Ohio v. Clark
Statements are nontestimonial if the primary purpose of the conversation is to address an ongoing emergency rather than to create an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.
After a preschool teacher discovered physical injuries on a three-year-old student, the child identified his caregiver as the abuser. The prosecution sought to introduce the child's spontaneous statements at trial, despite the child being unavailable for cross-examination. The court must determine if such statements are testimonial under the Sixth Amendment. Applying the primary purpose test, the court holds that statements are nontestimonial if the primary purpose of the conversation is to address an ongoing emergency rather than to create an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony. Because the teachers' questioning was aimed at protecting the child from immediate harm, the statements were not testimonial and were admissible.
At page 2180Reaffirming the primary purpose test for testimonial statements197 citing cases“in the end, the question is whether, in light of all the circumstances, viewed objectively, the 'primary purpose' of the conversation was to 'create an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.”
- Larr, No. 2:24-cv-01730 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 27, 2026). See Clark, 576 U.S. at 248 (“Statements by very young children will rarely, if ever, implicate the Confrontation Clause.”); id. at 248-49 (suggesting that, even if testimonial, such statements would likely be found admissible despite the C…
- Tommy Gene Jones v. Christopher Moody, No. 4:24-cv-00599 (D. Ariz. Oct. 3, 2025).(a statement cannot fall within the Confrontation Clause 15 unless its primary purpose was testimonial.)
- Johnny Manuel Delgadillo v. State of Texas, No. 01-23-00871-CR (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 19, 2025).unpublished Clark, 576 U.S. at 246 (“Because at least some statements to individuals who are not law enforcement officers could conceivably raise confrontation concerns, we decline to adopt a categorial rule excluding them from the Sixth Amendment’s r…
- Johnny Manuel Delgadillo v. State of Texas, No. 01-23-00872-CR (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 19, 2025).unpublished Clark, 576 U.S. at 246 (“Because at least some statements to individuals who are not law enforcement officers could conceivably raise confrontation concerns, we decline to adopt a categorial rule excluding them from the Sixth Amendment’s r…
- Gary Franz Devaughn v. State of Texas, No. 04-22-00467-CR (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 13, 2024).unpublished (A ‘formal station-house interrogation,’ like the questioning in Crawford, is more likely to provoke testimonial statements, while less formal questioning is less likely to reflect a primary purpose aimed at obtaining t…)
- People v. Cook, No. A161600 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2022).unpublished(A ‘formal station-house interrogation’ . . . is more likely to provoke testimonial statements, while less formal questioning is less likely to reflect a primary purpose aimed at obtaining testimonial evidence against t…)
- Haggard, James Ray, No. PD-0635-19 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 9, 2020).published Clark, 576 U.S. at 246 (“We have recognized that the Confrontation Clause does not prohibit the introduction of out-of-court statements that would have been admissible in a criminal case at the time of the founding.”) (citing Giles v. Cali…
- State v. Carter, 2017-Ohio-7501, 96 N.E.3d 1046.published(a statement cannot fall within the Confrontation Clause unless its primary purpose was testimonial)
- State v. Graddick, No. 2017-UP-201 (S.C. Ct. App. May 17, 2017).unpublished([A] statement cannot fall within the [protections of] the Confrontation Clause unless its primary purpose was testimonial.)
- State v. Lucas, 2024-Ohio-842, 240 N.E.3d 843.published “a formal station-house interrogation is more likely to provoke testimonial statements, while less formal questioning is less likely to reflect a primary purpose aimed at obtaining testimonial evidence against the accuse…”
Show 176 more citing cases
- State v. Tsosie, 516 P.3d 1116 (N.M. 2022).published “Statements made to someone who is not principally charged with uncovering and prosecuting criminal behavior are significantly less likely to be testimonial than statements given to law enforcement officers.” Id. (“It is common sense that…
- State v. Tsosie (N.M. 2022).unpublished “Statements made to someone who is not principally charged 3 with uncovering and prosecuting criminal behavior are significantly less likely to be 4 testimonial than statements given to law enforcement officers.” Id. (“It is common 5 sense…
- State v. Ford, 2021-Ohio-3058.published “a formal station-house interrogation is more likely to provoke testimonial statements, while less formal questioning is less likely to reflect a primary purpose aimed at obtaining testimonial evidence against the accuse…”
- Kevin Cody v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 812 S.E.2d 466 (Va. Ct. App. 2018).published “the existence vel non of an ongoing emergency is not the touchstone of the testimonial inquiry.”
- Duhs v. Capra, 180 F. Supp. 3d 205 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).published “a statement cannot fall within the confrontation clause unless its primary purpose was testimonial.”
- Brooke Mallett v. State of Mississippi, No. 2024-KA-01091-COA (Miss. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2026).publishedIn our determination of whether the statements at issue are testimonial or non- testimonial, we are guided by the words of the United States Supreme Court in Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237, 245-46 (2015): In the end, the question is whether,…
- Laquandra Erica Ross v. Commonwealth of Virginia, No. 1262252 (Va. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2026).unpublishedOn the other hand, in Cody, the Court held that the 911 call—made from the local sheriff’s office after a domestic abuse incident—was nontestimonial because the victim’s “statements to the emergency dispatcher were not made ‘with a primary…
- State Of Washington v. Gregory Lee Bonds, No. 73967-1 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2015).unpublished
- In the Interest of J.C., Minor Child J.C., Minor Child, 877 N.W.2d 447 (Iowa 2016).published
- Schmidt v. State, 2017 WY 101, 401 P.3d 868.published
- People v. McFee, 2016 COA 97, 412 P.3d 848.published
- State v. Rozerick E. Mattox, 2017 WI 9, 890 N.W.2d 256.published
- State v. Rafeh, 393 P.3d 1155 (Or. 2017).published
- State v. Scanlan, 445 P.3d 960 (Wash. 2019).published
- Ricky Lee Murray v. State, 597 S.W.3d 964 (Tex. App.—Austin 2020).published
- Ramirez, Antonio v. Tegels, Lizzie, No. 3:14-cv-00802 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 26, 2019).
- Gary Lee Avant v. State, 499 S.W.3d 123 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016).published
- State Of Washington v. Theresa Scanlan, 413 P.3d 82 (Wash. Ct. App. 2018).published
- State of Iowa v. Anthony Dwayne Jackson Pace, No. 16-1785 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2018).published
- State v. Burke, 431 P.3d 1109 (Wash. Ct. App. 2018).published
- People of Michigan v. Jacob Paul-Anthony Barnes, No. 339431 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2019).unpublished
- People of Michigan v. Dennis Ray Farmer Jr, No. 345496 (Mich. Ct. App. June 11, 2020).unpublished
- Cole v. Lawrence, No. 3:17-cv-00450 (S.D. Ill. May 6, 2020).
- State v. Raymond L. Nieves, 2017 WI 69, 897 N.W.2d 363.published
- Com. v. Thompson, T., No. 3714 EDA 2016 (Pa. Super. Ct. May 21, 2018).unpublished
- United States v. Perkins, No. 201600166 (N.M.C.C.A. July 28, 2016).published
- State v. Parsons, 543 P.3d 465 (Idaho 2024).published
- Thompson v. State, 2019 OK CR 3, 438 P.3d 373.published
- State v. R. Staudenmayer, 2023 MT 3, 523 P.3d 29.published
- State of Iowa v. Vester Matthew Rawlins, No. 22-1259 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2023).published
- Dilliraj Bista v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 891 S.E.2d 711 (Va. Ct. App. 2023).published
- Julio C. Riveron v. State of Texas, No. 04-22-00310-CR (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 10, 2024).unpublished
- Johnson v. Griffin, No. 1:13-cv-04337 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2022).
- Eric Laranze Taylor v. State of Texas, No. 04-23-00091-CR (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 14, 2024).unpublished
- State v. B. Hillious, 2025 MT 53, 565 P.3d 1218.published
- People v. Yohn, 2026 IL App (4th) 250326-U.unpublished
- Quartrez Logan v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 845 S.E.2d 228 (Va. Ct. App. 2020).published
- David Lara v. Charles Callahan, No. 18-56680 (9th Cir. Nov. 30, 2020).unpublished
- State v. Spencer, 497 P.3d 1125 (Idaho 2021).published
- People of Guam v. Vincent Rodriguez Cepeda, 2021 Guam 9 (Guam 2021).published
- People v. Cid C. Franklin, 242 N.E.3d 652 (N.Y. 2024).published
- State v. Thomas A. Nelson, 954 N.W.2d 11 (Wis. Ct. App. 2020).published
- State of Maine v. Ramel L. Sheppard, 2024 ME 84, 327 A.3d 1144.published
- People v. Vega, No. B334584 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 18, 2025).unpublished
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- State v. McNair, 2015-Ohio-2980.published
- Com. v. Fields, R., No. 2410 EDA 2014 (Pa. Super. Ct. Oct. 6, 2015).unpublished
- State v. Knecht, 2015-Ohio-4316.published
- Com. v. Peay, J, No. 495 EDA 2013 (Pa. Super. Ct. Oct. 22, 2015).unpublished
- Dee Ward v. State of Indiana, 50 N.E.3d 752 (Ind. 2016).published
- United States v. Brandon Barker, 820 F.3d 167 (5th Cir. 2016).published
- People of Michigan v. Jequis Tina-Dominique Mayes, No. 325454 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2016).unpublished
- United States v. Amaya, 828 F.3d 518 (7th Cir. 2016).published
- State v. Miller, 2016-Ohio-4993.published
- Gary Dewayne Hill v. State, No. 05-15-00756-CR (Tex. App.—Dallas July 22, 2016).unpublished
- United States v. Chery Gonzalez, 658 F. App'x 867 (9th Cir. 2016).unpublished
- People v. Munoz-Salgado, 2016 IL App (2d) 140325.published
- Peter Mark Lee v. State, No. 04-16-00368-CR (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 2, 2017).unpublished
- Steve Kou v. State, No. 04-16-00346-CR (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 1, 2017).published
- Washington v. Griffin, 876 F.3d 395 (2d Cir. 2017).published
- Yancy D. Cook v. Steven R. Bayle, No. 16-1579-pr (2d Cir. Dec. 27, 2017).unpublished
- United States v. Tang Yuk, No. 15-131(L) (2d Cir. Mar. 15, 2018).published
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- United States v. Francisco Lopez, No. 16-1244 (3d Cir. July 24, 2018).unpublished
- State v. Weaver, 2018-Ohio-2998.published
- Lee Alden Mooney v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 817 S.E.2d 354 (Va. Ct. App. 2018).published
- Thompson v. Allbaugh, No. 17-6127 (10th Cir. Oct. 22, 2018).unpublished
- State of Iowa v. Toby Richards, No. 18-0522 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2019).published
- State v. Joseph B. Reinwand, 2019 WI 25, 924 N.W.2d 184.published
- People of Michigan v. James Anthony Webb, No. 340907 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2019).unpublished
- United States v. Laura Grande-Signore, No. 16-11425 (11th Cir. June 24, 2019).unpublished
- Derrick Cardosi v. State of Indiana, 128 N.E.3d 1277 (Ind. 2019).published
- State of New Jersey v. Eugene Lavergne, No. A-3210-14T2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 7, 2018).unpublished
- State of Iowa v. Michael James Sykes, 940 N.W.2d 790 (Iowa Ct. App. 2019).published
- Miguel Mendoza v. State, No. 08-17-00230-CR (Tex. App.—El Paso Nov. 25, 2019).published
- State v. O.A.B., 2020-Ohio-547.published
- Kyle L. Combs v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.), 144 N.E.3d 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020).published
- Commonwealth v. McGann, 484 Mass. 312 (2020).published
- Ex parte Danny Salcido, No. 08-19-00178-CR (Tex. App.—El Paso Apr. 14, 2020).published
- United States v. Joseph Benson, 957 F.3d 218 (4th Cir. 2020).published
- United States v. Baas, No. 19-0377/MC (C.A.A.F. May 29, 2020).published
- State v. Stuebe, 467 P.3d 252 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2020).published
- People v. Malott, No. C082691 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2020).unpublished
- People v. Mayberry, 2020 IL App (1st) 181806, 166 N.E.3d 278.published
- Raul Lopez v. State, 615 S.W.3d 238 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2020).published
- John Wayne Wisenbaker, III v. State, No. 08-19-00034-CR (Tex. App.—El Paso Nov. 23, 2020).published
- State v. Myers, 2020-Ohio-6792.published
- Brandon Lee Snead v. Commonwealth of Virginia, No. 0027203 (Va. Ct. App. May 4, 2021).unpublished
- Daniel Michael Athens v. State of Texas, No. 08-19-00195-CR (Tex. App.—El Paso July 30, 2021).published
- People v. Arna, 2022 IL App (1st) 200010-U.unpublished
- State v. Laird, 2019 MT 198, 447 P.3d 416.published
- State v. Roberts, No. 1 CA-CR 22-0028 (Ariz. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2022).unpublished
- United States v. Juan Rodriguez-Preciado, No. 22-4153 (4th Cir. Jan. 9, 2023).unpublished
- Victor Meraz v. Christian Pfeiffer, No. 18-55862 (9th Cir. Jan. 13, 2023).unpublished
- Keith Elwood Hargrove v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 886 S.E.2d 322 (Va. Ct. App. 2023).published
- State of Iowa v. Arthur Griffin, Jr., 995 N.W.2d 823 (Iowa Ct. App. 2023).published
- State v. Lea (N.M. Ct. App. 2023).unpublished
- Jeffrey Douglas Cheripka v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 891 S.E.2d 754 (Va. Ct. App. 2023).published
- Ruben Johnson, IV v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, No. 2022 SC 0185 (Ky. Dec. 13, 2023).
- United States v. Avila (Patterson), No. 22-933 (2d Cir. Feb. 5, 2024).unpublished
- People of Michigan v. Lester T Jennings-Bush, No. 362031 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2024).unpublished
- Dennis Roy Verdine v. State of Texas, No. 13-23-00201-CR (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Apr. 11, 2024).unpublished
- State v. Minor, 2024-Ohio-1465.published
- State v. L. Strommen, 2024 MT 87, 547 P.3d 1227.published
- Austin v. United States, 315 A.3d 580 (D.C. 2024).published
- Villa v. Matteson, No. 5:20-cv-05611 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2023).
- Bahr v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr. (Pinellas Cnty.), No. 8:18-cv-02847 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 24, 2022).
- Denson v. Sec'y, No. 3:20-cv-00890 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 25, 2023).
- Budd v. Florida Dep't of Corr., No. 9:22-cv-81441 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 3, 2023).
- Peterson v. Watson, No. 1:19-cv-06454 (N.D. Ill. June 18, 2021).
- Ingram v. United States, No. 3:15-cv-00553 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 28, 2019).
- Stahl v. Superintendent, No. 9:17-cv-01314 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2021).
- Johns v. Capozza, No. 2:20-cv-01055 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 12, 2021).
- Fowler v. Dir., TDCJ-CID, No. 4:21-cv-01192 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 21, 2022).
- People v. Torres, 2021 IL App (1st) 182125-U.unpublished
- Darwin Marquel Wells, Jr. v. State of Mississippi, 328 So. 3d 124 (Miss. Ct. App. 2020).published
- State v. Leach, 2024-Ohio-3145.published
- State v. Bryan L. Urquhart, No. 2020AP001589-CR (Wis. Ct. App. July 27, 2022).unpublished
- Kirkman v. Lumpkin, No. 4:21-cv-00903 (S.D. Tex. July 27, 2022).
- Rigney v. Cabell, No. 7:21-cv-00479 (W.D. Va. Dec. 5, 2022).
- Reinwand, Joseph v. Novak, Susan, No. 3:19-cv-00767 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 21, 2020).
- State v. Martin, 2024-Ohio-5332.published
- People v. Wallace, 2024 IL App (4th) 231330-U.unpublished
- People v. Ventura, No. F085596 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2024).unpublished
- State v. Wilcox, 2024-Ohio-5719, 265 N.E.3d 1153.published
- State v. L. Hogues, 2024 MT 304, 561 P.3d 1.published
- State v. H. Johnson, 2024 MT 306, 560 P.3d 1219.published
- Peo v. Zumaran, No. 23CA0903 (Colo. Ct. App. May 15, 2025).unpublished
- State of West Virginia v. Sherie Tichenell, No. 22-719 (W. Va. May 19, 2025).published
- State of WV v. Marty L. Browning, No. 22-710 (W. Va. May 19, 2025).published
- People v. Bryan, 239 A.D.3d 547 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 2025).published
- Peo v. Montoya, No. 23CA0629 (Colo. Ct. App. July 17, 2025).unpublished
- State v. Smith, 2024-Ohio-5745, 246 N.E.3d 492.published
- State v. Miguel Montero, 339 A.3d 1055 (R.I. 2025).published
- State v. Lea, 535 P.3d 754 (N.M. Ct. App. 2023).published
- People v. Bacon, 275 N.E.3d 1048 (N.Y. 2025).published
- State v. Hill, No. 1 CA-CR 21-0231 (Ariz. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 2025).unpublished
- Peo v. Mathews, No. 22CA1445 (Colo. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2025).unpublished
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- Cunningham, No. 5:24-cv-12415 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 3, 2026).
- Peo v. Smith, No. 23CA1797 (Colo. Ct. App. Apr. 2, 2026).unpublished
- State of West Virginia v. Victor Lee Thompson, 927 S.E.2d 885 (W. Va. 2026).published
- State of West Virginia v. Heath Allen Rose, No. 23-272 (W. Va. May 21, 2026).published
- State v. Andrews, 2026-Ohio-1861.published
- State v. Barnes, 2026-Ohio-2088.published
- United States v. Tarek Fakhuri, No. 25-1099 (6th Cir. June 12, 2026).published
- State v. Barker, 2026-Ohio-2633.published
- State v. Ivery, 2026-Ohio-2542.published
- Peo v. Lopez, No. 24CA1668 (Colo. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2026).unpublished
- State v. Vargas, 2015 S.D. 72, 869 N.W.2d 150.published
- State of New Jersey v. Deshaun P. Wilson, 121 A.3d 921 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015).published
- State v. Hinkston, 2015-Ohio-3851.published
- State v. McLaughlin, 786 S.E.2d 269 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016).published
- People v. Smith, 248 Cal. App. 4th 794 (Ct. App. 2016).published
- State v. Singleton, 2016-Ohio-4696.published
- State Of Washington v. Jason T. Garcia, No. 73740-6 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2016).unpublished
- State v. Spradlin, 2017-Ohio-630.published
- People v. Smith, 12 Cal. App. 5th 766 (Ct. App. 2017).published
- State v. A. Porter, 2018 MT 16, 410 P.3d 955.published
- State v. Dotson, 2018-Ohio-2481, 114 N.E.3d 390.published
- United States v. Wills, No. 2018-0117 (D.D.C. Dec. 21, 2018).published
- State Of Washington v. Ebrima Darboe, No. 77833-1 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2019).unpublished
- United States v. Diosme Fernandez Hano, 922 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2019).published
- State Of Washington v. Joseph Mackner Eldridge, No. 77071-3 (Wash. Ct. App. June 3, 2019).unpublished
- United States v. Daniel Mathis, 932 F.3d 242 (4th Cir. 2019).published
- People v. Calhoun, 38 Cal. App. 5th 275 (Ct. App. 2019).published
- United States v. William Miller, 982 F.3d 412 (6th Cir. 2020).published
- Marcelo Mailland v. State, No. 08-19-00063-CR (Tex. App.—El Paso Dec. 15, 2020).published
- United States v. Deleon, 287 F. Supp. 3d 1187 (D.N.M. 2018).published
- Elbert Franklin v. State of Texas, No. 02-21-00088-CR (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 25, 2022).unpublished
- State v. Parsons, No. 48833 (Idaho Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2022).published
- Ebokoskia v. State, No. 49248 (Idaho Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2023).unpublished
- People v. Jackson, No. G060744M (Cal. Ct. App. July 13, 2023).unpublished
- State v. J. Martinez, Jr., 2023 MT 251, 545 P.3d 652.published
- State v. Carter, 1 N.W.3d 674 (S.D. 2023).published
- State v. Brennan, 590 P.3d 383 (Kan. Ct. App. 2026).unpublished
At page 2179Prohibiting testimonial statements under the Confrontation Clause61 citing casesin Crawford, "we adopted a different approach
- Gary Franz Devaughn v. State of Texas, No. 04-22-00467-CR (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 13, 2024).unpublished Clark, 576 U.S. at 245 (“A ‘formal station-house interrogation,’ like the questioning in Crawford, is more likely to provoke testimonial statements, while less formal questioning is less likely to reflect a primary purpose aimed at obtaini…
- United States v. Baas, No. 201700318, 2019 CCA LEXIS 173 (N.M.C.C.A. Apr. 15, 2019).published See Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2182 (“Statements made to someone who is not principally charged with uncovering and prosecuting criminal behavior are significantly less likely to be testimonial than statements given to law enforcement officers.”…
- State v. Carmona, 2016-NMCA-050.published([O]ur decision in Crawford did not offer an exhaustive definition of ‘testimonial’ statements.)
- State v. Carmona, 2016-NMCA-050, 9 N.M. 707.published([O]ur decision in Crawford did not offer an exhaustive definition of ‘testimonial’ statements.)
- Thayer v. United States, No. 2:24-cv-01010 (D. Nev. Aug. 30, 2024).“witnesses,' under the confrontation clause, are those 'who bear 19 testimony.”
- State v. Tsosie, 516 P.3d 1116 (N.M. 2022).published “Statements made to someone who is not principally charged with uncovering and prosecuting criminal behavior are significantly less likely to be testimonial than statements given to law enforcement officers.” Id. (“It is common sense that…
- In the Interest of J.C., Minor Child J.C., Minor Child, 877 N.W.2d 447 (Iowa 2016).published
- State v. Rozerick E. Mattox, 2017 WI 9, 890 N.W.2d 256.published
- State v. Rafeh, 393 P.3d 1155 (Or. 2017).published
- United States v. Moya, No. 17-2043 (10th Cir. Sept. 21, 2018).unpublished
Show 49 more citing cases
- State of Iowa v. Anthony Dwayne Jackson Pace, No. 16-1785 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2018).published
- United States v. Perkins, No. 201600166 (N.M.C.C.A. July 28, 2016).published
- United States v. Anthony Bernard Carter, 158 F.4th 1319 (11th Cir. 2025).published
- Philip Wallace v. State of Arkansas, 2023 Ark. 7, 659 S.W.3d 267.published
- People v. Burnett, 2015 IL App (1st) 133610, 46 N.E.3d 1171.published
- People v. Burnett, 2015 IL App (1st) 133610.published
- State v. Person, 2016-Ohio-681.published
- State v. Hairston, 2016-Ohio-8495.published
- Richard Dorsey v. Brian Cook, 677 F. App'x 265 (6th Cir. 2017).unpublished
- People v. Cox, 2017 IL App (1st) 151536.published
- Albert Lucero v. Kim Holland, 902 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2018).published
- Thompson v. State, 2019 OK CR 3, 438 P.3d 373.published
- United States v. Ramon Alvear, 959 F.3d 185 (5th Cir. 2020).published
- v. Garcia, 2021 CO 7.published
- State v. Mark D. Jensen, 2021 WI 27, 957 N.W.2d 244.published
- Cano v. Williams, No. 21-1214 (10th Cir. Apr. 15, 2022).unpublished
- People v. Leonard, No. C090650 (Cal. Ct. App. June 8, 2022).unpublished
- State of Iowa v. Zackery Nelson Bassett, 989 N.W.2d 797 (Iowa Ct. App. 2022).published
- State v. R. Staudenmayer, 2023 MT 3, 523 P.3d 29.published
- State v. Oscar C. Thomas, 2023 WI 9, 985 N.W.2d 87.published
- State of Iowa v. Vester Matthew Rawlins, No. 22-1259 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2023).published
- Dilliraj Bista v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 891 S.E.2d 711 (Va. Ct. App. 2023).published
- Wilson v. Superintendent Capra, No. 20-4140, 2023 WL 7179268 (2d Cir. Nov. 1, 2023).unpublished
- Johnson v. Griffin, No. 22-2007 (2d Cir. Jan. 26, 2024).unpublished
- Julio C. Riveron v. State of Texas, No. 04-22-00310-CR (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 10, 2024).unpublished
- Com. v. Vo, T., No. 1026 MDA 2023 (Pa. Super. Ct. May 30, 2024).unpublished
- Drawn v. Nueschid, No. 3:19-cv-02150 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2019).
- Torrence v. Neuschmid, No. 3:19-cv-05214 (N.D. Cal. July 29, 2020).
- Williams v. Harris, No. 3:14-cv-00101 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2020).
- Hunt v. Hamilton, No. 1:18-cv-00478 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 2020).unpublished
- Carriere, Jr v. Medeiros, No. 1:15-cv-13496 (D. Mass. Sept. 5, 2018).
- Fulgiam v. Kenneway, No. 1:18-cv-12106 (D. Mass. Mar. 8, 2019).
- Johnson v. Griffin, No. 1:13-cv-04337 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2022).
- State v. Fordson, 555 P.3d 52 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2024).published
- Eric Laranze Taylor v. State of Texas, No. 04-23-00091-CR (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 14, 2024).unpublished
- State of Arizona v. Gabriela Aragon, 555 P.3d 571 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2024).published
- State v. Oscar C. Thomas, 2021 WI App 55, 963 N.W.2d 887.published
- Williams v. Fox, No. 5:18-cv-04859 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2020).
- Watts v. Dir., TDCJ-CID, No. 4:22-cv-02776 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 18, 2023).
- State v. Frasard, No. 1 CA-CR 24-0020 (Ariz. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2025).unpublished
- State v. B. Hillious, 2025 MT 53, 565 P.3d 1218.published
- Clary v. Thornell, No. 2:22-cv-00205 (D. Ariz. Mar. 31, 2025).
- Kennebrew v. State, 893 S.E.2d 96 (Ga. 2023).published
- State of Missouri v. Litel Gilmore, 719 S.W.3d 867 (Mo. Ct. App. 2025).published
- People v. Velasquez-Gomez, No. A170878 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2025).unpublished
- Gormley, No. 4:22-cv-04087 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 2026).
- State v. Norris, No. 1 CA-CR 25-0327 PRPC (Ariz. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2026).unpublished
- People v. Yohn, 2026 IL App (4th) 250326-U.unpublished
- State v. Z. Maas, 2026 MT 217.published
576 U.S. at 249Evaluating testimonial nature of statements to non-police persons62 citing casesStatements made to someone who is not principally charged with uncovering and prosecuting criminal behavior are significantly less likely to be testimonial than statements given to law enforcement officers.
- State v. Burke, 478 P.3d 1096 (Wash. 2021).published But see Clark, 576 U.S. at 246 (preschool teachers).
- Kyle Sample v. State of Texas, No. 01-22-00291-CR (Tex. App. Mar. 26, 2024).unpublished(Statements made to someone who is not principally charged with uncovering and prosecuting criminal behavior are significantly less likely to be testimonial than statements given to law enforcement officers.)
- Timothy Lee Barnum v. State of Texas, No. 05-21-00275-CR (Tex. App.—Dallas July 15, 2022).unpublished(Statements made to someone who is not principally charged with uncovering and prosecuting criminal behavior are significantly less likely to be testimonial than statements given to law enforcement officers.)
- Ernest Lewis Hall v. State of Texas, No. 01-20-00240-CR (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 8, 2022).unpublished(Statements made to someone who is not principally charged with uncovering and prosecuting criminal behavior are significantly less likely to be testimonial than statements given to law enforcement officers.)
- Peo v. Faudoa, No. 19CA0504 (Colo. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2021).(Statement s made to someone who is not principally charged with uncoverin g and prosecuting criminal behavior are significantly less likely to be testimonial than statements given to law enforceme nt officers.)
- United States v. Acosta, Diaz, 833 F. App'x 856 (2d Cir. 2020).unpublished(Statements made to someone who is not principally charged with uncovering and prosecuting criminal behavior are significantly less likely to be testimonial than statements given to law enforcement officers.)
- Avery B. Crawford v. State, 595 S.W.3d 792 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2019).publishedSee Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2182 (2015) (“Statements made to someone who is not principally charged with uncovering and prosecuting criminal behavior are significantly less likely to be testimonial than statements given to law enfo…
- Christopher Allen Davis v. State, No. 05-18-00272-CR (Tex. App.—Dallas July 24, 2019).published See Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2182 (2015) (“Statements made to someone who is not principally charged with uncovering and prosecuting criminal behavior are significantly less likely to be testimonial than statements given to law enfo…
- United States v. Baas, No. 201700318, 2019 CCA LEXIS 173 (N.M.C.C.A. Apr. 15, 2019).published See Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2182 (“Statements made to someone who is not principally charged with uncovering and prosecuting criminal behavior are significantly less likely to be testimonial than statements given to law enforcement officers.”…
- State v. Waver, 2016-Ohio-5092.publishedSee also Ohio v. Clark, __ U.S. __, 135 S.Ct. 2173, 2182 (2015) ("Statements made to someone who is not principally charged with uncovering and prosecuting criminal behavior are significantly less likely to be testimonial than statements g…
Show 47 more citing cases
- State v. King, 2016-Ohio-3492.publishedIn Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006), the United States Supreme Court identified “statements made unwittingly to a Government informant” as the sort of statements that “were clearly nontestimonial.” Id. at 825 , citing Bourjaily v.…
- State v. Tsosie, 516 P.3d 1116 (N.M. 2022).published “Statements made to someone who is not principally charged with uncovering and prosecuting criminal behavior are significantly less likely to be testimonial than statements given to law enforcement officers.” Id. (“It is common sense that…
- State v. Tsosie (N.M. 2022).unpublished “Statements made to someone who is not principally charged 3 with uncovering and prosecuting criminal behavior are significantly less likely to be 4 testimonial than statements given to law enforcement officers.” Id. (“It is common 5 sense…
- State v. Freeman, No. 1 CA-CR 19-0666 (Ariz. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2021).unpublished See id. (“It is common sense that the relationship . . . is very different from that between a citizen and the police.”).
- Linton v. Saba, 812 F.3d 112 (1st Cir. 2016).published See Ohio v. Clark, - U.S.-, 135 S.Ct. 2173, 2182 , 192 L.Ed.2d 306 (2015) (“Statements made to someone who is not principally charged with uncovering and prosecuting criminal behavior are significantly less likely to be testimonial than st…
- State v. Saunders, No. 25-983 (N.C. Ct. App. Sept. 16, 2026).unpublished(declining to categorically exclude statements to non-law-enforcement persons from the Confrontation Clause but recognizing that such statements are substantially less likely to have the primary purpose of creating evide…)
- In the Interest of J.C., Minor Child J.C., Minor Child, 877 N.W.2d 447 (Iowa 2016).published
- State v. Scanlan, 445 P.3d 960 (Wash. 2019).published
- State v. R. Tome, 2021 MT 229, 495 P.3d 54.published
- Gary Lee Avant v. State, 499 S.W.3d 123 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016).published
- State v. Burke, 431 P.3d 1109 (Wash. Ct. App. 2018).published
- People of Michigan v. Jacob Paul-Anthony Barnes, No. 339431 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2019).unpublished
- People of Michigan v. Dennis Ray Farmer Jr, No. 345496 (Mich. Ct. App. June 11, 2020).unpublished
- Kevin Nash v. State of Texas, No. 02-22-00165-CR (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 31, 2023).unpublished
- State v. Raymond L. Nieves, 2017 WI 69, 897 N.W.2d 363.published
- State v. Mark D. Jensen, 2021 WI 27, 957 N.W.2d 244.published
- People v. Velasquez-Gomez, No. A170878 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2025).unpublished
- People v. Yohn, 2026 IL App (4th) 250326-U.unpublished
- United States v. Taloa Latu, 46 F.4th 1175 (9th Cir. 2022).published
- People v. Cid C. Franklin, 242 N.E.3d 652 (N.Y. 2024).published
- Tyus v. McConahay, No. 5:22-cv-00770 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 2025).
- State v. Najera, 2025 UT 61, 585 P.3d 1186.published
- Tryon v. State, 2018 OK CR 20, 423 P.3d 617.published
- Derrick Cardosi v. State of Indiana, 128 N.E.3d 1277 (Ind. 2019).published
- State v. Laird, 2019 MT 198, 447 P.3d 416.published
- State v. Leach, 2024-Ohio-3145.published
- Anthony Beasley v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, No. 2021 SC 0446 (Ky. June 14, 2023).unpublished
- Daniel Wilson v. Gary Boughton, 41 F.4th 803 (7th Cir. 2022).published
- People v. Luna, No. F077054 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2021).unpublished
- State v. Tsosie (N.M. Ct. App. 2020).unpublished
- State v. Sandoval (N.M. Ct. App. 2021).unpublished
- Ramirez Ruiz v. Covello, No. 24-5318 (9th Cir. July 15, 2025).unpublished
- Com. v. Smith, N., 2026 PA Super 10.published
- Phillip Jones v. Tim Shoop, 173 F.4th 759 (6th Cir. 2026).published
- State v. McLaughlin, 786 S.E.2d 269 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016).published
- State v. A. Porter, 2018 MT 16, 410 P.3d 955.published
- State v. Williams, 392 P.3d 1267 (Kan. 2017).published
- People v. Rangel, 62 Cal. 4th 1192 (2016).published
- People v. Clark, 63 Cal. 4th 522 (2016).published
- Com. v. Howard, S., No. 769 WDA 2016 (Pa. Super. Ct. Mar. 7, 2017).unpublished
- Frank Eugene Villarreal v. State, 2017 WY 81, 398 P.3d 512.published
- State of New Jersey Vs. Marc Gallucci State of New Jersey Vs. Stephanie R. Tylka (12-09-1393, Middlesex Cnty. & Statewide) (Consol.), No. A-3609-13T2/A-5239-13T2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 10, 2017).unpublished
- State Of Washington v. Sergio Agustin Donato, No. 75690-7 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 20, 2018).unpublished
- Anthony Reynaldo Martinez v. State, No. 02-18-00447-CR (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 26, 2019).unpublished
- State v. Tyus, 2020-Ohio-4455.published
- Com. v. Walker, D., No. 788 EDA 2022 (Pa. Super. Ct. Nov. 30, 2023).unpublished
- Chisem v. Radtke, No. 2:20-cv-00674 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 28, 2022).
576 U.S. at 246Analyzing testimonial nature of non-law enforcement statements40 citing casesBecause at least some statements to individuals who are not law enforcement officers could conceivably raise confrontation concerns, we decline to adopt a categorial rule excluding them from the Sixth Amendment’s reach.
- State v. Burke, 478 P.3d 1096 (Wash. 2021).published (preschool teachers)
- Johnny Manuel Delgadillo v. State of Texas, No. 01-23-00871-CR (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 19, 2025).unpublished (Because at least some statements to individuals who are not law enforcement officers could conceivably raise confrontation concerns, we decline to adopt a categorial rule excluding them from the Sixth Amendment’s reach…)
- Johnny Manuel Delgadillo v. State of Texas, No. 01-23-00872-CR (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 19, 2025).unpublished (Because at least some statements to individuals who are not law enforcement officers could conceivably raise confrontation concerns, we decline to adopt a categorial rule excluding them from the Sixth Amendment’s reach…)
- Christopher Odeku v. State of Texas, 722 S.W.3d 76 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2025).published([S]tatements to individuals who are not law enforcement officers . . . are much less likely to be testimonial.)
- People v. Buschauer, 2022 IL App (1st) 192472, 213 N.E.3d 416.published(Because at least some statements to individuals who are not law enforcement officers could conceivably raise confrontation concerns, we decline to adopt a categorical rule excluding them from the Sixth Amendment’s reac…)
- State v. Patrick A. Keller, 2021 WI App 22, 959 N.W.2d 343.published ([S]tatements to individuals who are not law enforcement officers ... are much less likely to be testimonial than statements to law enforcement officers.)
- Haggard, James Ray, No. PD-0635-19 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 9, 2020).published (We have recognized that the Confrontation Clause does not prohibit the introduction of out-of-court statements that would have been admissible in a criminal case at the time of the founding.)
- State v. Tsosie, 516 P.3d 1116 (N.M. 2022).published “Statements made to someone who is not principally charged with uncovering and prosecuting criminal behavior are significantly less likely to be testimonial than statements given to law enforcement officers.” Id. (“It is common sense that…
- United States v. Deronarte Norwood, 982 F.3d 1032 (7th Cir. 2020).published
- United States v. Anthony Bernard Carter, 158 F.4th 1319 (11th Cir. 2025).published
Show 26 more citing cases
- Philip Wallace v. State of Arkansas, 2023 Ark. 7, 659 S.W.3d 267.published
- State v. Mark D. Jensen, 2021 WI 27, 957 N.W.2d 244.published
- Johnson v. Griffin, No. 1:13-cv-04337 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2022).
- People v. Yohn, 2026 IL App (4th) 250326-U.unpublished
- Quartrez Logan v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 845 S.E.2d 228 (Va. Ct. App. 2020).published
- United States v. Taloa Latu, 46 F.4th 1175 (9th Cir. 2022).published
- Sanders v. Fischer, No. 1:16-cv-04832 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2021).
- Yusuf v. Colvin, No. 2:18-cv-03360 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2022).
- Tyus v. McConahay, No. 5:22-cv-00770 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 2025).
- State v. Najera, 2025 UT 61, 585 P.3d 1186.published
- State v. Minor, 2024-Ohio-1465.published
- Peo v. Zumaran, No. 23CA0903 (Colo. Ct. App. May 15, 2025).unpublished
- Peo v. Montoya, No. 23CA0629 (Colo. Ct. App. July 17, 2025).unpublished
- State v. Miguel Montero, 339 A.3d 1055 (R.I. 2025).published
- State v. Kanem Williamson (083979) (Essex Cnty. & Statewide), 249 A.3d 478 (N.J. 2021).published
- State Of Washington v. Vincent Landes, No. 81347-1 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2021).unpublished
- Anthony Beasley v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, No. 2021 SC 0446 (Ky. June 14, 2023).unpublished
- Commonwealth v. Hart, No. SJC 13217 (Mass. Dec. 8, 2023).published
- Rush Jack Samuel Holt, III v. Commonwealth of Virginia, No. 0343234 (Va. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2024).unpublished
- State v. Antonio G. Ramirez, Jr., 1 N.W.3d 719 (Wis. Ct. App. 2023).published
- State v. Shaw, 2024-Ohio-5637.published
- United States v. Age, 136 F.4th 193 (5th Cir. 2025).published
- Robert Matthew Caldwell v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 921 S.E.2d 231 (Va. Ct. App. 2025).published
- Commonwealth v. Walker, D., 350 A.3d 54 (Pa. 2026).published
- State v. Carter, 586 P.3d 237 (Idaho Ct. App. 2026).published
- Ebokoskia v. State, No. 49248 (Idaho Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2023).unpublished
At page 2182Young children's statements and confrontation clause implications33 citing cases“statements made to someone who is not principally charged with uncovering and prosecuting criminal behavior are significantly less likely to be testimonial than statements given to law enforcement officers.”
- Muth v. Gomez, No. 1:16-cv-05601 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 2020).unpublished(Statements by very young children will rarely, if ever, implicate the Confrontation Clause … . [I]t is extremely unlikely that a 3-year-old child in [the declarant’s] position would intend h[er] statements to be a subs…)
- Avery B. Crawford v. State, 595 S.W.3d 792 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2019).published(Statements made to someone who is not principally charged with uncovering and prosecuting criminal behavior are significantly less likely to be testimonial than statements given to law enforcement officers.)
- Christopher Allen Davis v. State, No. 05-18-00272-CR (Tex. App.—Dallas July 24, 2019).published (Statements made to someone who is not principally charged with uncovering and prosecuting criminal behavior are significantly less likely to be testimonial than statements given to law enforcement officers.)
- United States v. Baas, No. 201700318, 2019 CCA LEXIS 173 (N.M.C.C.A. Apr. 15, 2019).published (Statements made to someone who is not principally charged with uncovering and prosecuting criminal behavior are significantly less likely to be testimonial than statements given to law enforcement officers.)
- State v. Daise, 807 S.E.2d 710 (S.C. Ct. App. 2017).published See Clark, 135 S.Ct. at 2181 (“The teachers asked [the child-victim] about his injuries immediately upon discovering them, in the informal setting of a preschool lunchroom and classroom, and they did so precisely as any concerned eitizen w…
- State v. Waver, 2016-Ohio-5092.published(Statements made to someone who is not principally charged with uncovering and prosecuting criminal behavior are significantly less likely to be testimonial than statements given to law enforcement officers.)
- State v. King, 2016-Ohio-3492.published(Statements made to someone who is not principally charged with uncovering and prosecuting criminal behavior are significantly less likely to be testimonial than statements given to law enforcement officers.)
- Christopher J. Gonzalez v. State, No. 02-14-00229-CR (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 17, 2015).unpublished(Few preschool students understand the details of our criminal justice system.)
- People v. Alvarez, 18 Cal. 5th 387 (2025).published(Because at least some statements to individuals who are not law enforcement officers could conceivably raise confrontation concerns, we decline to adopt a categorical rule excluding them from the Sixth Amendment’s reac…)
- State v. Tsosie, 516 P.3d 1116 (N.M. 2022).published “it is common sense that the relationship between a student and his teacher is very different from that between a citizen and the police. we do not ignore that reality.”
Show 23 more citing cases
- State v. Tsosie (N.M. 2022).unpublished “it is common 5 sense that the relationship between a student and his teacher is very different from 6 that between a citizen and the police. we do not ignore that reality.”
- (HC) Perez v. Spearman, No. 2:18-cv-00629 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2021).(statements made to 22 someone who is not principally charged with uncovering and prosecuting criminal behavior are significantly less likely to be 23 testimonial than statements given to law enforcement officers)
- State v. Freeman, No. 1 CA-CR 19-0666 (Ariz. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2021).unpublished “it is common sense that the relationship . . . is very different from that between a citizen and the police.”
- United States v. David Casillas, 830 F.3d 403 (6th Cir. 2016).published (Statements made to someone who is not principally charged with uncovering and prosecuting criminal behavior are significantly less likely to be testimonial.)
- Linton v. Saba, 812 F.3d 112 (1st Cir. 2016).published (Statements made to someone who is not principally charged with uncovering and prosecuting criminal behavior are significantly less likely to be testimonial than statements given to law enforcement officers.)
- In the Interest of J.C., Minor Child J.C., Minor Child, 877 N.W.2d 447 (Iowa 2016).published
- Schmidt v. State, 2017 WY 101, 401 P.3d 868.published
- State v. Rafeh, 393 P.3d 1155 (Or. 2017).published
- United States v. Moya, No. 17-2043 (10th Cir. Sept. 21, 2018).unpublished
- State v. Scanlan, 445 P.3d 960 (Wash. 2019).published
- Gary Lee Avant v. State, 499 S.W.3d 123 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016).published
- State of Iowa v. Melvin T. Lucier, No. 15-1559 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 11, 2017).published
- State Of Washington v. Theresa Scanlan, 413 P.3d 82 (Wash. Ct. App. 2018).published
- State of Iowa v. Anthony Dwayne Jackson Pace, No. 16-1785 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2018).published
- State v. Burke, 431 P.3d 1109 (Wash. Ct. App. 2018).published
- Christopher M. Pelletier v. State, No. 14-18-00008-CR, 2019 WL 2536188 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 20, 2019).unpublished
- People of Michigan v. Jacob Paul-Anthony Barnes, No. 339431 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2019).unpublished
- In re S.M.B., 2019-Ohio-3578.published
- People of Michigan v. Dennis Ray Farmer Jr, No. 345496 (Mich. Ct. App. June 11, 2020).unpublished
- Kevin Nash v. State of Texas, No. 02-22-00165-CR (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 31, 2023).unpublished
- Cole v. Lawrence, No. 3:17-cv-00450 (S.D. Ill. May 6, 2020).
- Harison v. Harry, No. 2:17-cv-13692 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 9, 2020).
- State v. Rytting, 527 P.3d 777 (Or. Ct. App. 2023).published
576 U.S. at 244Determining testimonial nature of statements under confrontation clause35 citing casessetting out factors which can affect whether a child's statements to non-law enforcement individuals are non-testimonial
- Larr, No. 2:24-cv-01730 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 27, 2026). See Clark, 576 U.S. at 248 (“Statements by very young children will rarely, if ever, implicate the Confrontation Clause.”); id. at 248-49 (suggesting that, even if testimonial, such statements would likely be found admissible despite the C…
- Gary Franz Devaughn v. State of Texas, No. 04-22-00467-CR (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 13, 2024).unpublished Clark, 576 U.S. at 245 (“A ‘formal station-house interrogation,’ like the questioning in Crawford, is more likely to provoke testimonial statements, while less formal questioning is less likely to reflect a primary purpose aimed at obtaini…
- State v. Tsosie, 516 P.3d 1116 (N.M. 2022).published “Statements made to someone who is not principally charged with uncovering and prosecuting criminal behavior are significantly less likely to be testimonial than statements given to law enforcement officers.” Id. (“It is common sense that…
- State v. Parsons, 543 P.3d 465 (Idaho 2024).published
- State of Iowa v. Vester Matthew Rawlins, No. 22-1259 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2023).published
- Julio C. Riveron v. State of Texas, No. 04-22-00310-CR (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 10, 2024).unpublished
- Quartrez Logan v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 845 S.E.2d 228 (Va. Ct. App. 2020).published
- Knapper v. State, 2020 OK CR 16, 473 P.3d 1053.published
- David Lara v. Charles Callahan, No. 18-56680 (9th Cir. Nov. 30, 2020).unpublished
- State of Iowa v. Michael Wilson White, 957 N.W.2d 727 (Iowa Ct. App. 2021).published
Show 21 more citing cases
- State v. Spencer, 497 P.3d 1125 (Idaho 2021).published
- People of Guam v. Vincent Rodriguez Cepeda, 2021 Guam 9 (Guam 2021).published
- United States v. Erin Graham, Jr., 47 F.4th 561 (7th Cir. 2022).published
- United States v. Taloa Latu, 46 F.4th 1175 (9th Cir. 2022).published
- Foote v. State, 2023 OK CR 12, 533 P.3d 354.published
- Timothy Lee Coles v. Commonwealth of Virginia, No. 0110233 (Va. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2024).unpublished
- People v. Cid C. Franklin, 242 N.E.3d 652 (N.Y. 2024).published
- Jackson v. State, 2024 OK CR 11, 548 P.3d 473.published
- Head v. Christiansen, No. 2:18-cv-12416 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 5, 2023).
- Sanders v. Fischer, No. 1:16-cv-04832 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2021).
- Yusuf v. Colvin, No. 2:18-cv-03360 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2022).
- Carter v. LaRose, No. 4:19-cv-00208 (N.D. Ohio May 12, 2021).
- State v. Thomas A. Nelson, 954 N.W.2d 11 (Wis. Ct. App. 2020).published
- State v. Hardy, 2024-Ohio-5926, 260 N.E.3d 544.published
- Peo v. Starr, No. 22CA1870 (Colo. Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2025).unpublished
- State of Maine v. Ramel L. Sheppard, 2024 ME 84, 327 A.3d 1144.published
- People v. Vega, No. B334584 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 18, 2025).unpublished
- Tyus v. McConahay, No. 5:22-cv-00770 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 2025).
- State v. Najera, 2025 UT 61, 585 P.3d 1186.published
- State v. Smith, 2026-Ohio-2405.published
- State v. Tisdale, 2026-Ohio-2567.published
576 U.S. at 247Determining testimonial nature of young child statements32 citing casesnoting that the nontestimonial statements at issue were “informal and spontaneous” and occurred in an “informal setting
- State v. Burke, 478 P.3d 1096 (Wash. 2021).published But see Clark, 576 U.S. at 246 (preschool teachers).
- Larr, No. 2:24-cv-01730 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 27, 2026). See Clark, 576 U.S. at 248 (“Statements by very young children will rarely, if ever, implicate the Confrontation Clause.”); id. at 248-49 (suggesting that, even if testimonial, such statements would likely be found admissible despite the C…
- State v. Patrick A. Keller, 2021 WI App 22, 959 N.W.2d 343.published See Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237, 246 (2015) (“[S]tatements to individuals who are not law enforcement officers ... are much less likely to be testimonial than statements to law enforcement officers.”).
- State v. Daise, 807 S.E.2d 710 (S.C. Ct. App. 2017).published See Clark, 135 S.Ct. at 2181 (“The teachers asked [the child-victim] about his injuries immediately upon discovering them, in the informal setting of a preschool lunchroom and classroom, and they did so precisely as any concerned eitizen w…
- State v. Tsosie, 516 P.3d 1116 (N.M. 2022).published “Statements made to someone who is not principally charged with uncovering and prosecuting criminal behavior are significantly less likely to be testimonial than statements given to law enforcement officers.” Id. (“It is common sense that…
- Duhs v. Capra, 180 F. Supp. 3d 205 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).published Statements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations are also testimoni-alunder even a narrow standard.”); Ohio v. Clark, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2173, 2180 , 192 L.Ed.2d 306 (2015) (“[A] statement cannot fall within the Confron…
- In the Interest of J.C., Minor Child J.C., Minor Child, 877 N.W.2d 447 (Iowa 2016).published
- Ramirez, Antonio v. Tegels, Lizzie, No. 3:14-cv-00802 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 26, 2019).
- Harison v. Harry, No. 2:17-cv-13692 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 9, 2020).
- State v. Parsons, 543 P.3d 465 (Idaho 2024).published
Show 20 more citing cases
- Philip Wallace v. State of Arkansas, 2023 Ark. 7, 659 S.W.3d 267.published
- State v. Mark D. Jensen, 2021 WI 27, 957 N.W.2d 244.published
- Dilliraj Bista v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 891 S.E.2d 711 (Va. Ct. App. 2023).published
- State of West Virginia v. Sherie Tichenell, No. 22-719 (W. Va. May 19, 2025).published
- State of WV v. Marty L. Browning, No. 22-710 (W. Va. May 19, 2025).published
- Journy Lee Snead v. Commonwealth of Virginia, No. 1211192 (Va. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2021).unpublished
- Jose Meza v. Stuart Sherman, No. 19-15733 (9th Cir. Feb. 12, 2021).unpublished
- Daniel Wilson v. Gary Boughton, 41 F.4th 803 (7th Cir. 2022).published
- Adams v. Griffith, No. 4:17-cv-01580 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 29, 2020).
- Chandler v. Steele, No. 4:17-cv-01477 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 16, 2020).
- State v. Brian Thomas Javier, 22 N.W.3d 238 (Wis. Ct. App. 2025).unpublished
- In re H.B., 2025-Ohio-2159.published
- State Of Washington v. Donald Henry Moulton, No. 58963-0 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2025).unpublished
- State v. Parsons, No. 48833 (Idaho Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2022).published
- Duhs v. Capra, 639 F. App'x 691 (2d Cir. 2016).unpublished
- State v. Williams, 392 P.3d 1267 (Kan. 2017).published
- State v. McCluskey, 2018-Ohio-4859.published
- State v. Larr, 2023-Ohio-2128.published
- Larr, No. 2:24-cv-01730 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 5, 2025).
- State v. Wilson, 2026-Ohio-65.published
At page 2181Determining testimonial nature of statements to non-law enforcement21 citing caseschild’s report to preschool teachers was non-testimonial where the child neither was informed nor intended nor understood that his statements would be used by police or prosecutors
- State v. Daise, 807 S.E.2d 710 (S.C. Ct. App. 2017).published (The teachers asked [the child-victim] about his injuries immediately upon discovering them, in the informal setting of a preschool lunchroom and classroom, and they did so precisely as any concerned eitizen would talk…)
- Pueblo v. Pérez Santos, 195 P.R. Dec. 262 (2016).published([Considering all relevant evidence here, L.P.’s statements clearly were not made with the primary purpose of creating evidence for Clark’s prosecution)
- People v. Alvarez, 18 Cal. 5th 387 (2025).published“because at least some statements to individuals who are not law enforcement officers could conceivably raise confrontation concerns, we decline to adopt a categorical rule excluding them from the sixth amendment's reach…”
- In the Interest of J.C., Minor Child J.C., Minor Child, 877 N.W.2d 447 (Iowa 2016).published
- Commonwealth v. Jones, 37 N.E.3d 589 (Mass. 2015).published
- Taylor v. State, 130 A.3d 509 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016).published
- People v. McFee, 2016 COA 97, 412 P.3d 848.published
- State v. Rozerick E. Mattox, 2017 WI 9, 890 N.W.2d 256.published
- State v. Rafeh, 393 P.3d 1155 (Or. 2017).published
- State Of Washington v. Bryan Eugene Streepy, 199 Wash. App. 487 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017).published
Show 10 more citing cases
- United States v. Moya, No. 17-2043 (10th Cir. Sept. 21, 2018).unpublished
- State v. Scanlan, 445 P.3d 960 (Wash. 2019).published
- People v. Morales, 44 Cal. App. 5th 353 (Ct. App. 2020).partially published
- Ricky Lee Murray v. State, 597 S.W.3d 964 (Tex. App.—Austin 2020).published
- State v. R. Tome, 2021 MT 229, 495 P.3d 54.published
- Christopher O. Franklin v. State of Texas, No. 02-20-00159-CR (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 17, 2022).unpublished
- Pham v. Kirkpatrick, 209 F. Supp. 3d 497 (N.D.N.Y. 2016).published
- Weber v. Williams, No. 1:20-cv-03112 (D. Colo. Oct. 18, 2021).
- Paulk v. Kempf, No. 1:16-cv-00118 (D. Idaho June 17, 2019).
- Ramirez, Antonio v. Tegels, Lizzie, No. 3:14-cv-00802 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 26, 2019).
At page 2184Analyzing primary purpose of statements for confrontation clause12 citing cases“crawford sought to bring our application of the confrontation clause back to its original meaning, which was to exclude unconfronted statements made by witnesses-i.e., statements that were testimonial.”
- Christopher Allen Davis v. State, No. 05-18-00272-CR (Tex. App.—Dallas July 24, 2019).published See Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2182 (2015) (“Statements made to someone who is not principally charged with uncovering and prosecuting criminal behavior are significantly less likely to be testimonial than statements given to law enfo…
- State of Tennessee v. Michael Anthony Logan, No. M2013-02701-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. July 27, 2015).published “crawford sought to bring our application of the confrontation clause back to its original meaning, which was to exclude unconfronted statements made by witnesses-i.e., statements that were testimonial.”
- In the Interest of J.C., Minor Child J.C., Minor Child, 877 N.W.2d 447 (Iowa 2016).published
- State v. Rozerick E. Mattox, 2017 WI 9, 890 N.W.2d 256.published
- State v. Rafeh, 393 P.3d 1155 (Or. 2017).published
- State v. R. Tome, 2021 MT 229, 495 P.3d 54.published
- United States v. Raymond Fryberg, Jr., 854 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2017).published
- State v. Raymond L. Nieves, 2017 WI 69, 897 N.W.2d 363.published
- United States v. Binyamin Stimler, 864 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2017).published
- United States v. Binyamin Stimler, No. 15-4053 (3d Cir. July 17, 2017).published
Show 1 more citing case
- Com. v. Thompson, T., No. 3714 EDA 2016 (Pa. Super. Ct. May 21, 2018).unpublished
576 U.S. at 248Statements by young children rarely implicate confrontation clause10 citing casesStatements by very young children will rarely, if ever, implicate the Confrontation Clause.
- Larr, No. 2:24-cv-01730 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 27, 2026). (Statements by very young children will rarely, if ever, implicate the Confrontation Clause.)
- United States v. Deronarte Norwood, 982 F.3d 1032 (7th Cir. 2020).published
- State v. Parsons, 543 P.3d 465 (Idaho 2024).published
- Philip Wallace v. State of Arkansas, 2023 Ark. 7, 659 S.W.3d 267.published
- State v. Mark D. Jensen, 2021 WI 27, 957 N.W.2d 244.published
- State Of Washington v. Donald Henry Moulton, No. 58963-0 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2025).unpublished
- In re C.B., 2025-Ohio-1361.published
576 U.S. at 240Ruling on nontestimonial nature of child victim statements8 citing cases
- State v. Tsosie, 516 P.3d 1116 (N.M. 2022).published “Statements made to someone who is not principally charged with uncovering and prosecuting criminal behavior are significantly less likely to be testimonial than statements given to law enforcement officers.” Id. (“It is common sense that…
- State v. Tsosie (N.M. 2022).unpublished “Statements made to someone who is not principally charged 3 with uncovering and prosecuting criminal behavior are significantly less likely to be 4 testimonial than statements given to law enforcement officers.” Id. (“It is common 5 sense…
- United States v. Deronarte Norwood, 982 F.3d 1032 (7th Cir. 2020).published
- State v. Parsons, 543 P.3d 465 (Idaho 2024).published
- United States v. Anthony Bernard Carter, 158 F.4th 1319 (11th Cir. 2025).published
192 L. Ed. 2d at 317Determining testimonial nature of statements to private persons7 citing casesmajority opinion
- In the Interest of J.C., Minor Child J.C., Minor Child, 877 N.W.2d 447 (Iowa 2016).published
- State v. Laura L. Smith, 391 P.3d 1252 (Idaho 2017).published
- State of New Jersey in the Interest of A.R., 149 A.3d 297 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016).published
- State v. McLaughlin, 786 S.E.2d 269 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016).published
- State of New Jersey Vs. Marc Gallucci State of New Jersey Vs. Stephanie R. Tylka (12-09-1393, Middlesex Cnty. & Statewide) (Consol.), No. A-3609-13T2/A-5239-13T2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 10, 2017).unpublished
192 L. Ed. 2d at 315Analyzing the primary purpose test for confrontation clause6 citing cases
- In the Interest of J.C., Minor Child J.C., Minor Child, 877 N.W.2d 447 (Iowa 2016).published
- State v. Laura L. Smith, 391 P.3d 1252 (Idaho 2017).published
- State of New Jersey v. Deshaun P. Wilson, 121 A.3d 921 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015).published
- State v. McLaughlin, 786 S.E.2d 269 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016).published
- Com. v. Howard, S., No. 769 WDA 2016 (Pa. Super. Ct. Mar. 7, 2017).unpublished
576 U.S. at 241Determining testimonial nature of statements in emergencies7 citing cases
- State v. Tsosie, 516 P.3d 1116 (N.M. 2022).published “Statements made to someone who is not principally charged with uncovering and prosecuting criminal behavior are significantly less likely to be testimonial than statements given to law enforcement officers.” Id. (“It is common sense that…
- United States v. Deronarte Norwood, 982 F.3d 1032 (7th Cir. 2020).published
- State v. Parsons, 543 P.3d 465 (Idaho 2024).published
- Philip Wallace v. State of Arkansas, 2023 Ark. 7, 659 S.W.3d 267.published
576 U.S. at 242Applying Ohio rule of evidence regarding hearsay exceptions7 citing casescit‐ ing Ohio R. Evid. 807
- United States v. Deronarte Norwood, 982 F.3d 1032 (7th Cir. 2020).published
- State v. Parsons, 543 P.3d 465 (Idaho 2024).published
- Philip Wallace v. State of Arkansas, 2023 Ark. 7, 659 S.W.3d 267.published
- People v. Palacios, No. B310844 (Cal. Ct. App. July 6, 2022).unpublished
576 U.S. at 250Determining testimonial nature of out-of-court statements4 citing casesrecognizing that a child sexual assault victim’s incompetency to testify does not per se render the child’s out-of-court disclosures inadmissible
- Dilliraj Bista v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 891 S.E.2d 711 (Va. Ct. App. 2023).published
- People v. Hernandez, No. E075338 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2022).unpublished
- United States v. Draine, 26 F.4th 1178 (10th Cir. 2022).published
- State of Missouri v. Jason R. Shade, 657 S.W.3d 282 (Mo. Ct. App. 2022).published
At page 2185Defining witness status under the confrontation clause5 citing casesA suspicious mind (or even one that is merely not naïve
- Taylor v. State, 130 A.3d 509 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016).published
- State v. Rozerick E. Mattox, 2017 WI 9, 890 N.W.2d 256.published
- State v. R. Tome, 2021 MT 229, 495 P.3d 54.published
- United States v. Perkins, No. 201600166 (N.M.C.C.A. July 28, 2016).published
At page 2177Determining testimonial nature of non-police statements4 citing cases“bjecause neither the child nor his teachers had the primary purpose of assisting in clark's prosecution, the child's statements do not implicate the confrontation clause and therefore were admissible at trial.”
- State Of Washington v. Gregory Lee Bonds, No. 73967-1 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2015).unpublished
- In the Interest of J.C., Minor Child J.C., Minor Child, 877 N.W.2d 447 (Iowa 2016).published
- Schmidt v. State, 2017 WY 101, 401 P.3d 868.published
At page 2183Determining testimonial nature of out-of-court statements3 citing cases“mandatory reporting statutes alone cannot convert a conversation between a concerned teacher and her student into a law enforcement mission aimed primarily at gathering evidence for a prosecution.”
- State Of Washington v. Gregory Lee Bonds, No. 73967-1 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2015).unpublished
- State v. Thomas, 2015-Ohio-5247.published
- State v. Garcia, 2016-Ohio-4667, 66 N.E.3d 1208.published
576 U.S. at 253Distinguishing witness from non-witness under primary-purpose test3 citing cases
- State v. Parsons, 543 P.3d 465 (Idaho 2024).published
- Marcia Stein v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 115 F.4th 1244 (9th Cir. 2024).published
192 L. Ed. 2d at 312Distinguishing teacher statements from official interrogations3 citing cases
- In the Interest of J.C., Minor Child J.C., Minor Child, 877 N.W.2d 447 (Iowa 2016).published
- State v. McLaughlin, 786 S.E.2d 269 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016).published
192 L. Ed. 2d at 316Analyzing solemnity of extrajudicial statements under confrontation clause3 citing casesmajority opinion
- In the Interest of J.C., Minor Child J.C., Minor Child, 877 N.W.2d 447 (Iowa 2016).published
- State of New Jersey in the Interest of A.R., 149 A.3d 297 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016).published
192 L. Ed. 2d at 318Determining testimonial nature of private statements3 citing cases
- In the Interest of J.C., Minor Child J.C., Minor Child, 877 N.W.2d 447 (Iowa 2016).published
- State of New Jersey in the Interest of A.R., 149 A.3d 297 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016).published
192 L. Ed. 2d at 319Determining testimonial nature of private statements3 citing casesScalia,-J., concurring in the judgment
- In the Interest of J.C., Minor Child J.C., Minor Child, 877 N.W.2d 447 (Iowa 2016).published
- State of New Jersey in the Interest of A.R., 149 A.3d 297 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016).published
A formal station-house interrogation * * * is more likely to provoke testimonial statements, while less formal questioning is less likely to reflect a primary purpose aimed at obtaining testimonial evidence against the accused.
- State v. Lucas, 2024-Ohio-842, 240 N.E.3d 843.published (A formal station-house interrogation * * * is more likely to provoke testimonial statements, while less formal questioning is less likely to reflect a primary purpose aimed at obtaining testimonial evidence against the…)
- State v. Ford, 2021-Ohio-3058.published (A formal station-house interrogation * * * is more likely to provoke testimonial statements, while less formal questioning is less likely to reflect a primary purpose aimed at obtaining testimonial evidence against the…)
It is common sense that the relationship between a student and his teacher is very different from that between a citizen and the police. We do not ignore that reality.
- State v. Tsosie, 516 P.3d 1116 (N.M. 2022).published (It is common sense that the relationship between a student and his teacher is very different from that between a citizen and the police. We do not ignore that reality.)
- State v. Tsosie (N.M. 2022).unpublished (It is common 5 sense that the relationship between a student and his teacher is very different from 6 that between a citizen and the police. We do not ignore that reality.)
192 L. Ed. 2d at 313cited at this page2 citing cases
- In the Interest of J.C., Minor Child J.C., Minor Child, 877 N.W.2d 447 (Iowa 2016).published
Other citing cases
- State v. Johnson, 2023-Ohio-445, 208 N.E.3d 949.published
- Ubiles v. People, 66 V.I. 572 (V.I. 2017).published
- State v. Clark, 2021-Ohio-2771.published
- United States v. Fernando Noria, 945 F.3d 847 (5th Cir. 2019).published
- State v. Clark, 2016-Ohio-2825.published
v.
Darius Clark.
Darius Clark sent his girlfriend hundreds of miles away to engage in prostitution and agreed to care for her two young children while she was out of town. A day later, teachers discovered red marks on her 3-year-old son, and the boy identified Clark as his abuser. The question in this case is whether the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause prohibited prosecutors from introducing those statements when the child was not available to be cross-examined. Because neither the child nor his teachers had the primary purpose of assisting in Clark's prosecution, the child's statements do not implicate the Confrontation Clause and therefore were admissible at trial.
I
Darius Clark, who went by the nickname "Dee," lived in Cleveland, Ohio, with his girlfriend, T.T., and her two children: L.P., a 3-year-old boy, and A.T., an 18-month-old girl.[1] Clark was also T.T.'s pimp, and he would regularly send her on trips to Washington, D.C., to work as a prostitute. In March 2010, T.T. went on[*2178] one such trip, and she left the children in Clark's care.
The next day, Clark took L.P. to preschool. In the lunchroom, one of L.P.'s teachers, Ramona Whitley, observed that L.P.'s left eye appeared bloodshot. She asked him " '[w]hat happened,' " and he initially said nothing. 137 Ohio St.3d 346, 347, 2013-Ohio-4731, 999 N.E.2d 592, 594. Eventually, however, he told the teacher that he " 'fell.' " Ibid. When they moved into the brighter lights of a classroom, Whitley noticed " '[r]ed marks, like whips of some sort,' " on L.P.'s face. Ibid.She notified the lead teacher, Debra Jones, who asked L.P., " 'Who did this? What happened to you?' " Id., at 348, 999 N.E.2d, at 595. According to Jones, L.P. " 'seemed kind of bewildered' " and " 'said something like, Dee, Dee.' " Ibid. Jones asked L.P. whether Dee is "big or little," to which L.P. responded that "Dee is big." App. 60, 64. Jones then brought L.P. to her supervisor, who lifted the boy's shirt, revealing more injuries. Whitley called a child abuse hotline to alert authorities about the suspected abuse.
When Clark later arrived at the school, he denied responsibility for the injuries and quickly left with L.P. The next day, a social worker found the children at Clark's mother's house and took them to a hospital, where a physician discovered additional injuries suggesting child abuse. L.P. had a black eye, belt marks on his back and stomach, and bruises all over his body. A.T. had two black eyes, a swollen hand, and a large burn on her cheek, and two pigtails had been ripped out at the roots of her hair.
A grand jury indicted Clark on five counts of felonious assault (four related to A.T. and one related to L.P.), two counts of endangering children (one for each child), and two counts of domestic violence (one for each child). At trial, the State introduced L.P.'s statements to his teachers as evidence of Clark's guilt, but L.P. did not testify. Under Ohio law, children younger than 10 years old are incompetent to testify if they "appear incapable of receiving just impressions of the facts and transactions respecting which they are examined, or of relating them truly." Ohio Rule Evid. 601(A)(Lexis 2010). After conducting a hearing, the trial court concluded that L.P. was not competent to testify. But under Ohio Rule of Evidence 807, which allows the admission of reliable hearsay by child abuse victims, the court ruled that L.P.'s statements to his teachers bore sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness to be admitted as evidence.
Clark moved to exclude testimony about L.P.'s out-of-court statements under the Confrontation Clause. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that L.P.'s responses were not testimonial statements covered by the Sixth Amendment. The jury found Clark guilty on all counts except for one assault count related to A.T., and it sentenced him to 28 years' imprisonment. Clark appealed his conviction, and a state appellate court reversed on the ground that the introduction of L.P.'s out-of-court statements violated the Confrontation Clause.
In a 4-to-3 decision, the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed. It held that, under this Court's Confrontation Clause decisions, L.P.'s statements qualified as testimonial because the primary purpose of the teachers' questioning "was not to deal with an existing emergency but rather to gather evidence potentially relevant to a subsequent criminal prosecution." 137 Ohio St.3d, at 350, 999 N.E.2d, at 597. The court noted that Ohio has a "mandatory reporting" law that requires certain professionals, including preschool teachers, to report suspected child abuse to government authorities. See[*2179] id.,at 349-350, 999 N.E.2d, at 596-597. In the court's view, the teachers acted as agents of the State under the mandatory reporting law and "sought facts concerning past criminal activity to identify the person responsible, eliciting statements that 'are functionally identical to live, in-court testimony, doing precisely what a witness does on direct examination.' " Id.,at 355, 999 N.E.2d, at 600(quoting Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,557 U.S. 305, 310-311, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009); some internal quotation marks omitted).
We granted certiorari, 573 U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 43, 189 L.Ed.2d 896 (2014), and we now reverse.
II
A
The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, which is binding on the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him." In Ohio v. Roberts,448 U.S. 56, 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), we interpreted the Clause to permit the admission of out-of-court statements by an unavailable witness, so long as the statements bore "adequate 'indicia of reliability.' " Such indicia are present, we held, if "the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception" or bears "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." Ibid.
In Crawford v. Washington,541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), we adopted a different approach. We explained that "witnesses," under the Confrontation Clause, are those "who bear testimony," and we defined "testimony" as "a solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact." Id.,at 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). The Sixth Amendment, we concluded, prohibits the introduction of testimonial statements by a nontestifying witness, unless the witness is "unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination." Id.,at 54, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Applying that definition to the facts in Crawford,we held that statements by a witness during police questioning at the station house were testimonial and thus could not be admitted. But our decision in Crawforddid not offer an exhaustive definition of "testimonial" statements. Instead, Crawfordstated that the label "applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations." Id.,at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354.
Our more recent cases have labored to flesh out what it means for a statement to be "testimonial." In Davis v. Washingtonand Hammon v. Indiana,547 U.S. 813, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006), which we decided together, we dealt with statements given to law enforcement officers by the victims of domestic abuse. The victim in Davismade statements to a 911 emergency operator during and shortly after her boyfriend's violent attack. In Hammon,the victim, after being isolated from her abusive husband, made statements to police that were memorialized in a " 'battery affidavit.' " Id.,at 820, 126 S.Ct. 2266.
We held that the statements in Hammonwere testimonial, while the statements in Daviswere not. Announcing what has come to be known as the "primary purpose" test, we explained: "Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial[*2180] when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution." Id.,at 822, 126 S.Ct. 2266. Because the cases involved statements to law enforcement officers, we reserved the question whether similar statements to individuals other than law enforcement officers would raise similar issues under the Confrontation Clause. See id.,at 823, n. 2, 126 S.Ct. 2266.
In Michigan v. Bryant,562 U.S. 344, 131 S.Ct. 1143, 179 L.Ed.2d 93 (2011), we further expounded on the primary purpose test. The inquiry, we emphasized, must consider "all of the relevant circumstances." Id.,at 369, 131 S.Ct. 1143. And we reiterated our view in Davisthat, when "the primary purpose of an interrogation is to respond to an 'ongoing emergency,' its purpose is not to create a record for trial and thus is not within the scope of the [Confrontation] Clause." 562 U.S., at 358, 131 S.Ct. 1143. At the same time, we noted that "there may be othercircumstances, aside from ongoing emergencies, when a statement is not procured with a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony." Ibid."[T]he existence vel nonof an ongoing emergency is not the touchstone of the testimonial inquiry." Id.,at 374, 131 S.Ct. 1143. Instead, "whether an ongoing emergency exists is simply one factor ... that informs the ultimate inquiry regarding the 'primary purpose' of an interrogation." Id.,at 366, 131 S.Ct. 1143.
One additional factor is "the informality of the situation and the interrogation." Id.,at 377, 131 S.Ct. 1143. A "formal station-house interrogation," like the questioning in Crawford,is more likely to provoke testimonial statements, while less formal questioning is less likely to reflect a primary purpose aimed at obtaining testimonial evidence against the accused. Id.,at 366, 377, 131 S.Ct. 1143. And in determining whether a statement is testimonial, "standard rules of hearsay, designed to identify some statements as reliable, will be relevant." Id.,at 358-359, 131 S.Ct. 1143. In the end, the question is whether, in light of all the circumstances, viewed objectively, the "primary purpose" of the conversation was to "creat[e] an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony." Id.,at 358, 131 S.Ct. 1143. Applying these principles in Bryant,we held that the statements made by a dying victim about his assailant were not testimonial because the circumstances objectively indicated that the conversation was primarily aimed at quelling an ongoing emergency, not establishing evidence for the prosecution. Because the relevant statements were made to law enforcement officers, we again declined to decide whether the same analysis applies to statements made to individuals other than the police. See id.,at 357, n. 3, 131 S.Ct. 1143.
Thus, under our precedents, a statement cannot fall within the Confrontation Clause unless its primary purpose was testimonial. "Where no such primary purpose exists, the admissibility of a statement is the concern of state and federal rules of evidence, not the Confrontation Clause." Id.,at 359, 131 S.Ct. 1143. But that does not mean that the Confrontation Clause bars every statement that satisfies the "primary purpose" test. We have recognized that the Confrontation Clause does not prohibit the introduction of out-of-court statements that would have been admissible in a criminal case at the time of the founding. See Giles v. California,554 U.S. 353, 358-359, 128 S.Ct. 2678, 171 L.Ed.2d 488 (2008); Crawford,541 U.S., at 56, n. 6, 62, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Thus, the primary purpose test is a necessary, but[*2181] not always sufficient, condition for the exclusion of out-of-court statements under the Confrontation Clause.
B
In this case, we consider statements made to preschool teachers, not the police. We are therefore presented with the question we have repeatedly reserved: whether statements to persons other than law enforcement officers are subject to the Confrontation Clause. Because at least some statements to individuals who are not law enforcement officers could conceivably raise confrontation concerns, we decline to adopt a categorical rule excluding them from the Sixth Amendment's reach. Nevertheless, such statements are much less likely to be testimonial than statements to law enforcement officers. And considering all the relevant circumstances here, L.P.'s statements clearly were not made with the primary purpose of creating evidence for Clark's prosecution. Thus, their introduction at trial did not violate the Confrontation Clause.
L.P.'s statements occurred in the context of an ongoing emergency involving suspected child abuse. When L.P.'s teachers noticed his injuries, they rightly became worried that the 3-year-old was the victim of serious violence. Because the teachers needed to know whether it was safe to release L.P. to his guardian at the end of the day, they needed to determine who might be abusing the child.[2] Thus, the immediate concern was to protect a vulnerable child who needed help. Our holding in Bryantis instructive. As in Bryant,the emergency in this case was ongoing, and the circumstances were not entirely clear. L.P.'s teachers were not sure who had abused him or how best to secure his safety. Nor were they sure whether any other children might be at risk. As a result, their questions and L.P.'s answers were primarily aimed at identifying and ending the threat. Though not as harried, the conversation here was also similar to the 911 call in Davis. The teachers' questions were meant to identify the abuser in order to protect the victim from future attacks. Whether the teachers thought that this would be done by apprehending the abuser or by some other means is irrelevant. And the circumstances in this case were unlike the interrogation in Hammon,where the police knew the identity of the assailant and questioned the victim after shielding her from potential harm.
There is no indication that the primary purpose of the conversation was to gather evidence for Clark's prosecution. On the contrary, it is clear that the first objective was to protect L.P. At no point did the teachers inform L.P. that his answers would be used to arrest or punish his abuser. L.P. never hinted that he intended his statements to be used by the police or prosecutors. And the conversation between L.P. and his teachers was informal and spontaneous. The teachers asked L.P. about his injuries immediately upon discovering them, in the informal setting of a preschool lunchroom and classroom, and they did so precisely as any concerned citizen would talk to a child who might be the victim of abuse. This was nothing like the formalized station-house questioning in Crawfordor the police interrogation and battery affidavit in Hammon.
L.P.'s age fortifies our conclusion that the statements in question were not[*2182] testimonial. Statements by very young children will rarely, if ever, implicate the Confrontation Clause. Few preschool students understand the details of our criminal justice system. Rather, "[r]esearch on children's understanding of the legal system finds that" young children "have little understanding of prosecution." Brief for American Professional Society on the Abuse of Children as Amicus Curiae7, and n. 5 (collecting sources). And Clark does not dispute those findings. Thus, it is extremely unlikely that a 3-year-old child in L.P.'s position would intend his statements to be a substitute for trial testimony. On the contrary, a young child in these circumstances would simply want the abuse to end, would want to protect other victims, or would have no discernible purpose at all.
As a historical matter, moreover, there is strong evidence that statements made in circumstances similar to those facing L.P. and his teachers were admissible at common law. See Lyon & LaMagna, The History of Children's Hearsay: From Old Bailey to Post-Davis,82 Ind. L.J. 1029, 1030 (2007); see also id.,at 1041-1044(examining child rape cases from 1687 to 1788); J. Langbein, The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial 239 (2003) ("The Old Bailey" court in 18th-century London "tolerated flagrant hearsay in rape prosecutions involving a child victim who was not competent to testify because she was too young to appreciate the significance of her oath"). And when 18th-century courts excluded statements of this sort, see, e.g., King v. Brasier,1 Leach 199, 168 Eng. Rep. 202 (K.B. 1779), they appeared to do so because the child should have been ruled competent to testify, not because the statements were otherwise inadmissible. See Lyon & LaMagna, supra,at 1053-1054. It is thus highly doubtful that statements like L.P.'s ever would have been understood to raise Confrontation Clause concerns. Neither Crawfordnor any of the cases that it has produced has mounted evidence that the adoption of the Confrontation Clause was understood to require the exclusion of evidence that was regularly admitted in criminal cases at the time of the founding. Certainly, the statements in this case are nothing like the notorious use of ex parteexamination in Sir Walter Raleigh's trial for treason, which we have frequently identified as "the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed." Crawford,541 U.S., at 50, 124 S.Ct. 1354; see also Bryant,562 U.S., at 358, 131 S.Ct. 1143.
Finally, although we decline to adopt a rule that statements to individuals who are not law enforcement officers are categorically outside the Sixth Amendment, the fact that L.P. was speaking to his teachers remains highly relevant. Courts must evaluate challenged statements in context, and part of that context is the questioner's identity. See id.,at 369, 131 S.Ct. 1143. Statements made to someone who is not principally charged with uncovering and prosecuting criminal behavior are significantly less likely to be testimonial than statements given to law enforcement officers. See, e.g., Giles,554 U.S., at 376, 128 S.Ct. 2678. It is common sense that the relationship between a student and his teacher is very different from that between a citizen and the police. We do not ignore that reality. In light of these circumstances, the Sixth Amendment did not prohibit the State from introducing L.P.'s statements at trial.
III
Clark's efforts to avoid this conclusion are all off-base. He emphasizes Ohio's mandatory reporting obligations, in an attempt to equate L.P.'s teachers with the police and their caring questions with[*2183] official interrogations. But the comparison is inapt. The teachers' pressing concern was to protect L.P. and remove him from harm's way. Like all good teachers, they undoubtedly would have acted with the same purpose whether or not they had a state-law duty to report abuse. And mandatory reporting statutes alone cannot convert a conversation between a concerned teacher and her student into a law enforcement mission aimed primarily at gathering evidence for a prosecution.
It is irrelevant that the teachers' questions and their duty to report the matter had the natural tendency to result in Clark's prosecution. The statements at issue in Davisand Bryantsupported the defendants' convictions, and the police always have an obligation to ask questions to resolve ongoing emergencies. Yet, we held in those cases that the Confrontation Clause did not prohibit introduction of the statements because they were not primarily intended to be testimonial. Thus, Clark is also wrong to suggest that admitting L.P.'s statements would be fundamentally unfair given that Ohio law does not allow incompetent children to testify. In any Confrontation Clause case, the individual who provided the out-of-court statement is not available as an in-court witness, but the testimony is admissible under an exception to the hearsay rules and is probative of the defendant's guilt. The fact that the witness is unavailable because of a different rule of evidence does not change our analysis.
Finally, Clark asks us to shift our focus from the context of L.P.'s conversation with his teachers to the jury's perception of those statements. Because, in his view, the "jury treated L.P.'s accusation as the functional equivalent of testimony," Clark argues that we must prohibit its introduction. Brief for Respondent 42. Our Confrontation Clause decisions, however, do not determine whether a statement is testimonial by examining whether a jury would view the statement as the equivalent of in-court testimony. The logic of this argument, moreover, would lead to the conclusion that virtually all out-of-court statements offered by the prosecution are testimonial. The prosecution is unlikely to offer out-of-court statements unless they tend to support the defendant's guilt, and all such statements could be viewed as a substitute for in-court testimony. We have never suggested, however, that the Confrontation Clause bars the introduction of all out-of-court statements that support the prosecution's case. Instead, we ask whether a statement was given with the "primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony." Bryant, supra,at 358, 131 S.Ct. 1143. Here, the answer is clear: L.P.'s statements to his teachers were not testimonial.
IV
We reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice SCALIA, with whom Justice GINSBURGjoins, concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the Court's holding, and with its refusal to decide two questions quite unnecessary to that holding: what effect Ohio's mandatory-reporting law has in transforming a private party into a state actor for Confrontation Clause purposes, and whether a more permissive Confrontation Clause test-one less likely to hold the statements testimonial-should apply to interrogations by private actors. The statements here would not be testimonial[*2184] under the usual test applicable to informal police interrogation.
L.P.'s primary purpose here was certainly not to invoke the coercive machinery of the State against Clark. His age refutes the notion that he is capable of forming such a purpose. At common law, young children were generally considered incompetent to take oaths, and were therefore unavailable as witnesses unless the court determined the individual child to be competent. Lyon & LaMagna, The History of Children's Hearsay: From Old Bailey to Post-Davis,82 Ind. L.J. 1029, 1030-1031 (2007). The inconsistency of L.P.'s answers-making him incompetent to testify here-is hardly unusual for a child of his age. And the circumstances of L.P.'s statements objectively indicate that even if he could, as an abstract matter, form such a purpose, he did not. Nor did the teachers have the primary purpose of establishing facts for later prosecution. Instead, they sought to ensure that they did not deliver an abused child back into imminent harm. Nor did the conversation have the requisite solemnity necessary for testimonial statements. A 3-year-old was asked questions by his teachers at school. That is far from the surroundings adequate to impress upon a declarant the importance of what he is testifying to.
That is all that is necessary to decide the case, and all that today's judgment holds.
I write separately, however, to protest the Court's shoveling of fresh dirt upon the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation so recently rescued from the grave in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). For several decades before that case, we had been allowing hearsay statements to be admitted against a criminal defendant if they bore " 'indicia of reliability.' " Ohio v. Roberts,448 U.S. 56, 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980). Prosecutors, past and present, love that flabby test. Crawfordsought to bring our application of the Confrontation Clause back to its original meaning, which was to exclude unconfronted statements made by witnesses-i.e.,statements that were testimonial. 541 U.S., at 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354. We defined testimony as a " 'solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact,' " ibid.-in the context of the Confrontation Clause, a fact "potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution," Davis v. Washington,547 U.S. 813, 822, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006).
Crawfordremains the law. But when else has the categorical overruling, the thorough repudiation, of an earlier line of cases been described as nothing more than "adopt[ing] a different approach," ante, at 2179 -as though Crawfordis only a matter of twiddle-dum twiddle-dee preference, and the old, pre-Crawford"approach" remains available? The author unabashedly displays his hostility to Crawfordand its progeny, perhaps aggravated by inability to muster the votes to overrule them. Crawford"does not rank on the [author of the opinion's] top-ten list of favorite precedents-and ... the [author] could not restrain [himself] from saying (and saying and saying) so." Harris v. Quinn,573 U.S. ----, ----, 134 S.Ct. 2618, 2652-2653, 189 L.Ed.2d 620 (2014)(KAGAN, J., dissenting).
But snide detractions do no harm; they are just indications of motive. Dicta on legal points, however, can do harm, because though they are not binding they can mislead. Take, for example, the opinion's statement that the primary-purpose test is merely oneof several heretofore unmentioned conditions ("necessary, but not always sufficient") that must be satisfied before the Clause's protections apply. Ante, at 2180 - 2181. That is absolutely[*2185] false, and has no support in our opinions. The Confrontation Clause categorically entitles a defendant to be confronted with the witnesses against him; and the primary-purpose test sorts out, among the many people who interact with the police informally, who is acting as a witness and who is not. Those who fall into the former category bear testimony, and are therefore acting as "witnesses," subject to the right of confrontation. There are no other mysterious requirements that the Court declines to name.
The opinion asserts that future defendants, and future Confrontation Clause majorities, must provide "evidence that the adoption of the Confrontation Clause was understood to require the exclusion of evidence that was regularly admitted in criminal cases at the time of the founding."Ante,at 2182. This dictum gets the burden precisely backwards-which is of course precisely the idea. Defendants may invoke their Confrontation Clause rights once they have established that the state seeks to introduce testimonial evidence against them in a criminal case without unavailability of the witness and a previous opportunity to cross-examine. The burden is upon the prosecutor who seeks to introduce evidence overthis bar to prove a long-established practice of introducing specifickinds of evidence, such as dying declarations, see Crawford, supra,at 56, n. 6, 124 S.Ct. 1354, for which cross-examination was not typically necessary. A suspicious mind (or even one that is merely not naïve) might regard this distortion as the first step in an attempt to smuggle longstanding hearsay exceptions back into the Confrontation Clause-in other words, an attempt to return to Ohio v. Roberts.
But the good news is that there are evidently not the votes to return to that halcyon era for prosecutors; and that dicta, even calculated dicta, are nothing but dicta. They are enough, however, combined with the peculiar phenomenon of a Supreme Court opinion's aggressive hostility to precedent that it purports to be applying, to prevent my joining the writing for the Court. I concur only in the judgment.
Justice THOMAS, concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the Court that Ohio mandatory reporters are not agents of law enforcement, that statements made to private persons or by very young children will rarely implicate the Confrontation Clause, and that the admission of the statements at issue here did not implicate that constitutional provision. I nonetheless cannot join the majority's analysis. In the decade since we first sought to return to the original meaning of the Confrontation Clause, see Crawford v. Washington,541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), we have carefully reserved consideration of that Clause's application to statements made to private persons for a case in which it was squarely presented. See, e.g.,Michigan v. Bryant,562 U.S. 344, 357, n. 3, 131 S.Ct. 1143, 179 L.Ed.2d 93 (2011).
This is that case; yet the majority does not offer clear guidance on the subject, declaring only that "the primary purpose test is a necessary, but not always sufficient, condition" for a statement to fall within the scope of the Confrontation Clause. Ante,at 2180 - 2181. The primary purpose test, however, is just as much "an exercise in fiction ... disconnected from history" for statements made to private persons as it is for statements made to agents of law enforcement, if not more so. See Bryant, supra,at 379, 131 S.Ct. 1143(THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment) (internal quotation marks omitted). I would not apply it here. Nor would I leave the resolution of this important question in doubt.
[*2186] Instead, I would use the same test for statements to private persons that I have employed for statements to agents of law enforcement, assessing whether those statements bear sufficient indicia of solemnity to qualify as testimonial. See Crawford, supra, at 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354; Davis v. Washington,547 U.S. 813, 836-837, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006)(THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). This test is grounded in the history of the common-law right to confrontation, which "developed to target particular practices that occurred under the English bail and committal statutes passed during the reign of Queen Mary, namely, the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parteexaminations as evidence against the accused." Id.,at 835, 126 S.Ct. 2266(internal quotation marks omitted). Reading the Confrontation Clause in light of this history, we have interpreted the accused's right to confront "the witnesses against him," U.S. Const., Amdt. 6, as the right to confront those who "bear testimony" against him, Crawford,541 U.S., at 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354(relying on the ordinary meaning of "witness"). And because "[t]estimony ... is ... a solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact," ibid.(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted), an analysis of statements under the Clause must turn in part on their solemnity, Davis, supra,at 836, 126 S.Ct. 2266(opinion of THOMAS, J.).
I have identified several categories of extrajudicial statements that bear sufficient indicia of solemnity to fall within the original meaning of testimony. Statements "contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions" easily qualify. White v. Illinois,502 U.S. 346, 365, 112 S.Ct. 736, 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992)(THOMAS, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). And statements not contained in such materials may still qualify if they were obtained in "a formalized dialogue"; after the issuance of the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona,384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); while in police custody; or in an attempt to evade confrontation. Davis, supra,at 840, 126 S.Ct. 2266(opinion of THOMAS, J.); see also Bryant,562 U.S., at 379, 131 S.Ct. 1143(same) (summarizing and applying test). That several of these factors seem inherently inapplicable to statements made to private persons does not mean that the test is unsuitable for analyzing such statements. All it means is that statements made to private persons rarely resemble the historical abuses that the common-law right to confrontation developed to address, and it is those practices that the test is designed to identify.
Here, L.P.'s statements do not bear sufficient indicia of solemnity to qualify as testimonial. They were neither contained in formalized testimonial materials nor obtained as the result of a formalized dialogue initiated by police. Instead, they were elicited during questioning by L.P.'s teachers at his preschool. Nor is there any indication that L.P.'s statements were offered at trial to evade confrontation. To the contrary, the record suggests that the prosecution would have produced L.P. to testify had he been deemed competent to do so. His statements bear no "resemblance to the historical practices that the Confrontation Clause aimed to eliminate." Ibid.The admission of L.P.'s extrajudicial statements thus does not implicate the Confrontation Clause.
I respectfully concur in the judgment.
Like the Ohio courts, we identify Clark's victims and their mother by their initials.
In fact, the teachers and a social worker who had come to the school werereluctant to release L.P. into Clark's care after the boy identified Clark as his abuser. But after a brief "stare-down" with the social worker, Clark bolted out the door with L.P., and social services were not able to locate the children until the next day. App. 92-102, 150-151.