United States v. California Mobile Home Park Mgmt. Co., 29 F.3d 1413 (9th Cir. 1994). · Go Syfert
Copy Cite United States v. California Mobile Home Park Mgmt. Co., 29 F.3d 1413 (9th Cir. 1994).
Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitPublished opinionNo. 92-55568Jul 18, 1994

United States v. California Mobile Home Park Mgmt. Co.

Quick Summary

The Fair Housing Amendments Act imposes an affirmative duty on landlords to reasonably accommodate the needs of handicapped persons, which may include waiving generally applicable fees.

A resident with a respiratory disease requiring a home health care aide sued her mobile home park landlord for refusing to waive guest fees for the aide. The landlord moved to dismiss, arguing that the Fair Housing Amendments Act does not require the waiver of generally applicable fees. The court held that the Act imposes an affirmative duty upon landlords to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, or services to afford handicapped persons equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling. Because the refusal to waive such fees may constitute discrimination, the court determined that the reasonableness of a fee waiver is a fact-specific inquiry that must be decided on a case-by-case basis.

143 citation events (91 in the last 25 years) across 36 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1994 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1994 2010 2026
Statutes this case interprets
#1 24 C.F.R. § 100.204(b) cited 1× in this case · 1 total citations of statute Read the statute Leading cases
#2 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(a) cited 1× in this case · 4 total citations of statute Leading cases
Cited for
At page 1418Determining reasonableness of fee waivers for accommodation28 citing cases“highly fact-specific, requiring case-by-case determination.”9 citing courts quote it · 24 listed here
  • Skochko v. Mercy Hous., Inc., No. 3:20-cv-08659 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2022).
    “The reasonable 13 accommodation inquiry is highly fact-specific, requiring case-by-case determination.” Id. at 1418. 14 The plaintiff has the burden “of demonstrating that the particular accommodation [she] 15 requests . . . is reasonable…
  • Temple v. Hudson View Owners Corp., 222 F. Supp. 3d 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).published
    Co., 29 F.3d at 1418). 5 Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that a second parking space is necessary for their use and enjoyment of their residence.
  • Kromenhoek v. Cowpet Bay West Condo. Ass'n, 77 F. Supp. 3d 462 (D.V.I. 2014).published
    The FHAA does not, however, “extend a preference to handicapped residents,” United States v. California Mobile Home Park Management Co., 29 F.3d 1413, 1418 (9th Cir.1994) (emphasis added).
  • Ass'n of Apt. Owners of Liliuokalani Gardens v. Taylor, 892 F. Supp. 2d 1268 (D. Haw. 2012).published 3 cites
    Co., 29 F.3d 1413, 1418 (9th Cir.1994)).] Taylor further argues that the FHA’s implementing regulations do not contain any requirement that a service animal be specially trained. [Id. at 9.] The United States Department of Housing and Urba…
  • Solberg v. Majerle Mgmt., 879 A.2d 1015 (Md. 2005).published
    What has emerged is that “[t]he reasonable accommodation inquiry is highly fact-specific, requiring a case-by-case determination” and that, as in the Rehabilitation Act cases, “we must view the reasonable accommodations requirement ‘in lig…
  • Bentley v. Peace & Quiet Realty 2 LLC, 367 F. Supp. 2d 341 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).published
    Indeed, “the history of the FHAA clearly establishes that Congress anticipated that landlords would have to shoulder certain costs involved, so long as they are not unduly burdensome.” Mobile Home, 29 F.3d at 1416.
  • Andover Hous. Auth. v. Shkolnik, 820 N.E.2d 815 (Mass. 2005).published
    Co., 29 F.3d 1413, 1418 (9th Cir. 1994).
  • Richard McGary v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d 1259 (9th Cir. 2004).published 7 cites
    Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 , 93 S.Ct. 364 , 34 L.Ed.2d 415 (1972)); see also Gilligan, 108 F.3d at 249; Mobile Home I, 29 F.3d at 1416.
  • Prindable v. Ass'n of Apt. Owners of 2987 Kalakaua, 304 F. Supp. 2d 1245 (D. Haw. 2003).published
    The FHA does not, however, “extend a preference to handicapped residents,” United States v. California Mobile Home Park Management Co., 29 F.3d 1413, 1418 (9th Cir.1994), and, therefore, “accommodations that go- beyond affording a handicap…
  • Bachman v. Swan Harbour Assocs., 653 N.W.2d 415 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002).published 5 cites
    Jankowski Lee & Associates v Cisneros, 91 F3d 891, 896 (CA 7, 1996); Hovsons, Inc v Brick Twp, 89 F3d 1096, 1104 (CA 3, 1996); United States v California Mobile Home Park Management Co, 29 F3d 1413, 1418 (CA 9, 1994); Spom, supra at 250.
Show 14 more citing cases
  • Josephinium Assocs. v. Kahli, 45 P.3d 627 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).published 2 cites
    Corp., 994 F.Supp. 187, 189 (S.D.N.Y.1998). [14] Groner, 250 F.3d at 1044 (quoting California Mobile Home Park, 29 F.3d at 1418.) [15] Bronk v. Ineichen, 54 F.3d 425, 428 (7th.
  • Sporn v. Ocean Colony Condo. Ass'n, 173 F. Supp. 2d 244 (D.N.J. 2001).published 2 cites
    “The reasonable accommodation inquiry is highly fact-specific, requiring a case-by-case determination.” Hovsons, Inc. v. Township of Brick, 89 F.3d 1096, 1104 (3d cir.1996) (quoting United States v. California Mobile Home Park Management C…
  • Groner v. Golden Gate Gardens, No. 00-3189 (6th Cir. May 25, 2001).published 2 cites
    Co., 29 F.3d 1413, 1416 (9th Cir. 1994); instructed Groner to scream into his pillow in an attempt to see also H.R.
  • Groner v. Golden Gate Gardens Apts., 250 F.3d 1039 (6th Cir. 2001).published 2 cites
    “highly fact-specific, requiring case-by-case determination”
  • Schanz v. Vill. Apts., 998 F. Supp. 784 (E.D. Mich. 1998).published
    Plaintiff insisted that such a waiver was necessary to afford her an “equal opportunity to use and enjoy [her] dwelling.” Id. at 1418.
  • United States v. California Mobile Home Park Mgmt. Co., 107 F.3d 1374 (9th Cir. 1997).published 8 cites
    Id. at 1418. 4 On remand, Cohen-Strong filed a new motion for leave to intervene before the district court that would permit her to proceed alongside the United States as plaintiff.
  • Samuelson v. Mid-Atl. Realty Co., 947 F. Supp. 756 (D. Del. 1996).published 2 cites
    The inquiry as to whether a landlord must reasonably accommodate a tenant by waiving generally applicable fees is “highly fact-specific, requiring case-by-case determination.” Id. at 1418 (citations omitted).
  • Jankowski Lee & Assocs. v. Cisneros, 91 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 1996).published 2 cites
    United States v. California Mobile Home Park Management Co., 29 F.3d 1413, 1418 (9th Cir.1994).
  • Rivera-De-Davila v. Mora Dev. Corp., 624 F. Supp. 3d 80 (D.P.R. 2022).published
    Mass. 2018), aff'd, 940 F.3d 133 (1st Cir. 2019); see also Jankowski Lee & Associates v. Cisneros, 91 F.3d 891, 896 (7th Cir. 1996), as amended (Aug. 26, 1996)(“Whether an accommodation is ‘reasonable’ is a question of fact, determined by…
  • S. California Hous. Rights Ctr. v. Los Feliz Towers Homeowners Ass'n, 426 F. Supp. 2d 1061 (C.D. Cal. 2005).published
  • Sinisgallo v. Town of Islip Hous. Auth., 865 F. Supp. 2d 307 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).published
  • Decheri Hafer v. Unknown, No. 1:20-cv-01426 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2020).
  • Johnson v. Guardian Mgmt., 535 F. Supp. 3d 1004 (D. Or. 2021).published
  • Clark v. GSL Props., Inc., No. 3:24-cv-00409 (D. Or. Nov. 27, 2024).
At page 1416Interpreting the fair housing act generously21 citing casesFHA imposes affirmative duty upon landlords to make reasonable accommodations for handicapped persons2 citing courts put it this way · 16 listed here
  • Lawrence Salisbury v. City of Santa Monica, 998 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 2021).published 2 cites
    Settled principles of statutory interpretation place it beyond dispute that the “generous spirit” with which our court interprets the FHAA, Mobile Home, 29 F.3d at 1416, is not a license to ignore the text.
  • Montano v. Bonnie Brae Convalescent Hosp., Inc., 79 F. Supp. 3d 1120 (C.D. Cal. 2015).published 2 cites
    Co., 29 F.3d at 1416; see Giebeler, 343 F.3d at 1152 (“Accommodations need not be free of all possible cost to the landlord!.]”). 48.
  • Ass'n of Apt. Owners of Liliuokalani Gardens v. Taylor, 892 F. Supp. 2d 1268 (D. Haw. 2012).published 3 cites
    Co., 29 F.3d 1413, 1418 (9th Cir.1994)).] Taylor further argues that the FHA’s implementing regulations do not contain any requirement that a service animal be specially trained. [Id. at 9.] The United States Department of Housing and Urba…
  • Bentley v. Peace & Quiet Realty 2 LLC, 367 F. Supp. 2d 341 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).published
    Indeed, “the history of the FHAA clearly establishes that Congress anticipated that landlords would have to shoulder certain costs involved, so long as they are not unduly burdensome.” Mobile Home, 29 F.3d at 1416.
  • Richard McGary v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d 1259 (9th Cir. 2004).published 7 cites
    Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 , 93 S.Ct. 364 , 34 L.Ed.2d 415 (1972)); see also Gilligan, 108 F.3d at 249; Mobile Home I, 29 F.3d at 1416.
  • Bachman v. Swan Harbour Assocs., 653 N.W.2d 415 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002).published 5 cites
    Jankowski Lee & Associates v Cisneros, 91 F3d 891, 896 (CA 7, 1996); Hovsons, Inc v Brick Twp, 89 F3d 1096, 1104 (CA 3, 1996); United States v California Mobile Home Park Management Co, 29 F3d 1413, 1418 (CA 9, 1994); Spom, supra at 250.
  • Groner v. Golden Gate Gardens, No. 00-3189 (6th Cir. May 25, 2001).published 2 cites
    Co., 29 F.3d 1413, 1416 (9th Cir. 1994); instructed Groner to scream into his pillow in an attempt to see also H.R.
  • Lauer Farms, Inc. v. Waushara Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment, 986 F. Supp. 544 (E.D. Wis. 1997).published
    Indeed, for that reason at least one court has held that the FHA be given “ ‘a generous construction’ in order to carry out a ‘policy that Congress considered to be of the highest priority.’ ” United States v. California Mobile Home Park M…
  • Bryant Woods Inn Inc v. Howard Cnty. MD, 124 F.3d 597 (4th Cir. 1997).published 2 cites
    Accordingly, we may look to Rehabilitation Act cases to assist us in interpreting the FHA See, e.g., Hovsons, Inc. v. Township of Brick, 89 F.3d 1096, 1101 (3d Cir.1996); Shapiro v. Cadman Towers, Inc., 51 F.3d 328, 334 (2d Cir.1995); Unit…
  • Dr. Tadeusz Radecki v. James Joura Carol Joura, 114 F.3d 115 (8th Cir. 1997).published
    (FHA imposes affirmative duty upon landlords to make reasonable accommodations for handicapped persons)
Show 6 more citing cases
  • Dr. Tadeusz Radecki v. James Joura, No. 95-4091 (8th Cir. June 3, 1997).published
    (FHA imposes affirmative duty upon landlords to make reasonable accommodations for handicapped persons)
  • United States v. California Mobile Home Park Mgmt. Co., 107 F.3d 1374 (9th Cir. 1997).published 8 cites
    Id. at 1418. 4 On remand, Cohen-Strong filed a new motion for leave to intervene before the district court that would permit her to proceed alongside the United States as plaintiff.
  • Hovsons, Inc. v. Twp. Of Brick, 89 F.3d 1096 (3d Cir. 1996).published 5 cites
    United States v. California Mobile Home Park Management Co., 29 F.3d 1413, 1416 (9th Cir.1994).
  • Villegas v. Sandy Farms, Inc., 929 F. Supp. 1324 (D. Or. 1996).published
    Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 , 93 S.Ct. 364, 366-67 , 34 L.Ed.2d 415 (1972), and requires that the FHA be given “a generous construction to implement a policy that Congress considered to be of the highest priority.” United States v. California M…
  • Roe v. Hous. Auth. of City of Boulder, 909 F. Supp. 814 (D. Colo. 1995).published 2 cites
    United States v. California Mobile Home Park Management Co., 29 F.3d 1413, 1416 (9th Cir.1994).
  • Lloyd v. Hous. Auth. of Kirksville, 58 F.3d 398 (8th Cir. 1995).published 2 cites
    See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (f)(3)(B) (1988); Shapiro v. Cadman Towers, Inc., 51 F.3d 328, 333 (2d Cir.1995); United States v. California Mobile Home Park Management Co., 29 F.3d 1413, 1416-17 (9th Cir.1994).
“imposes an affirmative duty upon landlords reasonably to accommodate the needs of handicapped persons.”5 citing cases5 citing courts quote it
  • Boston Hous. Auth. v. Bridgewaters, 898 N.E.2d 848 (Mass. 2009).published
    (the FHAA imposes an affirmative duty upon landlords to accommodate the needs of handicapped persons)
  • Montano v. Bonnie Brae Convalescent Hosp., Inc., 79 F. Supp. 3d 1120 (C.D. Cal. 2015).published 2 cites
    Co., 29 F.3d at 1416; see Giebeler, 343 F.3d at 1152 (“Accommodations need not be free of all possible cost to the landlord!.]”). 48.
  • Groner v. Golden Gate Gardens Apts., 250 F.3d 1039 (6th Cir. 2001).published 2 cites
    An accommodation is reasonable when it imposes no "fundamental alteration in the nature of a program" or "undue financial and administrative burdens." Id. at 795 . 17 Whether a requested accommodation is required by law is "highly fact-spe…
  • Roe v. Hous. Auth. of City of Boulder, 909 F. Supp. 814 (D. Colo. 1995).published 2 cites
    United States v. California Mobile Home Park Management Co., 29 F.3d 1413, 1416 (9th Cir.1994).
  • Johnson v. Guardian Mgmt., 535 F. Supp. 3d 1004 (D. Or. 2021).published
At page 1417Analyzing disparate impact under fair housing act6 citing cases4 listed here
  • Birdwell v. Avalonbay Communities, Inc., No. 4:21-cv-00864 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2023).
    Hence, by requiring that Birdwell 11 pay rent based on the two-bedroom unit rate, AvalonBay is imposing a fee “with unequal impact, 12 imposed in return for permission to engage in conduct that, under the FHAA, a landlord is 13 required to…
  • Richard McGary v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d 1259 (9th Cir. 2004).published 7 cites
    Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 , 93 S.Ct. 364 , 34 L.Ed.2d 415 (1972)); see also Gilligan, 108 F.3d at 249; Mobile Home I, 29 F.3d at 1416.
  • Giebeler v. M & B Assocs., 343 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2003).published 2 cites
    See, e.g., Mobile Home I, 29 F.3d at 1417; City of Edmonds v. Wash. State Bldg.Code Council, 18 F.3d 802 , 806 (9th Cir.1994) (“Reasonable accommodation is borrowed from the caselaw interpreting the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.”), aff'd Cit…
  • Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden Apts., 136 F.3d 293 (2d Cir. 1998).published 2 cites
    See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (f)(3); see also United States v. California Mobile Home Park Management Co., 29 F.3d 1413, 1417 (9th Cir.1994). 45 Congress could not have intended the FHAA to require reasonable accommodations for those with handicap…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
United States of America, and Elayne Cohen-Strong, Intervenor-Appellant
v.
California Mobile Home Park Management Co. And Brian Dougher, D/B/A Costa Mesa Mobile Estates
92-55568.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Jul 18, 1994.
Published opinion
29 F.3d 1413
94 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5467
1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 17367
1994 WL 370124

29 F.3d 1413

63 USLW 2056, 6 A.D.D. 175, 5 NDLR P 196

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff,
and
Elayne Cohen-Strong, Intervenor-Appellant,
v.
CALIFORNIA MOBILE HOME PARK MANAGEMENT CO.; and Brian
Dougher, d/b/a Costa Mesa Mobile Estates,
Defendants-Appellees.

Nos. 92-55568, 92-56026.

United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Oct. 7, 1993.
Decided July 18, 1994.

No appearance for plaintiff.

Paul M. Smith, John P. Relman, Klein, Farr, Smith & Taranto, Washington, DC, for intervenor-appellant.

La Verne J. Bugna, Newport Beach, CA, for defendants-appellees.

Elizabeth M. Brown, Shea & Gardner, Washington, DC, for amici curiae.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

Before: REINHARDT and T.G. NELSON, Circuit Judges, and KAUFMAN,[*] District Judge.

FRANK A. KAUFMAN, Senior District Judge:

Elayne Cohen-Strong, whose young daughter has a respiratory disease requiring the supervision of a home health care aide, appeals the district court's denial of her motion to intervene and dismissal of this action against the owner and manager of the mobile home lot where she and her daughter reside. Cohen-Strong alleges that the defendants discriminated in violation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 ("FHAA"), by refusing to waive guest fees charged for her handicapped daughter's home health care aide. The principal issue in this appeal is whether the duty imposed under the FHAA to make "reasonable accommodations in rules" on behalf of handicapped persons may require a landlord to waive, in a given instance, fees generally applicable to all residents. Concluding that generally applicable fees are not immune from scrutiny for compliance with the FHAA's requirement of reasonable accommodation, and that Cohen-Strong is statutorily entitled to intervene, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 1989, plaintiff Cohen-Strong, and her infant daughter, were residing at a mobile home lot leased from defendant Costa Mesa Mobile Estates. Cohen-Strong's daughter had a respiratory disease which required her to be cared for by a home health care aide. The Management Company of Costa Mesa Estates demanded payment from Cohen-Strong for the presence of the home medical aide pursuant to its policy of charging residents a fee of $1.50 per day for the presence of long-term guests and $25.00 per month for guest parking. Cohen-Strong asked the Management Company to waive imposition of the fees on behalf of her daughter; however, that request was refused. As a result, Cohen-Strong paid $175 for the 2 1/4 months for which fees were assessed.

On September 12, 1989, Cohen-Strong filed a housing discrimination complaint against defendants with the Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"). The Secretary of HUD investigated her complaint, determined that reasonable cause existed to believe defendants had engaged in discriminatory practices, and charged defendants with a violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 3604.

Cohen-Strong elected to have her case prosecuted on her behalf by the Department of Justice ("DOJ") in federal district court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 3612(a). The DOJ filed a complaint in the Central District of California alleging that defendants had violated the Fair Housing Act by failing to make reasonable accommodations in housing. On January 6, 1992, defendants moved to dismiss, alleging that the Fair Housing Act does not require landlords to waive fees applicable to other residents generally. The district court judge granted the defendants' motion on January 27, 1992, without a written or oral opinion.

Sixty days after the district judge issued the order of dismissal, Cohen-Strong learned that the United States would not be appealing her case. Acting pro se, she requested and received from the district court on April 3, 1992, an extension of time until April 27, 1992, to file a notice of appeal. On April 24, 1992, she timely filed a notice of appeal and also a motion to intervene with the district court. The notice of appeal was accepted on April 24; however, the hearing on the motion to intervene was set for May 18, 1992. On May 18, 1992, Cohen-Strong appeared before the District Court, but was advised that her motion to intervene was not on the court calendar for that day. On June 8, 1992, recently retained counsel for Cohen-Strong refiled the motion for leave to intervene in order to seek a new hearing date.

On June 16, 1992, this Court issued an Order to Show Cause why Cohen-Strong's appeal should not be dismissed for lack of standing given that she was not a party below. Then, on July 13, 1992, the district court denied without prejudice Cohen-Strong's motion to intervene on the grounds that the district court lacked jurisdiction to grant such relief while the case was on appeal to this court. Cohen-Strong subsequently filed a second notice of appeal in response to the July 13 order. Satisfied with Cohen-Strong's response to the Order to Show Cause, this court discharged the Order to Show Cause on August 3, 1992, and consolidated Cohen-Strong's appeal on the merits with her appeal from the district court's denial of intervention.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court reviews a district court's order of dismissal for failure to state a claim de novo. Sosa v. Hiraoka, 920 F.2d 1451, 1455 (9th Cir.1990). This court accepts "the allegations of the complaint as true and construe[s] them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Id.

The denial by a district court of a motion to intervene as of right is reviewed de novo, Scotts Valley Band of Pomo Indians of Sugar Bowl Rancheria v. United States, 921 F.2d 924, 926 (9th Cir.1990), as are the legal conclusions of a district court based on statutory construction, Earles v. United States, 935 F.2d 1028, 1030 (9th Cir.1991).MOTION TO INTERVENE

Cohen Strong's notice of appeal was accepted and lodged with this Court before the district court had ruled with regard to Cohen-Strong's motion to intervene. Thus, the question arises as to whether plaintiff's appeal on the merits is properly before us. The district court did not rule on the motion prior to accepting the notice of appeal. That inaction effectively constituted a denial of that motion. Under the Fair Housing Act, a plaintiff is entitled to intervene as of right and to substitute herself for the United States on appeal. United States v. Presidio Invs., Ltd., 4 F.3d 805, 808 n. 1 (9th Cir.1993). Because Cohen-Strong timely filed her notice of appeal after the motion for intervention was effectively denied, her appeal on the merits is properly before us.

MOTION TO DISMISS

In granting defendants' motion to dismiss, the district court presumably concluded that the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 3601 et seq., is never violated when a landlord refuses to waive generally applicable fees on behalf of a handicapped person. We disagree.

The FHA originally prohibited discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin. The Supreme Court has ruled that the FHA must be given a "generous construction" in order to carry out a " 'policy that Congress considered to be of the highest priority.' " Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211, 212, 93 S.Ct. 364, 367, 368, 34 L.Ed.2d 415 (1972); see also Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 380, 102 S.Ct. 1114, 1125, 71 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982); United States v. Gilbert, 813 F.2d 1523, 1526-27 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 860, 108 S.Ct. 173, 98 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987). The generous spirit with which we are to interpret the FHA guides our analysis here.

Congress extended the FHA's protection to handicapped persons in the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 ("FHAA"), Pub.L. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619. Among the discriminatory practices proscribed by the amended Act is the "refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford [a handicapped] person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling." 42 U.S.C. Sec. 3604(f)(3)(B). Cohen-Strong argues that a landlord's refusal to waive guest fees for a handicapped person's medical aide may constitute a refusal to make reasonable accommodations, in violation of Sec. 3604(f)(3)(B).

As the language of Sec. 3604(f)(3)(B) makes clear, the FHAA imposes an affirmative duty upon landlords reasonably to accommodate the needs of handicapped persons. See H.R.Rep. No. 100-711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 25 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2186. Defendants assert, nonetheless, that this affirmative duty does not entail any requirement that landlords "financially subsidize" the handicapped. We find the effort to distinguish accommodations that have a financial cost from other accommodations unconvincing. Besides the fact that Sec. 3604's reasonable accommodations requirement contains no exemption for financial costs to the landlord,[1] the history of the FHAA clearly establishes that Congress anticipated that landlords would have to shoulder certain costs involved, so long as they are not unduly burdensome.

Congress based the FHAA's reasonable accommodations provision on the "regulations and caselaw dealing with discrimination on the basis of handicap" under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 794, which prohibits discrimination against the handicapped in federally funded programs. See H.R.Rep. No. 100-711 at 25, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2186; see also id. at 17, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2178 (the FHAA "uses the same definitions and concepts" used in Sec. 504).[2] The Supreme Court has held that, under the Rehabilitation Act, a proposed accommodation should not impose "undue financial ... burdens" upon the accommodator, a rule that clearly contemplates some financial burden resulting from accommodation. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 412, 99 S.Ct. 2361, 2370, 60 L.Ed.2d 980 (1979); see also Nelson v. Thornburgh, 567 F.Supp. 369, 380-81 (E.D.Pa.1983) (requiring employer to expend its own funds to provide readers for blind employees pursuant to Rehabilitation Act), aff'd, 732 F.2d 146 (3d Cir.1984) (table), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1188, 105 S.Ct. 955, 83 L.Ed.2d 962 (1985). Therefore, in light of the legislative history of the FHAA and its incorporation of the Rehabilitation Act's standards regarding reasonable accommodations, we hold that Sec. 3604(f)(3)(B) may require landlords to assume reasonable financial burdens in accommodating handicapped residents.[3]

Although defendants argue that any fee which is generally applicable to all residents of a housing community cannot be discriminatory, the Act itself is concerned with facially neutral rules of all types. Congress recognized that "[a]nother method of making housing unavailable to people with disabilities has been the application or enforcement of otherwise neutral rules and regulations on health, safety and land-use in a manner which discriminates against people with disabilities.... These and similar practices would be prohibited." H.R.Rep. No. 100-711, at 24, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2185. See also United States v. Village of Marshall, Wis., 787 F.Supp. 872, 879 (W.D.Wis.1991) ("strict adherence to a rule which has the effect of precluding handicapped individuals from residing in the residence was precisely the type of conduct which the Fair Housing Amendment Act sought to overcome with the enactment of Sec. 3604(f)(3)(B)").

Finally, to exempt generally applicable fee rules from scrutiny under the FHAA would permit landlords to circumvent the Act's requirements simply by imposing fees for certain matters, rather than by imposing flat bans or other types of restrictive rules. For example, the regulations interpreting the FHAA provide that a landlord must waive a "no pets" rule for a blind tenant who requires a seeing-eye dog, and that a landlord must waive a "first come, first serve" rule for allocating parking spaces when a mobility-impaired tenant requires a parking space near her unit. 24 C.F.R. Sec. 100.204(b) (1993). Under defendants' interpretation of the FHAA, a landlord might "allow" the blind tenant to have a dog, or the mobility-impaired tenant to have priority for a parking space, while imposing a high fee for exercising that right. In some extreme cases, such a fee could effectively prevent the handicapped tenant from obtaining the needed benefit.

In order to trigger review under Sec. 3604(f)(3)(B), the challenged fee rule must, like the rules described above, have the potential to deny persons an "equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling" because of their handicap. There are, of course, many types of residential fees that affect handicapped and non-handicapped residents equally; such fees are clearly proper. Fees that merit closer scrutiny are those with unequal impact, imposed in return for permission to engage in conduct that, under the FHAA, a landlord is required to permit.

Some generally applicable fees might be too small to have any exclusionary effect. Other fees might be sustained because to require their waiver would extend a preference to handicapped residents, as opposed to affording them equal opportunity.[4] The waiver of others might impose an undue financial burden on the landlord. The reasonable accommodation inquiry is highly fact-specific, requiring case-by-case determination. See Edmonds, 18 F.3d at 806; Kimbro v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 889 F.2d 869, 877-78 (9th Cir.1989) (interpreting reasonable accommodation provision in state antidiscrimination statute), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 814, 111 S.Ct. 53, 112 L.Ed.2d 28 (1990); Chalk v. United States Dist. Court Cent. Dist., 840 F.2d 701, 705 (9th Cir.1988) (interpreting reasonable accommodation provision of Rehabilitation Act). In a case such as this one, a reviewing court should examine, among other things, the amount of fees imposed, the relationship between the amount of fees and the overall housing cost, the proportion of other tenants paying such fees, the importance of the fees to the landlord's overall revenues, and the importance of the fee waiver to the handicapped tenant.

In the present case, it is clear that the factual inquiry was prematurely terminated. Final judgment was granted solely on the pleadings: no evidence or testimony was heard on defendants' motion to dismiss and no discovery had yet been conducted. Cohen-Strong thus had no opportunity to develop a record to support her claim of discrimination. She therefore was unable to demonstrate that the fees involved had the effect of denying her an equal opportunity to use and enjoy her dwelling. It is axiomatic that "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); see also Jackson v. Southern Calif. Gas Co., 881 F.2d 638, 643 (9th Cir.1989) (same). Since we hold that a landlord's refusal to waive generally applicable fees may, under some circumstances, constitute discrimination on the basis of handicap, Cohen-Strong must be afforded the opportunity to develop a full record in support of her claim.

We are not presently deciding that the fees in this case were improperly assessed. We hold only that such charges must be examined on a case-by-case basis to determine whether, in a given case, a waiver of the charge, in whole or at least in part, "may be necessary to afford [a handicapped] person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling," 42 U.S.C. Sec. 3604(f)(3)(B), and whether such waiver would impose an undue burden on the landlord. Therefore, we reverse and remand to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

* [*~1413–1415]

Honorable Frank A. Kaufman, United States District Judge for the District of Maryland, sitting by designation

1

Cf. City of Edmonds v. Washington State Bldg. Code Council, 18 F.3d 802 (9th Cir.1994), (refusing to recognize exemption from reasonable accommodations requirement for zoning ordinance, emphasizing that such an exemption not evident from plain language of FHAA)

To support an exemption for financial accommodations, defendants point to Sec. 3604(f)(3)(A), which requires landlords to permit "reasonable modifications of existing premises" as long as the handicapped resident pays the cost of such modifications. However, it is notable that, in contrast to Sec. 3604(f)(3)(A), the reasonable accommodations requirement described in Sec. 3604(f)(3)(B) does not specify that the handicapped resident should bear any financial burden imposed.

2 [*~1414–1416]

The regulations implementing Sec. 504 describe the reasonable accommodation requirement which Congress expressly included as part of the statutory language of the FHAA. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. Sec. 84.12(a) (1992) (Department of Health and Human Services regulations implementing Sec. 504): "A recipient [of federal funds] shall make reasonable accommodation to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified handicapped applicant...."

3 [*~1415–1417]

We note that, although the FHAA was enacted relatively recently, the courts that to date have interpreted its "reasonable accommodations" language have all applied the "undue financial burden" standard developed under the Rehabilitation Act. See Oxford House, Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F.Supp. 450, 461 (D.N.J.1992); United States v. City of Taylor, 798 F.Supp. 442, 447 (E.D.Mich.1992); Oxford House-Evergreen v. City of Plainfield, 769 F.Supp. 1329, 1344-45 (D.N.J.1991)

4 [*~1416–1418]

For example, the landlord of an apartment complex may charge all residents a monthly fee for parking their car. Although a handicapped resident may require a car far more than other residents, a waiver of the car fee would put him in a privileged position in relation to other residents

[*~1417–1418]

Here, while we remand for further inquiry into the merits of the present fee, it seems likely that few other residents would have a "guest" requiring an extra parking space every day. It is thus much less probable that waiver of guest fees would give Cohen-Strong an advantage over other residents.