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U.S. CodeTitle 47Chapter 9— Interception of Digital and Other CommunicationsSubchapter I— Interception of Digital and Other Communications

47 U.S.C. § 1002 (2026)

Assistance capability requirements

Edition and currency
U.S. Code current through Pub. L. 119-102 (OLRC release point). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTU.S. Code current through Pub. L. 119-102 (OLRC release point) cited 1996–2017 46citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 46 opinions since 1996.

(a) Capability requirementsExcept as provided in subsections (b), (c), and (d) of this section and sections 1007(a) and 1008(b) and (d) of this title, a telecommunications carrier shall ensure that its equipment, facilities, or services that provide a customer or subscriber with the ability to originate, terminate, or direct communications are capable of—(1) expeditiously isolating and enabling the government, pursuant to a court order or other lawful authorization, to intercept, to the exclusion of any other communications, all wire and electronic communications carried by the carrier within a service area to or from equipment, facilities, or services of a subscriber of such carrier concurrently with their transmission to or from the subscriber’s equipment, facility, or service, or at such later time as may be acceptable to the government;(2) expeditiously isolating and enabling the government, pursuant to a court order or other lawful authorization, to access call-identifying information that is reasonably available to the carrier—(A) before, during, or immediately after the transmission of a wire or electronic communication (or at such later time as may be acceptable to the government); and(B) in a manner that allows it to be associated with the communication to which it pertains,except that, with regard to information acquired solely pursuant to the authority for pen registers and trap and trace devices (as defined in section 3127 of title 18), such call-identifying information shall not include any information that may disclose the physical location of the subscriber (except to the extent that the location may be determined from the telephone number);(3) delivering intercepted communications and call-identifying information to the government, pursuant to a court order or other lawful authorization, in a format such that they may be transmitted by means of equipment, facilities, or services procured by the government to a location other than the premises of the carrier; and(4) facilitating authorized communications interceptions and access to call-identifying information unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference with any subscriber’s telecommunications service and in a manner that protects—(A) the privacy and security of communications and call-identifying information not authorized to be intercepted; and(B) information regarding the government’s interception of communications and access to call-identifying information.(b) Limitations(1) Design of features and systems configurationsThis subchapter does not authorize any law enforcement agency or officer—(A) to require any specific design of equipment, facilities, services, features, or system configurations to be adopted by any provider of a wire or electronic communication service, any manufacturer of telecommunications equipment, or any provider of telecommunications support services; or(B) to prohibit the adoption of any equipment, facility, service, or feature by any provider of a wire or electronic communication service, any manufacturer of telecommunications equipment, or any provider of telecommunications support services.(2) Information services; private networks and interconnection services and facilitiesThe requirements of subsection (a) do not apply to—(A) information services; or(B) equipment, facilities, or services that support the transport or switching of communications for private networks or for the sole purpose of interconnecting telecommunications carriers.(3) Encryption

A telecommunications carrier shall not be responsible for decrypting, or ensuring the government’s ability to decrypt, any communication encrypted by a subscriber or customer, unless the encryption was provided by the carrier and the carrier possesses the information necessary to decrypt the communication.

(c) Emergency or exigent circumstances

In emergency or exigent circumstances (including those described in sections 2518(7) or (11)(b) and 3125 of title 18 and section 1805(e) of title 50), a carrier at its discretion may comply with subsection (a)(3) by allowing monitoring at its premises if that is the only means of accomplishing the interception or access.

(d) Mobile service assistance requirements

A telecommunications carrier that is a provider of commercial mobile service (as defined in section 332(d) of this title) offering a feature or service that allows subscribers to redirect, hand off, or assign their wire or electronic communications to another service area or another service provider or to utilize facilities in another service area or of another service provider shall ensure that, when the carrier that had been providing assistance for the interception of wire or electronic communications or access to call-identifying information pursuant to a court order or lawful authorization no longer has access to the content of such communications or call-identifying information within the service area in which interception has been occurring as a result of the subscriber’s use of such a feature or service, information is made available to the government (before, during, or immediately after the transfer of such communications) identifying the provider of a wire or electronic communication service that has acquired access to the communications.

(Pub. L. 103–414, title I, § 103, Oct. 25, 1994, 108 Stat. 4280.)Statutory Notes and Related SubsidiariesEffective Date

Section effective on the date that is 4 years after Oct. 25, 1994, see section 111(b) of Pub. L. 103–414, set out as a note under section 1001 of this title.

The 20 cases that cite 47 U.S.C. § 1002 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENIn re Applic. of US for an Order for Disclosure, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
cites § 1002 13×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 1002
“Notably, the showing required to install a pen register is a low one: the Government need only identify the law enforcement agency conducting the investigation and certify that the information likely to be obtained is "relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation" being…”
Holding on this section
Prospective cell site location information may be obtained by combining the Pen Register Statute with 18 U.S.C. § 2703 because the word solely in 47 U.S.C. § 1002 permits such a combination.
Later courts cite it for
“inasmuch as cell site information is transmitted to the government only after it has been in the possession of the cell phone company” · 1 citing court
2
GREENIn re US for an Order Aut. Dis. of Prosp. Cell, 412 F. Supp. 2d 947 (E.D. Wis. 2006).
cites § 1002 8×cited by 29 cases
Where it cites § 1002
“However, because Congress has forbidden a cellphone company from disclosing cell-site information “solely pursuant” to a pen/trap order, see 47 U.S.C. § 1002 (a)(2)(B), the Pen/Trap Statute by itself is insufficient authority for such disclosure.”
The case’s holding
Combined pen register and Stored Communications Act authority does not authorize prospective disclosure of cell site location information, which CALEA bars obtaining solely under pen register authority.
Later courts cite it for
“any information that may disclose the physical location of a mobile facility or service beyond that associated with the number's area code or exchange.” · 2 citing courts
3
REDUnited States v. Aaron Graham, 824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016).
cites § 1002 2×cited by 136 cases
Abrogated by Carpenter v. United States: 4 citing opinions say abrogated outright and 1 limits it to other grounds.
Where it cites § 1002
“This is assertedly so because (1) the Communications Assistance For Law Enforcement Act, 47 U.S.C. § 1002 (2012) (Continued) 10 Applying the third-party doctrine to the facts of this case, we hold that Defendants did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the historical…”
The case’s holding
The government does not violate the Fourth Amendment by obtaining historical cell-site location information from a service provider without a warrant.
Later courts cite it for
“whether the government invades an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy when it obtains, from a third party, the third party's records.” · 2 citing courts
cites § 1002 4×cited by 77 cases
Flagged on editorial review. Abrogated in part by In Re of the United States for Historical Cell Site Data: 1 citing opinion says abrogated.
The case’s holding
Prospective cell site location data constitutes information from a tracking device and requires a showing of probable cause for government access.
Later courts cite it for
“... location information is a special class of customer information, which can only be used or disclosed in an emergency situation, absent express prior consent by the customer.” · 2 citing courts
5
GREENShawn Alvin Tracey v. State of Florida, 152 So. 3d 504 (Fla. 2014).
cites § 1002 4×cited by 53 cases
Where it cites § 1002
“Under the federal scheme, 47 U.S.C. § 1002 (a)(2)(B), a provision within the “Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act,” 47 U.”
The case’s holding
The use of real-time cell site location information to track a defendant constitutes a search requiring a warrant based upon probable cause.
Later courts cite it for
“real time cell site location information,” · 2 citing courts
cites § 1002 3×cited by 54 cases
The case’s holding
The government must establish probable cause to obtain prospective cell site location information because the Stored Communications Act does not authorize real-time disclosure of captured data.
Later courts cite it for
“because the government cannot demonstrate that cell site tracking could never under any circumstance implicate fourth amendment privacy rights, there is no reason to treat cell phone tracking differently from other forms of tracking ... which routinely require probable cause.” · 2 citing courts
7
GREENIn re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d 341 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).
cites § 1002 6×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 1002
“These “Limitations” on CALEA’s scope, 47 U.S.C. § 1002 (b), fell into three ..categories.”
cites § 1002 3×cited by 29 cases
Where it cites § 1002
“§§ 3122 , 3123 (The Pen Register and Trap and Trace Statute (the Pen Statute)), 47 U.S.C. § 1002 (a)(2) (The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (GALEA)) and 18 U.”
The case’s holding
Pen register, CALEA, and Stored Communications Act provisions do not combine to authorize real-time cell site location disclosure on less than probable cause, though a warrant may issue on probable cause.
Later courts cite it for
“there's a common sense decision that says if we want to do this higher step, if we want to go to triangulation, we're gonna have a hell of a fight . . .” · 2 citing courts
9
GREENUnited States v. Ellis, 270 F. Supp. 3d 1134 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
cites § 1002 3×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 1002
“application of the Communications Assistance of Law Enforcement Act (“CALEA”), 47 U.S.C. § 1002 (a)(2), the pen register statute did not authorize aceess to call-identifying information from telecommunications carriers that may disclose the subscriber’s physical location, and…”
cites § 1002 2×cited by 45 cases
Where it cites § 1002
“” 47 U.S.C. § 1002 (a)(2)(B). Indeed, Sprint Nextel — the cellular service provider for the subject of the government’s applications here — provides in its standard privacy policy that, although it routinely collects personal information pertaining to customers, including the…”
The case’s holding
Individuals maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in their specific location and their aggregate movements revealed through continuous real-time tracking of cellular telephone location data.
Later courts cite it for
“because cellular telephone users tend to keep their phone on their person or very close by, placing a particular cellular telephone within a home is essentially the corollary of locating the user within the home.” · 2 citing courts
11
GREENUnited States v. Espudo, 954 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (S.D. Cal. 2013).
cites § 1002 4×cited by 9 cases
Summary
No passage or summary on file for this case yet.
12
cites § 1002 2×cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 1002
“See 47 U.S.C. § 1002 (a)(2)(B). The necessary authority for the disclosure of cell-site information called for by the Pen/Trap Statute is provided by Section 2703 of the SCA.”
Later courts cite it for
“finding the statutes proffered by the government insufficient to authorize the court to issue an order authorizing disclosure of prospective cell site information, the court . . . is left with only the general authority to issue a rule 41 warrant upon a showing of probable cause to believe that the data sought will yield evidence of a crime.” · 2 citing courts
13
GREENState v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016).
cites § 1002 1×cited by 35 cases
The case’s holding
The use of a cell site simulator to track real-time cell phone location information requires a valid search warrant or a court order unless an exception applies.
Later courts cite it for
“will not be used as real-time tracking devices through the direct and active interference of law enforcement.” · 3 citing courts
14
GREENIn re the United States for Orders Pursuant to Title 18, 509 F. Supp. 2d 64 (D. Mass. 2007).
cites § 1002 3×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 1002
“See 47 U.S.C. § 1002 (a)(4) (Providing Government agents with unimpeded access to authorized communications, but in a manner such that the security and privacy of communications not authorized to be intercepted is not violated.”
15
GREENUnited States Telecom Ass'n v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 227 F.3d 450 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
cites § 1002 6×cited by 35 cases
Where it cites § 1002
“” See 47 U.S.C. § 1002 . The Act defines “call-identifying information” as “dialing or signaling information that identifies the origin, direction, destination, or termination of each communication generated or received by a subscriber by means of any equipment, facility, or…”
Later courts cite it for
“with respect to the precise question at issue, we proceed to the second step of chevron analysis.” · 1 citing court
cites § 1002 2×cited by 14 cases
Summary
No passage or summary on file for this case yet.
17
GREENIn re Application of US for Order, 497 F. Supp. 2d 301 (D.P.R. 2007).
cites § 1002 3×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 1002
“It also should be noted that, although nowhere mentioned in the government's applications in the present case, the government in other cases in which it has advanced the hybrid theory has also relied on a third statute — Section 1002 of the Communications Assistance for Law…”
18
REDUnited States v. Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d 759 (E.D. Mich. 2013).
cites § 1002 2×cited by 11 cases
Vacated in part by United States v. Eric Powell (2017): the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit's own opinion in this case ("We AFFIRM the denial of defendants’ motions to suppress; AFFIRM the judgments entered against Carlos…
Where it cites § 1002
“The “hybrid theory” combines the authorities of the SCA with the pen-register statute to authorize cellsite location data by reasoning that, although 47 U.S.C. § 1002 (a)(2) prevents collection of location data via the pen / trap statute alone, the term “solely” implies that the…”
Later courts cite it for
“informant testimony, confirmed by independently verified evidence, that carlos powell was a major player in a drug trafficking ring in detroit.” · 1 citing court
19
GREENIn re Elec. Commc'n Serv. to Disclose, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010).
cites § 1002 2×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 1002
“Thus, the protections that Congress adopted for CSLI in 47 U.S.C. § 1002 (a)(2) [7] have no apparent relevance to § 2703(d), and the legislative history does not show that Congress intended to exclude CSLI or other location information from § 2703(d).”
The case’s holding
Cell site location information from cell phone calls is obtainable under a statutory order that does not require a traditional probable cause determination.
Later courts cite it for
“a cell phone customer has not 'voluntarily' shared his location information with a cellular provider in any meaningful way.” · 11 citing courts
20
NEUTRALAm. Council on Educ. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 451 F.3d 226 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
cites § 1002 6×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 1002
“2 47 U.S.C. § 1002 (a). While CALEA’s substantive provisions apply to “telecommunications carrier[s],” they do not apply to “information services.”

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
199620062017

One bar per year. Tallest: 11 cases in 2006. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
S.D. Tex.8D. Md.4E.D.N.Y43rd Cir.2D.C. Cir.2S.D.N.Y.2D.P.R.2W.D. Tex.2

The 8 courts with the most citing cases, of 27 courts in all.

By subsection

Courts have not cited this section by subsection, so its cases are not split up here. The Leading cases tab lists the cases that cite it most heavily.

Show all 46 citing cases (list view) →

Enactment and amendments
(Pub. L. 103–414, title I, § 103, Oct. 25, 1994, 108 Stat. 4280.)
Versions

Edition shown: U.S. Code current through Pub. L. 119-102 (OLRC release point). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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