49 U.S.C. § 11705

Limitation on actions by and against rail carriers

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(a) A rail carrier providing transportation or service subject to the jurisdiction of the Board under this part must begin a civil action to recover charges for transportation or service provided by the carrier within 3 years after the claim accrues.(b) A person must begin a civil action to recover overcharges under section 11704(b) of this title within 3 years after the claim accrues, whether or not a complaint is filed under section 11704(c)(1).(c) A person must file a complaint with the Board to recover damages under section 11704(b) of this title within 2 years after the claim accrues.(d) The limitation period under subsection (b) of this section is extended for 6 months from the time written notice is given to the claimant by the rail carrier of disallowance of any part of the claim specified in the notice if a written claim is given to the rail carrier within that limitation period. The limitation periods under subsections (b) and (c) of this section are extended for 90 days from the time the rail carrier begins a civil action under subsection (a) of this section to recover charges related to the same transportation or service, or collects (without beginning a civil action under that subsection) the charge for that transportation or service if that action is begun or collection is made within the appropriate period.(e) A person must begin a civil action to enforce an order of the Board against a rail carrier for the payment of money within one year after the date the order required the money to be paid.(f) This section applies to transportation for the United States Government. The time limitations under this section are extended, as related to transportation for or on behalf of the United States Government, for 3 years from the date of—(1) payment of the rate for the transportation or service involved;(2) subsequent refund for overpayment of that rate; or(3) deduction made under section 3726 of title 31, whichever is later.(g) A claim related to a shipment of property accrues under this section on delivery or tender of delivery by the rail carrier.(Added Pub. L. 104–88, title I, § 102(a), Dec. 29, 1995, 109 Stat. 847.)Editorial NotesPrior Provisions

Provisions similar to those in this section were contained in section 11706 of this title prior to the general amendment of this subtitle by Pub. L. 104–88, § 102(a).

A prior section 11705, Pub. L. 95–473, Oct. 17, 1978, 92 Stat. 1451; Pub. L. 99–521, § 12(b), Oct. 22, 1986, 100 Stat. 2998, related to rights and remedies of persons injured by certain carriers, prior to the general amendment of this subtitle by Pub. L. 104–88, § 102(a). See sections 11704, 14704, and 15904 of this title.

Statutory Notes and Related SubsidiariesEffective Date

Section effective Jan. 1, 1996, except as otherwise provided in Pub. L. 104–88, see section 2 of Pub. L. 104–88, set out as a note under section 1301 of this title.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 118 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1979–2023 · leading case: Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985).
Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985). · cites it 4× “Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U. S. C. §§ 11705 (d)(3), § 11710(b). 63.”
Maislin Indus., U. S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116 (1990). · cites it 4× “49 U. S. C. § 11705 (b)(3) (1982 ed., Supp.”
Interstate Com. Comm'n v. Am. Trucking Associations, 467 U.S. 354 (1984). · cites it 6× “Under 49 U. S. C. § 11705 (b)(1), shippers that were charged the rejected tariff can then bring actions to recover the "overcharge," which is the amount by which the rejected tariff exceeded the prior tariff.”
Pejepscot Indus. Park, Inc. v. Maine Cent. R.R., 215 F.3d 195 (1st Cir. 2000). · cites it 3× “For example, 49 U.S.C. § 11705 (a) establishes a three-year statute of limitations on civil actions by rail carriers to recover payment for services provided; § 11705(b) establishes a three-year statute of limitations on civil actions by shippers to recover overcharges; and §…”
Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. Great Lakes Carbon Corp., 624 F.2d 822 (8th Cir. 1980). · cites it 3× “§ 16 (2), as revised and codified at 49 U.S.C. § 11705 . See ICC v. Atlantic Coast Line R.”
George Kraus & Antonio Aleman v. Santa Fe S. Pac. Corp., & the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 878 F.2d 1193 (9th Cir. 1989). · cites it 6× “” 49 U.S.C. § 11705 (b)(2). Santa Fe was such a carrier and SFSP was not.”
Atlantis Express, Inc. v. Stand. Transp. Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1992). · cites it 3× “49 U.S.C. §§ 11705 (b)(3), 11706(c)(2). The circuits, however, are split on whether the unreasonableness of filed rates can constitute a defense in an action to collect freight undercharges.”
Elam v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 635 F.3d 796 (5th Cir. 2011). “” 49 U.S.C. § 11705 (c)(1) (1994). 13 . To the extent the Elams allege KCSR was negligent solely because it blocked the Pine Crest Road crossing, that claim is impliedly preempted.”
Nora Johnson, Adm'x of the Est. of Melvin Mattingly, Deceased v. S.O.S. Transp., Inc., Cent. Transp., Inc., 926 F.2d 516 (6th Cir. 1991). · cites it 3× “Similarly, 49 U.S.C. § 11705 (Supp.1986) provides for a private right of action for persons who sustain damages "as a result of an act or omission of [a] carrier in violation of this subtitle.”
Chicago & North W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311 (1981). “10 Although §§ 8 and 9, recodified at 49 U. S. C. § 11705 (1976 ed., Supp. Ill), provide a general right to seek damages when injured by a carrier’s violation of the Act, this Court stated in Powell v.”
West Coast Truck Lines, Inc., an Oregon Corp. v. Am. Indus., Inc., Dba Am. Steel, an Oregon Corp., 893 F.2d 229 (9th Cir. 1990). · cites it 4× “Statute of Limitations West Coast argues that, in the absence of a referral, the ICC’s authority to determine issues of rate reasonableness must derive from 49 U.S.C. § 11705 (b)(3). Section 11705(b)(3) provides that “[a] common carrier providing transportation or service…”
McGinnis v. Union Pac. R.R., 496 F.3d 868 (8th Cir. 2007). “In addition, McGinnis asserted a claim for religious discrimination under Title VII, and a claim for a violation of the New York Dock conditions, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 11705 , but McGinnis does not appeal the district court's grant of summary judgment on these two claims.”
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