49 U.S.C. § 14502

Tax discrimination against motor carrier transportation property

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(a)Definitions.—In this section, the following definitions apply:(1)Assessment.—The term “assessment” means valuation for a property tax levied by a taxing district.(2)Assessment jurisdiction.—The term “assessment jurisdiction” means a geographical area in a State used in determining the assessed value of property for ad valorem taxation.(3)Motor carrier transportation property.—The term “motor carrier transportation property” means property, as defined by the Secretary, owned or used by a motor carrier providing transportation in interstate commerce whether or not such transportation is subject to jurisdiction under subchapter I of chapter 135.(4)Commercial and industrial property.—The term “commercial and industrial property” means property, other than transportation property and land used primarily for agricultural purposes or timber growing, devoted to a commercial or industrial use, and subject to a property tax levy.(b)Acts Burdening Interstate Commerce.—The following acts unreasonably burden and discriminate against interstate commerce and a State, subdivision of a State, or authority acting for a State or subdivision of a State may not do any of them:(1)Excessive valuation of property.—Assess motor carrier transportation property at a value that has a higher ratio to the true market value of the motor carrier transportation property than the ratio that the assessed value of other commercial and industrial property in the same assessment jurisdiction has to the true market value of the other commercial and industrial property.(2)Tax on assessment.—Levy or collect a tax on an assessment that may not be made under paragraph (1).(3)Ad valorem tax.—Levy or collect an ad valorem property tax on motor carrier transportation property at a tax rate that exceeds the tax rate applicable to commercial and industrial property in the same assessment jurisdiction.(c)Jurisdiction.—(1)In general.—Notwithstanding section 1341 of title 28 and without regard to the amount in controversy or citizenship of the parties, a district court of the United States has jurisdiction, concurrent with other jurisdiction of courts of the United States and the States, to prevent a violation of subsection (b) of this section.(2)Limitation in relief.—Relief may be granted under this subsection only if the ratio of assessed value to true market value of motor carrier transportation property exceeds, by at least 5 percent, the ratio of assessed value to true market value of other commercial and industrial property in the same assessment jurisdiction.(3)Burden of proof.—The burden of proof in determining assessed value and true market value is governed by State law.(4)Violation.—If the ratio of the assessed value of other commercial and industrial property in the assessment jurisdiction to the true market value of all other commercial and industrial property cannot be determined to the satisfaction of the district court through the random-sampling method known as a sales assessment ratio study (to be carried out under statistical principles applicable to such a study), the court shall find, as a violation of this section—(A) an assessment of the motor carrier transportation property at a value that has a higher ratio to the true market value of the motor carrier transportation property than the assessment value of all other property subject to a property tax levy in the assessment jurisdiction has to the true market value of all such other property; and(B) the collection of ad valorem property tax on the motor carrier transportation property at a tax rate that exceeds the tax ratio rate applicable to taxable property in the taxing district.(Added Pub. L. 104–88, title I, § 103, Dec. 29, 1995, 109 Stat. 900.)Editorial NotesPrior Provisions

Provisions similar to those in this section were contained in section 11503a of this title prior to the general amendment of this subtitle by Pub. L. 104–88, § 102(a).

Statutory Notes and Related SubsidiariesEffective Date

Section effective Jan. 1, 1996, except as otherwise provided in Pub. L. 104–88, see section 2 of Pub. L. 104–88, set out as a note under section 1301 of this title.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 10 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1998–2025 · leading case: W. Ports v. Emp. SEC. Dept., 41 P.3d 510 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).
W. Ports v. Emp. SEC. Dept., 41 P.3d 510 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). “See 49 U.S.C. § 14502 (b) (limiting assessments on motor carrier transportation property to tax rates that are no higher than those applicable to other taxable property within the taxing district).”
W. Ports Transp., Inc. v. Emp. Sec. Dep't, 110 Wash. App. 440 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). “See 49 U.S.C. § 14502 (b) (limiting assessments on motor carrier transportation property to tax rates that are no higher than those applicable to other taxable property within the taxing district).”
Tri-State Coach Lines, Inc. v. Metro. Pier & Exposition Auth., 732 N.E.2d 1137 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). “1997) (clearly and unmistakably forbidding any state or local regulation relating to the scheduling of interstate or intrastate transportation and the rates incurred thereunder); 49 U.S.C. § 14502 (b)(3) (Supp. 1997) (clearly and unmistakably forbidding any state or local ad…”
Franks & Son, Inc. v. State, 966 P.2d 1232 (Wash. 1998). “We believe a more realistic rationale for concurrent collection of the two fees was administrative convenience and efficiency. Finally, we note that elsewhere in the Interstate Commerce Act Congress expressly preempted state taxes with the type of unambiguous language required.”
Franks & Son, Inc. v. State, 136 Wash. 2d 737 (Wash. 1998). “49 U.S.C. § 14502 (limiting certain taxes on motor carriers).”
Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 2006 WI 88 (Wis. 2006). “§ 11501 ) and the Motor Carrier Act ( 49 U.S.C.A. § 14502 ). Courts have consistently relied upon cases interpreting the 4-R act to interpret § 40116(d) and vice versa.”
Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Morgan, 231 F.R.D. 518 (M.D. Tenn. 2005). “Colonial alleges that motor carriers generally escape discrimination by the States by reason of 49 U.S.C. § 14502 . 1 Even though Colonial’s pipeline system performs transportation and delivery services similar to the airplanes and trucks of Federal Express and United Parcel…”
Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Feek (W.D. Wash. 2024). “21, 2012) (Court in this district declined to consider claim that Federal Aviation 20 Administration Amendments Act, 49 U.S.C. § 14502 (c), preempted Washington law due 21 to lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the TIA).”
J. R. Tharpe Trucking Co., Inc. v. Prince Edward Cnty., Virginia (E.D. Va. 2025). “) In the Amended Complaint, Tharpe asserts six causes of action: Count I: Declaratory Judgment – Unlawful Levy of Tax in Violation of 49 U.S.C. § 14502 (against Prince Edward County and Commissioner Hensley and Ms.”
Tri-State Coach Lines, Inc. v. Metro. Pier & Exposition Auth. (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). “II 1997) (clearly and unmistakably forbidding any state or local regulation relating to the scheduling of interstate or intrastate transportation and the rates incurred thereunder); 49 U.S.C. §14502 (b)(3) (Supp. II 1997) (clearly and unmistakably forbidding any state or local…”
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