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Oregon Revised Statutes

Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.665 (2026)

Definitions

✓ current as of May 2026
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      163.665 Definitions. As used in ORS 163.665 to 163.693:

      (1) “Child” means a person who is less than 18 years of age, and any reference to a child in relation to a visual recording of the child is a reference to a person who was less than 18 years of age at the time the original image in the visual recording was created and not the age of the person at the time of an alleged offense relating to the subsequent reproduction, use or possession of the visual recording.

      (2) “Child abuse” means conduct that constitutes, or would constitute if committed in this state, a crime in which the victim is a child.

      (3) “Sexually explicit conduct” means actual or simulated:

      (a) Sexual intercourse or deviant sexual intercourse;

      (b) Genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital or oral-anal contact, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex or between humans and animals;

      (c) Penetration of the vagina or rectum by any object other than as part of a medical diagnosis or treatment or as part of a personal hygiene practice;

      (d) Masturbation;

      (e) Sadistic or masochistic abuse; or

      (f) Lewd exhibition of sexual or other intimate parts.

      (4) “Visual depiction” includes, but is not limited to, visual recordings, pictures and computer-generated images and pictures, whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical or other means.

      (5) “Visual recording” includes, but is not limited to, photographs, films, videotapes and computer and other digital pictures, regardless of the manner in which the recording is stored. [1985 c.557 §2; 1987 c.864 §1; 1991 c.664 §4; 1995 c.768 §4; 1997 c.719 §5; 2011 c.515 §1]

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 46 cases (16 in the last 5 years), 1993–2026 · leading case: State v. Stoneman, 920 P.2d 535 (Or. 1996).
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State v. Stoneman, 920 P.2d 535 (Or. 1996). · cites it 24× “That part began with a definition of "sexually explicit conduct" at ORS 163.665 (1987), set out above at note 4, and then at ORS 163.”
State v. Parra-Sanchez, 527 P.3d 1008 (Or. Ct. App. 2023). · cites it 17× “670 and the definitional statute attendant to that statute, ORS 163.665, support that formulation. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the answer to that question is no.”
State v. DiMolfetto, 342 Or. App. 456 (Or. Ct. App. 2025). · cites it 21× “In sum, the 1995 amendment to the definition of “sexually explicit conduct” in ORS 163.665(3) (f) does not affect the continuing validity of Stoneman or its application to this case.”
State v. Meyer, 852 P.2d 879 (Or. Ct. App. 1993). · cites it 12× “" ORS 163.665 provided, [6] in part: "`Sexually explicit conduct' means actual or simulated * * * (6) Lewd exhibition of genitals or anus.”
Schmidt v. Archdiocese of Portland, 180 P.3d 160 (Or. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 16× “005 and ORS 163.665, which, he contends, provide contextual support for his proposed interpretation of the phrase in ORS 12.”
State v. Carey-Martin, 430 P.3d 98 (Or. Ct. App. 2018). · cites it 5× “803: " ORS 163.665 [to] 163.693 govern the prosecution of crimes involving child pornography.”
State v. Stoneman, 888 P.2d 39 (Or. Ct. App. 1994). · cites it 9× “ORS 163.665 to ORS 163.695. The foundation of those statutes is ORS 163.”
State v. Garrett, 455 P.3d 979 (Or. Ct. App. 2019). · cites it 5× “” ORS 163.665(1). Here, the indictment alleged: (1) defen- dant “knowingly;” (2) “duplicate[d];” (3) “a photograph of sex- ually explicit conduct involving a child;” (4) while “knowing or being aware of and consciously disregarding the fact that creation of the visual recording…”
State v. Dunlap, 168 P.3d 295 (Or. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 4× “686 pertaining to depiction of “sexually explicit conduct involving a child,” which is defined in part in ORS 163.665 as the “[l]ewd exhibition of sexual or other intimate parts.”
United States v. Moon, 73 M.J. 382 (C.A.A.F. 2014). · cites it 2× “A (West 2014) (including lewd depictions of female breasts in the definition of “child pornography”); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 163.665 (West 2014) (defining “[s]exually explicit conduct” to include lewd exhibitions of sexual or other intimate parts); Tenn.”
State v. Cannon, 537 P.3d 182 (Or. Ct. App. 2023). · cites it 7× “ORS 163.665 further defines several of the key terms used in those statutes.”
State v. Clay, 457 P.3d 330 (Or. Ct. App. 2019). · cites it 3× “” ORS 163.665(3). In support of his motion, defendant argued that ORS 163.”
Show all 46 citing cases →
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.665(1) — 9 cases
State v. Garrett, 455 P.3d 979 (Or. Ct. App. 2019). “” ORS 163.665(1). Here, the indictment alleged: (1) defen- dant “knowingly;” (2) “duplicate[d];” (3) “a photograph of sex- ually explicit conduct involving a child;” (4) while “knowing or being aware of and consciously disregarding the fact that creation of the visual recording…”
State v. Carey-Martin, 430 P.3d 98 (Or. Ct. App. 2018). “803: " ORS 163.665 [to] 163.693 govern the prosecution of crimes involving child pornography.”
State v. Cazee, 482 P.3d 140 (Or. Ct. App. 2021).
State v. Stoneman, 888 P.2d 39 (Or. Ct. App. 1994). “ORS 163.665 to ORS 163.695. The foundation of those statutes is ORS 163.”
State v. Reeves, 280 P.3d 994 (Or. Ct. App. 2012).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.665(2) — 5 cases
State v. Meyer, 852 P.2d 879 (Or. Ct. App. 1993). “" ORS 163.665 provided, [6] in part: "`Sexually explicit conduct' means actual or simulated * * * (6) Lewd exhibition of genitals or anus.”
Schmidt v. Archdiocese of Portland, 180 P.3d 160 (Or. Ct. App. 2008). “005 and ORS 163.665, which, he contends, provide contextual support for his proposed interpretation of the phrase in ORS 12.”
State v. Richardson, 323 P.3d 311 (Or. Ct. App. 2014).
State v. Cannon, 537 P.3d 182 (Or. Ct. App. 2023). “ORS 163.665 further defines several of the key terms used in those statutes.”
State v. Cannon (Or. Ct. App. 2023).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.665(2)(f) — 2 cases
State v. Meyer, 852 P.2d 879 (Or. Ct. App. 1993). “" ORS 163.665 provided, [6] in part: "`Sexually explicit conduct' means actual or simulated * * * (6) Lewd exhibition of genitals or anus.”
State v. Lewis, 854 P.2d 1009 (Or. Ct. App. 1993).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.665(3) — 18 cases
State v. Parra-Sanchez, 527 P.3d 1008 (Or. Ct. App. 2023). “670 and the definitional statute attendant to that statute, ORS 163.665, support that formulation. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the answer to that question is no.”
State v. Stoneman, 920 P.2d 535 (Or. 1996). “That part began with a definition of "sexually explicit conduct" at ORS 163.665 (1987), set out above at note 4, and then at ORS 163.”
State v. Clay, 457 P.3d 330 (Or. Ct. App. 2019). “” ORS 163.665(3). In support of his motion, defendant argued that ORS 163.”
State v. Garrett, 455 P.3d 979 (Or. Ct. App. 2019). “” ORS 163.665(1). Here, the indictment alleged: (1) defen- dant “knowingly;” (2) “duplicate[d];” (3) “a photograph of sex- ually explicit conduct involving a child;” (4) while “knowing or being aware of and consciously disregarding the fact that creation of the visual recording…”
State v. McNutt, 463 P.3d 563 (Or. Ct. App. 2020).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.665(3)(c) — 1 case
State v. Bonine, 326 Or. App. 662 (Or. Ct. App. 2023).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.665(3)(d) — 1 case
Schmidt v. Archdiocese of Portland, 180 P.3d 160 (Or. Ct. App. 2008). “005 and ORS 163.665, which, he contends, provide contextual support for his proposed interpretation of the phrase in ORS 12.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.665(3)(f) — 15 cases
State v. DiMolfetto, 342 Or. App. 456 (Or. Ct. App. 2025). “In sum, the 1995 amendment to the definition of “sexually explicit conduct” in ORS 163.665(3) (f) does not affect the continuing validity of Stoneman or its application to this case.”
State v. Parra-Sanchez, 527 P.3d 1008 (Or. Ct. App. 2023). “670 and the definitional statute attendant to that statute, ORS 163.665, support that formulation. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the answer to that question is no.”
State v. Dunlap, 168 P.3d 295 (Or. Ct. App. 2007). “686 pertaining to depiction of “sexually explicit conduct involving a child,” which is defined in part in ORS 163.665 as the “[l]ewd exhibition of sexual or other intimate parts.”
Schmidt v. Mt. Angel Abbey, 223 P.3d 399 (Or. 2009).
State v. Cannon, 537 P.3d 182 (Or. Ct. App. 2023). “ORS 163.665 further defines several of the key terms used in those statutes.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.665(4) — 3 cases
State v. Barger, 247 P.3d 309 (Or. 2011).
State v. Carey-Martin, 430 P.3d 98 (Or. Ct. App. 2018). “803: " ORS 163.665 [to] 163.693 govern the prosecution of crimes involving child pornography.”
State v. Reeves, 280 P.3d 994 (Or. Ct. App. 2012).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.665(5) — 1 case
State v. Garrett, 455 P.3d 979 (Or. Ct. App. 2019). “” ORS 163.665(1). Here, the indictment alleged: (1) defen- dant “knowingly;” (2) “duplicate[d];” (3) “a photograph of sex- ually explicit conduct involving a child;” (4) while “knowing or being aware of and consciously disregarding the fact that creation of the visual recording…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.665(6) — 3 cases
State v. Meyer, 852 P.2d 879 (Or. Ct. App. 1993). “" ORS 163.665 provided, [6] in part: "`Sexually explicit conduct' means actual or simulated * * * (6) Lewd exhibition of genitals or anus.”
State v. Mross, 360 P.3d 670 (Or. Ct. App. 2015).
State v. Evans, 37 P.3d 227 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).
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