10 U.S.C. § 950p

Definitions; construction of certain offenses; common circumstances

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(a)Definitions.—In this subchapter:(1) The term “military objective” means combatants and those objects during hostilities which, by their nature, location, purpose, or use, effectively contribute to the war-fighting or war-sustaining capability of an opposing force and whose total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization would constitute a definite military advantage to the attacker under the circumstances at the time of an attack.(2) The term “protected person” means any person entitled to protection under one or more of the Geneva Conventions, including civilians not taking an active part in hostilities, military personnel placed out of combat by sickness, wounds, or detention, and military medical or religious personnel.(3) The term “protected property” means any property specifically protected by the law of war, including buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science, or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected, but only if and to the extent such property is not being used for military purposes or is not otherwise a military objective. The term includes objects properly identified by one of the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions, but does not include civilian property that is a military objective.(b)Construction of Certain Offenses.—The intent required for offenses under paragraphs (1), (2), (3), (4), and (12) of section 950t of this title precludes the applicability of such offenses with regard to collateral damage or to death, damage, or injury incident to a lawful attack.(c)Common Circumstances.—An offense specified in this subchapter is triable by military commission under this chapter only if the offense is committed in the context of and associated with hostilities.(d)Effect.—The provisions of this subchapter codify offenses that have traditionally been triable by military commission. This chapter does not establish new crimes that did not exist before the date of the enactment of this subchapter, as amended by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, but rather codifies those crimes for trial by military commission. Because the provisions of this subchapter codify offenses that have traditionally been triable under the law of war or otherwise triable by military commission, this subchapter does not preclude trial for offenses that occurred before the date of the enactment of this subchapter, as so amended.(Added Pub. L. 111–84, div. A, title XVIII, § 1802, Oct. 28, 2009, 123 Stat. 2606.)Editorial NotesReferences in Text

The date of the enactment of this subchapter, as amended by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, referred to in subsec. (d), is the date of enactment of Pub. L. 111–84, which was approved Oct. 28, 2009.

Prior Provisions

A prior section 950p, added Pub. L. 109–366, § 3(a)(1), Oct. 17, 2006, 120 Stat. 2624, related to statement of substantive offenses, prior to the general amendment of this chapter by Pub. L. 111–84.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 6 cases, 2013–2016 · leading case: Ali Hamza Ahmad al Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
Ali Hamza Ahmad al Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014). · cites it 28× “10 U.S.C. § 950p (2006). In Hamdan II, the Court read this provision to reflect the Congress’s “belie[f] that the Act codified no new crimes and thus posed no ex post facto problem.”
In Re: Abd Al-Rahim Hussein Al-Nashir, 835 F.3d 110 (D.C. Cir. 2016). · cites it 4× “” 10 U.S.C. § 950p(c) (emphasis added). He asserts that the use of the word “triable” instead of “punishable” or “liable” suggests F.”
United States v. Al-Nashiri, 191 F. Supp. 3d 1308 (M.C. 2016). · cites it 3× “Although appellee incorrectly couched his argument in jurisdictional terms, -he has raised an issue about whether there is sufficient nexus to United States hostilities in the facts here, involving a bombing of a French vessel resulting in the death of a Bulgarian citizen off…”
Al-Nashiri v. Obama, 76 F. Supp. 3d 218 (D.D.C. 2014). · cites it 3× “10 U.S.C. §§ 950p(c), 948a(9). The convening Authority can issue charges only against people who are not U.”
Abd Al-Nashiri v. Bruce MacDonald, 741 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2013). “The Complaint alleges that MacDonald’s military commission referral violated 10 U.S.C. § 950p(e); Article III § 2 of the Constitution; and the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments because the alleged offenses did not “occur,” as a matter of law, “in the context of and [were] not…”
Ali Hamza Ahmad al Bahlul v. United States (D.C. Cir. 2014). · cites it 14× “10 U.S.C. § 950p (2006). In Hamdan II, the Court read this provision to reflect the Congress’s “belie[f] that the Act codified no new crimes and thus posed no ex post facto problem.”
— 10 U.S.C. § 950p(a) — 2 cases
Ali Hamza Ahmad al Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014). “10 U.S.C. § 950p (2006). In Hamdan II, the Court read this provision to reflect the Congress’s “belie[f] that the Act codified no new crimes and thus posed no ex post facto problem.”
Ali Hamza Ahmad al Bahlul v. United States (D.C. Cir. 2014). “10 U.S.C. § 950p (2006). In Hamdan II, the Court read this provision to reflect the Congress’s “belie[f] that the Act codified no new crimes and thus posed no ex post facto problem.”
— 10 U.S.C. § 950p(b) — 2 cases
Ali Hamza Ahmad al Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014). “10 U.S.C. § 950p (2006). In Hamdan II, the Court read this provision to reflect the Congress’s “belie[f] that the Act codified no new crimes and thus posed no ex post facto problem.”
Ali Hamza Ahmad al Bahlul v. United States (D.C. Cir. 2014). “10 U.S.C. § 950p (2006). In Hamdan II, the Court read this provision to reflect the Congress’s “belie[f] that the Act codified no new crimes and thus posed no ex post facto problem.”
— 10 U.S.C. § 950p(c) — 3 cases
In Re: Abd Al-Rahim Hussein Al-Nashir, 835 F.3d 110 (D.C. Cir. 2016). “” 10 U.S.C. § 950p(c) (emphasis added). He asserts that the use of the word “triable” instead of “punishable” or “liable” suggests F.”
United States v. Al-Nashiri, 191 F. Supp. 3d 1308 (M.C. 2016). “Although appellee incorrectly couched his argument in jurisdictional terms, -he has raised an issue about whether there is sufficient nexus to United States hostilities in the facts here, involving a bombing of a French vessel resulting in the death of a Bulgarian citizen off…”
Al-Nashiri v. Obama, 76 F. Supp. 3d 218 (D.D.C. 2014). “10 U.S.C. §§ 950p(c), 948a(9). The convening Authority can issue charges only against people who are not U.”
— 10 U.S.C. § 950p(d) — 2 cases
Ali Hamza Ahmad al Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014). “10 U.S.C. § 950p (2006). In Hamdan II, the Court read this provision to reflect the Congress’s “belie[f] that the Act codified no new crimes and thus posed no ex post facto problem.”
Ali Hamza Ahmad al Bahlul v. United States (D.C. Cir. 2014). “10 U.S.C. § 950p (2006). In Hamdan II, the Court read this provision to reflect the Congress’s “belie[f] that the Act codified no new crimes and thus posed no ex post facto problem.”
— 10 U.S.C. § 950p(e) — 1 case
Abd Al-Nashiri v. Bruce MacDonald, 741 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2013). “The Complaint alleges that MacDonald’s military commission referral violated 10 U.S.C. § 950p(e); Article III § 2 of the Constitution; and the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments because the alleged offenses did not “occur,” as a matter of law, “in the context of and [were] not…”
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