Virginia Code
Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-83 (2026)
Repealed
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Repealed by Acts 1994, c. 273.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 29
cases, 1977–2001 · leading case: Lansdown v. Commonwealth, 308 S.E.2d 106 (Va. 1983).
Lansdown v. Commonwealth, 308 S.E.2d 106 (Va. 1983). “2d 889 (1968), and Va. Code § 19.2-83. In Terry , the Court considered the narrow question "whether it is always unreasonable for a policeman to seize a person and subject him to a limited search for weapons unless there is probable cause for an arrest.”
Commonwealth v. Brown, 378 S.E.2d 623 (Va. Ct. App. 1989). “The trial court's order in this case was not based on a violation of a provision of the Virginia or United States Constitutions, but was based on Code § 19.2-83, which limits the authority of a police officer to stop, question and search a suspicious person.”
Troncoso v. Commonwealth, 407 S.E.2d 349 (Va. Ct. App. 1991). “2-60 contains a statutory exclusionary rule which is not limited to constitutional violations, (2) that Code § 19.2-83 imposes upon the police a burden of articulable suspicion necessary for investigatory detention greater than that imposed by Terry v.”
Hatcher v. Commonwealth, 419 S.E.2d 256 (Va. Ct. App. 1992). “We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Using radar at about midnight on August 13, 1989, Officer Robert Reetz of the Manassas Police Department detected a car approaching him at a high rate of speed.”
Servis v. Commonwealth, 371 S.E.2d 156 (Va. Ct. App. 1988). “" Code § 19.2-83. Indeed, the defendant does not question the legality of the "stop" but instead he questions the scope of the "frisk.”
Gray v. Rhoads, 55 Va. Cir. 362 (Charlottesville Cir. Ct. 2001). “The Court also cited a by-then repealed statute, § 19.2-83, as analogous to § 19.2-59 in many way, but dealing with seizures and asked each to analyze the significance, if any, of the existence at the time of the two sections.”
Miller v. Commonwealth, 434 S.E.2d 897 (Va. Ct. App. 1993). “” The police pursued the investigation responsibly, largely with defendant’s cooperation and agreement, and the trial court’s finding that the detention was of reasonable duration was neither plainly wrong nor without evidence to support it.”
Simmons v. Commonwealth, 231 S.E.2d 218 (Va. 1977). “2 as amended (now Code § 19.2-83). (Italics supplied). *557 It is true, as defendant contends, that the language in that part of our statute which permits a police officer to stop a person whom he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a felony…”
Williams v. Commonwealth, 354 S.E.2d 79 (Va. Ct. App. 1987). “2d 434, 437 (1986); Code § 19.2-83. As the foregoing suggests, the authority to conduct a pat-down search does not automatically accompany an investigative detention.”
Phillips v. Commonwealth, 434 S.E.2d 918 (Va. Ct. App. 1993). “2d at 86 ; Code § 19.2-83. If, during the pat-down search, the police officer feels an object that he reasonably believes could be a dangerous weapon, the officer may seize the object from the suspect’s person.”
Jacques v. Commonwealth, 405 S.E.2d 630 (Va. Ct. App. 1991). “On brief, the appellant argues that Code § 19.2-83 proscribed the search of his car.”
Payne v. Commonwealth, 414 S.E.2d 869 (Va. Ct. App. 1992). “2d 49, 52 (1991) (emphasis added); Code § 19.2-83. The officer, however, must identify “ ‘particular facts from which he reasonably inferred that the individual was armed and dangerous.”
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