalez, 534 P.3d 289 (Or. Ct. App. 2023).
cites § 164.325 6×subsections: (1)(a)(B) 2×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 164.325
“At sentencing, defendant argued that the Ballot Measure 11 mandatory minimum 90-month sentence for first-degree arson would be unconstitutionally disproportionate as applied to her, in violation of Article I, section 16, of the Oregon Constitution and the Eighth and Fourteenth…”
The case’s holding
A mandatory sentence violates the proportionality requirement only if it is shocking and personal characteristics are relevant only if they affect intellectual capacity comparable to a child.
Later courts cite it for
“in contrast with ryan, defendant has not identified any statutory or other basis for concluding that there is a 'societal standard that eschews' treating persons with defendant's mental health attributes the same way that other adults are treated where, as here, they are found to have acted with the requisite culpable mental state.” · 3 citing courts
3
GREENState v. Moncada, 250 P.3d 31 (Or. Ct. App. 2011).
cites § 164.325 9×subsections: (1)(b) 5×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 164.325
“In that case, the defendant was convicted of, inter alia, three counts of first-degree arson, ORS 164.325 (1999), 8 and two counts of attempted first-degree arson, ORS 161.”
Later courts cite it for
“where the statute defining a crime does not expressly identify the person who qualifies as a 'victim,' the court examines the statute to identify the gravamen of the crime and determine the class of persons whom the legislature intended to directly protect by way of the criminal proscription.” · 5 citing courts
4
GREENState v. Crawford, 171 P.3d 974 (Or. Ct. App. 2007).
cites § 164.325 7×subsections: (1)(b) 5×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 164.325
“ORS 164.325 (1999) 4 provided: “(1) A person commits the crime of arson in the first degree if, by starting a fire or causing an explosion, the person intentionally damages: *552 “(a) Protected property of another; “(b) Any property, whether the property of the person or the…”
Later courts cite it for
“broad, unitary risk or harm that could be triggered by any of several legally interchangeable means,” · 1 citing court
5
GREENState v. Leckenby, 117 P.3d 273 (Or. Ct. App. 2005).
cites § 164.325 5×subsections: (1)(a) (1)(b)cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 164.325
“Defendant appeals his conviction for two counts of arson in the first degree, ORS 164.325, contending that the trial court erred in refusing to give a requested jury instruction on a lesser-included offense of reckless burning, ORS 164.”
Later courts cite it for
“we are not prepared to say that, if the jury is not aware of the lesser offense, it is unlikely to have an effect on how the jury evaluates the greater offense.” · 1 citing court
6
GREENState v. Montez, 789 P.2d 1352 (Or. 1990).
cites § 164.325 2×cited by 169 cases
Where it cites § 164.325
“[1] Defendant also was charged with Arson in the First Degree (ORS 164.325) and Abuse of a Corpse (ORS 166.”
The case’s holding
A party fails to preserve an objection to prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments if they do not move for a mistrial immediately after the statements are made.
Later courts cite it for
“a penalty phase hearing is merely a continuation of the same trial and not a separate or collateral proceeding threatening a new or different sanction” · 3 citing courts
7
GREENState ex rel. Juv. Dep't v. Deford, 34 P.3d 673 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).
cites § 164.325 3×subsections: (1)(b)cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 164.325
“ORS 164.325 provides, in relevant part, that a person commits first-degree arson: “(1) * * * [I]f, by starting a fire or causing an explosion, the person intentionally damages: "* * * * * “(b) Any property, whether the property of the person or the property of another person,…”
The case’s holding
To establish property for arson, the state must prove the existence of a market where willing buyers and sellers engage in arm's-length transactions for value.
Later courts cite it for
“a market for the item in which willing buyers and sell- ers engage in arm's-length transactions in which the item is traded for value.” · 2 citing courts
8
REDState v. Keys, 460 P.3d 1020 (Or. Ct. App. 2020).
cites § 164.325 3×cited by 8 cases
Reversed by State v. Keys (2021): the Oregon Supreme Court's own opinion in this case.
Where it cites § 164.325
“Whether or not that particular type of jurisdiction is labeled “subject matter jurisdiction,” it is the kind of jurisdiction that must exist for a court to try or convict a defendant and, like the absence of subject matter jurisdiction, its absence may be raised for the first…”
Later courts cite it for
“in the absence of indictment, preliminary hearing, or waiver, the circuit court lacks jurisdiction to try the defendant and any judgment rendered in that case is void.” · 3 citing courts
9
GREENBurdge v. Palmateer, 112 P.3d 320 (Or. 2005).
cites § 164.325 2×cited by 42 cases
Where it cites § 164.325
“"(i) Arson in the first degree, as defined in ORS 164.325. "(j) Robbery in the first degree, as defined in ORS 164.”
The case’s holding
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show that a lawyer exercising reasonable professional skill and judgment would have recognized a statutory ambiguity at the time.
Later courts cite it for
“that any lawyer exercising reasonable professional skill and judgment necessarily would have seen it.” · 3 citing courts
10
GREENState v. Travalini, 168 P.3d 1159 (Or. Ct. App. 2007).
cites § 164.325 4×subsections: (1)(a)(A) (1)(a)(B)cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 164.325
“The statute under which defendant was convicted, ORS 164.325 (2003), amended by Or Laws 2005, ch 706, § 4, 3 provides: “(1) A person commits the crime of arson in the first degree if: “(a) By starting a fire or causing an explosion, the person intentionally damages: “(A)…”
Later courts cite it for
“both this court and the supreme court have reasoned that a subcategory fact is not an 'element' of the substantive offense to which it is related.” · 2 citing courts
11
GREENState v. Whitley, 666 P.2d 1340 (Or. 1983).
cites § 164.325 5×subsections: (1)(b) 2×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 164.325
“First degree arson is defined in ORS 164.325: “(1) A person commits the crime of arson in the first degree if, by starting a fire or causing an explosion, he intentionally damages: (a) Protected property of another; or (b) Any property, whether his own or another’s, and such act…”
Later courts cite it for
“any article, substance or thing of value, including, but not limited to, money, tangible and intangible personal prop- erty, real property, choses-in-action, evidence of debt or of contract.” · 2 citing courts
12
GREENState v. Azad Haji Abdullah, 348 P.3d 1 (Idaho 2015).
cites § 164.325 1×cited by 103 cases
Where it cites § 164.325
“”), and Or.Rev.Stat. § 164.325 (“A person commits the crime of arson in the first degree if .”
The case’s holding
A strong presumption exists that counsel makes all significant decisions through the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.
Later courts cite it for
“a strong presumption 'that counsel made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” · 6 citing courts
13
GREENState v. Haynes, 942 P.2d 295 (Or. Ct. App. 1997).
cites § 164.325 4×subsections: (2) 3×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 164.325
“” ORS 164.325. “Protected property” is defined in ORS 164.”
Later courts cite it for
“the legislature frequently specifies what a statutory term definitely includes and also provides a general definition of what the term means apart from those things specifically enumerated.” · 2 citing courts
14
GREENState v. Cervantes, 223 P.3d 425 (Or. Ct. App. 2009).
cites § 164.325 2×cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 164.325
“, ORS 164.325 (making it unlawful to recklessly cause serious physical injury to a firefighter or peace officer acting in the line of duty relating to a fire started by an offender intended to damage the property of the offender or another person's property); see also ORS 164.”
The case’s holding
A trial court considering a demurrer may consider only the information alleged in the indictment.
Later courts cite it for
“a demurrer in a criminal case is governed by ors 135.630. that statute provides that a trial court, when considering whether to sustain a demurrer, may consider only the information alleged in the indictment.” · 1 citing court
15
GREENState v. Delker, 858 P.2d 1345 (Or. Ct. App. 1993).
cites § 164.325 4×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 164.325
“The state appeals from an order dismissing the indictment on the ground of former jeopardy.”
16
GREENState v. McNall, 476 P.3d 1259 (Or. Ct. App. 2020).
cites § 164.325 3×subsections: (1)(a)(A)cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 164.325
“He appeals, arguing that there was insufficient evidence for a rational jury to con- clude that he had caused the explosion intentionally. Held: The evidence was suf- ficient for the jury to conclude that defendant committed both offenses.”
17
GREENState v. Arellano-Sanchez, 481 P.3d 349 (Or. Ct. App. 2021).
cites § 164.325 2×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 164.325
“255 (Count 8); attempted first-degree arson, ORS 164.325 (Count 10); and second-degree criminal mischief, ORS 164.”
Later courts cite it for
“when the state presents evidence of multiple factual occurrences which could each independently support a guilty verdict on a single charge” · 2 citing courts
18
GREENMorehouse v. Haynes, 253 P.3d 1068 (Or. 2011).
cites § 164.325 2×subsections: (1)(a)(B) 2×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 164.325
“149(1) (aggravated vehicular homicide uses the mental states "criminal negligence" and "recklessly"); ORS 164.325(1)(a)(B), (C) (first-degree arson includes the mental state "recklessly").”
Later courts cite it for
“we take the facts from the summary judgment record and view those facts and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from them in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the nonmoving party.” · 2 citing courts
19
GREENState v. White, 154 P.3d 124 (Or. Ct. App. 2007).
cites § 164.325 2×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 164.325
“247, and first-degree arson, ORS 164.325. 1 Defendant first assigns error to the trial court’s denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge of interfering with a peace officer, contending that the police officer’s order, which led to that conviction, was not…”
The case’s holding
Lawfulness of the order to leave the premises is an essential element of criminal trespass in the second degree, so the State must prove the order was lawful.
Later courts cite it for
“when reviewing a motion for a judgment of acquittal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the state to determine whether a rational trier of fact, making reasonable inferences, could have found that the state proved the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” · 3 citing courts
20
YELLOWState v. Barnum, 39 P.3d 178 (Or. 2002).
cites § 164.325 1×cited by 35 cases
Flagged on editorial review. Overruled by statute on other grounds: 12 citing opinions limit it to other grounds and 1 says overruled outright. As recognized in State v. White.
Where it cites § 164.325
“Following an investigation, a grand jury indicted defendant for one count of arson, ORS 164.325, and two counts of first-degree burglary, ORS 164.”
The case’s holding
Repeated violations of the same statute are separately punishable only if they are separated by a sufficient pause in criminal conduct such that one crime ends before another begins.
Later courts cite it for
“charged and convicted of two counts of burglary,” · 3 citing courts

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
197319992026

One bar per year. Tallest: 9 cases in 2025. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Or. Ct. App.86Or.1310th Cir.19th Cir.1Idaho1Utah1Wash. Ct. App.1
By subsection
(1)6 cases
State v. Henson, 125 P.3d 1271 (Or. Ct. App. 2006).
State v. Monaco, 586 P.3d 901 (Or. 2026).
State v. Sheppard, 581 P.2d 549 (Or. Ct. App. 1978).
State v. Mills, 273 P.3d 162 (Or. Ct. App. 2012).
State v. Stockett, 558 P.2d 1241 (Or. Ct. App. 1977).
Showing the top 5 of 6. More in the list view →
(1)(a)6 cases
State v. Luers, 153 P.3d 688 (Or. Ct. App. 2007).“Defendant was convicted of three counts of arson in the first degree, ORS 164.325; two counts of attempted arson in the first degree, ORS 161.”
State v. Leckenby, 117 P.3d 273 (Or. Ct. App. 2005).“Defendant appeals his conviction for two counts of arson in the first degree, ORS 164.325, contending that the trial court erred in refusing to give a requested jury instruction on a lesser-included offense of reckless burning, ORS 164.”
State v. Underhill, 341 Or. App. 834 (Or. Ct. App. 2025).
State v. Gibson, 600 P.2d 962 (Or. Ct. App. 1979).
State v. Monaco, 586 P.3d 901 (Or. 2026).
Showing the top 5 of 6. More in the list view →
(1)(a)(A)6 cases
State v. Travalini, 168 P.3d 1159 (Or. Ct. App. 2007).“The statute under which defendant was convicted, ORS 164.325 (2003), amended by Or Laws 2005, ch 706, § 4, 3 provides: “(1) A person commits the crime of arson in the first degree if: “(a) By starting a fire or causing an explosion, the person intentionally damages: “(A)…”
State v. McNall, 476 P.3d 1259 (Or. Ct. App. 2020).“He appeals, arguing that there was insufficient evidence for a rational jury to con- clude that he had caused the explosion intentionally. Held: The evidence was suf- ficient for the jury to conclude that defendant committed both offenses.”
State v. Underhill, 341 Or. App. 834 (Or. Ct. App. 2025).
State v. Dykstra, 479 P.3d 294 (Or. Ct. App. 2020).
State v. Galloway, 431 P.3d 432 (Or. Ct. App. 2018).
Showing the top 5 of 6. More in the list view →
(1)(a)(B)8 cases
State v. Gonzalez, 534 P.3d 289 (Or. Ct. App. 2023).“At sentencing, defendant argued that the Ballot Measure 11 mandatory minimum 90-month sentence for first-degree arson would be unconstitutionally disproportionate as applied to her, in violation of Article I, section 16, of the Oregon Constitution and the Eighth and Fourteenth…”
Morehouse v. Haynes, 253 P.3d 1068 (Or. 2011).“149(1) (aggravated vehicular homicide uses the mental states "criminal negligence" and "recklessly"); ORS 164.325(1)(a)(B), (C) (first-degree arson includes the mental state "recklessly").”
State v. Travalini, 168 P.3d 1159 (Or. Ct. App. 2007).
State v. Mills, 273 P.3d 162 (Or. Ct. App. 2012).
State v. Jones, 347 P.3d 346 (Or. Ct. App. 2015).
Showing the top 5 of 8. More in the list view →
(1)(b)12 cases
State v. Luers, 153 P.3d 688 (Or. Ct. App. 2007).
State v. Moncada, 250 P.3d 31 (Or. Ct. App. 2011).“In that case, the defendant was convicted of, inter alia, three counts of first-degree arson, ORS 164.325 (1999), 8 and two counts of attempted first-degree arson, ORS 161.”
State v. Crawford, 171 P.3d 974 (Or. Ct. App. 2007).“ORS 164.325 (1999) 4 provided: “(1) A person commits the crime of arson in the first degree if, by starting a fire or causing an explosion, the person intentionally damages: *552 “(a) Protected property of another; “(b) Any property, whether the property of the person or the…”
State ex rel. Juv. Dep't v. Deford, 34 P.3d 673 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).“ORS 164.325 provides, in relevant part, that a person commits first-degree arson: “(1) * * * [I]f, by starting a fire or causing an explosion, the person intentionally damages: "* * * * * “(b) Any property, whether the property of the person or the property of another person,…”
State v. Whitley, 666 P.2d 1340 (Or. 1983).“First degree arson is defined in ORS 164.325: “(1) A person commits the crime of arson in the first degree if, by starting a fire or causing an explosion, he intentionally damages: (a) Protected property of another; or (b) Any property, whether his own or another’s, and such act…”
Showing the top 5 of 12. More in the list view →
(1)(c)1 case
State v. Luers, 153 P.3d 688 (Or. Ct. App. 2007).
(2)1 case
State v. Haynes, 942 P.2d 295 (Or. Ct. App. 1997).“” ORS 164.325. “Protected property” is defined in ORS 164.”

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Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2025 session (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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