Wash. Rev. Code » Title 77 · Chapter 77.15
Revised Code of Washington

Wash. Rev. Code § 77.15.080 (2026)

Fish and wildlife officers and ex officio fish and wildlife officers—Inspection authority

✓ current as of May 2026
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Based upon articulable facts that a person is engaged in fishing, harvesting, or hunting activities, fish and wildlife officers and ex officio fish and wildlife officers have the authority to temporarily stop the person and check for valid licenses, tags, permits, stamps, or catch record cards, and to inspect all fish, shellfish, seaweed, and wildlife in possession as well as the equipment being used to ensure compliance with the requirements of this title. Fish and wildlife officers and ex officio fish and wildlife officers also may request that the person write his or her signature for comparison with the signature on his or her fishing, harvesting, or hunting license. Failure to comply with the request is prima facie evidence that the person is not the person named on the license. Fish and wildlife officers and ex officio fish and wildlife officers may require the person, if age sixteen or older, to exhibit a driver's license or other photo identification.
[ 2014 c 202 s 303; 2014 c 48 s 3; 2012 c 176 s 9; 2002 c 281 s 8. Prior: 2001 c 306 s 1; 2001 c 253 s 23; 2000 c 107 s 233; 1998 c 190 s 113.]

Notes:

Reviser's note: This section was amended by 2014 c 48 s 3 and by 2014 c 202 s 303, each without reference to the other. Both amendments are incorporated in the publication of this section under RCW 1.12.025(2). For rule of construction, see RCW 1.12.025(1).
Findings—2014 c 202: See note following RCW 77.135.010.
Purpose—2002 c 281: See note following RCW 77.08.010.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 6 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 2007–2024 · leading case: Schlegel v. Dep't of Licensing, 153 P.3d 244 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
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Schlegel v. Dep't of Licensing, 153 P.3d 244 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 23× “Officer Fulton believed he had “articulable facts” under RCW 77.15.080 to stop some vehicles. Id. at 21.”
State of Washington v. James Michael Miller, 545 P.3d 388 (Wash. Ct. App. 2024). · cites it 25× “” Relying on this statute, DFW officers stopped James Miller’s sport-utility vehicle (SUV) in the Colockum Wildlife Area when they saw him wearing an orange sweatshirt and slowly driving down a bumpy road during modern firearm deer and elk season.”
Matthew Tarabochia v. Mickey Adkins, 766 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2014). “” Wash. Rev.Code § 77.15.080(1) (2002). This statute does not expressly authorize an automobile stop or define “engaged in fishing,” and Defendants have pointed to no regulatory or other published authority applying this provision to a roving automobile stop of commercial…”
Joe Wickersham v. State of Washington, 694 F. App'x 559 (9th Cir. 2017). “Namely, the Wickershams have not shown that Officer Willette was acting outside her authority under Wash. Rev. Code § 77.15.080 when she entered the property but did not see a woman actively fishing.”
State of Washington v. Richard Arthur Guisasola (Wash. Ct. App. 2013). · cites it 4× “Guisasola argues that the facts of the present case are not similar enough to Schlegel to support the court's determination that "articulable facts" existed to justify the stop.”
Joe Wickersham v. State Of Washington (Wash. Ct. App. 2019). · cites it 2× “The Wickershams contend that RCW 77.15.080 defines the scope of a DEW officer’s authority.”
Wash. Rev. Code § 77.15.080(1): 3 cases
Schlegel v. Dep't of Licensing, 153 P.3d 244 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). “Officer Fulton believed he had “articulable facts” under RCW 77.15.080 to stop some vehicles. Id. at 21.”
Matthew Tarabochia v. Mickey Adkins, 766 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2014). “” Wash. Rev.Code § 77.15.080(1) (2002). This statute does not expressly authorize an automobile stop or define “engaged in fishing,” and Defendants have pointed to no regulatory or other published authority applying this provision to a roving automobile stop of commercial…”
State of Washington v. Richard Arthur Guisasola (Wash. Ct. App. 2013). “Guisasola argues that the facts of the present case are not similar enough to Schlegel to support the court's determination that "articulable facts" existed to justify the stop.”
Wash. Rev. Code § 77.15.080(2): 1 case
Schlegel v. Dep't of Licensing, 153 P.3d 244 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). “Officer Fulton believed he had “articulable facts” under RCW 77.15.080 to stop some vehicles. Id. at 21.”
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