Wis. Stat. » CHAPTER 893 — LIMITATIONS OF COMMENCEMENT OF ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS; PROCEDURE FOR CLAIMS AGAINST GOVERNMENTAL UNITS
Wisconsin Statutes

Wis. Stat. § 893.23 (2026)

When action stayed

✓ current as of July 2026
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893.23893.23 When action stayed. When the commencement of an action is stayed by injunction or statutory prohibition the time of the continuance of the injunction or prohibition is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the action.
893.23 HistoryHistory: 1979 c. 323.
893.23 NoteJudicial Council Committee’s Note, 1979: This section is previous s. 893.36 renumbered for more logical placement in restructured ch. 893. [Bill 326-A]
893.23 AnnotationThe interplay between this section and s. 893.80 creates a statute of limitations equal to three years and 120 days when filing a claim under s. 893.80. Colby v. Columbia County, 202 Wis. 2d 342, 550 N.W.2d 124 (1996), 93-3348.
Subch. III of ch. 893 NoteJudicial Council Committee’s Note, 1979: This subchapter assembles sections affecting real or personal property in a single location in ch. 893. It revises some present provisions; rearranges others; adds a 7-year limitation statute under certain circumstances and a codification of case-law relating to obtaining prescriptive rights by adverse user; and deletes several present sections considered unnecessary.
Subch. III of ch. 893 NoteNotes following the sections of the subchapter explain the rearrangements, changes, and additions. However, specific discussion of those sections eliminated follows:
Subch. III of ch. 893 Note(1) Previous ss. 893.02 and 893.03 were judged duplicative of the principal operative sections and possibly confusing. Nelson v. Jacobs, 99 Wis. 547, 75 N.W. 406 (1898), appears to rely in part on these sections for the proposition that one who has adversely possessed for 20 years has marketable title which can be forced on a vendee who objects, even though not established of record. This is undesirable and contrary to current understanding; see Baldwin v. Anderson, 40 Wis. 2d 33, 161 N.W.2d 553 (1968). In addition, Zellmer v. Martin, 157 Wis. 341, 147 N.W. 371 (1914) suggests that these sections may mean that 20 years of continuous disseisin of a true owner may bar that owner even if the claiming adverse possessor has not possessed in one of the ways required by previous s. 893.09. This may be confusing, since the language of previous s. 893.09 precluded other forms of possession under the 20-year statute. Other than as here noted, ss. 893.02 and 893.03 have been rarely cited and are not significant. In view of the presumption of possession by the true owner provided by previous s. 893.05, which this subchapter retains, previous ss. 893.02 and 893.03 contributed no needed substance to the subchapter.
Subch. III of ch. 893 Note(2) Previous s. 893.075 was enacted as a companion to s. 700.30, which was held unconstitutional in Chicago & N.W. Transportation Co. v. Pedersen, 80 Wis. 2d 566, 259 N.W.2d 316 (1977). No new s. 700.30 has been enacted. Therefore, s. 893.075 is surplusage and repealed.
Subch. III of ch. 893 Note(3) The ancient doctrine of “descent cast” is no longer of practical importance, especially since the passage of the new probate code in 1971. Therefore, the need for a response to that doctrine in previous s. 893.13 has disappeared, and the section has been repealed.
Subch. III of ch. 893 Note(4) Previous s. 893.18 (7) limited the time within which title to real estate could be attacked based on a defect in the jurisdiction of a court of record which entered a judgment affecting the title. That section is repealed as its application is preempted by s. 706.09 (1) (g). [Bill 326-A]
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 12 cases (4 in the last 5 years), 1993–2024 · leading case: Colby v. Columbia Cnty., 550 N.W.2d 124 (Wis. 1996).
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Colby v. Columbia Cnty., 550 N.W.2d 124 (Wis. 1996). · cites it 13× “13 , Wis. Stat. § 893.23 and Wis. Stat. § 893.”
Snopek v. Lakeland Med. Ctr., 588 N.W.2d 19 (Wis. 1999). · cites it 6× “Without similar legislative action, the Colby court concluded that the interplay between Wis. Stat. § 893.23 (1993-93), the tolling provision for statutory waiting periods, and Wis.”
David Schlemm v. Brendan Pizzala, 94 F.4th 688 (7th Cir. 2024). · cites it 4× “Wis. Stat. § 893.23 provides that when the requirements of a statutory prohibition must be met before a plaintiff can sue, as with the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement, the statute of limitations is tolled for the “time of the continuance” of that prohibition.”
Moder v. L.E. Meyers Co., 589 F. Supp. 2d 1043 (W.D. Wis. 2008). · cites it 5× “Plaintiff cites Wis. Stat. § 893.23 in support of his position that the Equal Rights Division order tolled his statute of limitations for his defamation claims.”
Chilcote v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wisconsin, 841 F. Supp. 877 (E.D. Wis. 1993). · cites it 2× “Chilcote points to Wis.Stat. § 893.23, which tolls a statute of limitations for that period “[w]hen the commencement of an action is stayed by injunction or statutory prohibition.”
Landis v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wisconsin, Inc., 2000 WI App 164 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000). · cites it 5× “Phyllis next claims that the interplay between Wis. Stat. §§ 893.23 and 655.44(5) operates to toll the five-year statute of repose.”
Loesch v. City of Huron, 2006 SD 93 (S.D. 2006). “1996) (analyzing Wis Stat 893.23). The court held that the 120-day *698 period should be excluded from the statute of limitations.”
Givens v. Luedtke, 587 F. App'x 979 (7th Cir. 2014). “See Wis. Stat. § 893.23 ; Johnson v. Rivera, 272 F.”
David Schlemm v. Brendan Pizzala (7th Cir. 2024). · cites it 4× “Wis. Stat. § 893.23 provides that when the requirements of a statutory prohibition must be met before a plaintiff can sue, as with the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement, the statute of limitations is tolled for the “time of the continuance” of that prohibition.”
David Schlemm v. Brendan Pizzala (7th Cir. 2024). · cites it 4× “Wis. Stat. § 893.23 provides that when the requirements of a statutory prohibition must be met before a plaintiff can sue, as with the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement, the statute of limitations is tolled for the “time of the continuance” of that prohibition.”
David Schlemm v. Brendan Pizzala (7th Cir. 2024). · cites it 4× “Wis. Stat. § 893.23 provides that when the requirements of a statutory prohibition must be met before a plaintiff can sue, as with the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement, the statute of limitations is tolled for the “time of the continuance” of that prohibition.”
Henderson v. Schwochert (E.D. Wis. 2020). · cites it 2× “They assert that Henderson filed this lawsuit on May 19, 2019, about one month past the six-year statute of limitations.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.