26 U.S.C. § 7342
Penalty for refusal to permit entry or examination
Any owner of any building or place, or person having the agency or superintendence of the same, who refuses to admit any officer or employee of the Treasury Department acting under the authority of section 7606 (relating to entry of premises for examination of taxable articles) or refuses to permit him to examine such article or articles, shall, for every such refusal, forfeit $500.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 15
cases, 1968–2016 · leading case: Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970). “[3] And in case of the refusal of a dealer to permit the inspection, it is provided in 26 U. S. C. § 7342 : "Any owner of any building or place, or person having the agency or superintendence of the same, who refuses to admit any officer or employee of the Treasury Department…”
Big Cats of Serenity Springs, Inc. v. Rhodes, 843 F.3d 853 (10th Cir. 2016). “26 U.S.C. § 7342 (1964). The government argues that although the AWA is silent about warrant-less searches, rules promulgated under the AWA permit warrantless forcible entry under Burger and Colonnade.”
United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972). “We found, however, that Congress had not expressly provided for forcible entry in the absence of a warrant and had instead given Government agents a remedy by making it a criminal offense to refuse admission to the inspectors under 26 U. S. C. § 7342 . Here, the search was not…”
United States v. Juan Ibarra, 965 F.2d 1354 (5th Cir. 1992). “United States, for example, the Court addressed whether an IRS agent without a warrant, and over the owner’s objections, was authorized to enter a locked storage room pursuant to 26 U.”
Commonwealth v. Cadoret, 447 N.E.2d 685 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983). “The Commonwealth attempts to distinguish Colonnade from the instant case by arguing that the statute in that case provides that a fine be levied against whoever "refuses to admit" an agent or "refuses to permit" an inspection, (see 26 U.S.C. § 7342 [1976]), as contrasted with…”
United States v. Ciaccio, 356 F. Supp. 1373 (D. Md. 1972). “The Supreme Court held that under 26 U.S.C. § 7342 , which established a $500 fine for refusal to admit an agent to inspect liquor, a person could rely on the fine, a criminal penalty, as his only sanction, enabling him to avoid prosecution for any crimes which might be…”
State v. Barnett, 389 So. 2d 352 (La. 1980). “Here, the search was not accompanied by any unauthorized force, and if the target of the inspection had been a federally licensed liquor dealer, it is clear under Colonnade that the Fourth Amendment would not bar a seizure of illicit liquor. When the officers asked to inspect…”
United States v. Jamieson-McKames Pharm., Inc., 651 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1981). “26 U.S.C. § 7342 . . 21 U.S.C. § 331 (f) provides: The following acts and the causing thereof are prohibited: (f) The refusal to permit entry or inspec-1 tion as authorized by section 374 of this title.”
United States v. Litvin, 353 F. Supp. 1333 (D.D.C. 1973). ““We found, however, that Congress had not expressly provided for forcible entry in the absence of a warrant and had instead given Government agents a remedy by making it a criminal offense to refuse admission to the inspectors under 26 U.S.C. § 7342 .” [emphasis added.] 406 U.”
United States v. Hofbrauhaus of Hartford, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 544 (D. Conn. 1970). “5 The agent is not, by virtue of these provisions, given authority to conduct a general search of the premises; he is limited to the place where the liquor is kept and to inspection of specific objects, including, in this case, the alcoholic beverages.”
United States v. Duffy, 282 F. Supp. 777 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). “” 26 U.S.C. § 7342 . As part of the means of enforcing the prohibition against refilling liquor bottles, Congress in 1958 conferred specific authority on the Secretary or his delegate ( 26 U.”
United States v. Hart, 359 F. Supp. 835 (D. Del. 1973). “It was argued there, as in the present case, that the statutory scheme implied a Congressional intent to dispense with the normal search warrant requirements in an industry that was traditionally subject to pervasive government regulation. However, in Colonnade, the Court made…”
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