18 U.S.C. § 3172

Definitions

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As used in this chapter—(1) the terms “judge” or “judicial officer” mean, unless otherwise indicated, any United States magistrate judge, Federal district judge, and(2) the term “offense” means any Federal criminal offense which is in violation of any Act of Congress and is triable by any court established by Act of Congress (other than a Class B or C misdemeanor or an infraction, or an offense triable by court-martial, military commission, provost court, or other military tribunal).(Added Pub. L. 93–619, title I, § 101, Jan. 3, 1975, 88 Stat. 2085; amended Pub. L. 98–473, title II, § 223(i), Oct. 12, 1984, 98 Stat. 2029; Pub. L. 101–650, title III, § 321, Dec. 1, 1990, 104 Stat. 5117.)Editorial NotesAmendments

1984—Par. (2). Pub. L. 98–473 substituted “Class B or C misdemeanor or an infraction” for “petty offense as defined in section 1(3) of this title”.

Statutory Notes and Related SubsidiariesChange of Name

“United States magistrate judge” substituted for “United States magistrate” in par. (1) pursuant to section 321 of Pub. L. 101–650, set out as a note under section 631 of Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure.

Effective Date of 1984 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 98–473 effective Nov. 1, 1987, and applicable only to offenses committed after the taking effect of such amendment, see section 235(a)(1) of Pub. L. 98–473, set out as an Effective Date note under section 3551 of this title.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 53 cases (3 in the last 5 years), 1980–2025 · leading case: United States v. Mizgala, 61 M.J. 122 (C.A.A.F. 2005).
United States v. Mizgala, 61 M.J. 122 (C.A.A.F. 2005). · cites it 2× “Under Article 10, the 5 18 U.S.C. § 3172 (2)(2000) (stating that “offense” as used in the Speedy Trial Act specifically excludes “an offense triable by court-martial”).”
United States v. Albert E. Mills. United States of Am. v. Kenneth B. Wonson, 964 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1992). · cites it 3× “18 U.S.C. § 3172 . Thus the trigger mechanism is the arrest or service of summons “in connection with such charges.”
United States v. Ruben Cepeda-Luna, 989 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1993). · cites it 2× “” 18 U.S.C. § 3172 (2) (1988) (emphasis added).”
United States v. Rodriguez-Amaya, 521 F.3d 437 (4th Cir. 2008). · cites it 2× “Accordingly, we have little trouble concluding that the plain language of the Speedy Trial Act limits the Act’s coverage to persons detained in connection with a federal criminal arrest. B. Rodriguez-Amaya, likely aware that his first argument was a nonstarter, contends in the…”
United States v. John Charles Richard Mentz, 840 F.2d 315 (6th Cir. 1988). “18 U.S.C. § 3172 (1982). . Unless otherwise indicated, all dates are in 1986.”
United States v. Michael Lawrence Pollock, 726 F.2d 1456 (9th Cir. 1984). “We do, however, note that the Act defines “the terms ‘judge’ or ‘judicial officer’ [t]o mean, unless otherwise indicated, any United States magistrate [and] federal district judge.”
United States v. Winston Dyer, 325 F.3d 464 (3rd Cir. 2003). “This Court has not addressed the issue of whether a civil detention triggers the Speedy Trial Act’s thirty day time limit. According to the language of the Act, it applies only to an indictment issued in connection with the “offense” for which the defendant was “arrested.”
United States v. Thomas White (91-4009) & Daniel Geiger (91-4039), 985 F.2d 271 (6th Cir. 1993). “…objections). 2 . The term "judicial officer” means any United States District Judge or Federal Magistrate Judge. 18 U.S.C. § 3172 .”
United States v. Mildred Carrasquillo, 667 F.2d 382 (3rd Cir. 1981). “” 18 U.S.C. § 3172 (1) (1976). Significantly, *386 the definition does not encompass persons acting on behalf of the court.”
United States v. Franklin De La Pena-Juarez, Also Known as Carlos Ottoniel De La Pena, United States of Am. v. Gamaliel Aguirre-Tibra, 214 F.3d 594 (5th Cir. 2000). “” 18 U.S.C. § 3172 (2). Several courts have applied this proposition to the immigration context, holding that the Speedy Trial Act is not implicated when a defendant is detained on civil deportation charges.”
United States v. Drake, 543 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2008). “” 18 U.S.C. § 3172 (2); see also id. § 3161(a)-(c).”
Energy Mgt. P 26,666 United States of Am. v. Glenn Martin Heller, D/B/A Beacon Hill Gulf, 957 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1992). “1981) (the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3172 (1), defines “judicial officer” to mean any federal district judge or magistrate judge, and was meant to exclude district court clerks and any persons acting on behalf of the court); United States v.”
— 18 U.S.C. § 3172(2) — 1 case
United States v. Rodriguez-Amaya, 521 F.3d 437 (4th Cir. 2008). “Accordingly, we have little trouble concluding that the plain language of the Speedy Trial Act limits the Act’s coverage to persons detained in connection with a federal criminal arrest. B. Rodriguez-Amaya, likely aware that his first argument was a nonstarter, contends in the…”
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