49 U.S.C. § 11705
Limitation on actions by and against rail carriers
Provisions similar to those in this section were contained in section 11706 of this title prior to the general amendment of this subtitle by Pub. L. 104–88, § 102(a).
A prior section 11705, Pub. L. 95–473,
Section effective
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 118
cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1979–2023 · leading case: Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985).
Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985). “Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U. S. C. §§ 11705 (d)(3), § 11710(b). 63.”
Maislin Indus., U. S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116 (1990). “49 U. S. C. § 11705 (b)(3) (1982 ed., Supp.”
Interstate Com. Comm'n v. Am. Trucking Associations, 467 U.S. 354 (1984). “Under 49 U. S. C. § 11705 (b)(1), shippers that were charged the rejected tariff can then bring actions to recover the "overcharge," which is the amount by which the rejected tariff exceeded the prior tariff.”
Pejepscot Indus. Park, Inc. v. Maine Cent. R.R., 215 F.3d 195 (1st Cir. 2000). “For example, 49 U.S.C. § 11705 (a) establishes a three-year statute of limitations on civil actions by rail carriers to recover payment for services provided; § 11705(b) establishes a three-year statute of limitations on civil actions by shippers to recover overcharges; and §…”
Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. Great Lakes Carbon Corp., 624 F.2d 822 (8th Cir. 1980). “§ 16 (2), as revised and codified at 49 U.S.C. § 11705 . See ICC v. Atlantic Coast Line R.”
George Kraus & Antonio Aleman v. Santa Fe S. Pac. Corp., & the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 878 F.2d 1193 (9th Cir. 1989). “” 49 U.S.C. § 11705 (b)(2). Santa Fe was such a carrier and SFSP was not.”
Atlantis Express, Inc. v. Stand. Transp. Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1992). “49 U.S.C. §§ 11705 (b)(3), 11706(c)(2). The circuits, however, are split on whether the unreasonableness of filed rates can constitute a defense in an action to collect freight undercharges.”
Elam v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 635 F.3d 796 (5th Cir. 2011). “” 49 U.S.C. § 11705 (c)(1) (1994). 13 . To the extent the Elams allege KCSR was negligent solely because it blocked the Pine Crest Road crossing, that claim is impliedly preempted.”
Nora Johnson, Adm'x of the Est. of Melvin Mattingly, Deceased v. S.O.S. Transp., Inc., Cent. Transp., Inc., 926 F.2d 516 (6th Cir. 1991). “Similarly, 49 U.S.C. § 11705 (Supp.1986) provides for a private right of action for persons who sustain damages "as a result of an act or omission of [a] carrier in violation of this subtitle.”
Chicago & North W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311 (1981). “10 Although §§ 8 and 9, recodified at 49 U. S. C. § 11705 (1976 ed., Supp. Ill), provide a general right to seek damages when injured by a carrier’s violation of the Act, this Court stated in Powell v.”
West Coast Truck Lines, Inc., an Oregon Corp. v. Am. Indus., Inc., Dba Am. Steel, an Oregon Corp., 893 F.2d 229 (9th Cir. 1990). “Statute of Limitations West Coast argues that, in the absence of a referral, the ICC’s authority to determine issues of rate reasonableness must derive from 49 U.S.C. § 11705 (b)(3). Section 11705(b)(3) provides that “[a] common carrier providing transportation or service…”
McGinnis v. Union Pac. R.R., 496 F.3d 868 (8th Cir. 2007). “In addition, McGinnis asserted a claim for religious discrimination under Title VII, and a claim for a violation of the New York Dock conditions, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 11705 , but McGinnis does not appeal the district court's grant of summary judgment on these two claims.”
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