Wisconsin Statutes

Wis. Stat. § 706.08 (2026)

Nonrecording, effect

✓ current as of July 2026
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706.08706.08Nonrecording, effect.
706.08(1)(1)
706.08(1)(a)(a) Except for patents issued by the United States or this state, or by the proper officers of either, every conveyance that is not recorded as provided by law shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser, in good faith and for a valuable consideration, of the same real estate or any portion of the same real estate whose conveyance is recorded first.
706.08(1)(b)(b) A conveyance of mineral interests which is not recorded in the office of the register of deeds of the county in which the land is located, within 30 days after it is signed by the lessor, is void.
706.08(2)(2)Where a public tract index or abstract of title index is maintained, an instrument properly indexed therein and recorded at length at the place there shown shall be deemed to be duly recorded for purposes of this section, despite any error or omission in the process of including the instrument, or prior instruments in the same chain of title, in other records. Where an instrument is not properly indexed in such tract or abstract of title index, or where such index is not publicly maintained, the instrument shall be deemed to be duly recorded only if the instrument, together with prior instruments necessary to trace title by use of alphabetical indexes by names of parties, are properly indexed in such alphabetical indexes, and recorded at length at the places there shown. Wherever an instrument is duly recorded hereunder, its record shall be effective as of the date and hour at which it is shown by the general index to have been accepted for record.
706.08(3)(3)When an express trust is created, but its existence is not disclosed in a recorded conveyance to the trustee, the title of the trustee shall be deemed absolute as against the subsequent creditors of the trustee not having notice of the trust and as against purchasers from such trustee without notice and for a valuable consideration.
706.08(4)(4)It shall be conclusively presumed that a person is a trustee of a valid express trust and has full power of conveyance if all of the following occur:
706.08(4)(a)(a) The person is designated as trustee and holds an interest in land as trustee.
706.08(4)(b)(b) The person’s authority and powers as trustee are not set forth in a recorded instrument.
706.08(4)(c)(c) The person conveys an interest in land as trustee to a good faith purchaser, as defined in s. 401.201 (2) (qm).
706.08(5)(5)When a conveyance purports to be absolute in terms, but is made or intended to be made defeasible by force of another instrument for that purpose, the original conveyance shall not be thereby defeated or affected as against any person other than the maker of the defeasance or the maker’s heirs or devisees or persons having actual notice thereof, unless the instrument of defeasance has been recorded in the office of the register of deeds of the county where the lands lie.
706.08(6)(6)The recording of an assignment of a mortgage shall not in itself be deemed notice of such assignment to the mortgagor so as to invalidate any payment made to the mortgagee without actual notice of such assignment.
706.08(7)(7)No letter of attorney or other instrument containing a power to convey lands, when executed and recorded under this chapter, shall be deemed to be revoked by any act of the party by whom it was executed unless the instrument containing such revocation is also recorded in the same office in which the instrument containing the power was recorded, and such record shall import notice to all persons, including the agent named in said letter of attorney of the contents thereof. The death of the party executing such letter of attorney shall not operate as a revocation thereof as to the attorney or agent until the attorney or agent has notice of the death, or as to one who without notice of such death in good faith deals with the attorney or agent.
706.08 AnnotationAn unrecorded conveyance, if delivered, is valid against judgment creditors since they are not bona fide creditors for value. West Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Interstate Investment, Inc., 57 Wis. 2d 690, 205 N.W.2d 361 (1973).
706.08 AnnotationA purchaser having constructive notice that there may have been an unrecorded conveyance was not a “purchaser in good faith” under sub. (1) (a). Kordecki v. Rizzo, 106 Wis. 2d 713, 317 N.W.2d 479 (1982).
706.08 AnnotationAn original mortgagee’s knowledge of a prior mortgage not properly of record will not be imputed to an assignee of the mortgage with no knowledge of the prior mortgage and does not render the assignee not a purchaser in good faith under sub. (1) (a) who cannot claim priority. Bank of New Glarus v. Swartwood, 2006 WI App 224, 297 Wis. 2d 458, 725 N.W.2d 944, 05-0647.
706.08 Annotation“Good faith” for purposes of sub. (1) (a) exists only when there is no notice under s. 706.09. Anderson v. Quinn, 2007 WI App 260, 306 Wis. 2d 686, 743 N.W.2d 492, 06-2462.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 46 cases (3 in the last 5 years), 1980–2025 · leading case: Bank of New Glarus v. Swartwood, 2006 WI App 224 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006).
Bank of New Glarus v. Swartwood, 2006 WI App 224 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 37× “Rather, Ameriquest contends that it is entitled to summary judgment on the issue of priority because Bank of New Glarus's chain of title in the Iowa County Register of Deeds contains a "gap"; the record does not show FDIC's appointment as receiver of the First National loans…”
Assocs. Fin. Servs. Co. of Wisconsin v. Brown, 2002 WI App 300 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002). · cites it 9× “It contended that its mortgage was superior to the Lockharts' quitclaim deed because the mortgage was properly recorded pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 706.08 (l)(a). 4 The Lockharts claimed that summary *920 judgment was inappropriate because an issue of fact existed as to whether…”
Grosskopf Oil, Inc. v. Winter, 457 N.W.2d 514 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990). · cites it 7× “In absence of any reference to leases, we conclude that the statute establishes priority of certain recorded mortgages over subsequently filed liens, but does not apply to leases.”
Seelen v. Couillard (In re Couillard), 486 B.R. 466 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2012). · cites it 11× “” As such, a bankruptcy trustee in Wisconsin may exercise the rights of a subsequent purchaser under Wis. Stat. § 706.08 (1). In re Carley Capital Group, 117 B.”
Wenzel v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC (In re Wenzel), 554 B.R. 861 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2016). · cites it 6× “Plaintiffs contend that the lack of a legal description in the Countrywide mortgage made it void as against subsequent purchasers under Wisconsin statute, Wis. Stat. § 706.08 (l)(a). They argue that the absence of a legal description in the Countrywide mortgage made it…”
Carolina Builders Corp. v. Dietzman, 2007 WI App 201 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 6× “Because the appellants do not cite to any statute or case law to explain the foundation for this argument, we are uncertain whether they are relying on Wis. Stat. § 706.08 (1)(a) or some doctrine having another source.”
George v. Argent Mortg. Co. (In Re Radbil), 364 B.R. 355 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2007). · cites it 8× “Wis. Stat. § 706.08 (l)(a). The operative date in this case is March 31, 2004, the date the mortgage was recorded by the Milwaukee County Register of Deeds.”
Kallas v. B&g Realty, 485 N.W.2d 278 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992). · cites it 6× “Although not strictly applicable here because B&G Realty was not a "subsequent purchaser," section 706.08(1) (a) does reflect the law's determination that those who first record their interests in land have priority over those with competing interests.”
In re Olsen, 563 B.R. 899 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2017). · cites it 4× “See Wis. Stat. §§ 706.08 , 706.09; see also Kordecki v.”
Anderson v. Quinn, 2007 WI App 260 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 3× “9 This statute mirrors current Wis. Stat. § 706.08 (l)(a), which provides in relevant part: *700 [E]very conveyance that is not recorded as provided by law shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser, in good faith and for a valuable consideration, of the same real estate…”
George v. Guar. Mortg. Co. (In Re Ljubic), 362 B.R. 914 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2007). · cites it 6× “Wis. Stat. § 706.08 (l)(a). The date of recordation was July 2, 2003, 23 days after the debtors executed the promissory note, June 9, 2003, and 48 days prior to the petition date.”
State v. Barkdoll, 298 N.W.2d 539 (Wis. 1980). · cites it 3× “Sec. 706.08, Stats., a race-notice recording statute, provides that an unrecorded conveyance is void as against any subsequent purchaser of the real estate in good faith and for a valuable consideration whose conveyance is first recorded.”
— Wis. Stat. § 706.08(1) — 12 cases
Badger State Agri-Credit & Realty, Inc. v. Lubahn, 365 N.W.2d 616 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985).
Ellsworth v. Fitzpatrick (In Re Fitzpatrick), 29 B.R. 701 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1983).
Kallas v. B&g Realty, 485 N.W.2d 278 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992). “Although not strictly applicable here because B&G Realty was not a "subsequent purchaser," section 706.08(1) (a) does reflect the law's determination that those who first record their interests in land have priority over those with competing interests.”
Bank of New Glarus v. Swartwood, 2006 WI App 224 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006). “Rather, Ameriquest contends that it is entitled to summary judgment on the issue of priority because Bank of New Glarus's chain of title in the Iowa County Register of Deeds contains a "gap"; the record does not show FDIC's appointment as receiver of the First National loans…”
Kordecki v. Rizzo, 317 N.W.2d 479 (Wis. 1982).
— Wis. Stat. § 706.08(1)(a) — 7 cases
Assocs. Fin. Servs. Co. of Wisconsin v. Brown, 2002 WI App 300 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002). “It contended that its mortgage was superior to the Lockharts' quitclaim deed because the mortgage was properly recorded pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 706.08 (l)(a). 4 The Lockharts claimed that summary *920 judgment was inappropriate because an issue of fact existed as to whether…”
Kallas v. B&g Realty, 485 N.W.2d 278 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992). “Although not strictly applicable here because B&G Realty was not a "subsequent purchaser," section 706.08(1) (a) does reflect the law's determination that those who first record their interests in land have priority over those with competing interests.”
Bank of New Glarus v. Swartwood, 2006 WI App 224 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006). “Rather, Ameriquest contends that it is entitled to summary judgment on the issue of priority because Bank of New Glarus's chain of title in the Iowa County Register of Deeds contains a "gap"; the record does not show FDIC's appointment as receiver of the First National loans…”
Seelen v. Couillard (In re Couillard), 486 B.R. 466 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2012). “” As such, a bankruptcy trustee in Wisconsin may exercise the rights of a subsequent purchaser under Wis. Stat. § 706.08 (1). In re Carley Capital Group, 117 B.”
Anderson v. Quinn, 2007 WI App 260 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007). “9 This statute mirrors current Wis. Stat. § 706.08 (l)(a), which provides in relevant part: *700 [E]very conveyance that is not recorded as provided by law shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser, in good faith and for a valuable consideration, of the same real estate…”
— Wis. Stat. § 706.08(2) — 1 case
Bank of New Glarus v. Swartwood, 2006 WI App 224 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006). “Rather, Ameriquest contends that it is entitled to summary judgment on the issue of priority because Bank of New Glarus's chain of title in the Iowa County Register of Deeds contains a "gap"; the record does not show FDIC's appointment as receiver of the First National loans…”
— Wis. Stat. § 706.08(5) — 1 case
Preston v. Iron Cnty., 314 N.W.2d 131 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981).
— Wis. Stat. § 706.08(l)(a) — 11 cases
Assocs. Fin. Servs. Co. of Wisconsin v. Brown, 2002 WI App 300 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002). “It contended that its mortgage was superior to the Lockharts' quitclaim deed because the mortgage was properly recorded pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 706.08 (l)(a). 4 The Lockharts claimed that summary *920 judgment was inappropriate because an issue of fact existed as to whether…”
Grosskopf Oil, Inc. v. Winter, 457 N.W.2d 514 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990). “In absence of any reference to leases, we conclude that the statute establishes priority of certain recorded mortgages over subsequently filed liens, but does not apply to leases.”
Seelen v. Couillard (In re Couillard), 486 B.R. 466 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2012). “” As such, a bankruptcy trustee in Wisconsin may exercise the rights of a subsequent purchaser under Wis. Stat. § 706.08 (1). In re Carley Capital Group, 117 B.”
Carolina Builders Corp. v. Dietzman, 2007 WI App 201 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007). “Because the appellants do not cite to any statute or case law to explain the foundation for this argument, we are uncertain whether they are relying on Wis. Stat. § 706.08 (1)(a) or some doctrine having another source.”
In Re Carley Capital Grp., 117 B.R. 951 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1990).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.