215.402
Definitions for ORS 215.402 to 215.438 and 215.700 to 215.780. As used in ORS 215.402 to 215.438
and 215.700 to 215.780 unless the context requires otherwise:
(1) “Contested
case” means a proceeding in which the legal rights, duties or privileges of
specific parties under general rules or policies provided under ORS 215.010 to
215.311, 215.317, 215.327, 215.402 to 215.438 and 215.700 to 215.780, or any
ordinance, rule or regulation adopted pursuant thereto, are required to be
determined only after a hearing at which specific parties are entitled to
appear and be heard.
(2) “Hearing”
means a quasi-judicial hearing, authorized or required by the ordinances and
regulations of a county adopted pursuant to ORS 215.010 to 215.311, 215.317,
215.327, 215.402 to 215.438 and 215.700 to 215.780:
(a) To determine
in accordance with such ordinances and regulations if a permit shall be granted
or denied; or
(b) To determine
a contested case.
(3) “Hearings
officer” means a planning and zoning hearings officer appointed or designated
by the governing body of a county under ORS 215.406.
(4) “Permit”
means discretionary approval of a proposed development of land under ORS
215.010 to 215.311, 215.317, 215.327 and 215.402 to 215.438 and 215.700 to
215.780 or county legislation or regulation adopted pursuant thereto. “Permit”
does not include:
(a) A limited
land use decision as defined in ORS 197.015;
(b) A decision
which determines the appropriate zoning classification for a particular use by
applying criteria or performance standards defining the uses permitted within
the zone, and the determination applies only to land within an urban growth
boundary;
(c) A decision
which determines final engineering design, construction, operation,
maintenance, repair or preservation of a transportation facility which is
otherwise authorized by and consistent with the comprehensive plan and land use
regulations; or
(d) An expedited
land division, as described in ORS 197A.140. [1973 c.552 §12; 1977 c.654 §1;
1981 c.748 §49; 1991 c.817 §8; 1995 c.79 §77; 1995 c.595 §12; 2001 c.672 §15;
2015 c.260 §4; 2025 c.476 §39]
Notes of Decisions
State ex rel. Schrodt v. Jackson Cnty., 324 P.3d 615 (Or. Ct. App. 2014).
· cites it 13× “Although ORS chapter 215 does not define “development,” one ordinary definition of “development” — both at the time ORS 215.402 was enacted and now — is “a making useable or available.”
Eagle Creek Rock Prods., Inc. v. Clackamas Cnty., 556 P.2d 150 (Or. Ct. App. 1976).
· cites it 2× “See, ORS 215.402 et seq. Indeed the majority opinion seems to recognize that this is a mixed question of law and fact for initial determination by the local administrative body when it states: "It may be necessary or desirable for a local government to hold a hearing to assist…”
Doughton v. Douglas Cnty., 744 P.2d 1299 (Or. Ct. App. 1987).
· cites it 3× “LUBA concluded on remand that the county’s decision whether to issue the permit was a discretionary one under ORS 215.402(4) and that the county was therefore required to provide respondent with notice and a right to a hearing and was required to make appropriate findings of…”
Heritage Enter. v. City of Corvallis, 708 P.2d 601 (Or. 1985).
““(b) Does not include a ministerial decision of a local government made under clear and objective standards contained in an acknowledged comprehensive plan or land use regulation and for which no right to a hearing is provided by the local government under ORS 215.402 to 215.438…”
Flowers v. Klamath Cnty., 780 P.2d 227 (Or. Ct. App. 1989).
“See ORS 215.402(4). Although LUBA agreed with petitioners that the hearing and other requirements were applicable and were not followed, it agreed with county that petitioners had not “appeared” before it and had not adequately pleaded that *387 they were aggrieved or adversely…”
State ex rel Kine v. Deschutes Cnty., 477 P.3d 417 (Or. Ct. App. 2020).
· cites it 5× ““Permit,” as defined by ORS 215.402(4), for purposes of ORS 215.429(1), “means discretionary approval of a pro- posed development of land.”
Knight v. Dep't of Rev., State of or., 646 P.2d 1343 (Or. 1982).
“The composition of the county governing body, determined by popular vote, will affect the decision of whether to zone for farm use. This decision is influenced by many factors, not merely tax benefits.”
Jones v. Douglas Cnty., 270 P.3d 278 (Or. Ct. App. 2011).
“015(10), and a discretionary ‘permit’ decision for purposes of ORS 215.402 and the corresponding statute applicable to cities.”
Bryant v. Clackamas Cnty., 643 P.2d 649 (Or. Ct. App. 1982).
“ORS 215.402 et seq. allow counties to appoint hearings officers to conduct hearings on matters such as the minor partition requests involved in this case.”
State Ex Rel. Fraley v. Deschutes Cnty. Bd. of Commissioners, 948 P.2d 1249 (Or. Ct. App. 1997).
“The trial court concluded that petitioner’s application for the declaratory ruling constituted a “permit” application under ORS 215.402 and was therefore subject to the requirements and remedies of ORS 215.”
Tarjoto v. Lane Cnty., 904 P.2d 641 (Or. Ct. App. 1995).
“) *310 LUBA’s conclusion that the time for a local appeal does not begin to run until the required notice of the decision is provided was based on opinions of ours and its own, dealing with analogous issues in the interpretation and application of ORS 215.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 215.402(1) — 2 cases
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 215.402(2) — 3 cases
State ex rel. Schrodt v. Jackson Cnty., 324 P.3d 615 (Or. Ct. App. 2014).
“Although ORS chapter 215 does not define “development,” one ordinary definition of “development” — both at the time ORS 215.402 was enacted and now — is “a making useable or available.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 215.402(4) — 9 cases
State ex rel. Schrodt v. Jackson Cnty., 324 P.3d 615 (Or. Ct. App. 2014).
“Although ORS chapter 215 does not define “development,” one ordinary definition of “development” — both at the time ORS 215.402 was enacted and now — is “a making useable or available.”
Doughton v. Douglas Cnty., 744 P.2d 1299 (Or. Ct. App. 1987).
“LUBA concluded on remand that the county’s decision whether to issue the permit was a discretionary one under ORS 215.402(4) and that the county was therefore required to provide respondent with notice and a right to a hearing and was required to make appropriate findings of…”
Flowers v. Klamath Cnty., 780 P.2d 227 (Or. Ct. App. 1989).
“See ORS 215.402(4). Although LUBA agreed with petitioners that the hearing and other requirements were applicable and were not followed, it agreed with county that petitioners had not “appeared” before it and had not adequately pleaded that *387 they were aggrieved or adversely…”
State ex rel Kine v. Deschutes Cnty., 477 P.3d 417 (Or. Ct. App. 2020).
““Permit,” as defined by ORS 215.402(4), for purposes of ORS 215.429(1), “means discretionary approval of a pro- posed development of land.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 215.402(4)(c) — 1 case
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