17 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1973–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Foggy v. Arizona Board of Pardons and Parolesgreen2 sentences2021See Foggy v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 108 Ariz. 470, 471 (1972) (holding the superior court “has the power to review proceedings of the Board to determine the absence of due process in the conduct of a parole hearing” but the court lacks authority to review the Board’s actual “decisions”); see also Cooper v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 149 Ariz. 182, 184 (1986) (“Due process requires that judicial review be available to insure that the requirements of due process have been met and that the parole board has acted within the scope of its powers.”). ¶13 Although a petition for writ of 1973We have stated: “While we agree that the Superior Court has the power to review proceedings of the Board to determine the absence of due process in the conduct of a parole hearing, it is apparent that the legislature “intended, by giving the Board the ‘exclusive power’ to grant parole, to deny the courts the right to review the decisions of the parole board * * Foggy v. Arizona Board of Pardons and Paroles, 108 Ariz. 470, 471 , 501 P.2d 942, 943 (1972). | 2 | 2 |
Cooper v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons and Parolesgreen2 sentences2021See Foggy v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 108 Ariz. 470, 471 (1972) (holding the superior court “has the power to review proceedings of the Board to determine the absence of due process in the conduct of a parole hearing” but the court lacks authority to review the Board’s actual “decisions”); see also Cooper v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 149 Ariz. 182, 184 (1986) (“Due process requires that judicial review be available to insure that the requirements of due process have been met and that the parole board has acted within the scope of its powers.”). ¶13 Although a petition for writ of 2019Neither the superior court nor this court serves as a “superparole board.” Cooper, 149 Ariz. at 184 . ¶13 As applied, Ingersoll claims the Board failed to provide him a proper parole hearing “as defined by applicable procedure, policy, rule, and most fundamental, law” and deprived him of due process. | 2 | 2 |
Stewart v. Arizona Board of Pardons & Parolesgreen1 sentence2021Nor does the record show he litigated the issue previously.2 Although Eddy’s petition and reply are not a model of clarity, the submissions show an attempt to raise parole-process claims that fall outside the purview of Rule 32. ¶12 “This court has held that [A.R.S.] section 31-412(A) creates a constitutionally-protected liberty interest in parole release.” Borchers v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 174 Ariz. 463, 467 (App. 1992) (citing Stewart v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 156 Ariz. 538, 543 (App. 1988)). | 1 | 1 |
Borchers v. Arizona Board of Pardons & Parolesgreen1 sentence2021Nor does the record show he litigated the issue previously.2 Although Eddy’s petition and reply are not a model of clarity, the submissions show an attempt to raise parole-process claims that fall outside the purview of Rule 32. ¶12 “This court has held that [A.R.S.] section 31-412(A) creates a constitutionally-protected liberty interest in parole release.” Borchers v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 174 Ariz. 463, 467 (App. 1992) (citing Stewart v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 156 Ariz. 538, 543 (App. 1988)). | 1 | 1 |
McGee v. Arizona State Board of Pardons and Parolesgreen1 sentence2019See Cooper, 149 Ariz. at 186 . ¶19 Ingersoll argues the Board and superior court “apparently believe that by simply allowing applicants to appear before the clemency board that the legal requirements of a parole hearing have been met.” “Due process . . . requires notice and opportunity to be heard . . . .” McGee v. Ariz. State Bd. of Pardons and Parole, 92 Ariz. 317, 320 (1962); see A.R.S. § 31-411(B) (2019) (“A prisoner who is eligible for parole . . . shall be given an opportunity to be heard . . . .”). | 1 | 1 |
Brady v. Marylandgreen1 sentence2017In doing so, the court correctly rejected Carson’s assertion that the successive notice 1 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”). 2 STATE v. CARSON Decision of the Court was timely based on his pre-September 30, 1992, sentencing. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Flemminggreen1 sentence2016Due process entitles a probationer to “some minimal inquiry at or reasonably near the place of the alleged parole violation or arrest and as promptly as convenient after arrest while information is fresh and sources are available.” State v. Flemming, 184 Ariz. 110, 115 (1995). | 1 | 1 |
Wilson v. Ellisgreen2 sentences1995In accord with art. 2, § 24, however, those rules specifically allow the defendant to "seek review ... by filing a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32." Ariz.R.Crim.P. 17.1(e), 27.8(e); Wilson v. Ellis, 176 Ariz. 121, 123 , 859 P.2d 744, 746 (1993) ("It was precisely because of art. 2, § 24 that this court expressly left open the avenue of appellate review by PCR in lieu of direct appeal when it amended the rules with respect to cases involving [guilty pleas]."). 1995In accord with art. 2, § 24, however, those rules specifically allow the defendant to "seek review ... by filing a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32." Ariz.R.Crim.P. 17.1(e), 27.8(e); Wilson v. Ellis, 176 Ariz. 121, 123 , 859 P.2d 744, 746 (1993) ("It was precisely because of art. 2, § 24 that this court expressly left open the avenue of appellate review by PCR in lieu of direct appeal when it amended the rules with respect to cases involving [guilty pleas]."). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Vasquezgreen1 sentence1994Id. at 41, 523 P.2d at 92 (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Robert Joost v. U.S. Parole Commissiongreen1 sentence1985See Joost v. United States Parole Comm., 698 F.2d 418 (10th Cir.1983). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Morrissey v. Brewer
green
2 sentences1995Timeliness of Probation Revocation [11] Due process provides a paroled prisoner with a right to “some minimal inquiry ... at or reasonably near the place of the alleged parole violation or arrest and as promptly as convenient after arrest while information is fresh and sources are available.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485 , 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2602 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). “[A] probationer, like a parolee, is entitled to a preliminary and a final revocation hearing, under the conditions specified in Morrissey v. Brewer____” Gagnon v. Scarpelli 411 U.S. 778, 782 , 93 S.Ct. 1756, 1760 , 36 L 1995Timeliness of Probation Revocation [11] Due process provides a paroled prisoner with a right to “some minimal inquiry ... at or reasonably near the place of the alleged parole violation or arrest and as promptly as convenient after arrest while information is fresh and sources are available.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485 , 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2602 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). “[A] probationer, like a parolee, is entitled to a preliminary and a final revocation hearing, under the conditions specified in Morrissey v. Brewer____” Gagnon v. Scarpelli 411 U.S. 778, 782 , 93 S.Ct. 1756, 1760 , 36 L | 5 | 1975–1995 |
Henry Charles Cooks v. United States
green
2 sentences1998Id. ¶ 19 The state argues that Ysea received a benefit from dismissal of the parole violation charge. 1998Id. ¶ 19 The state argues that Ysea received a benefit from dismissal of the parole violation charge. | 2 | 1998–1998 |
Gagnon v. Scarpelli
red
2 sentences1995Timeliness of Probation Revocation [11] Due process provides a paroled prisoner with a right to “some minimal inquiry ... at or reasonably near the place of the alleged parole violation or arrest and as promptly as convenient after arrest while information is fresh and sources are available.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485 , 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2602 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). “[A] probationer, like a parolee, is entitled to a preliminary and a final revocation hearing, under the conditions specified in Morrissey v. Brewer____” Gagnon v. Scarpelli 411 U.S. 778, 782 , 93 S.Ct. 1756, 1760 , 36 L 1995Timeliness of Probation Revocation [11] Due process provides a paroled prisoner with a right to “some minimal inquiry ... at or reasonably near the place of the alleged parole violation or arrest and as promptly as convenient after arrest while information is fresh and sources are available.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485 , 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2602 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). “[A] probationer, like a parolee, is entitled to a preliminary and a final revocation hearing, under the conditions specified in Morrissey v. Brewer____” Gagnon v. Scarpelli 411 U.S. 778, 782 , 93 S.Ct. 1756, 1760 , 36 L | 2 | 1974–1995 |
Turner v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2010Id. at 1052-53 , 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 300 . 2010Id. at 1052-53 , 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 300 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Foggy v. Eyman
green
2 sentences1975The court may not, however, invade the province of the parole board in determining who is to be paroled.” Foggy v. Eyman, 110 Ariz. 185, 187 , 516 P.2d 321 (1973). 1975The court may not, however, invade the province of the parole board in determining who is to be paroled.” Foggy v. Eyman, 110 Ariz. 185, 187 , 516 P.2d 321 (1973). | 1 | 1975–1975 |
In Re Edge
green
1 sentence1974If the parolee was convicted of a crime forming the basis of the revocation proceedings, there was obviously probable cause to hold him for a parole violation.” 108 Cal.Rptr. at 764 . | 1 | 1974–1974 |
State v. Howland
green
2 sentences1973See also § 31-412 A.R.S.; State v. Howland, 103 Ariz. 250 , 439 P.2d 821 (1968). 1973See also § 31-412 A.R.S.; State v. Howland, 103 Ariz. 250 , 439 P.2d 821 (1968). | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.