(1) “Bodily injury” means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.
(2) “Serious bodily injury” means:
(A) bodily injury that creates any of the following:
(i) a substantial risk of death;
(ii) a substantial loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ;
(iii) a substantial impairment of health; or
(iv) substantial disfigurement; or
(B) strangulation by intentionally impeding normal breathing or circulation of the blood
by applying pressure on the throat or neck or by blocking the nose or mouth of another
person.
(3) “Deadly weapon” means any firearm, or other weapon, device, instrument, material,
or substance, whether animate or inanimate that in the manner it is used or is intended
to be used is known to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury.
(b) As used in this subchapter, “course of conduct” means a pattern of conduct composed
of two or more acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity
of purpose. Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning
of “course of conduct.” (Amended 1971, No. 222 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. April 5, 1972; 1993, No. 95, § 3; 2005, No. 192 (Adj. Sess.), § 6, eff. May 26, 2006; 2013, No. 150 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 2015, No. 162 (Adj. Sess.), § 4.)
State v. Muscari, 807 A.2d 407 (Vt. 2002). · cites it 4ד*106 Title 13 V.S.A. § 1021(2) defines “serious bodily injury” as “bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes substantial loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ or substantial impairment of health, or substantial…”
State v. Justin R. Kuzawski, 181 A.3d 62 (Vt. 2017). · cites it 15ד) Amendment, 13 V.S.A. § 1021. The actual language of the deadly weapons definition was unchanged, and Longley therefore still applies.”
State v. Longley, 2007 VT 101 (Vt. 2007). · cites it 3דThe New Hampshire Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion when interpreting a statutory definition of “deadly weapon” nearly identical to that found in 13 V.S.A. § 1021. 1 State v. Hatt, 740 A.”
State v. D'AMICO, 385 A.2d 1082 (Vt. 1978). · cites it 4דMurphy was a prosecution for a breach of peace under 13 V.S.A. § 1021, now superseded, which made it a crime to destroy property, assault, beat or strike another person.”
State of Vermont v. Christian J. Noll, 199 A.3d 1054 (Vt. 2018). · cites it 2דInsofar as expression may be part of the course of conduct that supports a stalking charge, it is, by definition, only that expression that is not protected by the First Amendment.”
Elmer J. Bailey v. State of Indiana, 979 N.E.2d 133 (Ind. 2012). “”); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 1021 (1) (2009) (“ ‘Bodily injury1 means physical pain, illness or any impairment of physical condition.”
State v. Turner, 2003 VT 73 (Vt. 2003). · cites it 2דFirst, defendant claims that the State presented insufficient evidence that the knife used in the stabbing was a *597 “deadly weapon” as defined by 13 V.S.A. § 1021(3), and that he is therefore entitled to a judgment of acquittal.”
State v. Read, 680 A.2d 944 (Vt. 1996). · cites it 2ד" 13 V.S.A. § 1021(2) (1958) (repealed 1972).”
State v. Baron, 2004 VT 20 (Vt. 2004). · cites it 2ד: *317 For the purpose of this chapter: (1) “Bodily injury” means physical pain, illness or any impairment of physical condition; (2) “Serious bodily injury” means bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes substantial loss or impairment of the…”
State v. William Schenk, 190 A.3d 820 (Vt. 2018). · cites it 2ד§ 1702(d)(1) (incorporating definition of serious bodily injury in 13 V.S.A. § 1021(a)(2)). It also provides that “ ‘[t]hreat’ and ‘threaten’ shall not include constitutionally protected activity.”
State v. Bourn, 421 A.2d 1281 (Vt. 1980). · cites it 3ד” 13 V.S.A. § 1021(1). Simple assault under 13 V.”
State v. Francis, 561 A.2d 392 (Vt. 1989). “§ 608, incorporates the elements of assault as defined in 13 V.S.A. §§ 1021, 1023. 151 Vt. at 307-08 , 561 A.”
State v. Bourn, 421 A.2d 1281 (Vt. 1980). “” 13 V.S.A. § 1021(1). Simple assault under 13 V.”
State v. Baron, 2004 VT 20 (Vt. 2004). “: *317 For the purpose of this chapter: (1) “Bodily injury” means physical pain, illness or any impairment of physical condition; (2) “Serious bodily injury” means bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes substantial loss or impairment of the…”
State v. Muscari, 807 A.2d 407 (Vt. 2002). “*106 Title 13 V.S.A. § 1021(2) defines “serious bodily injury” as “bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes substantial loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ or substantial impairment of health, or substantial…”
State v. Read, 680 A.2d 944 (Vt. 1996). “" 13 V.S.A. § 1021(2) (1958) (repealed 1972).”
State v. Turner, 2003 VT 73 (Vt. 2003). “First, defendant claims that the State presented insufficient evidence that the knife used in the stabbing was a *597 “deadly weapon” as defined by 13 V.S.A. § 1021(3), and that he is therefore entitled to a judgment of acquittal.”
State v. Longley, 2007 VT 101 (Vt. 2007). “The New Hampshire Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion when interpreting a statutory definition of “deadly weapon” nearly identical to that found in 13 V.S.A. § 1021. 1 State v. Hatt, 740 A.”
State v. Justin R. Kuzawski, 181 A.3d 62 (Vt. 2017). “) Amendment, 13 V.S.A. § 1021. The actual language of the deadly weapons definition was unchanged, and Longley therefore still applies.”
State of Vermont v. Christian J. Noll, 199 A.3d 1054 (Vt. 2018). “Insofar as expression may be part of the course of conduct that supports a stalking charge, it is, by definition, only that expression that is not protected by the First Amendment.”
State v. William Schenk, 190 A.3d 820 (Vt. 2018). “§ 1702(d)(1) (incorporating definition of serious bodily injury in 13 V.S.A. § 1021(a)(2)). It also provides that “ ‘[t]hreat’ and ‘threaten’ shall not include constitutionally protected activity.”
State v. Justin R. Kuzawski, 181 A.3d 62 (Vt. 2017). “) Amendment, 13 V.S.A. § 1021. The actual language of the deadly weapons definition was unchanged, and Longley therefore still applies.”
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