83 Pennsylvania opinions name it 5 courts 1943–2025 16 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Milby, L. v. Pote, C. v. Southern Christriangreen2 sentences2023We repeat that we will not act as counsel and develop arguments on Father’s behalf, “nor shall we scour the record to find evidence to support an argument[.]” Milby v. Pote, 189 A.3d 1065, 1079 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted). 2023Essentially, Father presents a blanket claim that the trial court chose to “reward” Mother.17 We repeat that we will not act as counsel and develop arguments on Father’s behalf, “nor shall we scour the record to find evidence to support an argument[.]” Milby v. Pote, 189 A.3d 1065, 1079 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted). | 3 | 3 |
Vandergrift Estategreen2 sentences1980We note that it is well-settled in Pennsylvania that “Where a fiduciary acts upon the advice of counsel, such fact is ‘a factor to be considered in determining good faith, but it is not a blanket of immunity in all circumstances’.” Lohm Estate, 440 Pa. 268, 275 , 269 A.2d 451 (1970), quoting Vandergrift Estate, 406 Pa. 14, 37, n. 14 , 177 A.2d 432, 433, n. 14 (1962). 1980We note that it is well-settled in Pennsylvania that “Where a fiduciary acts upon the advice of counsel, such fact is ‘a factor to be considered in determining good faith, but it is not a blanket of immunity in all circumstances’.” Lohm Estate, 440 Pa. 268, 275 , 269 A.2d 451 (1970), quoting Vandergrift Estate, 406 Pa. 14, 37, n. 14 , 177 A.2d 432, 433, n. 14 (1962). | 3 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. Mouzongreen2 sentences2025Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 812 A.2d 617, 620 (Pa. 2002). 2021Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 812 A2d 617, 620 (Pa. 2002), A blanket claim of excessiveness, with no further allegations, does not create a substantial question. | 2 | 5 |
Deeds Ex Rel. Renzulli v. University of Pennsylvania Medical Centergreen2 sentences2021Ctr., 110 A.3d 1009, 1012 (Pa. Super. 2015), appeal dismissed, 128 A.3d 764 (Pa. 2015), wherein this Court ordered a new trial, based on a violation of the collateral source rule, even though the jury found the defendant not liable. 2021Ctr., 110 A.3d 1009, 1012 (Pa. Super. 2015), appeal dismissed, 128 A.3d 764 (Pa. 2015), wherein this Court ordered a new trial, based on a violation of the collateral source rule, even though the jury found the defendant not liable. | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Raineygreen2 sentences2019Commonwealth v. Rainey, 928 A.2d 215, 227 (Pa. 2007) followed the United States Supreme Court in rejecting the theory of contextual implication as a blanket rule. 2017Moreover, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected a “contextual implication theory”—that is, the linkage between the redacted statement and other evidence to implicate a specific defendant—“as a blanket rule.” Commonwealth v. Rainey, 928 A.2d 215, 227 (Pa. 2007). | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Tielschgreen2 sentences2017A blanket privilege generally is not permitted.” Commonwealth v. Treat, 848 A.2d 147, 148 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citing Commonwealth v. Tielsch, 789 A.2d 216, 217 (Pa.Super. 2001)). 2004See Commonwealth v. Tielsch, 789 A.2d 216, 217 (Pa.Super.2001) (“[I]f questions are posed on cross-examination concerning matters for which Appellant can assert his Fifth Amendment privilege, he can do so at that time.”). | 2 | 2 |
Mayle v. Pennsylvania Department of Highwaysgreen2 sentences1986See Mayle v. Pennsylvania Department of Highways, 479 Pa. 384 , 388 A.2d 709 (1978). 1986See Mayle v. Pennsylvania Department of Highways, 479 Pa. 384 , 388 A.2d 709 (1978). | 2 | 2 |
Lohm Estategreen2 sentences2018Our Supreme Court has recognized that "[w]here a fiduciary acts upon the advice of counsel, such fact is 'a factor to be considered in determining good faith, but is not a blanket of immunity in all circumstances.' " In re Lohm's Estate , 440 Pa. 268 , 269 A.2d 451 , 455 (1970). 2018Our Supreme Court has recognized that "[w]here a fiduciary acts upon the advice of counsel, such fact is 'a factor to be considered in determining good faith, but is not a blanket of immunity in all circumstances.' " In re Lohm's Estate , 440 Pa. 268 , 269 A.2d 451 , 455 (1970). | 1 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. Smithgreen2 sentences2024Id 25 Moreover, within this Commonwealth, the "imposition of a sentence is vested in the discretion of the sentencing court and will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of discretion." Commonwealth v. v. Smith, 543 Pa. 566 , 673 A.2d 893, 895 (1996). 2024Id 25 Moreover, within this Commonwealth, the "imposition of a sentence is vested in the discretion of the sentencing court and will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of discretion." Commonwealth v. v. Smith, 543 Pa. 566 , 673 A.2d 893, 895 (1996). | 1 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Whartongreen2 sentences2019In doing so, the Rainey Court illustrated a standard for how "contextual implication" should be evaluated in a joint trial. 'This danger merely requires the trial court, and the reviewing court, to balance the interests, i.e., the potential prejudice to the defendant versus the probative value of the evidence, the possibility of minimizing the prejudice, and the benefits to the criminal justice system of conducting joint trials." Id. at 227-228 (quoting Corrunonwealth v. Wharton, 607 A.2d 710, 717 (Pa. 1992)). 2007Wharton, 607 A.2d at 717 ; Commonwealth v. Chestnut, 511 Pa. 169 , 512 A.2d 603 (1986). | 1 | 2 |
Missouri v. McNeelygreen2 sentences2016In Missouri v. McNeely , --- U.S. ----, 133 S.Ct. 1552 , 1563, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013), the Court held that the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement cannot serve as a blanket exception in all drunk driving cases. 2016In Missouri v. McNeely , --- U.S. ----, 133 S.Ct. 1552 , 1563, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013), the Court held that the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement cannot serve as a blanket exception in all drunk driving cases. | 1 | 2 |
Kohler Estategreen2 sentences1975“The trustee was fully justified under the situation here existing in acting upon [counsel’s] advice not to bring suit . . . .” Wanamaker Trust Estate, 340 Pa. 419, 422 , 17 A.2d 380, 381 (1941); see Mintz Estate, supra; Kohler Estate, 348 Pa. 55, 57-58 , 33 A.2d 920, 922 (1943); Stirling Estate, 342 Pa. 497, 503-04 , 21 A.2d 72, 75 (1941); Dempster Estate, 308 Pa. 153, 158 , 162 A. 447, 448 (1932); see generally 3 A. W. 1975“The trustee was fully justified under the situation here existing in acting upon [counsel’s] advice not to bring suit . . . .” Wanamaker Trust Estate, 340 Pa. 419, 422 , 17 A.2d 380, 381 (1941); see Mintz Estate, supra; Kohler Estate, 348 Pa. 55, 57-58 , 33 A.2d 920, 922 (1943); Stirling Estate, 342 Pa. 497, 503-04 , 21 A.2d 72, 75 (1941); Dempster Estate, 308 Pa. 153, 158 , 162 A. 447, 448 (1932); see generally 3 A. W. | 1 | 2 |
Borden Trustgreen2 sentences1962To this the trustee replied that questions of distribution had arisen which must be submitted for court determination and that, under 'the circumstances, the trustee considered it necessary to liquidate the investments and that the trustee was “now proceeding with such liquidation.” Where a fiduciary acts upon the advice of counsel, such fact is “a factor to be considered in determining good faith, but is not a blanket of immunity in all circumstances”: Borden Trust, 358 Pa. 138, 143 , 56 A. 2d 108 ; Corr Estate, 358 Pa. 591, 600 , 58 A. 2d 847 . 1962To this the trustee replied that questions of distribution had arisen which must be submitted for court determination and that, under 'the circumstances, the trustee considered it necessary to liquidate the investments and that the trustee was “now proceeding with such liquidation.” Where a fiduciary acts upon the advice of counsel, such fact is “a factor to be considered in determining good faith, but is not a blanket of immunity in all circumstances”: Borden Trust, 358 Pa. 138, 143 , 56 A. 2d 108 ; Corr Estate, 358 Pa. 591, 600 , 58 A. 2d 847 . | 1 | 2 |
McNair's Petitiongreen2 sentences1953“A grand jury’s investigation cannot be a blanket inquiry to bring to light supposed grievances or wrongs for the purpose of criticizing an officer or a department of government, nor may it be instituted without direct knowledge or knowledge gained from trustworthy information that criminal conspiracy, systematic violations of the law or other criminal acts of a widespread nature prevail, . . .”: McNair’s Petition, supra, 324 Pa. 48, 61 , 187 A. 498, 504 . 1953“A grand jury’s investigation cannot be a blanket inquiry to bring to light supposed grievances or wrongs for the purpose of criticizing an officer or a department of government, nor may it be instituted without direct knowledge or knowledge gained from trustworthy information that criminal conspiracy, systematic violations of the law or other criminal acts of a widespread nature prevail, . . .”: McNair’s Petition, supra, 324 Pa. 48, 61 , 187 A. 498, 504 . | 1 | 2 |
Birchfield v. N. Dakota. William Robert Bernardgreen1 sentence2025And such suspensions would bear an obvious “real and substantial relation” to the Commonwealth’s undeniable interest in deterring drunk driving, see Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. 438, 465 (2016) (observing that states have a compelling interest in deterring drunk driving), and in removing drivers who have been convicted of DUI from the Commonwealth’s roadways for a period of time. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Griffithgreen2 sentences2024In Commonwealth v. Griffith, 32 A.3d 1231 (Pa. 2011), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected a blanket rule that the Commonwealth introduce expert testimony to establish drug impairment. 2024In Commonwealth v. Griffith, 32 A.3d 1231 (Pa. 2011), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected a blanket rule that the Commonwealth introduce expert testimony to establish drug impairment. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Perrygreen2 sentences2022See supra n.2; see also Perry, 128 A.3d at 1290 n.3. - 13 - J-A01045-22 new trial because the jury had access to unmarked evidence during its deliberations. 2022While this Court’s decision in Perry did not establish a blanket rule requiring a PCRA petitioner to call counsel whose effectiveness is being challenged, we did find that without Appellate Counsel’s testimony, the PCRA court was unable to determine whether counsel had a reasonable basis for her actions, which was fatal to Perry’s ineffectiveness claim.11 See Perry, 128 A.3d at 1290 (“Instantly, Perry failed to demonstrate that appellate counsel lacked a reasonable basis for failing to assert on appeal that Perry was entitled to a ____________________________________________ 11 Because this Co | 1 | 1 |
McCalla v. Muragreen1 sentence2021Finn v. City of Philadelphia, 664 A.2d 1342, 1344 (Pa. 1995) (“[T]his court has held that the two statutes dealing with governmental and sovereign immunities, viz., the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act and the Sovereign Immunity Act, are to be interpreted consistently, as they deal with indistinguishable subject matter.”), citing, inter alia, Kiley by Kiley v. City of Philadelphia, 645 A.2d 184, 186 (Pa. 1994), Snyder v. Harmon, 562 A.2d 307 , 312 n.7 (Pa. 1989); see also McCalla v. Mura, 649 A.2d 646, 648-49 (Pa. 1994) (analogizing the Court’s interpretation of Sovereign Immunity Act Sub | 1 | 1 |
KILEY BY KILEY v. City of Philadelphiagreen1 sentence2021Finn v. City of Philadelphia, 664 A.2d 1342, 1344 (Pa. 1995) (“[T]his court has held that the two statutes dealing with governmental and sovereign immunities, viz., the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act and the Sovereign Immunity Act, are to be interpreted consistently, as they deal with indistinguishable subject matter.”), citing, inter alia, Kiley by Kiley v. City of Philadelphia, 645 A.2d 184, 186 (Pa. 1994), Snyder v. Harmon, 562 A.2d 307 , 312 n.7 (Pa. 1989); see also McCalla v. Mura, 649 A.2d 646, 648-49 (Pa. 1994) (analogizing the Court’s interpretation of Sovereign Immunity Act Sub | 1 | 1 |
Finn v. City of Philadelphiagreen1 sentence2021Finn v. City of Philadelphia, 664 A.2d 1342, 1344 (Pa. 1995) (“[T]his court has held that the two statutes dealing with governmental and sovereign immunities, viz., the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act and the Sovereign Immunity Act, are to be interpreted consistently, as they deal with indistinguishable subject matter.”), citing, inter alia, Kiley by Kiley v. City of Philadelphia, 645 A.2d 184, 186 (Pa. 1994), Snyder v. Harmon, 562 A.2d 307 , 312 n.7 (Pa. 1989); see also McCalla v. Mura, 649 A.2d 646, 648-49 (Pa. 1994) (analogizing the Court’s interpretation of Sovereign Immunity Act Sub | 1 | 1 |
| Gocial v. Independence Blue Crossgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Treatgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Flonnory v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Runyangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Welchgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Tillerygreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Jonesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bargas v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Womer v. Hillikergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Thomasgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Ablesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Schenck v. TOWNSHIP OF CENTERgreen | 1 | 1 |
| American States Insurance v. State Auto Insurancegreen | 1 | 1 |
| In the Matter of Witnesses Before the Special March 1980 Grand Jury. Appeal of United States of Americagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Britamco Underwriters, Inc. v. Stokesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ohio v. Johnsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Szuchongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brogan v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bucks County Water & Sewer v. Rawlingsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Henkel Corp. v. Polyglass USA, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Chestnut
green
2 sentences2001In Commonwealth v. Chestnut, 511 Pa. 169 , 512 A.2d 603 (1986), a case pre-dating Richardson , we reaffirmed this holding and explicitly rejected a blanket rule that would prohibit the introduction of redacted confessions that implicate the defendant by contextual implication, explaining that such a rule would have “the likely effect of making all statements by a co-defendant inadmissible, regardless of whether they could be properly redacted.” Id. at 174, 512 A.2d at 605 . 2001In Commonwealth v. Chestnut, 511 Pa. 169 , 512 A.2d 603 (1986), a case pre-dating Richardson , we reaffirmed this holding and explicitly rejected a blanket rule that would prohibit the introduction of redacted confessions that implicate the defendant by contextual implication, explaining that such a rule would have “the likely effect of making all statements by a co-defendant inadmissible, regardless of whether they could be properly redacted.” Id. at 174, 512 A.2d at 605 . | 4 | 1992–2007 |
Valentine v. Acme Markets, Inc.
green
2 sentences2021BMT also relies on Valentine v. ACME Markets, 687 A.2d 1157 (Pa. Super. 1997), in which the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of the slip-and-fall plaintiff’s prior and subsequent falls. 2021BMT also relies on Valentine v. ACME Markets, 687 A.2d 1157 (Pa. Super. 1997), in which the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of the slip-and-fall plaintiff’s prior and subsequent falls. | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Deeds ex rel. Renzulli v. University of Pennsylvania Medical Center
green
2 sentences2021Ctr., 110 A.3d 1009, 1012 (Pa. Super. 2015), appeal dismissed, 128 A.3d 764 (Pa. 2015), wherein this Court ordered a new trial, based on a violation of the collateral source rule, even though the jury found the defendant not liable. 2021Ctr., 110 A.3d 1009, 1012 (Pa. Super. 2015), appeal dismissed, 128 A.3d 764 (Pa. 2015), wherein this Court ordered a new trial, based on a violation of the collateral source rule, even though the jury found the defendant not liable. | 2 | 2021–2021 |
United States v. DiFrancesco
green
2 sentences1994In United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 , 101 S.Ct. 426 , 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980), the Supreme Court held that Lange did not state a blanket rule that the trial judge could never increase a sentence if the defendant had begun to serve that sentence. 1994In United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 , 101 S.Ct. 426 , 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980), the Supreme Court held that Lange did not state a blanket rule that the trial judge could never increase a sentence if the defendant had begun to serve that sentence. | 2 | 1988–1994 |
Commonwealth v. Manley
green
2 sentences1981In Commonwealth v. Manley, 491 Pa. 461 , 421 A.2d 636 (1980), the Supreme Court concluded that the defendant “did not intend a blanket waiver of his Rule 1100 Rights” when he signed a statement that I hereby certify that on [December 9, 1974], Hon[orable] Alex Bonavitacola orders case continued] to January 27, 1975 [in] Room 625. 1981In Commonwealth v. Manley, 491 Pa. 461 , 421 A.2d 636 (1980), the Supreme Court concluded that the defendant “did not intend a blanket waiver of his Rule 1100 Rights” when he signed a statement that I hereby certify that on [December 9, 1974], Hon[orable] Alex Bonavitacola orders case continued] to January 27, 1975 [in] Room 625. | 2 | 1981–1981 |
Corr Estate
green
2 sentences1962To this the trustee replied that questions of distribution had arisen which must be submitted for court determination and that, under 'the circumstances, the trustee considered it necessary to liquidate the investments and that the trustee was “now proceeding with such liquidation.” Where a fiduciary acts upon the advice of counsel, such fact is “a factor to be considered in determining good faith, but is not a blanket of immunity in all circumstances”: Borden Trust, 358 Pa. 138, 143 , 56 A. 2d 108 ; Corr Estate, 358 Pa. 591, 600 , 58 A. 2d 847 . 1962To this the trustee replied that questions of distribution had arisen which must be submitted for court determination and that, under 'the circumstances, the trustee considered it necessary to liquidate the investments and that the trustee was “now proceeding with such liquidation.” Where a fiduciary acts upon the advice of counsel, such fact is “a factor to be considered in determining good faith, but is not a blanket of immunity in all circumstances”: Borden Trust, 358 Pa. 138, 143 , 56 A. 2d 108 ; Corr Estate, 358 Pa. 591, 600 , 58 A. 2d 847 . | 2 | 1962–1971 |
Samia v. United States
green
1 sentence2024He asserts it was “overwhelmingly obvious” that he was “the other guy” referred to in Smith’s statement. ____________________________________________ 3 In declining to expand the narrow limits of Bruton, the Samia Court declared that such an expansion would work “an unnecessary and imprudent change in law” and would require “extensive pretrial hearings to determine whether the jury could infer from the Government’s case in its entirety that that the defendant has been named in an altered confession.” See id. at 654 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
McFarland v. Commonwealth
neutral
1 sentence2021Welfare, 551 A.2d 364 , 367 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988), appeal denied, 574 A.2d 74 (Pa. 1989) (DHS’s refusal to renew certificate of compliance need not be supported by finding that day care provider willfully violated regulation). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Snyder v. Harmon
green
1 sentence2021Finn v. City of Philadelphia, 664 A.2d 1342, 1344 (Pa. 1995) (“[T]his court has held that the two statutes dealing with governmental and sovereign immunities, viz., the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act and the Sovereign Immunity Act, are to be interpreted consistently, as they deal with indistinguishable subject matter.”), citing, inter alia, Kiley by Kiley v. City of Philadelphia, 645 A.2d 184, 186 (Pa. 1994), Snyder v. Harmon, 562 A.2d 307 , 312 n.7 (Pa. 1989); see also McCalla v. Mura, 649 A.2d 646, 648-49 (Pa. 1994) (analogizing the Court’s interpretation of Sovereign Immunity Act Sub | 1 | 2021–2021 |
McEwing v. Lititz Mutual Insurance
green
1 sentence2021Co., 77 A.3d 639 , 648 n.7 (Pa. Super. 2013). - 35 - J-A06024-20 Having concluded that Appellants through their pleadings invoked the affirmative defense of reliance on advice of counsel, we now address Appellants’ last claim: whether the trial court erred in finding a blanket privilege waiver and ordering the wholesale production of documents that otherwise would be privileged.14 3. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Katz v. St. Mary Hospital green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State Employees' Retirement System v. Fultz green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Martinez v. Ryan green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Alleyne v. United States green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Montgomery v. Louisiana green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Buck v. Davis green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Commonwealth v. Beachey green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Commonwealth v. Koehler green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Com. v. Kinard green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Commonwealth v. Grant green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Levy v. Senate of Pennsylvania green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| United States v. Gennaro J. Orrico green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Jeffers v. United States green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Commonwealth v. Nernberg green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Herbert v. Lando green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| In Re: Continental Airlines green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Fish v. Behers green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Pia v. Perrotti green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Richards v. Wisconsin green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| United States v. California Mobile Home Park Management Co. green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Commonwealth v. Rawls green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Lachapelle v. Goffstown green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.