13-753. Mental evaluations of capital defendants; hearing; appeal; definitions
A. In any case in which the state files a notice of intent to seek the death penalty, a person who is found to have an intellectual disability pursuant to this section shall not be sentenced to death but shall be sentenced to life or natural life.
B. If the state files a notice of intent to seek the death penalty, the court, unless the defendant objects, shall appoint a prescreening psychological expert in order to determine the defendant's intelligence quotient using current community, nationally and culturally accepted intelligence testing procedures. The prescreening psychological expert shall submit a written report of the intelligence quotient determination to the court within ten days of the testing of the defendant. If the defendant objects to the prescreening, the defendant waives the right to a pretrial determination of status. The waiver does not preclude the defendant from offering evidence of the defendant's intellectual disability in the penalty phase.
C. If the prescreening psychological expert determines that the defendant's intelligence quotient is higher than seventy-five, the notice of intent to seek the death penalty shall not be dismissed on the ground that the defendant has an intellectual disability. If the prescreening psychological expert determines that the defendant's intelligence quotient is higher than seventy-five, the report shall be sealed by the court and be available only to the defendant. The report shall be released on the motion of any party if the defendant introduces the report in the present case or is convicted of an offense in the present case and the sentence is final. A prescreening determination that the defendant's intelligence quotient is higher than seventy-five does not prevent the defendant from introducing evidence of the defendant's intellectual disability or diminished mental capacity at the penalty phase of the sentencing proceeding.
D. If the prescreening psychological expert determines that the defendant's intelligence quotient is seventy-five or less, the trial court, within ten days of receiving the written report, shall order the state and the defendant to each nominate three experts in intellectual disabilities, or jointly nominate a single expert in intellectual disabilities. The trial court shall appoint one expert in intellectual disabilities nominated by the state and one expert in intellectual disabilities nominated by the defendant, or a single expert in intellectual disabilities jointly nominated by the state and the defendant, none of whom made the prescreening determination of the defendant's intelligence quotient. The trial court, in its discretion, may appoint an additional expert in intellectual disabilities who was neither nominated by the state nor the defendant, and who did not make the prescreening determination of the defendant's intelligence quotient. Within forty-five days after the trial court orders the state and the defendant to nominate experts in intellectual disabilities, or on the appointment of such experts, whichever is later, the state and the defendant shall provide to the experts in intellectual disabilities and the court any available records that may be relevant to the defendant's status. The court may extend the deadline for providing records on good cause shown by the state or defendant.
E. Not less than twenty days after receipt of the records provided pursuant to subsection D, or twenty days after the expiration of the deadline for providing the records, whichever is later, each expert in intellectual disability shall examine the defendant using current community, nationally and culturally accepted physical, developmental, psychological and intelligence testing procedures, for the purpose of determining whether the defendant has an intellectual disability. Within fifteen days of examining the defendant, each expert in intellectual disabilities shall submit a written report to the trial court that includes the expert's opinion as to whether the defendant has an intellectual disability.
F. If the scores on all the tests for intelligence quotient administered to the defendant are above seventy, the notice of intent to seek the death penalty shall not be dismissed on the ground that the defendant has an intellectual disability. This does not preclude the defendant from introducing evidence of the defendant's intellectual disability or diminished mental capacity at the penalty phase of the sentencing proceeding.
G. No less than thirty days after the experts in intellectual disabilities submit reports to the court and before trial, the trial court shall hold a hearing to determine if the defendant has an intellectual disability. At the hearing, the defendant has the burden of proving intellectual disability by clear and convincing evidence. A determination by the trial court that the defendant's intelligence quotient is sixty-five or lower establishes a rebuttable presumption that the defendant has an intellectual disability. This subsection does not preclude a defendant with an intelligence quotient of seventy or below from proving intellectual disability by clear and convincing evidence.
H. If the trial court finds that the defendant has an intellectual disability, the trial court shall dismiss the intent to seek the death penalty, shall not impose a sentence of death on the defendant if the defendant is convicted of first degree murder and shall dismiss one of the attorneys appointed under rule 6.2, Arizona rules of criminal procedure, unless the court finds that there is good cause to retain both attorneys. If the trial court finds that the defendant does not have an intellectual disability, the court's finding does not prevent the defendant from introducing evidence of the defendant's intellectual disability or diminished mental capacity at the penalty phase of the sentencing proceeding.
I. Within ten days after the trial court makes a finding on intellectual disability, the state or the defendant may file a petition for special action with the Arizona court of appeals pursuant to the rules of procedure for special actions. The filing of the petition for special action is governed by the rules of procedure for special actions, except that the court of appeals shall exercise jurisdiction and decide the merits of the claims raised.
J. This section applies to all capital sentencing proceedings.
K. For the purposes of this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
1. "Adaptive behavior" means the effectiveness or degree to which the defendant meets the standards of personal independence and social responsibility expected of the defendant's age and cultural group.
2. "Expert in intellectual disabilities" means a psychologist or physician licensed pursuant to title 32, chapter 13, 17 or 19.1 with at least five years' experience in the testing or testing assessment, evaluation and diagnosis of intellectual disabilities.
3. "Intellectual disability" means a condition based on a mental deficit that involves significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning, existing concurrently with significant impairment in adaptive behavior, where the onset of the foregoing conditions occurred before the defendant reached the age of eighteen.
4. "Prescreening psychological expert" means a psychologist licensed pursuant to title 32, chapter 19.1 with at least five years' experience in the testing, evaluation and diagnosis of intellectual disabilities.
5. "Significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning" means a full scale intelligence quotient of seventy or lower. The court in determining the intelligence quotient shall take into account the margin of error for the test administered.
Notes of Decisions
Roosevelt Arthur Williams v. State of Arizona, 303 P.3d 532 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013).
· cites it 88× “Consistent with this change in terminology, § 13-753 was amended in 2011 to substitute “intellectual disability” for “mental retardation” with no substantive changes to the statute.”
State of Arizona v. Eric Boyston, 298 P.3d 887 (Ariz. 2013).
· cites it 29× “After Boyston’s trial, the legislature amended the pertinent statute, A.R.S. § 13-753, changing "mental retardation” to "intellectual disability.”
State of Arizona v. Shawn Ryan Grell, 291 P.3d 350 (Ariz. 2013).
· cites it 36× “See A.R.S. § 13-753. Here, the trial court ruled - 22 - in 2005, based on evidence presented in 2001, that Grell had not shown mental retardation.”
State v. Israel Joseph Naranjo, 321 P.3d 398 (Ariz. 2014).
· cites it 14× “When the legislature last amended A.R.S. § 13-753 in 2011, it replaced the term "mental retardation” with "intellectual disability.”
Smith v. Schriro, 813 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2016).
· cites it 10× “Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.02 (K)(3) (2006); Ariz.”
State v. Hon. gates/apolinar Altamirano, 410 P.3d 433 (Ariz. 2018).
· cites it 20× “In April 2015, the trial court ordered Altamirano to undergo an ID prescreening evaluation pursuant to § 13-753. Altamirano objected to the evaluation but also stated he did "not waive his right to raise these issues at a later time, if appropriate, and his refusal to…”
State Ex Rel. Thomas v. Duncan, 216 P.3d 1194 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009).
· cites it 30× “DISCUSSION ¶ 9 The State argues that the refusal of the trial court to appoint a prescreening psychological expert to personally evaluate Defendant contravenes the procedure described in A.R.S. § 13-753. The Defendant contends that the order complies with the statute because the…”
Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014).
· cites it 2× “See Ariz.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 13-753(F) (West 2013); Del.”
Warren Lee Hill, Jr. v. Carl Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2011).
· cites it 2× “, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-753 (establishing procedure by which defendants in capital cases are pre-screened by psychological expert who administers IQ test; those with scores below 76 are tested further by mental retardation experts, and if the defendant then scores 70 or…”
Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 36 A.3d 24 (Pa. 2011).
“2004) (Alabama rule governing post-conviction procedure to act as interim guidance for adjudicating Atkins claims until state legislature acts); Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 13-753 (2001); Ark.Code § 5-4-618 (1993); Colo.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-753(0) — 1 case
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-753(1) — 1 case
Roosevelt Arthur Williams v. State of Arizona, 303 P.3d 532 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013).
“Consistent with this change in terminology, § 13-753 was amended in 2011 to substitute “intellectual disability” for “mental retardation” with no substantive changes to the statute.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-753(A) — 2 cases
State v. Hon. gates/apolinar Altamirano, 410 P.3d 433 (Ariz. 2018).
“In April 2015, the trial court ordered Altamirano to undergo an ID prescreening evaluation pursuant to § 13-753. Altamirano objected to the evaluation but also stated he did "not waive his right to raise these issues at a later time, if appropriate, and his refusal to…”
State Ex Rel. Thomas v. Duncan, 216 P.3d 1194 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009).
“DISCUSSION ¶ 9 The State argues that the refusal of the trial court to appoint a prescreening psychological expert to personally evaluate Defendant contravenes the procedure described in A.R.S. § 13-753. The Defendant contends that the order complies with the statute because the…”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-753(B) — 6 cases
State v. Hon. gates/apolinar Altamirano, 410 P.3d 433 (Ariz. 2018).
“In April 2015, the trial court ordered Altamirano to undergo an ID prescreening evaluation pursuant to § 13-753. Altamirano objected to the evaluation but also stated he did "not waive his right to raise these issues at a later time, if appropriate, and his refusal to…”
State Ex Rel. Thomas v. Duncan, 216 P.3d 1194 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009).
“DISCUSSION ¶ 9 The State argues that the refusal of the trial court to appoint a prescreening psychological expert to personally evaluate Defendant contravenes the procedure described in A.R.S. § 13-753. The Defendant contends that the order complies with the statute because the…”
State of Arizona v. Eric Boyston, 298 P.3d 887 (Ariz. 2013).
“After Boyston’s trial, the legislature amended the pertinent statute, A.R.S. § 13-753, changing "mental retardation” to "intellectual disability.”
Roosevelt Arthur Williams v. State of Arizona, 303 P.3d 532 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013).
“Consistent with this change in terminology, § 13-753 was amended in 2011 to substitute “intellectual disability” for “mental retardation” with no substantive changes to the statute.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-753(C) — 1 case
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-753(D) — 4 cases
State of Arizona v. Eric Boyston, 298 P.3d 887 (Ariz. 2013).
“After Boyston’s trial, the legislature amended the pertinent statute, A.R.S. § 13-753, changing "mental retardation” to "intellectual disability.”
Roosevelt Arthur Williams v. State of Arizona, 303 P.3d 532 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013).
“Consistent with this change in terminology, § 13-753 was amended in 2011 to substitute “intellectual disability” for “mental retardation” with no substantive changes to the statute.”
State Ex Rel. Thomas v. Duncan, 216 P.3d 1194 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009).
“DISCUSSION ¶ 9 The State argues that the refusal of the trial court to appoint a prescreening psychological expert to personally evaluate Defendant contravenes the procedure described in A.R.S. § 13-753. The Defendant contends that the order complies with the statute because the…”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-753(E) — 3 cases
State of Arizona v. Eric Boyston, 298 P.3d 887 (Ariz. 2013).
“After Boyston’s trial, the legislature amended the pertinent statute, A.R.S. § 13-753, changing "mental retardation” to "intellectual disability.”
Roosevelt Arthur Williams v. State of Arizona, 303 P.3d 532 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013).
“Consistent with this change in terminology, § 13-753 was amended in 2011 to substitute “intellectual disability” for “mental retardation” with no substantive changes to the statute.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-753(E)(1) — 1 case
Roosevelt Arthur Williams v. State of Arizona, 303 P.3d 532 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013).
“Consistent with this change in terminology, § 13-753 was amended in 2011 to substitute “intellectual disability” for “mental retardation” with no substantive changes to the statute.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-753(E)(2) — 1 case
State v. Israel Joseph Naranjo, 321 P.3d 398 (Ariz. 2014).
“When the legislature last amended A.R.S. § 13-753 in 2011, it replaced the term "mental retardation” with "intellectual disability.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-753(E)(5) — 2 cases
Smith v. Schriro, 813 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2016).
“Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.02 (K)(3) (2006); Ariz.”
Roosevelt Arthur Williams v. State of Arizona, 303 P.3d 532 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013).
“Consistent with this change in terminology, § 13-753 was amended in 2011 to substitute “intellectual disability” for “mental retardation” with no substantive changes to the statute.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-753(F) — 6 cases
Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014).
“See Ariz.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 13-753(F) (West 2013); Del.”
Smith v. Schriro, 813 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2016).
“Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.02 (K)(3) (2006); Ariz.”
State of Arizona v. Shawn Ryan Grell, 291 P.3d 350 (Ariz. 2013).
“See A.R.S. § 13-753. Here, the trial court ruled - 22 - in 2005, based on evidence presented in 2001, that Grell had not shown mental retardation.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-753(G) — 5 cases
Roosevelt Arthur Williams v. State of Arizona, 303 P.3d 532 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013).
“Consistent with this change in terminology, § 13-753 was amended in 2011 to substitute “intellectual disability” for “mental retardation” with no substantive changes to the statute.”
State of Arizona v. Eric Boyston, 298 P.3d 887 (Ariz. 2013).
“After Boyston’s trial, the legislature amended the pertinent statute, A.R.S. § 13-753, changing "mental retardation” to "intellectual disability.”
State of Arizona v. Shawn Ryan Grell, 291 P.3d 350 (Ariz. 2013).
“See A.R.S. § 13-753. Here, the trial court ruled - 22 - in 2005, based on evidence presented in 2001, that Grell had not shown mental retardation.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-753(H) — 5 cases
State of Arizona v. Eric Boyston, 298 P.3d 887 (Ariz. 2013).
“After Boyston’s trial, the legislature amended the pertinent statute, A.R.S. § 13-753, changing "mental retardation” to "intellectual disability.”
Roosevelt Arthur Williams v. State of Arizona, 303 P.3d 532 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013).
“Consistent with this change in terminology, § 13-753 was amended in 2011 to substitute “intellectual disability” for “mental retardation” with no substantive changes to the statute.”
State v. Hon. gates/apolinar Altamirano, 410 P.3d 433 (Ariz. 2018).
“In April 2015, the trial court ordered Altamirano to undergo an ID prescreening evaluation pursuant to § 13-753. Altamirano objected to the evaluation but also stated he did "not waive his right to raise these issues at a later time, if appropriate, and his refusal to…”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-753(H)(2) — 1 case
State v. Israel Joseph Naranjo, 321 P.3d 398 (Ariz. 2014).
“When the legislature last amended A.R.S. § 13-753 in 2011, it replaced the term "mental retardation” with "intellectual disability.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-753(I) — 1 case
Roosevelt Arthur Williams v. State of Arizona, 303 P.3d 532 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013).
“Consistent with this change in terminology, § 13-753 was amended in 2011 to substitute “intellectual disability” for “mental retardation” with no substantive changes to the statute.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-753(J) — 1 case
State v. Israel Joseph Naranjo, 321 P.3d 398 (Ariz. 2014).
“When the legislature last amended A.R.S. § 13-753 in 2011, it replaced the term "mental retardation” with "intellectual disability.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-753(K) — 3 cases
Roosevelt Arthur Williams v. State of Arizona, 303 P.3d 532 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013).
“Consistent with this change in terminology, § 13-753 was amended in 2011 to substitute “intellectual disability” for “mental retardation” with no substantive changes to the statute.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-753(K)(1) — 8 cases
State of Arizona v. Shawn Ryan Grell, 291 P.3d 350 (Ariz. 2013).
“See A.R.S. § 13-753. Here, the trial court ruled - 22 - in 2005, based on evidence presented in 2001, that Grell had not shown mental retardation.”
Roosevelt Arthur Williams v. State of Arizona, 303 P.3d 532 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013).
“Consistent with this change in terminology, § 13-753 was amended in 2011 to substitute “intellectual disability” for “mental retardation” with no substantive changes to the statute.”
Smith v. Schriro, 813 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2016).
“Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.02 (K)(3) (2006); Ariz.”
State of Arizona v. Eric Boyston, 298 P.3d 887 (Ariz. 2013).
“After Boyston’s trial, the legislature amended the pertinent statute, A.R.S. § 13-753, changing "mental retardation” to "intellectual disability.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-753(K)(2) — 3 cases
State of Arizona v. Eric Boyston, 298 P.3d 887 (Ariz. 2013).
“After Boyston’s trial, the legislature amended the pertinent statute, A.R.S. § 13-753, changing "mental retardation” to "intellectual disability.”
State v. Israel Joseph Naranjo, 321 P.3d 398 (Ariz. 2014).
“When the legislature last amended A.R.S. § 13-753 in 2011, it replaced the term "mental retardation” with "intellectual disability.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-753(K)(3) — 9 cases
Roosevelt Arthur Williams v. State of Arizona, 303 P.3d 532 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013).
“Consistent with this change in terminology, § 13-753 was amended in 2011 to substitute “intellectual disability” for “mental retardation” with no substantive changes to the statute.”
State of Arizona v. Shawn Ryan Grell, 291 P.3d 350 (Ariz. 2013).
“See A.R.S. § 13-753. Here, the trial court ruled - 22 - in 2005, based on evidence presented in 2001, that Grell had not shown mental retardation.”
State of Arizona v. Eric Boyston, 298 P.3d 887 (Ariz. 2013).
“After Boyston’s trial, the legislature amended the pertinent statute, A.R.S. § 13-753, changing "mental retardation” to "intellectual disability.”
State v. Israel Joseph Naranjo, 321 P.3d 398 (Ariz. 2014).
“When the legislature last amended A.R.S. § 13-753 in 2011, it replaced the term "mental retardation” with "intellectual disability.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-753(K)(5) — 7 cases
State of Arizona v. Eric Boyston, 298 P.3d 887 (Ariz. 2013).
“After Boyston’s trial, the legislature amended the pertinent statute, A.R.S. § 13-753, changing "mental retardation” to "intellectual disability.”
State of Arizona v. Shawn Ryan Grell, 291 P.3d 350 (Ariz. 2013).
“See A.R.S. § 13-753. Here, the trial court ruled - 22 - in 2005, based on evidence presented in 2001, that Grell had not shown mental retardation.”
Smith v. Schriro, 813 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2016).
“Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.02 (K)(3) (2006); Ariz.”
Roosevelt Arthur Williams v. State of Arizona, 303 P.3d 532 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013).
“Consistent with this change in terminology, § 13-753 was amended in 2011 to substitute “intellectual disability” for “mental retardation” with no substantive changes to the statute.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-753(K)(S) — 1 case
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