Any person who shall be indicted for first, second, or third degree sexual assault
and/or first or second degree child molestation sexual assault and/or § 11-37-8 may also be charged in the same indictment with either or all of the offenses described
in §§ 11-37-2, 11-37-4, 11-37-6, 11-37-8, 11-37-8.1, and 11-37-8.3. If upon trial the jury shall acquit the person of any of the charges of sexual assault
and shall find him or her guilty of any of the other offenses, judgment and sentence
may be entered against him or her accordingly.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
3
cases, 2002–2016 · leading case:
In re B.H., 138 A.3d 774 (R.I. 2016).
In re B.H., 138 A.3d 774 (R.I. 2016).
· cites it 5× “2d at 424 (quoting § 11-37-9). Therefore, in this case, each count of the petition charging respondent with first-degree child molestation necessarily included a charge on the lesser-included offense of second-degree child molestation.”
State v. Silvia, 798 A.2d 419 (R.I. 2002).
“” Furthermore, § 11-37-9, “Joinder of offenses,” states in relevant part, that when “[a]ny person who is indicted for * * * first * * * degree child molestation * * * upon trial the jury [or trial justice] acquits that person of any of the charges of sexual assault and finds him…”
In the Matter of B.H., No. 13-364, 14-19 (R.I. May 26, 2016).
· cites it 5× “2d at 424 (citing G.L. 1956 § 11-37-9 on joinder of offenses for the trial court’s authority to enter judgment on lesser-included offenses).”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
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treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.