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Oregon Revised Statutes

Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.725 (2026)

Remedies for violation of ORS 166.720; time limitation

✓ current as of May 2026
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      166.725 Remedies for violation of ORS 166.720; time limitation. (1) Any circuit court may, after making due provision for the rights of innocent persons, enjoin violations of the provisions of ORS 166.720 (1) to (4) by issuing appropriate orders and judgments, including, but not limited to:

      (a) Ordering a divestiture by the defendant of any interest in any enterprise, including real property.

      (b) Imposing reasonable restrictions upon the future activities or investments of any defendant, including, but not limited to, prohibiting any defendant from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise in which the defendant was engaged in violation of the provisions of ORS 166.720 (1) to (4).

      (c) Ordering the dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise.

      (d) Ordering the suspension or revocation of a license, permit or prior approval granted to any enterprise by any agency of the state.

      (e) Ordering the forfeiture of the charter of a corporation organized under the laws of this state, or the revocation of a certificate of authority authorizing a foreign corporation to conduct business within this state, upon finding that the board of directors or a managerial agent acting on behalf of the corporation, in conducting the affairs of the corporation, has authorized or engaged in conduct in violation of ORS 166.720 (1) to (4) and that, for the prevention of future criminal activity, the public interest requires the charter of the corporation forfeited and the corporation dissolved or the certificate of authority revoked.

      (2) All property, real or personal, including money, used in the course of, derived from or realized through conduct in violation of a provision of ORS 166.715 to 166.735 is subject to civil forfeiture to the state. The state shall dispose of all forfeited property as soon as commercially feasible. If property is not exercisable or transferable for value by the state, it shall expire. All forfeitures or dispositions under this section shall be made with due provision for the rights of innocent persons. Forfeited property shall be distributed as follows:

      (a)(A) All moneys and the clear proceeds of all other property forfeited shall be deposited with the State Treasurer to the credit of the Common School Fund.

      (B) For purposes of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, “clear proceeds” means proceeds of forfeited property less costs of maintaining and preserving property pending its sale or other disposition, less costs of sale or disposition and, if the Department of Justice has not otherwise recovered its costs and expenses of the investigation and prosecution leading to the forfeiture, less 30 percent of the remaining proceeds of the property which is awarded to the department as reasonable reimbursement for costs of such investigation and prosecution.

      (b) Any amounts awarded to the Department of Justice pursuant to paragraph (a) of this subsection shall be deposited in the Criminal Justice Revolving Account in the State Treasury.

      (3) Property subject to forfeiture under this section may be seized by a police officer, as defined in ORS 133.525, upon court process. Seizure without process may be made if:

      (a) The seizure is incident to a lawful arrest or search or an inspection under an administrative inspection warrant; or

      (b) The property subject to seizure has been the subject of a prior judgment in favor of the state in a forfeiture proceeding based upon this section.

      (4) In the event of a seizure under subsection (3) of this section, a forfeiture proceeding shall be instituted promptly. Property taken or detained under this section shall not be subject to replevin, but is deemed to be in the custody of the police officer making the seizure, subject only to the order of the court. When property is seized under this section, pending forfeiture and final disposition, the police officer may:

      (a) Place the property under seal;

      (b) Remove the property to a place designated by the court; or

      (c) Require another agency authorized by law to take custody of the property and remove it to an appropriate location.

      (5) The Attorney General, any district attorney or any state agency having jurisdiction over conduct in violation of a provision of ORS 166.715 to 166.735 may institute civil proceedings under this section. In any action brought under this section, the circuit court shall give priority to the hearing and determination. Pending final determination, the circuit court may at any time enter such injunctions, prohibitions or restraining orders, or take such actions, including the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, as the court may deem proper. The Attorney General, district attorney or state agency bringing an action under this section may be awarded, upon entry of a judgment in favor of the state, costs of investigation and litigation, reasonably incurred. Amounts recovered may include costs and expenses of state and local governmental departments and agencies incurred in connection with the investigation or litigation.

      (6)(a) Any aggrieved person may institute a proceeding under subsection (1) of this section:

      (A) If the proceeding is based upon racketeering activity for which a criminal conviction has been obtained, any rights of appeal have expired and the action is against the individual convicted of the racketeering activity; or

      (B) If the person is entitled to pursue a cause of action under subsection (7)(a)(B) of this section.

      (b) In such proceeding, relief shall be granted in conformity with the principles that govern the granting of injunctive relief from threatened loss or damage in other civil cases, except that no showing of special or irreparable damage to the person shall have to be made. Upon the execution of proper bond against damages for an injunction improvidently granted and a showing of immediate danger of significant loss or damage, a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction may be issued in any such action before a final determination on the merits.

      (7)(a) Any person who is injured by reason of any violation of the provisions of ORS 166.720 (1) to (4) shall have a cause of action for three-fold the actual damages sustained and, when appropriate, punitive damages:

      (A) If a criminal conviction for the racketeering activity that is the basis of the violation has been obtained, any rights of appeal have expired and the action is against the individual convicted of the racketeering activity; or

      (B) If the violation is based on racketeering activity as defined in ORS 166.715 (6)(a)(B) to (J), (K) as it relates to burglary and criminal trespass, (L) to (P), (S), (T), (U), (V), (X) to (Z), (AA) to (EE), (LL), (MM) or (PP) to (WW).

      (b) The defendant or any injured person may demand a trial by jury in any civil action brought pursuant to this subsection.

      (c) Any injured person shall have a right or claim to forfeited property or to the proceeds derived therefrom superior to any right or claim the state has in the same property or proceeds.

      (8) An investigative agency may bring an action for civil penalties for any violation of ORS 166.720 (1) to (4). Upon proof of any such violation, the court shall impose a civil penalty of not more than $250,000.

      (9) A judgment rendered in favor of the state in any criminal proceeding under ORS 166.715 to 166.735 shall estop the defendant in any subsequent civil action or proceeding brought by the state or any other person as to all matters as to which such judgment would be an estoppel as between the state and the defendant.

      (10) The Attorney General may, upon timely application, intervene in any civil action or proceeding brought under subsection (6) or (7) of this section if the Attorney General certifies that, in the opinion of the Attorney General, the action or proceeding is of general public importance. In such action or proceeding, the state shall be entitled to the same relief as if the Attorney General instituted the action or proceeding.

      (11)(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a criminal or civil action or proceeding under ORS 166.715 to 166.735 may be commenced at any time within five years after the conduct in violation of a provision of ORS 166.715 to 166.735 terminates or the cause of action accrues. If a criminal prosecution or civil action or other proceeding is brought, or intervened in, to punish, prevent or restrain any violation of the provisions of ORS 166.715 to 166.735, the running of the period of limitations prescribed by this section with respect to any cause of action arising under subsection (6) or (7) of this section which is based in whole or in part upon any matter complained of in any such prosecution, action or proceeding shall be suspended during the pendency of such prosecution, action or proceeding and for two years following its termination.

      (b) A cause of action arising under subsection (6)(a)(A) or (7)(a)(A) of this section accrues when the criminal conviction for the underlying activity is obtained. In addition to any suspension of the running of the period of limitations provided for in paragraph (a) of this subsection, the period of limitations prescribed by paragraph (a) of this subsection is suspended during any appeal from the criminal conviction for the underlying activity.

      (12) The application of one civil remedy under any provision of ORS 166.715 to 166.735 shall not preclude the application of any other remedy, civil or criminal, under ORS 166.715 to 166.735 or any other provision of law. Civil remedies under ORS 166.715 to 166.735 are supplemental and not mutually exclusive.

      (13) Notwithstanding subsection (6) or (7) of this section, a person may not institute a proceeding under subsection (6) of this section and does not have a cause of action under subsection (7) of this section if the conduct that is the basis of the proceeding or action could also be the basis of a claim of discrimination because of sex that constitutes sexual harassment.

      (14) In an action brought under the provisions of this section by a person other than the Attorney General, a district attorney or a state agency, the court may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party. In a civil action brought under the provisions of this section by the Attorney General, a district attorney or a state agency:

      (a) The court may award reasonable attorney fees to the Attorney General, district attorney or state agency if the Attorney General, district attorney or state agency prevails in the action; and

      (b) The court may award reasonable attorney fees to a defendant who prevails in an action under this section if the court determines that the Attorney General, district attorney or state agency had no objectively reasonable basis for asserting the claim or no reasonable basis for appealing an adverse decision of the trial court. [1981 c.769 §5; 1983 c.715 §2; 1995 c.79 §54; 1995 c.618 §58a; 1995 c.619 §1; 1995 c.696 §17; 1997 c.249 §51; 1997 c.789 §3; 2003 c.576 §390; 2007 c.869 §8; 2017 c.21 §101; 2023 c.216 §4]

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 34 cases (3 in the last 5 years), 1987–2026 · leading case: Am. Fed'n of Teachers-Oregon v. Oregon Taxpayers United Pac, 145 P.3d 1111 (Or. Ct. App. 2006).
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Am. Fed'n of Teachers-Oregon v. Oregon Taxpayers United Pac, 145 P.3d 1111 (Or. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 53× “See ORS 166.725 (persons harmed by unlawful racketeering may obtain treble damages and various other forms of relief).”
Black v. Arizala, 48 P.3d 843 (Or. Ct. App. 2002). · cites it 14× “We next consider plaintiffs' argument that the court also erred in holding *851 that, as a result of the 1995 amendments to ORS 166.725, plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under ORICO.”
Cruze v. Hudler, 267 P.3d 176 (Or. Ct. App. 2011). · cites it 11× “725(7)(a)(B) (aggrieved person may bring a civil ORICO claim for damages “[i]f the violation is based on racketeering activity as defined in” ORS 166.715(6)(P) (referring to forgery and related offenses)).”
Htaike v. Sein, 344 P.3d 527 (Or. Ct. App. 2015). · cites it 6× “The ORICO statute of limitations, ORS 166.725 (ll)(a), provides, in relevant part: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a criminal or civil action or proceeding under ORS 166.”
Oregon Educ. Ass'n v. Parks, 291 P.3d 789 (Or. Ct. App. 2012). · cites it 7× “The court also concluded that plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence that they were injured by reason of defendants’ violation of ORS 166.”
Willms v. AmeriTitle, Inc., 499 P.3d 79 (Or. Ct. App. 2021). · cites it 6× “For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment on plaintiffs’ common law fraud claim and reverse the judgment on plaintiffs’ ORICO claim because the trial court erred when it prevented defendant from arguing to the jury that plaintiffs’ claims were time barred under the…”
Am. Fed'n of Teachers v. Oregon Taxpayers United Pac, 189 P.3d 9 (Or. 2008). · cites it 15× “We therefore affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.”
Oregon Educ. Ass'n v. Oregon Taxpayers United, 291 P.3d 202 (Or. Ct. App. 2012). · cites it 3× “To the contrary, when we upheld the injunction as applied to Sizemore in AFT III, we noted that, “[i]n issuing the injunction, the court in this case acted under its authority in ORS 166.725(1) to issue ‘appropriate orders and judgments’ in an ORICO case.”
Black v. Arizala, 95 P.3d 1109 (Or. 2004). · cites it 2× “ORS 166.725(6), (7); Or Laws 1995, ch 619, § 1.”
Riddle v. Eugene Lodge No. 357 of the Benevolent & Prot. Order of Elks of the United States, 768 P.2d 917 (Or. Ct. App. 1989). · cites it 5× “720; they must show that they come within the provisions of ORS 166.725(7)(a): “Any person who is injured by reason of any violation of the provisions of ORS 166.”
Swango v. Nationstar Sub1, LLC, 292 F. Supp. 3d 1134 (D. Or. 2018). · cites it 2× “" Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.725 (7)(a)(B). MetLife and Nationstar are correct that Plaintiff failed to plead a qualifying predicate violation under ORICO because mail fraud is not among the listed predicates and the allegations in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint do not clearly fit…”
Oregon Educ. Ass'n v. Oregon Taxpayers United PAC, 204 P.3d 855 (Or. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 4× “In their second assignment of error, defendants assert that plaintiffs do not have standing to bring this action for contempt because they were not aggrieved by the alleged contempt.”
Show all 34 citing cases →
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.725(1) — 5 cases
Am. Fed'n of Teachers-Oregon v. Oregon Taxpayers United Pac, 145 P.3d 1111 (Or. Ct. App. 2006). “See ORS 166.725 (persons harmed by unlawful racketeering may obtain treble damages and various other forms of relief).”
Oregon Educ. Ass'n v. Oregon Taxpayers United, 291 P.3d 202 (Or. Ct. App. 2012). “To the contrary, when we upheld the injunction as applied to Sizemore in AFT III, we noted that, “[i]n issuing the injunction, the court in this case acted under its authority in ORS 166.725(1) to issue ‘appropriate orders and judgments’ in an ORICO case.”
Oregon Educ. Ass'n v. Oregon Taxpayers United PAC, 204 P.3d 855 (Or. Ct. App. 2009). “In their second assignment of error, defendants assert that plaintiffs do not have standing to bring this action for contempt because they were not aggrieved by the alleged contempt.”
State ex rel. Reid v. Frohnmayer, 763 P.2d 733 (Or. Ct. App. 1988).
State Accident Ins. Fund v. Anderson, 894 P.2d 1152 (Or. 1995).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.725(1)(b) — 1 case
Am. Fed'n of Teachers-Oregon v. Oregon Taxpayers United Pac, 145 P.3d 1111 (Or. Ct. App. 2006). “See ORS 166.725 (persons harmed by unlawful racketeering may obtain treble damages and various other forms of relief).”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.725(10) — 1 case
Am. Fed'n of Teachers-Oregon v. Oregon Taxpayers United Pac, 145 P.3d 1111 (Or. Ct. App. 2006). “See ORS 166.725 (persons harmed by unlawful racketeering may obtain treble damages and various other forms of relief).”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.725(11) — 3 cases
Htaike v. Sein, 344 P.3d 527 (Or. Ct. App. 2015). “The ORICO statute of limitations, ORS 166.725 (ll)(a), provides, in relevant part: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a criminal or civil action or proceeding under ORS 166.”
Penuel v. Titan/Value Equities Grp., Inc., 872 P.2d 28 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).
Stevens v. Stevens (D. Or. 2024).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.725(11)(a) — 1 case
Willms v. AmeriTitle, Inc., 499 P.3d 79 (Or. Ct. App. 2021). “For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment on plaintiffs’ common law fraud claim and reverse the judgment on plaintiffs’ ORICO claim because the trial court erred when it prevented defendant from arguing to the jury that plaintiffs’ claims were time barred under the…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.725(11)(b) — 1 case
Black v. Arizala, 48 P.3d 843 (Or. Ct. App. 2002). “We next consider plaintiffs' argument that the court also erred in holding *851 that, as a result of the 1995 amendments to ORS 166.725, plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under ORICO.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.725(12) — 4 cases
Multnomah Cnty. V. $5,650 In U.S. Currency, 786 P.2d 729 (Or. 1990).
State Accident Ins. Fund v. Anderson, 894 P.2d 1152 (Or. 1995).
Multnomah Cnty. v. $5,650 in U.S. Currency, 774 P.2d 489 (Or. Ct. App. 1989).
State Accident Ins. Fund Corp. v. Anderson, 863 P.2d 509 (Or. Ct. App. 1993).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.725(13) — 1 case
Cruze v. Hudler, 267 P.3d 176 (Or. Ct. App. 2011). “725(7)(a)(B) (aggrieved person may bring a civil ORICO claim for damages “[i]f the violation is based on racketeering activity as defined in” ORS 166.715(6)(P) (referring to forgery and related offenses)).”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.725(14) — 2 cases
Htaike v. Sein, 344 P.3d 527 (Or. Ct. App. 2015). “The ORICO statute of limitations, ORS 166.725 (ll)(a), provides, in relevant part: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a criminal or civil action or proceeding under ORS 166.”
Willms v. AmeriTitle, Inc., 499 P.3d 79 (Or. Ct. App. 2021). “For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment on plaintiffs’ common law fraud claim and reverse the judgment on plaintiffs’ ORICO claim because the trial court erred when it prevented defendant from arguing to the jury that plaintiffs’ claims were time barred under the…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.725(2) — 1 case
State Accident Ins. Fund v. Anderson, 894 P.2d 1152 (Or. 1995).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.725(5) — 3 cases
Oregon Educ. Ass'n v. Oregon Taxpayers United PAC, 204 P.3d 855 (Or. Ct. App. 2009). “In their second assignment of error, defendants assert that plaintiffs do not have standing to bring this action for contempt because they were not aggrieved by the alleged contempt.”
State ex rel. Reid v. Frohnmayer, 763 P.2d 733 (Or. Ct. App. 1988).
State Accident Ins. Fund v. Anderson, 894 P.2d 1152 (Or. 1995).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.725(6) — 4 cases
Black v. Arizala, 48 P.3d 843 (Or. Ct. App. 2002). “We next consider plaintiffs' argument that the court also erred in holding *851 that, as a result of the 1995 amendments to ORS 166.725, plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under ORICO.”
Black v. Arizala, 95 P.3d 1109 (Or. 2004). “ORS 166.725(6), (7); Or Laws 1995, ch 619, § 1.”
Taylor v. Hender, 840 P.2d 1331 (Or. Ct. App. 1992).
State Accident Ins. Fund v. Anderson, 894 P.2d 1152 (Or. 1995).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.725(7) — 7 cases
Oregon Educ. Ass'n v. Parks, 291 P.3d 789 (Or. Ct. App. 2012). “The court also concluded that plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence that they were injured by reason of defendants’ violation of ORS 166.”
Ainslie v. First Interstate Bank, 939 P.2d 125 (Or. Ct. App. 1997).
Penuel v. Titan/Value Equities Grp., Inc., 872 P.2d 28 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).
Comput. Concepts, Inc. v. Brandt, 905 P.2d 1177 (Or. Ct. App. 1995).
State ex rel. Reid v. Frohnmayer, 763 P.2d 733 (Or. Ct. App. 1988).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.725(7)(a) — 12 cases
Am. Fed'n of Teachers-Oregon v. Oregon Taxpayers United Pac, 145 P.3d 1111 (Or. Ct. App. 2006). “See ORS 166.725 (persons harmed by unlawful racketeering may obtain treble damages and various other forms of relief).”
Am. Fed'n of Teachers v. Oregon Taxpayers United Pac, 189 P.3d 9 (Or. 2008). “We therefore affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.”
Oregon Educ. Ass'n v. Parks, 291 P.3d 789 (Or. Ct. App. 2012). “The court also concluded that plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence that they were injured by reason of defendants’ violation of ORS 166.”
Riddle v. Eugene Lodge No. 357 of the Benevolent & Prot. Order of Elks of the United States, 768 P.2d 917 (Or. Ct. App. 1989). “720; they must show that they come within the provisions of ORS 166.725(7)(a): “Any person who is injured by reason of any violation of the provisions of ORS 166.”
Cruze v. Hudler, 267 P.3d 176 (Or. Ct. App. 2011). “725(7)(a)(B) (aggrieved person may bring a civil ORICO claim for damages “[i]f the violation is based on racketeering activity as defined in” ORS 166.715(6)(P) (referring to forgery and related offenses)).”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.725(7)(a)(B) — 5 cases
Cruze v. Hudler, 267 P.3d 176 (Or. Ct. App. 2011). “725(7)(a)(B) (aggrieved person may bring a civil ORICO claim for damages “[i]f the violation is based on racketeering activity as defined in” ORS 166.715(6)(P) (referring to forgery and related offenses)).”
Am. Fed'n of Teachers-Oregon v. Oregon Taxpayers United Pac, 145 P.3d 1111 (Or. Ct. App. 2006). “See ORS 166.725 (persons harmed by unlawful racketeering may obtain treble damages and various other forms of relief).”
Great Am. Ins. v. Linderman, 116 F. Supp. 3d 1183 (D. Or. 2015).
Columbia Sportswear North Am., Inc. v. Seirus Innovative Accessories, Inc. (D. Or. 2019).
Columbia Sportswear North Am., Inc. v. Seirus Innovative Accessories, Inc. (D. Or. 2020).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.725(7)(c) — 2 cases
Oregon Ex Rel. Frohnmayer v. Lacy (In Re Lacy), 74 B.R. 23 (Bankr. D. Or. 1987).
State ex rel. Reid v. Frohnmayer, 763 P.2d 733 (Or. Ct. App. 1988).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.725(8) — 1 case
State Accident Ins. Fund v. Anderson, 894 P.2d 1152 (Or. 1995).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.725(l)(a) — 1 case
State Accident Ins. Fund v. Anderson, 894 P.2d 1152 (Or. 1995).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.725(l)(b) — 2 cases
Am. Fed'n of Teachers-Oregon v. Oregon Taxpayers United Pac, 145 P.3d 1111 (Or. Ct. App. 2006). “See ORS 166.725 (persons harmed by unlawful racketeering may obtain treble damages and various other forms of relief).”
Oregon Educ. Ass'n v. Oregon Taxpayers United, 291 P.3d 202 (Or. Ct. App. 2012). “To the contrary, when we upheld the injunction as applied to Sizemore in AFT III, we noted that, “[i]n issuing the injunction, the court in this case acted under its authority in ORS 166.725(1) to issue ‘appropriate orders and judgments’ in an ORICO case.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.725(l)(d) — 1 case
State Accident Ins. Fund v. Anderson, 894 P.2d 1152 (Or. 1995).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.725(l)(e) — 1 case
State Accident Ins. Fund v. Anderson, 894 P.2d 1152 (Or. 1995).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.725(ll)(a) — 2 cases
Htaike v. Sein, 344 P.3d 527 (Or. Ct. App. 2015). “The ORICO statute of limitations, ORS 166.725 (ll)(a), provides, in relevant part: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a criminal or civil action or proceeding under ORS 166.”
State v. Jones, 3 P.3d 719 (Or. Ct. App. 2000).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.725(ll)(b) — 2 cases
Black v. Arizala, 95 P.3d 1109 (Or. 2004). “ORS 166.725(6), (7); Or Laws 1995, ch 619, § 1.”
Black v. Arizala, 48 P.3d 843 (Or. Ct. App. 2002). “We next consider plaintiffs' argument that the court also erred in holding *851 that, as a result of the 1995 amendments to ORS 166.725, plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under ORICO.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.