Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-303 (2026)

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Comment: The Perpetuation of Illusory Rights in the Arkansas Juvenile Code, 57 Ark. L. Rev. 275 (2004).

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Annual Survey of Caselaw, Family Law, 24 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 1021.

Annual Survey of Caselaw, Family Law, 26 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 911.

Mary Ward, Note: Arkansas’s Human Trafficking Laws: Steps in the Right Direction or a False Sense of Accomplishment?, 37 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 133 (2014).

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Definition for “Delinquent juvenile” in this section, which sets out the age of a juvenile offender and defines the type of behavior that will cause one to be classified as a delinquent juvenile, is not facially void, as under the definition a juvenile would only have to look to the criminal code and city ordinances to determine what constitutes proscribed acts. Manatt v. State, 311 Ark. 17, 842 S.W.2d 845 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1005, 113 S. Ct. 1647, 123 L. Ed. 2d 268 (1993).

Abandonment.

Trial court erred in terminating the father's parental rights based on abandonment because the father was in prison throughout the entirety of the proceeding, there was no evidence that he was served with the emergency order of custody, and the trial court's orders repeatedly found him to be in noncompliance with a case plan of which he had no knowledge. Brinkley v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 625, 533 S.W.3d 639 (2017).

Termination of the father's parental rights based on subjecting the children to aggravated circumstances by abandoning them was proper because the father was aware that his children had been placed in foster care and adjudicated dependent-neglected; despite his knowledge of the proceedings, there was no proof of any contact with his children throughout the case either while he was incarcerated, while he was out on bond, after he had been released to the halfway house, or after he had returned to court for his originally scheduled termination hearing; and there was no evidence that the father took advantage of any opportunities to have contact with his children that would have been available to him in prison or in the halfway house. Clark v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 243, 548 S.W.3d 216 (2018).

Court of Appeals affirmed the finding that the Department of Human Services proved the ground of abandonment because the evidence was sufficient to support a conclusion that the father failed to support or maintain regular contact with his child without just cause; by his own testimony, the father attended only three visits in 2017, and he admitted that he exercised three visits in January 2018 only after his lawyer told him it would look better for him. Norris v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 571, 567 S.W.3d 861 (2018).

Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's termination of the father's parental rights based on the statutory ground of abandonment because the father testified that he purposely avoided involvement in the case, he knew that the children were in the custody of the Department of Human Services and that legal proceedings were being pursued but he chose not to participate, the children spent over one year in foster care and the father had no contact or visitation with them during that year, and the father's explanations for his absence were considered by the trial court and deemed unjustified. Burns v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 253, 576 S.W.3d 505 (2019).

Abuse.

Order finding that a mother's 11-month-old child was dependent-neglected under this section on the basis that the mother subjected the child to Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy was proper; even though no medical professional had raised any concerns prior to the child's admission to the hospital, the appellate court deferred to the trial court's superior position to observe the parties and judge the witnesses' credibility. Parker v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. App. 18, 380 S.W.3d 471 (2011).

Sufficient evidence supported the trial court's determination that appellant's children were dependent-neglected based on an allegation of abuse by choking under subdivision (3)(A) of this section, because appellant's daughter testified that her father held her down on a bed, placed his hands around her neck, and choked her; she was not able to breathe. Her brother confirmed that the choking took place and his father ordered him to restrain her legs during the incident; a family-service worker also testified that appellant admitted to her that the incident occurred. Lynch v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 149 (2012).

Court erred in adjudicating the children as dependent-neglected, because the Department of Human Services failed to provide sufficient proof that the spankings were anything other than moderate or reasonable, and did not result in other than transient pain, and one incident that did not result in injury should not give rise to the removal of the children from the home. Johnson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 244, 413 S.W.3d 549 (2012).

There was testimony that one child had gotten a whipping with a belt from her mother, resulting in welts on her back, and thus the circuit court could and did decide that abuse had been proven by a preponderance of the evidence; while only one child had signs of physical abuse, the statute is clear that a juvenile can be at risk of serious harm, and thus dependent-neglected, based on an act of abuse inflicted on the juvenile's sibling, and the adjudication of the mother's children as dependent-neglected was affirmed. Turner v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 655 (2014).

Mother asserted that because the slapping was a one-time incident, and no physical injury occurred, the circuit court erred in finding that the mother had committed abuse; while she was correct as to the abuse finding, as the evidence showed that fighting between the mother and her daughters had increased and become volatile, and both girls expressed that they were happier now and wished to remain in their father's custody, the circuit court did not clearly err in finding that a material change of circumstances had occurred and that the change of custody was in the children's best interest. Earl v. Earl, 2015 Ark. App. 663, 476 S.W.3d 206 (2015).

In a dependency-neglect proceeding, a circuit court's finding of physical abuse as to the mother was reversed where the mother was not home at the time of another child's unexplained death, testimony that the mother had previously spanked one child did not support a finding that she had abused all of her children, and there was testimony that the children did not feel unsafe around her. Young v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 270, 549 S.W.3d 383 (2018).

Circuit court did not find that spanking alone constituted abuse; rather, it had considered the age, size, and condition of the child and the location of the injury and the frequency or recurrence of injuries when it determined whether the physical discipline was reasonable or moderate. Phillips v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 463, 560 S.W.3d 499 (2018).

Aggravated Circumstances.

Termination of the father's parental rights was affirmed based on the finding of aggravated circumstances, given that there was clear evidence that reunification services were unlikely to succeed; the father never fully complied with the case plan, he did not understand the significance of his violent tendencies, and the results of his psychological evaluation and his therapist's testimony supported the finding that further services would likely not help the father and termination was necessary to protect the child. Weathers v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 142, 433 S.W.3d 271 (2014).

Trial court's finding that the mother abandoned her child under this section was not clearly erroneous given her leaving her nine-month-old child in a trash can in a dark area at 9 p.m. with the understanding that no one might find the child. Cole v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 395 (2014).

Finding of aggravated circumstances because of extreme cruelty was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence; the mother suffered from significant and untreated mental health conditions, the father knew the child was not safe in the mother's care but left the child with her anyway, the mother placed harmful medications within the child's reach, which resulted in a life-threatening event for the child, as she was found to have tramadol and methadone in her system, and the trial court found that the father was not credible, to which finding the court deferred. Callison v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 592, 446 S.W.3d 210 (2014).

In a dependent-neglect case, an aggravated circumstances finding that the abuse or neglect suffered by an injured child could have endangered his life was not clearly erroneous; the child suffered a skull fracture that required an emergency surgery to evacuate a hematoma. Moreover, at the adjudication stage, it did not matter which of the parents might have committed the abuse or neglect. Merritt v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 503, 471 S.W.3d 231 (2015).

Appeal.

After trial court entered order finding that child was a member of a family in need of services the father attempted to appeal on the child's behalf but he was not a licensed attorney who could represent the child on an appeal, and the matter was not a final order. Bass v. State, 93 Ark. App. 411, 219 S.W.3d 697 (2005).

Order finding that a father's three children were dependent-neglected under subdivision (18)(A)(iii) (now (17)(A)(iii)) of this section based upon his sexual abuse of one of the children was proper because the father failed to object to supporting documentation attached to a report to the prosecuting attorney; hence, that assignment of error could not be reviewed on appeal. Blanchard v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 785, 379 S.W.3d 686 (2010).

Trial court did not err in terminating the mother's parental rights because there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that termination was in the child's best interest, and the Department of Human Services had proved that the mother had abandoned the child and had subjected him to aggravated circumstances under § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(ix) (a)(3)(B) and subdivision (1) of this section. Thus, counsel complied with Ark. Sup. Ct. & Ct. App. R. 6-9(i), and the appeal was wholly without merit. Fant v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 428 (2012).

In a termination of parental rights case where the mother did not challenge a finding of aggravated circumstances in an appeal from the adjudication hearing, the issue could not be raised on review of the decision terminating parental rights. Hannah v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 502 (2013).

Circuit court issued a written order finding the children dependent-neglected due to abuse, and thus the finding of abuse was included in the written order and was preserved for appeal. Ward v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 491 (2014).

In this dependent-neglected child case, because the finding of abuse by the circuit court was not in error, the arguments regarding the circuit court's finding of neglect due to inadequate supervision were not addressed. Ward v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 491 (2014).

Aggravated circumstances finding was a separate finding made in addition to the dependency-neglect finding, and the parents' challenge to the aggravated-circumstances finding was part of the adjudication decision and was properly before the court on appeal. Callison v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 592, 446 S.W.3d 210 (2014).

Challenge to the aggravated-circumstances finding in the adjudication order is properly before the appellant court on an appeal from the adjudication order even when the appellant concedes the dependency-neglect finding. Merritt v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 503, 471 S.W.3d 231 (2015).

Trial court's finding of dependency-neglect was affirmed where the mother failed to challenge the alternate finding that the children were at a substantial risk of harm as a result of educational neglect based on the mother's admission that she did not have one child enrolled in school for an entire school year. Trotty v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 557, 504 S.W.3d 636 (2016).

Custodian.

Department of Human Services is a custodian for purposes of the provision assessing costs and restitution, in §§ 9-27-330 and 9-27-331. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. State, 312 Ark. 481, 850 S.W.2d 847 (1993).

The mere status of stepfather does not entitle that person to notice and participation in the question of protective services or custody; something more must be shown to qualify as standing in loco parentis under subdivision (14) of this section. Stair v. Phillips, 315 Ark. 429, 867 S.W.2d 453 (1993).

Delinquent Juvenile.

The offense of driving while under the influence of intoxicants is a “traffic offense,” and under the Juvenile Code the municipal court has jurisdiction to hear such cases. Robinson v. Sutterfield, 302 Ark. 7, 786 S.W.2d 572 (1990); J.B. v. State, 309 Ark. 70, 827 S.W.2d 144 (1992).

Construing “minor in possession of a handgun” in violation of § 5-73-119(a)(1) in tandem with the grant of jurisdiction to juvenile court in § 9-27-306(a)(1) and the definition of “delinquent juvenile” in this section, provides the juvenile court with jurisdiction of the handgun charge. Jones v. State, 319 Ark. 762, 894 S.W.2d 591 (1995).

Because a juvenile's father had not resorted to use of a deadly weapon during an argument, because there had been an interlude of approximately five minutes since their last confrontation, because the father, at the time he was struck, had turned away from the juvenile, and because the juvenile did not testify as to whether the juvenile's beliefs were reasonable, the juvenile lacked justification under §§ 5-1-102(18), 5-2-606(a)(1), 5-2-607(a)(1), (2), and was properly adjudicated as a delinquent for second-degree domestic battering. D.W. v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 187 (2011).

Dependent Juvenile.

On appeal from the termination of her parental rights, the mother's argument that it was a logical fallacy and inconsistent with legislative intent under § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(i) (a) that the definition of “dependent-neglected juvenile” included a “dependent” child was without merit because the statute's clear and unambiguous language expressed that a dependent-neglected juvenile included a dependent juvenile. The child met the definition of a “dependent juvenile” under former subdivision (17)(A) of this section because his mother was in the custody of the Department of Human Services; moreover, subdivision (18)(B) (now (17)(B)) of this section provided that a dependent-neglected juvenile included dependent juveniles and therefore, the child also fell within the definition of a dependent-neglected juvenile. K.C. v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 353, 374 S.W.3d 884 (2010) (decided before 2015 amendment).

Dependent-Neglect Adjudication.

A dependent-neglect adjudication is a hearing to determine whether allegations in a petition are substantiated by the proof, and its thrust is the protection of a juvenile who is at substantial risk of serious harm. Fariss v. State, 303 Ark. 541, 798 S.W.2d 103 (1990).

Child of parent with bipolar disorder held to be dependent-neglected. Johnston v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 55 Ark. App. 392, 935 S.W.2d 589 (1996).

A newborn infant was properly found to be a dependent-neglected juvenile where the infant's older sister was seriously abused by the mother and/or the father; even if one of the parents could successfully deflect blame for the actual injuries the sister suffered to the other parent, the uncontroverted testimony established that such injuries were noticeable and inflicted over a long period of time, so that the parent who did not actually inflict the injuries was still unfit on the basis that he or she did not notice obvious signs of abuse. Brewer v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 71 Ark. App. 364, 43 S.W.3d 196 (2001).

To hold that a court must find that a child is at substantial risk of serious harm on the day of an adjudication would mandate that no child could be found dependent/neglected after being placed into the Department of Human Services custody; thus, mother's argument that her children could not have been dependent since they were out of her custody for a year at the time of the filing was rejected as meritless. Harwell-Williams v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 368 Ark. 183, 243 S.W.3d 898 (2006).

Trial court erred in finding that father's child was a dependent-neglected child because, after the father was incarcerated, there were two different family members who stated they were willing to care for the child. Moiser v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 95 Ark. App. 32, 233 S.W.3d 172 (2006).

Trial court did not err in finding that the Department of Health and Human Services failed to meet its burden of proving that children were dependent-neglected because there was no evidence other than the fact that their father had pleaded guilty to sexual assault of other minors. Ark. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Mitchell, 100 Ark. App. 45, 263 S.W.3d 574 (2007).

Where appellant allowed his daughter to live in the residence of a ministry with a man who was accused of perpetrating physical and sexual abuse against children, appellant's failure to protect his daughter from potential harm was more than enough to warrant her being found dependent-neglected within the meaning of this section. The evidence also showed that appellant's daughter was not properly immunized, was diagnosed with child maltreatment syndrome-sexual and adjustment disorder with anxiety, and mental health therapy was recommended; there was sufficient evidence to declare her dependent-neglected. Seago v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2009 Ark. App. 767, 360 S.W.3d 733 (2009).

Circuit court did not err in adjudicating children dependent-neglected after they were removed from a ministry compound because the evidence established a clear picture of the danger to children in the ministry compound because there was testimony that many children were beaten, placed on fasts, and imprisoned in a warehouse for eight months; there was further evidence that the ministry leader molested girls and “married” several young girls and that it was normal for underage girls to be married to much older men. In spite of evidence demonstrating that sexual abuse of underage girls, beatings, and fasts were widely known within the ministry, the father denied knowing of any potential danger to his children; the evidence sufficiently demonstrated that the environment in which the father placed his children was dangerous. Broderick v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2009 Ark. App. 771, 358 S.W.3d 909 (2009).

Father's argument that the circuit court erred in adjudicating the child dependent-neglected because, although the mother's relapse into drugs might have constituted such neglect, there was no evidence that he neglected the child, was without merit. The juvenile code was not concerned, at the adjudication stage, with which parent committed the acts constituting dependency-neglect; because of the mother's relapse into drug use, the child was unquestionably dependent-neglected, as defined in this section. Tadlock v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2009 Ark. App. 841, 372 S.W.3d 403 (2009).

Evidence was sufficient to support the circuit court's adjudication that a father's son was dependent-neglected because the father failed to supervise due to drinking, caused his son mental and physical injury due to alcohol abuse, and was an unfit parent because of the alcohol abuse, and there was ample evidence that the father abused alcohol, drank before driving his automobile with his son as a passenger, and drank before wrecking a golf cart in which his son was riding; the father acknowledged that he had not stopped drinking at the time of the hearing and had no good reason for not doing so, and it was the opinion of the son’s therapist that the father's drinking caused the son stress and negative behaviors, that the son demonstrated signs of emotional abuse, and that he suffered mental injury caused by the father. Hays v. Ark. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 2009 Ark. App. 864, 372 S.W.3d 830 (2009).

Although the circuit court abused its discretion in allowing intoxication testimony under the business-records exception to hearsay evidence, Ark. R. Evid. 803(6), a father suffered no actual prejudice by the testimony, and its admission was harmless; the testimonies of the son's mother, a police officer, the son's therapist, and his caseworker, coupled with the father's driving while intoxicated convictions and his admissions about use of alcohol, were more than sufficient to substantiate findings that the father's neglect and parental unfitness arose from alcohol abuse and had a negative effect on the child. Hays v. Ark. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 2009 Ark. App. 864, 372 S.W.3d 830 (2009).

Adjudication order finding that the father's two children were dependent-neglected was affirmed because direct proof of sexual gratification was not necessary in that such a purpose could be inferred from the circumstances; the son stated that the father touched him inappropriately on his genitals and buttocks in a manner that made him feel uncomfortable. Ashcroft v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 244, 374 S.W.3d 743 (2010).

Trial court's finding that a mother's children were dependent-neglected was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in affording greater weight to the opinion of a forensic psychologist, who conducted a psychological examination of the mother, than a social worker's opinion because the mother's history of chaotic relationships and living situations soundly supported the psychologist's prognosis that the mother's chances of achieving stability were poor; at the time the Department of Human Services (DHS) took the children into custody, they were living with their maternal grandmother because the mother wanted to avoid having DHS take them into custody, the mother and her methamphetamine-addicted husband had lived with a family friend for over a year, during which time the friend had molested one of her children, and the mother failed a drug test and did not have a job. McCann v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 828 (2010).

Adjudication of the child as dependent-neglected was supported by evidence that the mother used drugs, which exposed the mother to criminal liability, which inevitably would affect the child's well being because the mother could not care for the child if incarcerated, and the mother's ability to care for the child may have been impaired while under the influence. Maynard v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. App. 82, 389 S.W.3d 627 (2011).

Sufficient evidence supported a circuit court's adjudication of two children as dependent-neglected as the parents had a history of drug use, and there was nothing to prevent them from removing the children from a grandmother's house. The children were at substantial risk of neglect or parental unfitness as defined by this section. Chambers v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. App. 91 (2011).

Trial court properly found that the Department of Health and Human Services had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the child of a mother and a father was dependent-neglected under this section due to the condition of the house in which he lived as there were numerous things that the caseworker observed in the house that could harm the child, including open containers of chemicals, knives and guns within his reach, broken glass on the floor, and various unsanitary conditions. Duvall v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. App. 261, 378 S.W.3d 873 (2011).

Trial court did not err in adjudicating a mother's daughter dependent-neglected on the ground that the daughter was at substantial risk of future sexual abuse by her six-year-old brother because the mother had missed her psychological-evaluation appointment and resisted efforts to remedy household instability and neglect. Weatherspoon v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 34 (2012).

Order adjudicating appellant's daughter dependent-neglected was affirmed because the daughter had been involved in a fight with a male and had suffered a head injury, which required medical attention, and the daughter showed up at a hearing in juvenile court without a parent or guardian present. Lowe v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 155 (2012).

Finding that the adopted daughter was dependent-neglected as a result of sexual abuse by the father was not clearly erroneous, because the daughter testified that her father first touched her inappropriately when she was eleven years old, the daughter testified that the abuse hurt and that she would try to pull away, and the court expressly found the testimonies of the daughter and the certified sexual-assault examiner to be both credible and consistent with each other. Wells v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 176 (2012).

Order in which the child was adjudicated dependent-neglected was affirmed because there was a true prior finding by investigators that appellant and the paternal grandfather subjected the child to extreme and repeated cruelty; appellant and the paternal grandfather would record inappropriate interviews with the child that were emotionally traumatizing. Stoliker v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 415, 422 S.W.3d 123 (2012).

Trial court did not err in adjudicating a mother's infant son dependent-neglected because the trial court was faced with the uncontested prior finding that one of the infant's siblings had been physically abused while under the age of one, even though the offender was unknown. Eason v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 507, 423 S.W.3d 138 (2012).

Mother failed to take reasonable action to protect one child after she knew the mother's husband had sexually abused the child, and the mother facilitated a conversation between the child and her husband and encouraged the child to tell the husband she loved him, and thus the trial court did not clearly err in adjudicating this child and another child as dependent-neglected. Wear v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 702 (2013).

Evidence supported a dependency-neglect finding because a parent threatened to harm an employee of the child's school after an altercation and threatened to commit suicide and kill the parent's children in a phone call to the school the next day. Moreover, the parent had been emotionally erratic and depressed following the death of a parent the year before and had a short temper and was possibly sleep-deprived due to her nighttime employment. Clary v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 338 (2014).

In this dependency-neglect case, mother's counsel claimed that the Department of Human Services should have proven the termination of her rights to another child by written documentation, but that rule concerns authentication and identification of evidence and has nothing to do with the best-evidence rule, which applies only when a party tries to prove the content of a writing; while a document would have demonstrated termination, nothing prohibited the mother from testifying to any fact within her personal knowledge and the question of whether her rights had been terminated resided within her personal experience, and she admitted the same. Goodwin v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 599, 445 S.W.3d 547 (2014).

Mother's admission that her rights to one of her children had been terminated, that other states had taken another child into custody, and that she did not have custody of any of her children was sufficient to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the child in question in this case was at substantial risk of serious harm because of neglect or parental unfitness; the dependency-neglect ruling was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence after considering the mother's history of unfitness, unstable housing, and her current inability to support herself. Goodwin v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 599, 445 S.W.3d 547 (2014).

While the affidavit mentioned only physical abuse, the petition itself alleged abuse, neglect, and parental unfitness, and the trial court adjudicated the children dependent-neglected based on all three grounds as alleged in the petition, and the father's notice argument failed. Beeckman v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 192 (2015).

Photographs showed that the child sustained physical injuries, the trial court could reasonably have found that the father's striking the child repeatedly with a chair was not an accident, the trial court was not required to believe the father's assertion that his actions constituted physical discipline that was reasonable and thus not abuse, and the trial court did not clearly err in adjudicating the children dependent-neglected due to abuse. Beeckman v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 192 (2015).

Dependent-Neglected Juvenile.

Trial court properly terminated the parental rights of the mother and father under § 9-27-341 and found that each parent, either as the offender or as the accomplice, had committed a felony battery against a grandson of the mother because the mother's story that she was not involved was implausible considering the medical testimony; termination was in the child's best interests under § 9-27-341(b)(3)(A)(i) and (ii) given that the child was a dependent-neglected child under this section, and one purpose of § 9-27-302(2)(B) was to protect a juvenile's safety. Todd v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 85 Ark. App. 174, 151 S.W.3d 315 (2004).

Trial court did not err in adjudicating parents' children dependent-neglected because injuries to their infant had to be the result of a high-force trauma, and a caregiver would have had to know the infant suffered the trauma; yet no one sought medical care for the infant immediately after whatever event caused the injuries, which consisted of multiple rib fractures, a skull fracture, bruises, and retinal hemorrhaging. Churchill v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 530, 423 S.W.3d 637 (2012).

Children were improperly removed from a father's care and determined to be dependent-neglected because the evidence did not support a finding of inadequate supervision based on the father's lost knife, and the evidence did not clearly establish that the father cut a child with a knife. Moreover, there was no indication that the father's hitting a child on the face or head with his hand was knowing and intentional or whether it occurred on more than one occasion. Figueroa v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 83 (2013).

Given the conclusive finding that a child’s older siblings were dependent-neglected, and the additional evidence of the child’s medical needs, the circuit court’s finding that the child was dependent-neglected was not clearly erroneous or clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Hernandez v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 424 (2013).

After an adjudication hearing, the court found that the Department of Human Services had proved, not by just a preponderance of the evidence, but by clear and convincing evidence that the child was exposed to extreme cruelty and abuse. The court noted eight separate injuries, none of which had plausible explanations, and found that the child was dependent-neglected and had been subjected to aggravated circumstances. Hannah v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 502 (2013).

In this dependent-neglected child case, the lack of a reference in the order to an injury at variance with the history given was of no consequence, as the circuit court clearly indicated that its finding of abuse was based on an injury at variance with the history given, and that finding was supported by the testimony. Ward v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 491 (2014).

In this dependent-neglected child case, as there was no indication that the child was not in the parents' legal custody at the time of his injury, the injury was caused either by them or by someone they entrusted with the child's care. Ward v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 491 (2014).

Mother conceded that sexual abuse of her child by her boyfriend occurred, and that finding alone was sufficient to support the conclusion that the child was dependent-neglected; the court would not second-guess credibility determinations by the circuit court, which did not clearly err in its ruling. Middlebrook v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 161 (2015).

In a dependent-neglect case, there was a substantial risk of harm to a sibling of an injured child because of the unexplained abuse and neglect suffered by the injured child. Merritt v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 503, 471 S.W.3d 231 (2015).

Child was properly adjudicated as dependent-neglected because the child was left unsupervised with her mother, who had drug and mental health issues; moreover, grandmother was unable to adequately supervise the child due to her substance abuse issues with prescribed medication. Harris v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 508, 470 S.W.3d 316 (2015).

Trial court's adjudication of the parents' son as dependent-neglected was not clearly erroneous or clearly against the preponderance of the evidence where the evidence showed that the father inadequately supervised his son, placing him at substantial risk of serious harm, as there was testimony that the nursing staff had instructed the father that the mother was not to be left alone while breast-feeding their son, the nurses denied that they had left the mother alone, and the son was dropped by his mother who was under the influence of pain medication. Samuels v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 2, 479 S.W.3d 596 (2016).

Trial court erred in denying a petition by the Department of Human Services to adjudicate a mother's two younger children dependent-neglected because the younger children were at substantial risk of serious harm as a result of both the mother's abuse of the older child and the younger children themselves where the mother admitted to hitting the older child with a cookie sheet and whipping the children with an extension cord, all of the children had loop-shaped injuries that the trial court recognized were from being hit with the extension cord, and even if the loop-shaped injuries were old, they demonstrated that the children were at substantial risk of similar harm in the future. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Walker, 2016 Ark. App. 203, 489 S.W.3d 214 (2016).

Circuit court did not clearly err in adjudicating a child dependent-neglected because it had more than a preponderance of the evidence of a substantial risk of serious harm to the child; the Department of Human Services investigated and substantiated reports of severe environmental neglect in the parents' household, and it attempted, unsuccessfully, to resolve the environmental neglect issues. Bean v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 350, 498 S.W.3d 315 (2016).

Circuit court did not clearly err in finding insufficient evidence of dependency-neglect and dismissing the dependency-neglect case where there was no dispute that a baby's fall was an accident, and the court found the mother more credible than a police officer that she was not going to leave the baby with the intoxicated father. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Lewis, 2017 Ark. App. 140, 515 S.W.3d 176 (2017).

Circuit court's order adjudicating an infant dependent-neglected was reversed where it based the decision on the fact that two other children had been removed from the mother, the fact that the removal order was entered before the infant's birth indicated that the circuit court had no intention of assessing the level of risk posed to the infant at the time of birth, and the court had focused on the mother's and father's mindset, which, standing alone, was not a basis for adjudication. Haney v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 437, 526 S.W.3d 903 (2017).

Definition of dependency-neglect under this section does not require that the trial court identify the perpetrator of the sexual abuse. Parnell v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 108, 538 S.W.3d 264 (2018) (sub. op. on reh'g).

Trial court found that the child was sexually abused, probably by his father, and the failure to identify the perpetrator of the sexual abuse did not diminish the trial court's finding of dependency-neglect; at the termination hearing, the trial court found that the father had in fact sexually abused the child, a sibling of the triplets, and as the mother was aware of the father's status as a sex offender and failed to protect the child, termination of her rights under § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(vi) was proper. Parnell v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 108, 538 S.W.3d 264 (2018) (sub. op. on reh'g).

In a dependency-neglect proceeding, a circuit court's finding of parental unfitness was reversed where there was no evidence of the mother's involvement in another child's unexplained death, and a physician testified that the child's injuries from abuse would not have been obvious and visible to the mother. Young v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 270, 549 S.W.3d 383 (2018).

Dependent-neglected finding upheld. Ward v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 376, 553 S.W.3d 761 (2018).

Evidence supported the trial court's determination that the child was dependent-neglected based on the mother's parental unfitness because the child's sibling was found dependent-neglected and remained in the Department of Human Services' custody, the mother had not complied with the case plan in the sibling's case, the mother had tested positive for drugs throughout her entire pregnancy with the child, and she had not submitted to random drug screens since the child's birth. Hilburn v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 420, 558 S.W.3d 885 (2018).

Evidence was sufficient to show that a child was dependent-neglected based on physical abuse where the circuit court found that the father lacked credibility and his memory was poor as to how the child sustained bruises unless it improved his position, and the father admitted that he likely caused the bruises by spanking the child. Phillips v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 463, 560 S.W.3d 499 (2018).

After a child's death, the trial court did not err in finding the other children dependent-neglected where the evidence showed that the mother knew the juveniles would be at a substantial risk of serious harm if left in the grandmother's and sister's care in their home, she knew that the grandmother's house had prescription pills lying around within the children's reach, the mother had her own drug issues, and she frequently left the children with the grandmother and sister despite the fact that they were under investigation for selling drugs out of their house. Cramer v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 571, 589 S.W.3d 491 (2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support a finding that a child was dependent-neglected because a neighbor witnessed the child having vaginal and oral sex with a young teenage male; an investigator testified that the conclusion of the Arkansas State Police investigation was a true finding of “sexually aggressive behavior”. Salinas v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 72, 572 S.W.3d 389 (2019).

Circuit court's finding that a child was a dependent-neglected juvenile, at substantial risk of serious harm based on neglect and parental unfitness, was not clearly erroneous because the mother's lack of supervision was directly connected to the sexual assault a teenage male perpetrated on the child; despite the circuit court's order to provide “line-of-sight” supervision and the “red flags” the mother saw, she permitted the child to play with the male unsupervised, which resulted in sexual abuse; and this was the second time in two years that the child had been sexually abused while in her mother's care. Salinas v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 72, 572 S.W.3d 389 (2019).

Circuit court's finding that three other children of the mother were dependent-neglected was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence because the court did not make an automatic finding of dependency-neglect but made a specific finding that all the children were at substantial risk of harm as a result of the mother's acts or omissions; there was evidence that one of the children was experiencing mental-health issues due to the guilt she suffered when her sibling was sexually abused. Salinas v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 72, 572 S.W.3d 389 (2019).

Trial court did not err in finding dependency-neglect based on sexual abuse although the prosecutor had declined to pursue changes; the trial court found that the child disclosed facts in her interview that would not have been known to a child of her age, especially as she was delayed, and there were no hearsay objections or objections of any other kind and therefore the trial court had before it testimony from a sexual-assault nurse, the medical examination record, and the specific allegations of abuse the child made during her interview, which supported the trial court's finding. Libokmeto v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 274, 577 S.W.3d 35 (2019).

Facts supported a finding of dependency-neglect based on neglect and parental unfitness because the trial court did not adjudicate a child dependent-neglected based merely on the fact that the parents' older child had previously been adjudicated dependent-neglected. The evidence showed that the severity of the injuries suffered by the older child, the mother's refusal to hold the father accountable for the older child's injuries, and the mother's willingness to allow the father into the child's life, placed the child at substantial risk of serious harm. Ring v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2020 Ark. App. 150, 596 S.W.3d 76 (2020).

Directed Verdict.

Although a circuit court's grant of a motion for directed verdict by the Department of Human Services at the close of its case in chief in a dependency-neglect proceeding under this section was improper under Ark. R. Civ. P. 50(a), the appellate court refused to reverse the adjudication order because the parents failed to raise their Rule 50 argument in the trial court. Reid v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 156 (2010).

Double Jeopardy.

Defendant's prosecution for incest was not barred by dependent-neglect civil proceeding brought by the Department of Human Services as the defendant simply was not threatened with multiple punishments and the double jeopardy clause was not offended. Fariss v. State, 303 Ark. 541, 798 S.W.2d 103 (1990).

Family in Need of Services.

Where children were alleged to have committed burglary and acts of criminal mischief, it was proper to adjudicate the family in need of services. Byler v. State, 306 Ark. 37, 810 S.W.2d 941 (1991).

It is entirely clear that by using the words “includes, but is not limited to,” the legislature intended a broader concept of a family in need of services than the three illustrations listed in the statute. Byler v. State, 306 Ark. 37, 810 S.W.2d 941 (1991).

Where a mother made unsubstantiated sexual abuse allegations, a trial court did not err by awarding custody to a father in a family-in-need-of-services case under § 9-27-338, because it was not in the child's best interest to return to the mother where the child was doing better while not in her custody; moreover, the father did not have to show a material change in circumstances since this was not a regular custody proceeding. Judkins v. Duvall, 97 Ark. App. 260, 248 S.W.3d 492 (2007), overruled in part, Mahone v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. 370, 383 S.W.3d 854 (2011).

Family Services.

“Family services” may include ordering the Department of Human Services to pay to have water and electricity turned back on for the mother of a child in order to prevent a juvenile from being removed from the home. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. R.P., 333 Ark. 516, 970 S.W.2d 225 (1998).

Given that the trial court is empowered to order family services including cash assistance in family-in-need-of-services cases to prevent a juvenile from being removed from a parent, the General Assembly has specifically waived sovereign immunity as to the Department of Human Services in such instances. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. R.P., 333 Ark. 516, 970 S.W.2d 225 (1998).

Order requiring the Department of Health and Human Services to pay for an attorney for a child in its custody who had been accused of sexual misconduct was upheld pursuant to subdivisions (25)(A) and (B) (now (24)(A) and (B)) of this section; providing the child with an attorney, in order to keep the child off the sex offender list, would greatly assist in the child's adoption. Ark. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. C.M., 100 Ark. App. 414, 269 S.W.3d 387 (2007).

Judicial Review.

Because any one of the allegations would have been sufficient to support a finding of dependency-neglect, the trial court's findings of neglect and parental unfitness did not need to be addressed. Beeckman v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 192 (2015).

Jurisdiction.

Circuit court had jurisdiction to hear the case even though it concerned child-custody law and was outside the subject of proceedings in the juvenile division, because the designation of divisions was for the purpose of judicial administration and not for the purpose of subject-matter jurisdiction, and the creation of divisions would in no way limit the powers and duties of the judges to hear all matters within the jurisdiction of the circuit court; once the juvenile division of the circuit court ordered that the child be placed in the permanent custody of the third parties, the child was no longer dependent-neglected and she came into dependency-neglect proceedings due to parental neglect and parental unfitness. Young v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. 334 (2012).

Juvenile.

This section clearly defines a juvenile as an individual from birth to age eighteen; thus, the unborn fetus did not fall within the definition and, as a consequence, the lower court judge's order placing the fetus in the custody of the Department of Human Services and requiring that department to render prenatal care constituted a plain, manifest, clear, and gross abuse of discretion. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Collier, 351 Ark. 506, 95 S.W.3d 772 (2003).

Juvenile was deprived of his right to counsel during a contempt proceeding, even though the juvenile had the services of an attorney ad litem, because the ad litem only represented the best interest of the juvenile, and not the juvenile's due process and other constitutional rights, as a defense attorney would. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Mainard, 358 Ark. 204, 188 S.W.3d 901 (2004).

Neglect.

Where the record reflected a dispute between the mother and the child's doctors about a proper psychological examiner and that, but for Department of Human Services intervention, treatment could have been delayed even more than it was, and the record also indicated that some of the doctors and social workers involved in this case were concerned that the mother would not allow the child to remain at a psychiatric facility for the duration of her treatment, the evidence of “neglect” under subdivisions (18) and (36) (now (17) and (37)) of this section was sufficient, even though it may have stemmed from parental motives which could not be characterized as neglectful in the sense of being intended to harm the child or not to care for her. Nance v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 316 Ark. 43, 870 S.W.2d 721 (1994).

Where a mother demonstrated she was an unfit parent and indifferent to the needs of her children by failing to comply with the court's orders to get counseling and disassociate herself from an abusive man, the trial court's decision to terminate her parental rights was supported by clear and convincing evidence; the evidence showed that her husband struck the older child across the face hard enough to leave marks, the mother's house was cold, filled with trash, and smelled like rotting food, and the mother was overheard calling to cancel a counseling session. Trout v. Dep't of Human Servs., 359 Ark. 283, 197 S.W.3d 486 (2004).

The parent father was found to have neglected his teenagers under this section when he consented to the marriage of his 16-year-old daughter to a 34-year-old man from another state whom he barely knew. Porter v. Ark. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 374 Ark. 177, 286 S.W.3d 686 (2008).

In a case in which a mother appealed a circuit court's order adjudicating her daughter dependent-neglected, the crux of the mother's argument was that her mere suspicion of sexual abuse did not give rise to the statutory requirement for neglect that she knew or had reasonable cause to know of the sexual abuse by her daughter's stepfather; however, the circuit court found that she had suspicions that the abuse was occurring and not only failed to prevent it, but actually facilitated the abuse by leaving her daughter home alone with the stepfather. While the mother was not the person who sexually abused her daughter, the fact remained that her daughter was found to be at substantial risk of serious harm as a result of sexual abuse; thus her daughter was dependent-neglected. Lipscomb v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 257 (2010).

Order for the Department of Human Services to provide a pregnant teenager with school uniforms and maternity clothes was clearly erroneous because the lack of such did not pose an immediate danger to the teenager's health or physical well-being under § 12-18-1001(a); there was a lack of evidence to support the finding that the teenager was at immediate risk of severe maltreatment and that family services were necessary to prevent her removal, the failure to make findings necessitated reversal, and the trial court's personal recollections were not sufficient. In addition, even if the teenager lacked school uniforms and maternity clothes because her family could not afford them and was kept out of school as a result, this did not constitute neglect that warranted removal from the home. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. A.M., 2012 Ark. App. 240, 423 S.W.3d 86 (2012) (decided under former version of § 9-27-313(a)(1)(C)).

Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's decision adjudicating appellant's children dependent-neglected, because they were in her care the day she was arrested for possession of drug paraphernalia and tested positive for methamphetamine. Appellant's conduct constituted neglect and placed the children at risk of substantial harm. Gaer v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 516 (2012).

Circuit court properly adjudicated a 15-year-old child as dependent-neglected by the grandmother, as her custodian, because the grandmother, who was responsible for her care, failed to properly supervise and investigate the putative father's home where the conditions were found to be unlivable, allowed the child to visit and stay there, and failed to provide adequate shelter for the child. Tapp v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 216, 518 S.W.3d 725 (2017).

Trial court's order adjudicating two sons dependent-neglected was reversed where the court cited subdivisions (36)(A)(vii) (a) and (b) (now (37)(A)(vii) (a) and (b) ) in its finding of neglect, but the finding that the mother was delusional and irrational did not support the conclusion that the children were ever “left alone”. Madore v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 296, 521 S.W.3d 172 (2017).

Circuit court's finding that a child was dependent-neglected was not clearly erroneous where the evidence showed that the putative father had punched the mother in the face while she was holding the child and yet the mother initially inquired about dropping the criminal charges against the putative father. The evidence that the child had been subjected to her parents' ongoing domestic abuse and had been placed in harm's way herself after having been previously injured showed that she was at substantial risk of serious harm as a result of neglect and parental unfitness. The mother's actions taken after the child was removed from her custody did not negate her failure to act to protect the child while she was in the mother's care. Araujo v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 181, 574 S.W.3d 683 (2019).

Circuit court did not clearly err in adjudicating a child dependent-neglected because a preponderance of the evidence showed a mother undisputedly drove while intoxicated with the child in the car and was charged with a crime related to possession of a narcotic without a prescription, creating a dangerous situation and placing the child at substantial risk of serious harm, despite the mother's subsequent treatment plan compliance. Reeves v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2020 Ark. App. 72, 595 S.W.3d 401 (2020).

Parent.

Plain reading of this section means that a parent can be biological, or by adoption, or by a man who is married to a biological mother at the time of conception or by a man who has signed an acknowledgement of paternity, or by being found by a court of competent jurisdiction to be the biological father. Howerton v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 560, 506 S.W.3d 872 (2016).

Although not initially included, appellant was added as a party and deemed by the circuit court to be the child's legal father because the child was conceived while appellant was married to the mother; the circuit court also deemed another man to be the child's legal father because he was listed on the birth certificate and was found to be the biological father through a paternity test. However, a review of case law from other jurisdictions showed a consensus that a child can have only one legal father and the Court of Appeals found those decisions to be persuasive. Howerton v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 560, 506 S.W.3d 872 (2016).

Appellant could not be the child's legal father—presumptive or otherwise—once the circuit court found that another man was the legal father. By finding another man to be the child's legal father, the circuit court effectively divested appellant of all parental rights. Thus, the circuit court's ruling terminating appellant's parental rights was clearly erroneous because he had no rights. Howerton v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 560, 506 S.W.3d 872 (2016).

Although initially identified as a putative parent and a paternity test established that he was the father, nothing in the record showed that the father's legal status as a putative parent or biological parent was established to apply the 12-month time period described in § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(i) (b) or (b)(3)(B)(ii) (a) , and therefore the circuit court erred in terminating his parental rights. This interpretation supported the goal of the juvenile system provided in § 9-27-302, which shall be liberally construed. Earls v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. 171, 518 S.W.3d 81 (2017).

Plain reading of the definition of “parent” in this section means that a parent can be biological, or by adoption, or by a man who is married to a biological mother at the time of conception or by a man who has signed an acknowledgment of paternity, or by being found by a court of competent jurisdiction to be the biological father. Earls v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. 171, 518 S.W.3d 81 (2017).

Department of Human Services did not fail to prove that the father was a parent of the child, given that DNA results showed that his probability of paternity was 99.99%, he was the putative father of the child at the time the child was taken into care, and he was ordered to receive services identical to those offered to the mother. Johnson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 221, 547 S.W.3d 489 (2018).

Trial court erred in terminating appellant's parental rights because there was no evidence that appellant's status as a “legal father” fell within the statutory definition of a parent for purposes of the aggravated-circumstances ground for termination. There was no evidence that appellant had been found by the court to be the biological father of the child; although the appellate court did have a finding by the trial court that appellant was the “legal father” of the child, the appellate court could not ascertain on what basis that determination was made; and the trial court's orders frequently exchanged the terms “legal father” and “putative father” when referring to both appellant and another “father” identified in the case. Tovias v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 228, 575 S.W.3d 621 (2019).

Where appellant argued only that DHS had not established that he was a “parent” and that DHS failed to offer sufficient proof that he was married to the mother when the child was born, the circuit court's decision terminating his parental rights was not clearly erroneous; the circuit court had found appellant to be the “non-custodial parent who was a legal parent” in the adjudication order and appellant did not appeal that order, a family-service worker testified at the termination hearing that from her understanding the child was born during the marriage, and appellant's attorney ad litem stated that she had recognized the “legal issue and those potential consequences” of a DNA test and that appellant had declined the test. Thacker v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 379, 585 S.W.3d 698 (2019).

Putative Father.

Alleged father's right to his presumptive child should not have been terminated because, when the circuit court in effect voided a default paternity order and determined that the alleged father was not the biological father, all references and connections to the alleged father should have been removed from the case. The alleged father could not have been the presumptive legal father or even a putative father. Wright v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 676, 449 S.W.3d 721 (2014).

Reasonable Efforts.

In a dependency-neglect case, an argument that services were not provided to prevent the removal of a child from the home was rejected because a finding was made in an ex parte order that the first contact by the department occurred during an emergency in which the child could not have remained safely at home, even with services provided. Harris v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 508, 470 S.W.3d 316 (2015).

Trial court was not required to make specific findings under § 9-27-328 because it was an emergency situation in which reasonable efforts were not required and the mother's parental rights to her other children were terminated. Samuels v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 2, 479 S.W.3d 596 (2016).

Reunification.

Where the court terminated a mother's parental rights to her oldest child after a two-year custody proceeding in which the mother demonstrated she was an unfit parent and indifferent to the needs of her children by failing to comply with the court's orders to get counseling and disassociate herself from an abusive man, the court also properly terminated her parental rights to her younger son who had only been in her custody for five months as there was little likelihood that continued services would result in reunification. Trout v. Dep't of Human Servs., 359 Ark. 283, 197 S.W.3d 486 (2004).

Termination of parental rights was proper where the circuit court's order found that the parents subjected their minor children to aggravating circumstances and noted that the mother's parental rights were terminated as to another child previously, the children were out of the home for more than twelve months, and the parents failed to remedy the circumstances causing their removal even after being provided with substantial reunification services. Carroll v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 85 Ark. App. 255, 148 S.W.3d 780 (2004).

Order terminating parents' rights to their three children was upheld where the parents subjected the children to aggravated circumstances, as provided in § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(ix) (a)(3) , and the mother's deep-seated psychological problems prevented her from becoming a fit parent in that they caused her to refuse to accept responsibility for her actions; the trial court did not err in finding that there was little likelihood that services to the family would result in successful reunification. Yarborough v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 96 Ark. App. 247, 240 S.W.3d 626 (2006).

Parents' argument that the Department of Human Services failed to present clear and convincing evidence that it made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the father was rejected because the department was relieved of the burden to provide reunification services where the father was found to have subjected the daughter to sexual abuse, which was aggravated circumstances under § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(ix) (b) . Sparkman v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 96 Ark. App. 363, 242 S.W.3d 282 (2006).

Trial court's finding that there was little likelihood that services would result in successful reunification was not clearly erroneous because the evidence indicated that the mother's twins were taken into custody by the Department of Human Services (DHS) because of newborn illegal substance exposure and had been in their grandmother's custody since they left DHS custody, the mother admitted she had used cannabis and cocaine continuously for nine months, and her examiner reported that the mother did not present with intellectual capacity to manage the independent care of her children. Cole v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 395 (2014).

Sexual Abuse.

Adjudication of the mother's daughter as dependent-neglected was appropriate pursuant to this section because, although the child testified that her stepfather sexually abused her by putting his hand inside her underwear and by putting his fingers inside her body and that the abuse had gone on for some time, the mother testified that she did not think that the child was being truthful and that she did not believe that the stepfather posed any danger to the child in the home. Given that testimony, the appellate court was unable to say that the trial court's determination that the mother failed to protect her child was against the preponderance of the evidence. Jackson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 246, 374 S.W.3d 198 (2010).

Trial court properly terminated a mother's parental rights because there was no clear error in its finding that the mother subjected her children to aggravated circumstances; the mother failed to protect her children from the father's sexual abuse, and she admitted to knowingly engaging in sex acts in front of the children, which was sexual abuse under Arkansas law. Geatches v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 344, 498 S.W.3d 326 (2016).

Trial court's adjudication of a father's daughters as dependent-neglected, based on allegations of the father's sexual abuse of one of the daughters, was not clearly erroneous or against the preponderance of the evidence because the court considered the hearsay statements of the daughter that were made to interviewers, which statements the court found to be sufficiently trustworthy, and the credible testimony from witnesses such as interviewers and a teacher. Hambrick v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 458, 503 S.W.3d 134 (2016).

Cited: Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Clark, 304 Ark. 403, 802 S.W.2d 461 (1991); Banks v. State, 306 Ark. 273, 813 S.W.2d 256 (1991); Valdez v. State, 33 Ark. App. 94, 801 S.W.2d 659 (1991); Troutt Bros. v. Emison, 311 Ark. 27, 841 S.W.2d 604 (1992); Avery v. State, 311 Ark. 391, 844 S.W.2d 364 (1993); Boyd v. State, 313 Ark. 171, 853 S.W.2d 263 (1993); Briscoe v. State, 323 Ark. 4, 912 S.W.2d 425 (1996); J.T. v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 329 Ark. 243, 947 S.W.2d 761 (1997); K.N. v. State, 360 Ark. 579, 203 S.W.3d 103 (2005); Bayron v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 75, 388 S.W.3d 482 (2012); Billingsley v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 348 (2015); Matthews v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 359 (2015); Merritt v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 552, 473 S.W.3d 31 (2015); Whitehead v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 42, 481 S.W.3d 469 (2016); Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Veasley, 2016 Ark. App. 175 (2016); Manohar v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 482, 528 S.W.3d 881 (2017); McKinney v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 325, 551 S.W.3d 412 (2018).