Ismail v. Cohen
A court may not grant remittitur if the jury award falls within a reasonable range of possible verdicts and does not shock the judicial conscience.
A plaintiff sued a police officer and the city for excessive force, and a jury awarded $800,000 in damages. The district court ordered a remittitur, which the plaintiff rejected, leading to a second trial with a lower award. The plaintiff cross-appealed, arguing the remittitur was improper. The court held that a remittitur is a statement that the court is shocked by the jury's award and requires a more searching standard of review than a standard excessiveness claim. The court determined that the first jury's verdict was within the reasonable range of possible awards and did not shock the judicial conscience. The court reversed the remittitur and reinstated the first jury's verdict.
At page 186Standards for reviewing and reversing excessive damage awards111 citing cases“a remittitur, in effect, is a statement by the court that it is shocked by the jury's award of damages.”
- Edwin Hardeman v. Monsanto Co., 997 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2021).published(Reference to other awards in similar cases is proper.)
- United States Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. United Health Programs of Am., Inc, No. 1:14-cv-03673 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2020). (Reference to other awards in similar cases is proper.)
- Watson v. United States, 179 F. Supp. 3d 251 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).published(It is well settled that calculation of damages is the province of the jury.)
- McCabe v. Mais, 580 F. Supp. 2d 815 (N.D. Iowa 2008).published See, e.g., Ismail, 899 F.2d at 187 (“Reference to other awards in similar cases in proper.”); Levka v. City of Chi., 748 F.2d 421, 425 (7th Cir.1984) (stating that a court may consider whether an award “is out of line compared to other awa…
- James K. Lee v. Michael Edwards, 101 F.3d 805 (2d Cir. 1996).published See Ismail, 899 F.2d at 187 (“[0]ur task is not to balance the number of high and low awards and reject the verdict ... if the number of lower awards is greater.”).
- Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996).published (A remittitur, in effect, is a statement by the court that it is shocked by the jury’s award of damages.)
- Loma Linda Univ. v. Smarter Alloys, Inc., No. 1:19-cv-00607 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2025).“It is well settled that calculation of damages is the province of the jury”
- Great West Capital, LLC v. Payne, No. 3:22-cv-00768 (D. Or. Aug. 27, 2025).“[r]eference . . . other awards in similar cases”
- Sarhadi v. Geever, No. 1:24-cv-00031 (N.D.N.Y. July 22, 2025).Because there is no “mathematical computation” or “precise formula” to measure such damages, courts should review precedents and make “[r]eference to other awards in similar cases.” Id. at 1304-05; Ismail v. Cohen, 899 F.2d 183, 186 (2d Ci…
- Cipley v. Cnty. of Nassau, No. 2:20-cv-00975 (E.D.N.Y. May 7, 2025).Compensatory Damages To determine whether an award is so high as to “shock the judicial conscience,” the Court must “‘consider[ ] . . . the amounts awarded in other, comparable cases.’” Tretola v. Cnty. of Nassau, 14 F. Supp. 3d 58, 80 (E.…
Show 95 more citing cases
- Haidon v. Bloomfield, No. 3:19-cv-00119 (D. Conn. Aug. 29, 2024).Ismail v. Cohen, 899 F.2d 183, 186 (2d Cir. 1990).
- Taylor v. City of New York, No. 1:18-cv-08421 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2024).“within reasonable range”
- Taylor v. City of New York, No. 1:18-cv-08421 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2024).“within reasonable range”
- Torres v. Metro-North R.R. Co., No. 1:20-cv-10782 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2023). “[i]t is well settled that calculation of damages is the province of the jury”
- Koehler v. Metro. Transp. Auth., No. 2:16-cv-00003 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2023). “A remittitur, in effect, is a statement by the court that it is shocked by the jury's award of damages”
- Small v. New York City Dep't of Corr., No. 1:09-cv-01912 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2022).(affirming award of $650,000 where plaintiff was beaten by police officer, sustained head trauma, displaced vertebrae, and cracked ribs, and suffered from considerable mental and emotional injury)
- Magalios v. Peralta, No. 7:19-cv-06188, 2022 WL 407403 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2022).“A remittitur, in effect, is a statement by the court that it is shocked by the jury’s award of damages”
- Thomas Jennings v. Yurkiw, 18 F.4th 383 (2d Cir. 2021).published Ismail v. Cohen, 899 F.2d 183, 186 (2d Cir. 1990).
- White v. New York State Off. of Child. & Fam. Servs., No. 5:11-cv-00309 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2021).“A remittitur, in effect, is a statement by the court that it is shocked by the jury's award of damages”
- Sooroojballie v. Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey & Gary Frattali, 816 F. App'x 536 (2d Cir. 2020).unpublished“calculation of damages is the province of the jury”
- Liqwd, Inc. v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., No. 1:17-cv-00014 (D. Del. Dec. 16, 2019).“It is well settled that calculation of damages is the province of the jury”
- Dancy v. McGinley, 843 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2016).published Applicable Law “The ‘calculation of damages is the province of the jury,’ ... and ‘we will not vacate or reduce a jury award merely because we would have granted a lesser amount of damages.’ ” Turley v. ISG Lackawanna, Inc., 774 F.3d 140,…
- Bouveng v. NYG Capital LLC, 175 F. Supp. 3d 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).published“A remittitur, in effect, is a statement by the court that it is shocked by the jury’s award of damages”
- Anderson Grp., LLC v. City of Saratoga Springs, 805 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2015).published(It is well settled that calculation of damages is the province of the jury.)
- Genovese v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 128 F. Supp. 3d 661 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).publishedThis Court’s task, when evaluating a request for remittitur of damages, is to determine whether the award was within the “limit of a reasonable range.” Anderson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 493 Fed.Appx. 149, 151 (2d Cir.2012) (citing Ism…
- Turley v. ISG Lackawanna, Inc., 774 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2014).published“calculation of damages is the province of the jury”
- Beastie Boys v. Monster Energy Co., 66 F. Supp. 3d 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).publishedDist., 702 F.3d 655, 671 (2d Cir.2012) (quoting Ismail v. Cohen, 899 F.2d 183, 186 (2d Cir.1990)).
- Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 48 F. Supp. 3d 703 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).publishedIn determining whether the ratio between nominal and punitive damages is reasonable, “[i]t is appropriate for [the court] to examine punitive damage awards in similar cases.” Lee, 101 F.3d at 812 (citing Ismail v. Cohen, 899 F.2d 183, 186…
- Stampf v. Long Island R.R., 761 F.3d 192 (2d Cir. 2014).publishedCf. Ismail v. Cohen, 899 F.2d 183, 186 (2d Cir.1990). *210 Courts have found it useful to compare punitive damages awards with previous court rulings on the issue of excessiveness to assist with this determination.
- Tretola v. Cnty. of Nassau, 14 F. Supp. 3d 58 (E.D.N.Y. 2014).published“so high as to shock the judicial conscience and constitute a denial of justice”
- Tretola v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 2 F. Supp. 3d 341 (E.D.N.Y. 2014).published“so high as to shock the judicial conscience and constitute a denial of justice”
- Blissett v. Coughlin, III, 66 F.3d 531 (2d Cir. 1995).published
- Blissett v. Coughlin, 66 F.3d 531 (2d Cir. 1995).published
- Mathie v. Fries, 121 F.3d 808 (2d Cir. 1997).published
- Sinkov v. Americor, Inc., 419 F. App'x 86 (2d Cir. 2011).unpublished
- Jason B. Gardner v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 907 F.2d 1348 (2d Cir. 1990).published
- United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 961 F.2d 359 (2d Cir. 1992).unpublished
- Kelly v. Snider, 963 F.2d 367 (4th Cir. 1992).unpublished
- Trademark Rsch. Corp. v. Maxwell Online, Inc., 995 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1993).published
- Walz v. Town of Smithtown, 46 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 1995).published
- Paolitto v. John Brown E.&C., Inc., 151 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 1998).published
- Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n v. City of New York, 310 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 2002).published
- DiSorbo v. Hoy, 343 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2003).published
- Payne v. Jones, 696 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2012).published
- Zeno v. Pine Plains Cent. Sch. Dist., 702 F.3d 655 (2d Cir. 2012).published
- Koerner v. Club Mediterranee, S.A., 833 F. Supp. 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).published
- King v. MacRi, 800 F. Supp. 1157 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).published
- Hallinan v. Repub. Bank & Trust Co., 519 F. Supp. 2d 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).published
- Niemann v. Whalen, 928 F. Supp. 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).published
- Mason v. City of New York, 949 F. Supp. 1068 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).published
- OKRAYAENTS v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 555 F. Supp. 2d 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).published
- In re Jt. E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Lit., 827 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).published
- East Coast Novelty Co. v. City of New York, 842 F. Supp. 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).published
- Gros v. Port Washington Police Dist., 944 F. Supp. 1072 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).published
- Slade v. Whitco Corp., 810 F. Supp. 396 (N.D.N.Y. 1993).published
- McCoy v. Goldberg, 810 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).published
- Annis v. Cnty. of Westchester, 939 F. Supp. 1115 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).published
- Hogan v. Franco, 896 F. Supp. 1313 (N.D.N.Y. 1995).published
- Dailey v. Societe Generale, 915 F. Supp. 1315 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).published
- DeCarlo v. Perales, 963 F. Supp. 175 (N.D.N.Y. 1997).published
- Paturzo v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 751 F. Supp. 1086 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).published
- Slade v. Whitco Corp., 811 F. Supp. 71 (N.D.N.Y. 1993).published
- Schramm v. Long Island R.R., 857 F. Supp. 255 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).published
- McIntosh v. Irving Trust Co., 887 F. Supp. 662 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).published
- Lee v. Coss, 39 F. Supp. 2d 170 (D. Conn. 1999).published
- Zakre v. Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale, 541 F. Supp. 2d 555 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).published
- Quinn v. Nassau Cnty. Police Dep't, 53 F. Supp. 2d 347 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).published
- McClary v. Coughlin, 87 F. Supp. 2d 205 (W.D.N.Y. 2000).published
- Colbert v. Furumoto Realty, Inc., 144 F. Supp. 2d 251 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).published
- Marcoux v. Farm Serv. & Supplies, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).published
- Lurzer GmbH v. Am. Showcase, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).published
- Lynch v. Town of Southampton, 492 F. Supp. 2d 197 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).published
- Rainone v. Potter, 388 F. Supp. 2d 120 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).published
- Hightower v. Nassau Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 325 F. Supp. 2d 199 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).published
- Gonzalez v. Bratton, 147 F. Supp. 2d 180 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).published
- Arnold v. Cnty. of Nassau, 89 F. Supp. 2d 285 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).published
- Ortiz v. New York City Hous. Auth., 22 F. Supp. 2d 15 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).published
- Tatum v. City of New York, 668 F. Supp. 2d 584 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).published
- In re Air Crash Near Nantucket Island, Mass., on 10/31/1999, 307 F. Supp. 2d 465 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).published
- Thomas v. iSTAR Fin., Inc., 520 F. Supp. 2d 478 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).published
- Beckford v. Irvin, 49 F. Supp. 2d 170 (W.D.N.Y. 1999).published
- Matusick v. Erie Cnty. Water Auth., 774 F. Supp. 2d 514 (W.D.N.Y. 2011).published
- Kelleher v. New York State Trooper Fearon, 90 F. Supp. 2d 354 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).published
- Mugavero v. Arms Acres, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 2d 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).published
- Katt v. City of New York, 151 F. Supp. 2d 313 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).published
- Charts v. Nationwide Mut. Ins., 397 F. Supp. 2d 357 (D. Conn. 2005).published
- Ziemba v. Armstrong, 433 F. Supp. 2d 248 (D. Conn. 2006).published
- Thorsen v. Cnty. of Nassau, 722 F. Supp. 2d 277 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).published
- Repub. Bank & Trust Co. v. Hallinan, 306 F. App'x 626 (2d Cir. 2009).unpublished
- Kowalsky v. Egyptair, 307 F. Supp. 2d 465 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).published
- Welch v. United Parcel Serv. Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 164 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).published
- MacMillan v. Millennium Broadway Hotel, 873 F. Supp. 2d 546 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).published
- Maiorana v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 827 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).published
- Allam v. Meyers, 906 F. Supp. 2d 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).published
- Messier v. United States, 962 F. Supp. 2d 389 (D. Conn. 2013).published
- Davids v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 977 F. Supp. 2d 171 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).published
- Stanczyk v. City of New York, 990 F. Supp. 2d 242 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).published
- Lee v. Edwards, 906 F. Supp. 94 (D. Conn. 1995).published
- Maurer v. Patterson, 197 F.R.D. 244 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).published
- H.Y.G.H. v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359 (2d Cir. 1992).published
- Shuford v. New York City Dep't Of Corr., No. 1:17-cv-06349 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2023).
- Thompson v. Booth, No. 7:16-cv-03477 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2022).
- Mendoza v. City of Rome, 872 F. Supp. 1110 (N.D.N.Y. 1994).published
- Greenaway v. Cnty. of Nassau, 327 F. Supp. 3d 552 (E.D.N.Y. 2018).published
- Saint-Jean v. Emigrant Mortg. Co., 337 F. Supp. 3d 186 (E.D.N.Y. 2018).published
At page 187Reviewing jury awards for reasonable range of damages32 citing cases“balance the number of high and low awards and reject the verdict in the instant case if the number of lower awards is greater.”
- McCabe v. Mais, 580 F. Supp. 2d 815 (N.D. Iowa 2008).published (Reference to other awards in similar cases in proper.)
- James K. Lee v. Michael Edwards, 101 F.3d 805 (2d Cir. 1996).published “ur task is not to balance the number of high and low awards and reject the verdict ... if the number of lower awards is greater.”
- United States Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. McLane/E., Inc., No. 5:20-cv-01628 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2024).“is within reasonable range”
- J-Quan Johnson v. City Of New York, No. 1:15-cv-06915 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2022). Under federal law, a court should reduce a jury award only if it is “so high as to shock the judicial conscience and constitute a denial of justice.” Id. (quoting Ismail v. Cohen, 899 F.2d 183, 187 (2d Cir. 1990)).
- Nikos Kidis v. Jean Reid, 976 F.3d 708 (6th Cir. 2020).published Ismail v. Cohen, 899 F.2d 183, 187 (2d Cir. 1990). • $150,000/$160,000* (over $2 million in compensatory damages, subject to remittitur to determine the excessive portion of the award for economic damages): A police officer punched an unar…
- Bouveng v. NYG Capital LLC, 175 F. Supp. 3d 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).published“A remittitur, in effect, is a statement by the court that it is shocked by the jury’s award of damages.” Ismail v. Cohen, 899 F.2d 183, 186 (2d Cir.1990). “’While it is properly within the province of the jury to calculate damages, there…
- Newton v. City of New York, 171 F. Supp. 3d 156 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).publishedIsmail v. Cohen, 899 F.2d 183, 187 (2d Cir.1990). .
- Tretola v. Cnty. of Nassau, 14 F. Supp. 3d 58 (E.D.N.Y. 2014).publishedUnder Federal law, an award will not be disturbed unless it is “so high as to shock the judicial conscience and constitute a denial of justice.” Ismail v. Cohen, 899 F.2d 183, 186 (2d Cir.1990).
- Alla v. Verkay, 979 F. Supp. 2d 349 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).published Moreover, in police misconduct cases in which we sustained awards around $150,000, see, e.g., Ismail [v. Cohen, 899 F.2d 183, 185, 187 (2d Cir.1990) ], the wrongs at issue were more egregious.... 711 F.3d at 105 .
- DiSorbo v. Hoy, 343 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2003).published
Show 20 more citing cases
- Zeno v. Pine Plains Cent. Sch. Dist., 702 F.3d 655 (2d Cir. 2012).published
- Niemann v. Whalen, 928 F. Supp. 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).published
- DeCarlo v. Perales, 963 F. Supp. 175 (N.D.N.Y. 1997).published
- Katt v. City of New York, 151 F. Supp. 2d 313 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).published
- MacMillan v. Millennium Broadway Hotel, 873 F. Supp. 2d 546 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).published
- Jones v. Huff, 789 F. Supp. 526 (N.D.N.Y. 1992).published
- Nolley v. Cnty. of Erie, 802 F. Supp. 898 (W.D.N.Y. 1992).published
- Schroeder v. Mabellos, 823 F. Supp. 806 (D. Haw. 1993).published
- Perdue v. City Univ. of New York, 13 F. Supp. 2d 326 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).published
- Jocks v. Tavernier, 97 F. Supp. 2d 303 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).published
- Hill v. Airborne Freight Corp., 212 F. Supp. 2d 59 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).published
- Chopra v. Gen. Elec. Co., 527 F. Supp. 2d 230 (D. Conn. 2007).published
- Sabir v. Jowett, 214 F. Supp. 2d 226 (D. Conn. 2002).published
- Rivera v. Baccarat, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d 318 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).published
- Fink v. City of New York, 129 F. Supp. 2d 511 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).published
- Zellner v. Summerlin, 399 F. Supp. 2d 154 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).published
- Ruhlmann v. Smith, 323 F. Supp. 2d 356 (N.D.N.Y. 2004).published
- Giard v. Darby, 360 F. Supp. 2d 229 (D. Mass. 2005).published
- Krystal Wagner v. State of Iowa & William L. Spece, 952 N.W.2d 843 (Iowa 2020).published
- Greenaway v. Cnty. of Nassau, 327 F. Supp. 3d 552 (E.D.N.Y. 2018).published
At page 188Admissibility of prior misconduct evidence under rule 404(b)23 citing casesaffirming admission under Rule 404(b) of post-incident misconduct evidence that officer participated in a similar incident soon after the incident at issue
- Morant, No. 3:22-cv-00630 (D. Conn. Apr. 23, 2026).“the district court set forth several legitimate reasons for the admission of the . . . evidence (pattern, intent, absence of mistake, etc.)”
- T.H., No. 2:24-cv-00887 (D.N.M. Jan. 15, 2026).(admission into evidence that officer committed similar misconduct in another incident was not error)
- E. Jean Carroll v. Donald J. Trump, 124 F.4th 140 (2d Cir. 2024).published United States v. Pascarella, 84 F.3d 61, 69 (2d Cir. 1996); Ismail v. Cohen, 899 F.2d 183, 188 (2d Cir. 1990); see also United States v. Robinson, 702 F.3d 22, 37 (2d Cir. 2012) (evidence of uncharged criminal conduct that "is inextricably…
- Baltas v. Frenis, No. 3:18-cv-01168 (D. Conn. Dec. 6, 2024).“A trial court has ‘broad discretion’ in decisions relating to extrinsic acts.” Berkovich v. Hicks, 922 F.2d 1018, 1022 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting Ismail v. Cohen, 899 F.2d 183, 188 (2d Cir.1990)).
- Alexander v. Lewis, No. 3:20-cv-00370 (D. Conn. Aug. 30, 2024).“A trial court has ‘broad discretion’ in decisions relating to extrinsic acts.” Berkovich v. Hicks, 922 F.2d 1018, 1022 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing Ismail v. Cohen, 899 F.2d 183, 188 (2d Cir.1990)).
- Walls v. City of New York, 502 F. Supp. 3d 686 (E.D.N.Y. 2020).published (affirming admission under Rule 404(b) of post-incident misconduct evidence that officer participated in a similar incident soon after the incident at issue)
- Caraballo v. City of New York, No. 1:18-cv-10335 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2020). (allegations that post-date incident are discoverable)
- Simcoe v. Gray, 670 F. App'x 725 (2d Cir. 2016).unpublishedIsmail v. Cohen, 899 F.2d 183, 188 (2d Cir. 1990).
- Gross v. Lunduski, 304 F.R.D. 136 (W.D.N.Y. 2014).published Moreover, “[w]here the evidence is offered for a proper purpose, it makes no difference whether the acts occurred before or after the events at issue.” Id. (citing United States v. Germosen, 139 F.3d 120, 128 (2d Cir.1998) (“the fact that…
- Katt v. City of New York, 151 F. Supp. 2d 313 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).published
Show 13 more citing cases
- Sabir v. Jowett, 214 F. Supp. 2d 226 (D. Conn. 2002).published
- Vladimir Berkovich v. Winslow Hicks Stephen G. Tate, 922 F.2d 1018 (2d Cir. 1991).published
- In re Air Disaster At Lockerbie Scotland On December 21, 1988, 37 F.3d 804 (2d Cir. 1994).published
- Hynes v. LaBoy, 887 F. Supp. 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).published
- Sinha v. State Univ. of New York at Farmingdale, 764 F. Supp. 765 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).published
- Carofino v. Forester, 450 F. Supp. 2d 257 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).published
- Pagnucco v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 37 F.3d 804 (2d Cir. 1994).published
- Jean-Laurent v. Hennessy, 840 F. Supp. 2d 529 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).published
- Pacheco v. City of New York, 234 F.R.D. 53 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).published
- Phillips v. City of New York, 277 F.R.D. 82 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).published
- Lewis v. Velez, 149 F.R.D. 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).published
- Volker v. Cnty. of Nassau, No. 2:13-cv-01187 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2019).
- Heggs v. City of New York, No. 1:18-cv-09709 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2021).
At page 185Sustaining awards in police misconduct cases9 citing casesupholding $150,000 No. 72
- Allah, No. 9:23-cv-00785 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2026).(upholding $150,000 No. 72)
- Thomas Jennings v. Yurkiw, 18 F.4th 383 (2d Cir. 2021).published Ismail v. Cohen, 899 F.2d 183, 186 (2d Cir. 1990).
- Anderson v. Aparicio, 25 F. Supp. 3d 303 (E.D.N.Y. 2014).publishedId. (citing Ismail v. Cohen, 899 F.2d 183, 185 (2d Cir.1990)). .
- Alla v. Verkay, 979 F. Supp. 2d 349 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).published Moreover, in police misconduct cases in which we sustained awards around $150,000, see, e.g., Ismail [v. Cohen, 899 F.2d 183, 185, 187 (2d Cir.1990) ], the wrongs at issue were more egregious.... 711 F.3d at 105 .
- United States v. Curley, 639 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2011).published
- Sulkowska v. City of New York, 129 F. Supp. 2d 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).published
- Blackledge v. Carlone, 126 F. Supp. 2d 224 (D. Conn. 2001).published
- Mathie v. Fries, 121 F.3d 808 (2d Cir. 1997).published
- Crews v. Cnty. of Nassau, 149 F. Supp. 3d 287 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).published
At page 184Reinstating jury verdict and vacating remittitur awards3 citing casesreversing remittitur and reinstating original jury verdict of $650,000 compensatory damages for police brutality claim
- Martinez v. City of New York, No. 1:16-cv-00079 (E.D.N.Y. July 19, 2023).In today’s dollars, however, any ceiling set by the court based on ’s 1993 jury award would be nearly $400,000, an outcome that is, in any event, more consistent with other Second Circuit caselaw. , , 18 F.4th at 393 (affirming punitive da…
- Blissett v. Coughlin, III, 66 F.3d 531 (2d Cir. 1995).published
- Blissett v. Coughlin, 66 F.3d 531 (2d Cir. 1995).published
v.
Scott COHEN, individually and as a New York City Police Officer and City of New York, a municipal corporation, Appellants/Cross-Appellees
This appeal arises from an action commenced to recover damages based on the conduct or, more precisely, the misconduct of a New York City police officer.
The action originally came on for trial before a jury and Peter K. Leisure, District Judge, in the Southern District of New York. The jury on March 7, 1989, found appellant/cross-appellee Scott Cohen liable on the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) claim and on pendent state law claims. That jury also found appellant/cross-appellee City of New York liable on a theory of respondeat superior on the state law claims. The jury awarded compensatory damages totaling $650,000 and punitive damages totaling $150,000.
The district court denied defendants’ motion for judgment n.o.v. or, in the alternative, for a new trial. In an order entered May 3, 1989, however, the court did grant defendants’ motion for a remittitur. It ordered appellee/cross-appellant Labib Ismail to accept a reduction in compensatory damages to $200,000 and in punitive damages to $1,000 or “face a new trial on all issues.” Ismail declined to accept the remittitur.
The case then came on for a new trial before a jury and Whitman Knapp, District Judge. Judge Leisure’s order notwithstanding, Judge Knapp ruled that defendants were entitled to a trial on the question of damages only. The second jury found that Ismail was entitled to compensatory damages of $300,000 and punitive damages of $50,000. On June 7, 1989, the court entered judgment on that verdict.
Appellants raise four claims of error on appeal: (1) that Judge Leisure failed to dismiss the action against the City for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; (2) that Judge Leisure improperly admitted evidence of a prior bad act by Cohen; (3) that Judge Knapp exceeded his authority in limiting the new trial to damages only; and (4) that the damage award resulting from the new trial was excessive. On cross-appeal, Ismail contends that Judge Leisure’s remittitur was improper in light of the evidence presented at trial.
We hold that the first jury verdict was fair and reasonable. We therefore reverse and vacate Judge Leisure’s remittitur. We also remand the case to the district court[*185] with instructions to reinstate the first jury's verdict; enter judgment on that verdict; and vacate the judgment entered on the second jury’s verdict. We affirm Judge Leisure’s rulings on the jurisdiction and evidence issues. In light of our holding, we do not reach the remaining issues.
I.
We summarize only those facts and prior proceedings believed necessary to an understanding of the issues raised on appeal.
Ismail (a United States citizen of Egyptian origin) kept a motor vehicle in Manhattan where he resides. Early in the morning of October 11, 1983, he left his apartment to move his vehicle in order to comply with New York City alternate side parking regulations. The vehicle would not start despite Ismail’s attempts. After 8 A.M. he was in violation of the regulations. Soon thereafter, Scott Cohen, a New York City police officer, approached and threatened to write a ticket. After heated words were exchanged, Cohen began to do so. Ismail looked for an eyewitness to what he perceived was unfair treatment. Finding one, he walked toward the witness, away from Cohen. According to the witness, at no time did Ismail appear to threaten Cohen.
As Ismail walked away, Cohen struck him on the back of his head without warning, causing a brief loss of consciousness. When Ismail came to, he found Cohen’s gun pressed against his head. Moreover, Cohen had handcuffed Ismail so that the latter’s arms were behind his back. Cohen also implanted his knee firmly in Ismail’s back. Cohen stated that he would kill Ismail if the latter attempted to move.
Cohen brought Ismail to a police station. From there, he was transferred to the Central Booking headquarters. Since Ismail complained of injuries, he was taken to Bellevue Hospital. The doctors there found that Cohen’s actions had caused a variety of injuries to Ismail. These included two displaced vertebrae, a cracked rib and serious head trauma.
From Bellevue, Ismail was taken back to Central Booking. He then was sent to the Bronx to spend the night in jail. He was incarcerated all of the following day and evening. Finally, on October 13, about 60 hours after he was arrested, Ismail was arraigned and released on his own recognizance.
Based on Cohen’s report, Ismail was tried on three criminal counts: resisting arrest, obstructing governmental administration, and harassment. Cohen’s report also alleged criminal assault and disorderly conduct, but those charges were never brought to trial. After a trial on February 28 and 29, 1984, Ismail was acquitted on all counts. At the trial, Cohen gave materially false testimony and admitted that, although he never even read the criminal complaint, he had sworn to its accuracy.
Ismail commenced the instant action on January 4, 1985 in the Southern District of New York against Cohen in his individual and official capacities, and against the City of New York. His federal claims were deprivation of constitutional rights, in violation of § 1983, and ethnic discrimination, as demonstrated by Cohen’s alleged racial slurs, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988). His pendent state law claims included assault, battery, false arrest, malicious prosecution and abuse of process. All of these claims as against the City, with one exception, were brought on the basis of respondeat superior. On the exception, the § 1983 claim, Ismail alleged that the City had a policy or custom of encouraging unconstitutional police activity. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
Ruling on the City’s pretrial motion, Judge Leisure severed the Monell claim against the City, but let the remaining claims go to trial.
At trial, defendants objected to the introduction of evidence that, less than three months after the incident with Ismail, Cohen had attacked and arrested one Angel Castaldo without justification, and then had lied to cover up his conduct. Judge Leisure overruled the objection and admitted the evidence.
[*186] Ismail testified at trial that he continued to suffer from chronic intermittent pain in his arms, torso and head, and that this pain interfered to some extent with his daily-activities. Ismail also testified that the incident caused considerable mental and emotional injury that had not healed entirely over the years. Expert medical witnesses testified in support of all of Ismail’s claims.
On March 7, 1989, the first jury returned a verdict finding Cohen liable on the § 1983 count, and on the state law counts of battery, false arrest, malicious prosecution and abuse of process. They found him not liable on the § 1981 and assault counts. The jury awarded Ismail $650,000 in compensatory damages and $150,000 in punitive damages. The City was found vicariously liable for the compensatory damages only. Judge Leisure denied defendants’ motions for judgment n.o.v. or for a new trial, but ordered Ismail to remit $450,000 of the compensatory and $149,000 of the punitive damages, or “face a new trial on all issues.” Ismail declined to accept the remittitur.
After further proceedings, set forth above, this appeal and cross-appeal followed.
II.
It is well settled that calculation of damages is the province of the jury. We have held that “[t]he standard of appellate review of damage awards, whether compensatory or punitive, ‘is whether the award is so high as to shock the judicial conscience and constitute a denial of justice.’ ” O’Neill v. Krzeminski, 839 F.2d 9, 13 (2 Cir.1988) (quoting Zarcone v. Perry, 572 F.2d 52, 56 (2 Cir.1978)). That standard of review has long been applicable in cases where the district court simply enters judgment on the jury verdict. Morrissey v. National Maritime Union, 544 F.2d 19, 34 (2 Cir.1976) (Friendly, J.); Dagnello v. Long Island R. R., 289 F.2d 797, 806 (2 Cir.1961) (Medina, J.).
The circumstances of this case — a plaintiff’s appeal from a district court’s remittitur — occur far less frequently. Appellate courts accord considerable deference to the factual findings of both judge and jury. A remittitur, in effect, is a statement by the court that it is shocked by the jury’s award of damages. We have faced this dilemma before and have held that a more searching standard of review is necessary. We have stated that “an appellate court should ‘reverse the grant of a new trial for excessive verdict only where the quantum of damages was clearly within “the maximum limit of a reasonable range.” ’ ” Reinertsen v. George W. Rogers Constr. Corp., 519 F.2d 531, 532 (2 Cir.1975) (quoting Taylor v. Washington Terminal Co., 409 F.2d 145, 149 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 835 (1969)). This standard has been approved by several other circuits as well. In re Innovative Construction Systems, Inc., 793 F.2d 875, 888 (7 Cir.1986); Bonura v. Sea Land Service, Inc., 505 F.2d 665, 670 (5 Cir.1975); Manning v. Altec, Inc., 488 F.2d 127, 132-33 (6 Cir.1973). We therefore review this jury’s award to determine whether it exceeded the reasonable range.
Judge Leisure stated correctly that such a determination should not be made in a vacuum. Reference to other awards in similar cases is proper. Martell v. Boardwalk Enterprises, Inc., 748 F.2d 740, 752-53 (2 Cir.1984). The district court here, however, improperly limited its frame of reference to federal § 1983 cases. See id. at 750 (damage awards for state law violations require reference to analogous state court damage awards); Zarcone, supra, 572 F.2d at 54-55 (in § 1983 cases, reference to analogous personal injury awards is proper).
We turn first to the compensatory damage award. Before we review the applicable case law, we address the district court’s criticism of Ismail for failing to seek treatment (other than at Bellevue Hospital on the day of the incident) for injuries that he claimed were chronic and permanent. Ismail adduced testimony from qualified medical experts which showed that, given the nature of the injuries, such treatment would not have helped. In view of that testimony, which the jury[*187] chose to credit, the court’s criticism seems unwarranted. Ismail also failed to seek counseling for his mental anguish, but explained that this failure was due to his ethnic and religious heritage rather than to a desire to exacerbate his damages.
There are several New York cases where damage awards similar to that in the instant case were upheld. The most striking is Vitale v. Hagan, 132 A.D.2d 468, 517 N.Y.S.2d 725 (1st Dep't 1987), modified on other grounds, 71 N.Y.2d 955, 524 N.E.2d 144, 528 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1988). The plaintiff in Vitale did not sustain any chronic physical injury, and was not even forced to undergo the indignity of a criminal trial. Yet he was awarded, inter alia, $750,000 for the humiliation of malicious prosecution by the defendant police officer. In Osterczy v. New York City Transit Auth., No. 17610/82 (Sup.Ct. Nov. 3, 1983), aff'd mem., 107 A.D.2d 1091, 485 N.Y.S.2d 158 (1st Dep’t 1985), the court entered judgment on a jury verdict which awarded plaintiff $500,000 for a wrenched neck due to a sudden stop on a subway train. See also Loughman v. A.W. Flint Co., 132 A.D.2d 507, 518 N.Y.S.2d 389 (1st Dep’t 1987) ($640,000 award reinstated for fall from ladder where plaintiff sustained unspecified “serious back injuries”), app. denied, 70 N.Y.2d 613, 519 N.E.2d 343, 524 N.Y.S.2d 432 (1988).
With respect to mental distress damages, we have been willing to uphold substantial awards where warranted. Hughes v. Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n, 850 F.2d 876, 883 (2 Cir.) ($225,000 in emotional distress damages in light of concerted harassment was not excessive even though no permanent harm resulted), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 495 (1988).
As for punitive damages, it is not even necessary to go beyond our § 1983 cases to determine that the $150,000 award in the instant case is within reasonable range. In Hughes, supra, 850 F.2d at 880-81, we held that defendants’ vendetta against plaintiff merited a punitive damage award of $350,-000, including $175,000 against an individual defendant. In O’Neill, supra, 839 F.2d at 13, we held that a $185,000 punitive assessment against three police officers was proper in light of the beating that the officers gave plaintiff about the face while he was handcuffed. In contrast to the instant case, the facts of O’Neill involved no criminal prosecution or permanent physical or emotional injury.
Appellants’ brief collects a sizable list of cases in which either judgment was entered on a smaller jury verdict or the district or appellate court ordered remittitur. We stress, however, that our task is not to balance the number of high and low awards and reject the verdict in the instant case if the number of lower awards is greater. Rather, we inquire whether the March 7 verdict is within reasonable range. We are satisfied that it is.
We reverse and vacate the remittitur and remand with instructions to reinstate the first jury’s verdict; enter judgment on that verdict; and vacate the judgment entered on the second jury’s verdict.
III.
We turn next to appellants’ contention that since, in their view, there was no federal subject matter jurisdiction over the City, the district court erred in exercising pendent jurisdiction over the state law re-spondeat superior claims. We have carefully considered this contention and find it to be without merit.
Where there is federal question jurisdiction, determination of pendent jurisdiction over related state law claims is committed in the first instance to the discretion of the district court. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-27 (1966). Appellants acknowledge that determination of federal question jurisdiction and, by extension, pendent jurisdiction does not constitute an abuse of discretion if the federal claim is colorable or plausible. Hughes, supra, 850 F.2d at 881. Ismail asserted two bases of federal question jurisdiction over the City: § 1983 and § 1981. Appellants claim that neither was colorable or plausible and, therefore, the City was not a proper party to this action. We address these claims seriatim.
[*188] Ismail alleged in his complaint that the City maintained a policy or custom of condoning unlawful attacks on citizens by police officers, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and § 1983. Monell v. Department of Social Services, supra, 436 U.S. at 658. Since the evidence required to prove such a policy differed from the evidence required to prove the allegations in the main body of the complaint (the October 11 attack by Cohen), the district court severed that count. When the verdict was rendered, therefore, the count was still outstanding.
Appellants do not attack the merits of the § 1983 claim against the City, but contend that Ismail abandoned it. The record demonstrates that he did not. Following the verdict at the first trial, the court asked Ismail’s attorney about his intention on the severed claim. The attorney stated that he would not pursue it if the court entered judgment on the verdict. The court chose to remit the damage award instead. Under the circumstances, the attorney did not abandon the claim. In any event, our disposition of this appeal effectively terminates the proceedings prior to the alleged abandonment.
The basis for liability on the § 1981 ethnic discrimination claim against the City was respondeat superior. We have never decided whether an employer can be held vicariously liable under § 1981. Since there was some evidence that Cohen had discriminated against Ismail, based on alleged racial slurs, the court’s decision to submit the § 1981 claim against the City to the jury was not erroneous. The correctness of that decision was not altered by the fact that the jury found for appellants on the claim.
In an opinion rendered June 22, 1989, the Supreme Court ruled that an employer could not be liable under § 1981 merely due to the fact of employment. Jett v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 109 S.Ct. 2702 (1989). Appellants, however, offer no support for their contention that Jett somehow affected the assertion of jurisdiction retrospectively.
We hold that the district court correctly held that it had pendent jurisdiction over the state law respondeat superior claims against the City.
IV.
As part of his proof of Cohen’s misconduct, Ismail sought to introduce evidence that Cohen participated in a similar incident soon after that involved in the instant case. According to that evidence (set forth in a complaint filed with the Civilian Complaint Review Board), on December 27, 1983, Cohen punched one Angel Castaldo in the jaw without provocation and hit him again while he was down. To cover up, Cohen later falsely claimed that he was responding to an attack by Castaldo on his partner. Cohen then brought Castaldo to the police station where he was charged with assault even though, on the evidence presented, no observer in good faith could believe that Castaldo was guilty.
In a pretrial order of February 7, 1989, the district court in the instant case held that the Castaldo evidence was admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) and 403. Rule 404(b) prohibits the use of other wrongful acts against a defendant merely to show that the defendant had the propensity to commit the act in question. Under our “inclusionary” approach, it will be admissible for any other relevant purpose. United States v. Brennan, 798 F.2d 581, 589 (2 Cir.1986). Rule 403 permits exclusion of relevant, probative evidence if the probative value of that evidence is “substantially outweighed” by “the danger of unfair prejudice.” Our standard of review is identical for both rules. We grant the district court broad discretion, and reverse only for abuse of that discretion. Id.; Fiacco v. City of Rensselaer, 783 F.2d 319, 327-28 (2 Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 922 (1987).
In a carefully reasoned memorandum, the district court here set forth several legitimate reasons for the admission of the Castaldo evidence (pattern, intent, absence of mistake, etc.) and determined that the risk of unfair prejudice did not substantial[*189]ly outweigh the probative value of the evidence.
On the record before us, we reject appellants’ contention that the court’s ruling admitting the Castaldo evidence constituted an abuse of discretion.
V.
To summarize:
We hold that the jury verdict of March 7, 1989 did not exceed the reasonable range of possible verdicts. We therefore reverse and vacate the district court’s remittitur, and remand the case to the district court with instructions to reinstate the first jury’s verdict; enter judgment on that verdict; and vacate the judgment entered on the second jury’s verdict.
Rejecting appellants’ remaining contentions, we hold (1) that the district court correctly exercised pendent jurisdiction over the state law claims against the City and (2) that the court properly admitted the Castaldo evidence.
Reversed, vacated and remanded in part; affirmed in part.