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Oregon Revised Statutes

Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.755 (2026)

Conduct for which stalking protective order may not be issued

✓ current as of May 2026
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      163.755 Conduct for which stalking protective order may not be issued. (1) Nothing in ORS 30.866 or 163.730 to 163.750 shall be construed to permit the issuance of a court’s stalking protective order under ORS 30.866 or 163.738, the issuance of a citation under ORS 163.735, a criminal prosecution under ORS 163.732 or a civil action under ORS 30.866:

      (a) For conduct that is authorized or protected by the labor laws of this state or of the United States.

      (b) By or on behalf of a person who is in the legal or physical custody of a law enforcement unit or is in custody under ORS chapter 419C.

      (c) By or on behalf of a person not described in paragraph (b) of this subsection to or against another person who:

      (A) Is a parole and probation officer or an officer, employee or agent of a law enforcement unit, a county juvenile department or the Oregon Youth Authority; and

      (B) Is acting within the scope of the other person’s official duties.

      (2) As used in this section, “law enforcement unit” and “parole and probation officer” have the meanings given those terms in ORS 181A.355. [1995 c.353 §8; 2003 c.292 §1]

 

      Note: 163.755 was enacted into law by the Legislative Assembly but was not added to or made a part of ORS chapter 163 or any series therein by legislative action. See Preface to Oregon Revised Statutes for further explanation.

 

SEXUAL ABUSE

RESTRAINING ORDERS

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 4 cases, 1999–2015 · leading case: State v. Rangel, 977 P.2d 379 (Or. 1999).
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State v. Rangel, 977 P.2d 379 (Or. 1999). “See ORS 163.755 (exempting conduct protected by state or federal labor laws).”
Amarillas v. White, 292 P.3d 587 (Or. Ct. App. 2012). · cites it 3× “” Respondent invokes ORS 163.755(l)(c), which provides: “(1) Nothing in ORS 30.”
Habrat v. Milligan, 145 P.3d 180 (Or. Ct. App. 2006). “The trial court appeared explicitly to discredit respondent’s testimony that any of his conduct, beyond the actual delivery of mail to the salon, was required by his official position.”
Campola v. Zekan, 362 P.3d 1205 (Or. Ct. App. 2015). “Our conclusion that the evidence is insufficient to support the entry of the SPO against respondent makes it unnecessary for us to address respondent’s additional assignments of error: that “[t]he Circuit Court’s imposition of a permanent SPO against Respondent, whose actions…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.755(1)(a) — 1 case
Campola v. Zekan, 362 P.3d 1205 (Or. Ct. App. 2015). “Our conclusion that the evidence is insufficient to support the entry of the SPO against respondent makes it unnecessary for us to address respondent’s additional assignments of error: that “[t]he Circuit Court’s imposition of a permanent SPO against Respondent, whose actions…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.755(l)(c) — 1 case
Amarillas v. White, 292 P.3d 587 (Or. Ct. App. 2012). “” Respondent invokes ORS 163.755(l)(c), which provides: “(1) Nothing in ORS 30.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.755(l)(e)(B) — 1 case
Habrat v. Milligan, 145 P.3d 180 (Or. Ct. App. 2006). “The trial court appeared explicitly to discredit respondent’s testimony that any of his conduct, beyond the actual delivery of mail to the salon, was required by his official position.”
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