confrontation clause (California) · Go Syfert
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confrontation clause in California

1,260 California opinions name it 5 courts 1967–2026 355 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (80)

CaseFollowedCited
Crawford v. Washingtongreen
scotus · 2004 · cited in 406 California opinions naming this issue, 2004–2026
2 sentences

2026(Ibid.) Second, if the hearsay statement is offered by the prosecution and would pose a Confrontation Clause violation under Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 , the court determines whether the statement is “testimonial” in character.

2026In Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 68 (Crawford), the United States Supreme Court held that the confrontation clause of the federal Constitution generally bars the admission of “testimonial” hearsay when offered by the prosecution against a criminal defendant without a showing of witness “unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” (See Valencia, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 830 .) To determine the admissibility of out-of-court statements, courts “engage in a two- step analysis.

141406
Davis v. Washingtongreen
scotus · 2006 · cited in 133 California opinions naming this issue, 2006–2026
2 sentences

2026The Confrontation Clause Applies to Testimonial Statements Only In Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. 36 , the Supreme Court held the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment “bars ‘admission of testimonial 6 It appears that after the trial court ruled the video was admissible in its entirety, the prosecutor may have had second thoughts about whether the statements made by individuals other than Angelo were admissible under the exceptions to the hearsay rule of Evidence Code sections 1240 and 1250. 12 statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the d

2026“The Crawford court ‘“dramatically departed’” from confrontation clause precedent, which had generally permitted statements of unavailable 8 Lara also refers to the California Constitution but includes no separate analysis of its provisions or their application here. 11 witnesses to be admitted at trial so long as these statements were reliable enough.” (People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169 , 1195.) Instead, “Crawford held the confrontation clause ‘prohibits “admission of testimonial statements of . . . witness[es] who did not appear at trial unless [the witness] was unavailable to testify, a

52133
People v. Cagegreen
cal · 2007 · cited in 88 California opinions naming this issue, 2007–2026
2 sentences

2026Prior to Crawford, the admission at trial of a witness’s or declarant’s hearsay statements did not violate the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment if the witness or declarant was unavailable and the statements had adequate “ ‘indicia of reliability,’ ” meaning they fell within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” or bore “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” (Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 66 , overruled by Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. 36 .) In Crawford, the high court “announced a new standard for determining when the 94 confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment prohibits

2025Rubio’s argument that admission of Celina’s journal entry violated his right to confrontation fails because he has not shown Celina’s statements in the entry were testimonial under Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 68-69 , which requires that “the statement must have been given and taken primarily for the purpose ascribed to testimony—to establish or prove some past fact for possible use in a criminal trial.” (People v. Cage (2007) 40 Cal.4th 965, 984 , italics omitted; see People v. Lopez (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1028, 1065-1066 [murder victim’s “recording of the day’s events in her private

5188
Ohio v. Robertsred
scotus · 1980 · cited in 85 California opinions naming this issue, 1981–2026
2 sentences

2026Prior to Crawford, the admission at trial of a witness’s or declarant’s hearsay statements did not violate the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment if the witness or declarant was unavailable and the statements had adequate “ ‘indicia of reliability,’ ” meaning they fell within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” or bore “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” (Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 66 , overruled by Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. 36 .) In Crawford, the high court “announced a new standard for determining when the 94 confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment prohibits

2017For many years, the confrontation clause barred the admission of any out-of-court statement admitted for its truth if the hearsay declarant was not available for cross-examination, unless the statement bore "adequate 'indicia of reliability' "-that is, unless (1) the evidence fell within a "firmly rooted hearsay *28 exception," or (2) the evidence otherwise had "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." ( Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56 , 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 , overruled by Crawford , supra , 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 .) In 2004, Crawford dramatically reshaped the con

3785
Delaware v. Van Arsdallgreen
scotus · 1986 · cited in 76 California opinions naming this issue, 1991–2026
2 sentences

2026Van Arsdall held that whether a Confrontation Clause violation is harmless “depends upon a host of factors,” but identified five specific factors that are “readily accessible to reviewing courts”: (1) “the importance of the witness’ testimony in the prosecution’s case,” (2) “whether the testimony was cumulative,” (3) “the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points,” (4) “the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted,” and (5) “the overall strength of the prosecution’s case.” (Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 684 .) Her

2026(Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at pp. 678-679.) We next address the People’s contention that no Confrontation Clause violation occurred because defendant could have questioned the deputy who told Snyder to “Google” defendant “and watch the video” and could have questioned the person on the radio who “‘said the same thing’” as Deputy Kabluyen and told him they were calling medical attention for defendant despite his denial “‘so when he does it again.’” That defendant could have asked other witnesses about the 2015 incident to attack the deputies’ credibility is beside the point.

3376
People v. Sanchezgreen
cal · 2016 · cited in 119 California opinions naming this issue, 2016–2026
2 sentences

2026Absent a confrontation clause violation, we evaluate prejudice stemming from the allowance of expert testimony in violation of Sanchez under the standard set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 (Watson), which requires reversal if “it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.” (Id. at p. 836; see also Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 698 [improper admission of nontestimonial hearsay 16 Although we reject the application of the confrontation clause to Kelly hearings, we express no opinion as to whet

2026Absent a confrontation clause violation, we evaluate prejudice stemming from the allowance of expert testimony in violation of Sanchez under the standard set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 (Watson), which requires reversal if “it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.” (Id. at p. 836; see also Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 698 [improper admission of nontestimonial hearsay 16 Although we reject the application of the confrontation clause to Kelly hearings, we express no opinion as to whet

30119
Chapman v. Californiayellow
scotus · 1967 · cited in 82 California opinions naming this issue, 1967–2026
2 sentences

2026J. (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 , asking whether “it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.” “However, if the improperly admitted hearsay is also testimonial within the meaning of the high court’s confrontation clause jurisprudence (see, e.g., Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at pp. 68-69), the error is assessed under the federal constitutional standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 , 24 . . . .” (People v. Valencia (2021) 11 Cal.5th 818, 840 .) As the high court explained, the beneficiary of such an e

2026At the conclusion of the evidence, the court revisited that ruling and reaffirmed its ruling on the admissibility of the statements made during the Perkins operation because they showed a conspiracy. (i) Standards of Review and Prejudice “We review a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion.” (People v. Ng (2022) 13 Cal.5th 448, 540 , citing People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 725 .) Where evidence is erroneously admitted as a matter of state law, the test for harmless error is set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson).) “However,

2982
People v. Quartermaingreen
cal · 1997 · cited in 58 California opinions naming this issue, 2008–2026
2 sentences

2026(Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673 , 678-679 (Van Arsdall).) The Supreme Court has held that a violation of the confrontation clause occurs when a defendant is barred “from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness, and thereby ‘to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors . . . could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.’” (Id. at p. 680.) 13 However, trial courts “retain wide latitude insofar as the [c]onfrontation [c]lause is concerned to impose reasonable lim

2026(See, e.g., People v. Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 623 [“notwithstanding the confrontation clause, a trial court may restrict” examination of witnesses on the grounds stated in Evidence Code section 352]; see also People v. Jones, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 305 .) Allen was not precluded from trying to prove the cause of M.B.’s death was a fall due to her diabetic condition.

2358
California v. Greengreen
scotus · 1970 · cited in 41 California opinions naming this issue, 1971–2024
2 sentences

2016(Roberto V., supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1373-1374.) We apply the standards of Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. 36 , which clarify that the confrontation clause "does not bar admission of a statement so long as the declarant is present at trial to defend or explain it." (Id. at p. 59, fn. 9; California v. Green, supra, 399 U.S. at pp. 158, 168; People v. Cage (2007) 40 Cal.4th 965, 991 .) Doe was present at trial and her prior statements were admissible under a state law exception to the hearsay rule, Evidence Code section 1360.

2015(Id. at p. 59.)” (People v. Lopez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 569, 576 .) 19 Jane Doe did, in fact, testify at trial, which would ordinarily foreclose a confrontation clause challenge to the admission of testimonial hearsay. “[W]hen the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements.” (Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 59, fn. 9 , citing California v. Green (1970) 399 U.S. 149, 162 (Green); see also People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 413 .) However, defendant contends Jane Doe te

2241
Maryland v. Craiggreen
scotus · 1990 · cited in 39 California opinions naming this issue, 1992–2025
2 sentences

2023Defendant is correct that, as a general rule, the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees defendants “a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact.” (Coy v. Iowa (1988) 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (Coy); but see Maryland v. Craig (1990) 497 U.S. 836, 850 (Craig) [Sixth Amendment’s preference for face-to-face confrontation gives way when “necessary to further an important public policy” and “where the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured”].) In this case, we need not delve into Craig’s public policy exception beca

2023Defendant is correct that, as a general rule, the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees defendants “a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact.” (Coy v. Iowa (1988) 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (Coy); but see Maryland v. Craig (1990) 497 U.S. 836, 850 (Craig) [Sixth Amendment’s preference for face-to-face confrontation gives way when “necessary to further an important public policy” and “where the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured”].) In this case, we need not delve into Craig’s public policy exception beca

2139
Michigan v. Bryantgreen
scotus · 2011 · cited in 46 California opinions naming this issue, 2011–2026
2 sentences

2026“The confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that ‘[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right … to be confronted with the witnesses against him.’ ” (People v. Fletcher (1996) 13 Cal.4th 451, 455 .) In Crawford, the United States Supreme Court “held that, in general, admission of ‘testimonial’ statements of a witness who was not subject to cross-examination at trial violates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation, unless the witness is unavailable, and t

2023Defendant’s counsel did, however, argue that defendant “was not given a full and fair opportunity to cross-examine . . . [the CI] at trial.” We find this sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal. 11 In Perkins, the United States Supreme Court held “that an undercover law enforcement officer posing as a fellow inmate need not give Miranda [v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 ] warnings to an incarcerated suspect before asking questions that may elicit an incriminating response.” (Perkins, supra, 496 U.S. at p. 300 .) 18 In any event, the admission of defendant’s conversation with the CI did not i

2046
People v. Lopezgreen
cal · 2012 · cited in 43 California opinions naming this issue, 2012–2026
2 sentences

2024In short, while Sims’s argument suggests that every criminalist involved in the processing of forensic evidence must testify to comport with the confrontation clause, neither Lopez nor Ogaz supports his position.9 We 9 To the contrary, in Lopez, a lab assistant, Brian Constantino, “prepared the [blood] sample for testing,” and “a second analyst, Jorge Peña, prepared the sample and conducted a blood-alcohol analysis by means of a gas chromatograph.” (Lopez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 598 (dis. opn. of Liu, J.).) Yet, our high court found no confrontation clause violation although neither Constanti

2022There is no “degree of formality or solemnity” (Lopez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 581 ) in a conversation between two inmates on 4 Additionally, the confrontation clause “does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.” (Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 59, fn. 9 .) This aspect of the analysis, however, is not at issue here; there is no dispute that Navarrette’s statements to the informant were offered for their truth. 7 a jail recreation yard, even if one of those inmates is secretly an informant.

2043
People v. Reddgreen
cal · 2010 · cited in 41 California opinions naming this issue, 2012–2026
2 sentences

2026(See People v. Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 730 [defendant “did not raise an objection below based upon the confrontation clause, and therefore has forfeited this claim”].) Averill suggests that this court should exercise its discretion to consider the claim of error despite forfeiture because the admission of Griego’s statements affected his substantial rights.

2025This objection “presented legal issues different from those underlying an objection that the admission of testimony would violate the confrontation clause.” (Redd, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 730, fn. 19 .) The authorities defendant raises in reply do not persuade us otherwise.

2041
People v. Fletchergreen
cal · 1996 · cited in 40 California opinions naming this issue, 2000–2026
2 sentences

2026“The confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that ‘[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right … to be confronted with the witnesses against him.’ ” (People v. Fletcher (1996) 13 Cal.4th 451, 455 .) In Crawford, the United States Supreme Court “held that, in general, admission of ‘testimonial’ statements of a witness who was not subject to cross-examination at trial violates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation, unless the witness is unavailable, and t

2025A criminal defendant has a “fundamental constitutional right to a fair opportunity to present a defense.” (Crane v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 683, 687 .) “Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment [citation], or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, [citations], the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’ ” (Id. at p. 690.) The confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, applicable to the states through the due process clause o

1940
Barber v. Pageyellow
scotus · 1968 · cited in 38 California opinions naming this issue, 1968–2026
2 sentences

2026(Pointer v. Texas (1965) 380 U.S. 400, 403 .) “[T]here has traditionally been an exception to the confrontation requirement where a witness is unavailable and has given testimony at previous judicial proceedings against the same defendant which was subject to cross-examination by that defendant.” (Barber v. Page (1968) 390 U.S. 719, 722 .) When prior testimony is at issue, “the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” (Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 68 .) “This traditional exception is codified in the Calif

2025Code, § 686.) It is equally well settled that the right of cross-examination is the primary interest secured by the confrontation guarantee and an essential safeguard of a fair trial.” (People v. Brock (1985) 38 Cal.3d 180 , 188-189.) Accordingly, “to deprive an accused of the right to cross-examine the witnesses against him is [also] a denial of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process of law.” (Pointer v. Texas (1965) 380 U.S. 400, 405 .) “Although important, the constitutional right of confrontation is not absolute.” (People v. Herrera (2010) 49 Cal.4th 613, 621 (Herrera).) “[T]h

1838
Kentucky v. Stincergreen
scotus · 1987 · cited in 23 California opinions naming this issue, 1997–2026
1823
Williams v. Illinoisred
scotus · 2012 · cited in 66 California opinions naming this issue, 2012–2025
2 sentences

2014(See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (2009) 557 U.S. 305, 310, 324 [ 129 S.Ct. 2527 , 174 L.Ed.2d 314 ] [evidence certificates prepared by laboratory analyst attesting substance was cocaine were testimonial; the statements “prepared specifically for use at petitioner’s trial—were testimony against petitioner, and the analysts were subject to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment”]; Bullcoming v. New Mexico (2011) 564 U.S. __ [ 131 S.Ct. 2705 , 180 L.Ed.2d 610 ] [certified blood alcohol report prepared by nontestifying laboratory analyst was testimonial]; but see Williams v. Illinois (2012) 56

2014(See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (2009) 557 U.S. 305, 310, 324 [ 129 S.Ct. 2527 , 174 L.Ed.2d 314 ] [evidence certificates prepared by laboratory analyst attesting substance was cocaine were testimonial; the statements “prepared specifically for use at petitioner’s trial—were testimony against petitioner, and the analysts were subject to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment”]; Bullcoming v. New Mexico (2011) 564 U.S. __ [ 131 S.Ct. 2705 , 180 L.Ed.2d 610 ] [certified blood alcohol report prepared by nontestifying laboratory analyst was testimonial]; but see Williams v. Illinois (2012) 56

1766
Bruton v. United Statesgreen
scotus · 1968 · cited in 63 California opinions naming this issue, 1969–2024
2 sentences

2024“In Bruton, the United States Supreme Court held that the admission into evidence at a joint trial of a nontestifying codefendant’s confession implicating the defendant violates the defendant’s right to cross-examination guaranteed by the confrontation clause, even if the jury is instructed to disregard the confession in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant.” (People v. Burney (2009) 47 Cal. 4th 203, 230 ; Bruton, supra, 391 U.S. at pp. 127-128, 135-137.) People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 is the “state analogue” to Bruton.

2020In Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 , 127-128, 137, as later limited by Richardson v. Marsh (1987) 481 U.S. 200 , 208-209, the United States Supreme Court held that the admission into evidence at a joint trial of a nontestifying codefendant’s confession incriminating the defendant on its face violates the defendant’s right to cross-examination guaranteed by the confrontation clause, even if the jury is instructed to disregard the confession in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant.

1763
People v. Dungogreen
cal · 2012 · cited in 50 California opinions naming this issue, 2013–2025
2 sentences

2018(See id . at pp. 627, 147 Cal.Rptr.3d 527 , 286 P.3d 442 (conc. opn. of Werdegar, J.); id . at p. 635, fn. 3, 147 Cal.Rptr.3d 527 , 286 P.3d 442 (dis. opn. of Corrigan, J.).) However, the Dungo court concluded the evidence upon which the expert relied-the autopsy report of another pathologist-did not violate the confrontation clause because the report was not testimonial. ( Dungo , at pp. 620-621, 147 Cal.Rptr.3d 527 , 286 P.3d 442 .) The Dungo court acknowledged that the United States Supreme Court had not agreed on a definition of "testimonial," but further noted "two critical components" ha

2018(See id . at pp. 627, 147 Cal.Rptr.3d 527 , 286 P.3d 442 (conc. opn. of Werdegar, J.); id . at p. 635, fn. 3, 147 Cal.Rptr.3d 527 , 286 P.3d 442 (dis. opn. of Corrigan, J.).) However, the Dungo court concluded the evidence upon which the expert relied-the autopsy report of another pathologist-did not violate the confrontation clause because the report was not testimonial. ( Dungo , at pp. 620-621, 147 Cal.Rptr.3d 527 , 286 P.3d 442 .) The Dungo court acknowledged that the United States Supreme Court had not agreed on a definition of "testimonial," but further noted "two critical components" ha

1750
People v. Gutierrezgreen
cal · 2009 · cited in 33 California opinions naming this issue, 2011–2025
2 sentences

2025(Gutierrez, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 824 .) In short, even if the trial court erred in admitting E.M.’s statements to Baroni and Pisching under the confrontation clause, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given E.M.’s statements to McSherry and Spano identifying the perpetrator in terms that describe one’s romantic partner, the evidence that she was married to and living with defendant, and the strength of the physical evidence connecting defendant to the crime.

2025(See People v. Ramirez Ruiz (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 809 , 825; People v. Nelson (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1453, 1466 .) The trial court did not err by concluding Lee’s statements were not testimonial under the circumstances. “‘[S]tatements made to someone who is not principally charged with uncovering and prosecuting criminal behavior are significantly less likely to 15 be testimonial than statements given to law enforcement officers.’” (Rangel, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1214 .) This is because “the confrontation clause addresse[s] the specific concern of ‘[a]n accuser who makes a formal statement to

1633
Pointer v. Texasgreen
scotus · 1965 · cited in 40 California opinions naming this issue, 1967–2026
2 sentences

2026(Pointer v. Texas (1965) 380 U.S. 400, 403 .) “[T]here has traditionally been an exception to the confrontation requirement where a witness is unavailable and has given testimony at previous judicial proceedings against the same defendant which was subject to cross-examination by that defendant.” (Barber v. Page (1968) 390 U.S. 719, 722 .) When prior testimony is at issue, “the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” (Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 68 .) “This traditional exception is codified in the Calif

2025Code, § 686.) It is equally well settled that the right of cross-examination is the primary interest secured by the confrontation guarantee and an essential safeguard of a fair trial.” (People v. Brock (1985) 38 Cal.3d 180 , 188-189.) Accordingly, “to deprive an accused of the right to cross-examine the witnesses against him is [also] a denial of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process of law.” (Pointer v. Texas (1965) 380 U.S. 400, 405 .) “Although important, the constitutional right of confrontation is not absolute.” (People v. Herrera (2010) 49 Cal.4th 613, 621 (Herrera).) “[T]h

1440
People v. Thomasyellow
calctapp · 2005 · cited in 36 California opinions naming this issue, 2007–2022
2 sentences

2022Defendant points out that the decisional law at the time provided that an expert witness could testify as to the material that forms the basis of his or her opinion, even if it would otherwise be inadmissible. ( Gardeley, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 618-619; People v. Thomas (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1209-1210 (Thomas).) Defendant further notes that prior decisional law also held that because such testimony is not offered for the truth of the matter, but rather to explain the gang expert’s testimony, it did not violate the confrontation clause.

2020(See People v. Hill (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1104 , 1127-1128 (Hill); People v. Sisneros (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 142 , 153-154; People v. Cooper (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 731 , 746-747; People v. Fulcher (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 41, 57 ; People v. Thomas (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1202 , 1209-1210.) Subsequently, in Williams, the high court held in a four- one-four decision that a lab technician’s testimony regarding work performed by another lab was not admitted to prove the truth of the matter and, alternatively, the underlying outside lab report, which was not admitted into evidence, was not testimonia

1436
People v. Waidlagreen
cal · 2000 · cited in 33 California opinions naming this issue, 2000–2026
2 sentences

2026Waiver of Right to Be Present “A criminal defendant, broadly stated, has a right to be personally present at trial under various provisions of law, including the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment itself; section 15 of article I of the California Constitution; and sections 977 and 1043.” (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 741 .) However, “a defendant may waive his right to be present at his trial by being disru

2026At the conclusion of the evidence, the court revisited that ruling and reaffirmed its ruling on the admissibility of the statements made during the Perkins operation because they showed a conspiracy. (i) Standards of Review and Prejudice “We review a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion.” (People v. Ng (2022) 13 Cal.5th 448, 540 , citing People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 725 .) Where evidence is erroneously admitted as a matter of state law, the test for harmless error is set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson).) “However,

1433
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusettsgreen
scotus · 2009 · cited in 50 California opinions naming this issue, 2009–2025
2 sentences

2024Analysis Stelmach’s argument that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her in limine motion centers on the assertion that defense counsel, in arguing DNA laboratory reports are not testimonial hearsay and do not implicate the confrontation clause, cited Geier, supra, 41 Cal.4th 555 , which she asserts was overruled by Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (2009) 557 U.S. 305 (Melendez-Diaz).

2024Analysis Stelmach’s argument that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her in limine motion centers on the assertion that defense counsel, in arguing DNA laboratory reports are not testimonial hearsay and do not implicate the confrontation clause, cited Geier, supra, 41 Cal.4th 555 , which she asserts was overruled by Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (2009) 557 U.S. 305 (Melendez-Diaz).

1350
Richardson v. Marshgreen
scotus · 1987 · cited in 26 California opinions naming this issue, 1992–2026
2 sentences

2022Legal Principles “There is a statutory preference for joint trials of jointly charged defendants. (§ 1098.) ‘ “The court may, in its discretion, order separate trials if, among other reasons, there is an incriminating confession by one defendant that implicates a codefendant, or if the defendants will present conflicting defenses. [Citations.] Additionally, severance may be called for when ‘there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.’ ” ’ ” (People v. M

2022Legal Principles “There is a statutory preference for joint trials of jointly charged defendants. (§ 1098.) ‘ “The court may, in its discretion, order separate trials if, among other reasons, there is an incriminating confession by one defendant that implicates a codefendant, or if the defendants will present conflicting defenses. [Citations.] Additionally, severance 5 The trial court also denied Roman’s own motion for a separate trial. 10 may be called for when ‘there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury fro

1326
Idaho v. Wrightred
scotus · 1990 · cited in 18 California opinions naming this issue, 1997–2026
1318
People v. Blackshergreen
cal · 2011 · cited in 35 California opinions naming this issue, 2013–2025
2 sentences

2022In People v. Blacksher (2011) 52 Cal.4th 769 (Blacksher), our Supreme Court, relying upon Bryant, identified six factors to consider in determining whether statements made during police questioning were for the “ ‘primary purpose of creating an out-of- court substitute for trial testimony’ that implicates the confrontation clause.” (Id. at p. 813.) They are: (1) an objective evaluation of the circumstances of the encounter and the statements and actions of the individuals involved in the encounter; (2) whether the statements were made during an ongoing emergency or under circumstances that rea

2021(Davis, at pp. 819-821, 829-830.) 12 In Blacksher, our Supreme Court “identified six factors to consider in determining whether statements made in the course of police questioning were for the ‘ “primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony” that implicates the confrontation clause.’ (Blacksher, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 813 .) These are (1) an objective evaluation of the circumstances of the encounter and the statements and actions of the individuals involved in the encounter; (2) whether the statements were made during an ongoing emergency or under circumstances t

1235
Davis v. Alaskagreen
scotus · 1974 · cited in 34 California opinions naming this issue, 1997–2025
2 sentences

2001(See Ritchie, supra, at pp. 51-54 , 107 S.Ct. 989 (opn. of Powell, J.); but see id., at pp. 61-65, 107 S.Ct. 989 (cone. opn. of Blackmun, J.); id., at pp. 66-72, 107 S.Ct. 989 (dis. opn. of Brennan, J.); Davis, supra, 415 U.S. 308, 315-321 , 94 S.Ct. 1105 , 39 L.Ed.2d 347 .) Several California decisions had concluded that, upon a showing of good cause, and after consideration of the competing interest in confidentiality, the confrontation clause might give a defendant the right to pretrial discovery, from nonparties, of a witness's otherwise privileged psychiatric records already in existence.

2001(See Ritchie, supra, at pp. 51-54 , 107 S.Ct. 989 (opn. of Powell, J.); but see id., at pp. 61-65, 107 S.Ct. 989 (cone. opn. of Blackmun, J.); id., at pp. 66-72, 107 S.Ct. 989 (dis. opn. of Brennan, J.); Davis, supra, 415 U.S. 308, 315-321 , 94 S.Ct. 1105 , 39 L.Ed.2d 347 .) Several California decisions had concluded that, upon a showing of good cause, and after consideration of the competing interest in confidentiality, the confrontation clause might give a defendant the right to pretrial discovery, from nonparties, of a witness's otherwise privileged psychiatric records already in existence.

1234
Lilly v. Virginiagreen
scotus · 1999 · cited in 25 California opinions naming this issue, 2000–2025
1225
People v. Herreragreen
cal · 2010 · cited in 24 California opinions naming this issue, 2011–2026
1224
People v. Rangelgreen
cal · 2016 · cited in 23 California opinions naming this issue, 2018–2026
1223
People v. Sisnerosgreen
calctapp · 2009 · cited in 19 California opinions naming this issue, 2011–2020
1219
Tennessee v. Streetgreen
scotus · 1985 · cited in 16 California opinions naming this issue, 1991–2020
1216
United States v. Gagnongreen
scotus · 1985 · cited in 14 California opinions naming this issue, 1997–2022
1214
People v. Lewisgreen
cal · 2006 · cited in 13 California opinions naming this issue, 2007–2025
1213
People v. Hillgreen
calctapp · 2011 · cited in 35 California opinions naming this issue, 2013–2020
2 sentences

2020(See People v. Hill (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1104 , 1127-1128 (Hill); People v. Sisneros (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 142 , 153-154; People v. Cooper (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 731 , 746-747; People v. Fulcher (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 41, 57 ; People v. Thomas (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1202 , 1209-1210.) Subsequently, in Williams, the high court held in a four- one-four decision that a lab technician’s testimony regarding work performed by another lab was not admitted to prove the truth of the matter and, alternatively, the underlying outside lab report, which was not admitted into evidence, was not testimonia

2018(See People v. Sisneros (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 142 , 153-154, 94 Cal.Rptr.3d 98 [noting the holding from Thomas in the context of a gang expert testifying about witness intimidation by the gang and the expert's consideration of the fact that an accessory refused to take the oath and testify in front of the jury; the court observed that the accessory "never offered any statement, much less a testimonial statement," and rejected the confrontation clause claim on this basis]; People v. Ramirez (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1422 , 1427, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 96 [rejecting defendant's confrontation clause claim

1135
People v. Arceogreen
calctapp · 2011 · cited in 25 California opinions naming this issue, 2013–2022
1125
People v. Ramirezgreen
calctapp · 2007 · cited in 20 California opinions naming this issue, 2011–2018
1120
Dutton v. Evansgreen
scotus · 1970 · cited in 19 California opinions naming this issue, 1971–2022
1119
People v. Bradfordgreen
cal · 1997 · cited in 16 California opinions naming this issue, 1998–2023
1116

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (8)

CaseNegativeCited
Ohio v. Robertsred
scotus · 1980 · cited in 85 California opinions naming this issue, 1981–2026
2 sentences

2026Prior to Crawford, the admission at trial of a witness’s or declarant’s hearsay statements did not violate the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment if the witness or declarant was unavailable and the statements had adequate “ ‘indicia of reliability,’ ” meaning they fell within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” or bore “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” (Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 66 , overruled by Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. 36 .) In Crawford, the high court “announced a new standard for determining when the 94 confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment prohibits

2017For many years, the confrontation clause barred the admission of any out-of-court statement admitted for its truth if the hearsay declarant was not available for cross-examination, unless the statement bore "adequate 'indicia of reliability' "-that is, unless (1) the evidence fell within a "firmly rooted hearsay *28 exception," or (2) the evidence otherwise had "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." ( Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56 , 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 , overruled by Crawford , supra , 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 .) In 2004, Crawford dramatically reshaped the con

385
Davis v. Alaskagreen
scotus · 1974 · cited in 34 California opinions naming this issue, 1997–2025
2 sentences

2001(See Ritchie, supra, at pp. 51-54 , 107 S.Ct. 989 (opn. of Powell, J.); but see id., at pp. 61-65, 107 S.Ct. 989 (cone. opn. of Blackmun, J.); id., at pp. 66-72, 107 S.Ct. 989 (dis. opn. of Brennan, J.); Davis, supra, 415 U.S. 308, 315-321 , 94 S.Ct. 1105 , 39 L.Ed.2d 347 .) Several California decisions had concluded that, upon a showing of good cause, and after consideration of the competing interest in confidentiality, the confrontation clause might give a defendant the right to pretrial discovery, from nonparties, of a witness's otherwise privileged psychiatric records already in existence.

2001(See Ritchie, supra, at pp. 51-54 , 107 S.Ct. 989 (opn. of Powell, J.); but see id., at pp. 61-65, 107 S.Ct. 989 (cone. opn. of Blackmun, J.); id., at pp. 66-72, 107 S.Ct. 989 (dis. opn. of Brennan, J.); Davis, supra, 415 U.S. 308, 315-321 , 94 S.Ct. 1105 , 39 L.Ed.2d 347 .) Several California decisions had concluded that, upon a showing of good cause, and after consideration of the competing interest in confidentiality, the confrontation clause might give a defendant the right to pretrial discovery, from nonparties, of a witness's otherwise privileged psychiatric records already in existence.

234
Williams v. Illinoisred
scotus · 2012 · cited in 66 California opinions naming this issue, 2012–2025
2 sentences

2014(See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (2009) 557 U.S. 305, 310, 324 [ 129 S.Ct. 2527 , 174 L.Ed.2d 314 ] [evidence certificates prepared by laboratory analyst attesting substance was cocaine were testimonial; the statements “prepared specifically for use at petitioner’s trial—were testimony against petitioner, and the analysts were subject to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment”]; Bullcoming v. New Mexico (2011) 564 U.S. __ [ 131 S.Ct. 2705 , 180 L.Ed.2d 610 ] [certified blood alcohol report prepared by nontestifying laboratory analyst was testimonial]; but see Williams v. Illinois (2012) 56

2014(See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (2009) 557 U.S. 305, 310, 324 [ 129 S.Ct. 2527 , 174 L.Ed.2d 314 ] [evidence certificates prepared by laboratory analyst attesting substance was cocaine were testimonial; the statements “prepared specifically for use at petitioner’s trial—were testimony against petitioner, and the analysts were subject to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment”]; Bullcoming v. New Mexico (2011) 564 U.S. __ [ 131 S.Ct. 2705 , 180 L.Ed.2d 610 ] [certified blood alcohol report prepared by nontestifying laboratory analyst was testimonial]; but see Williams v. Illinois (2012) 56

166
Bruton v. United Statesgreen
scotus · 1968 · cited in 63 California opinions naming this issue, 1969–2024
2 sentences

2024“In Bruton, the United States Supreme Court held that the admission into evidence at a joint trial of a nontestifying codefendant’s confession implicating the defendant violates the defendant’s right to cross-examination guaranteed by the confrontation clause, even if the jury is instructed to disregard the confession in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant.” (People v. Burney (2009) 47 Cal. 4th 203, 230 ; Bruton, supra, 391 U.S. at pp. 127-128, 135-137.) People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 is the “state analogue” to Bruton.

2020In Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 , 127-128, 137, as later limited by Richardson v. Marsh (1987) 481 U.S. 200 , 208-209, the United States Supreme Court held that the admission into evidence at a joint trial of a nontestifying codefendant’s confession incriminating the defendant on its face violates the defendant’s right to cross-examination guaranteed by the confrontation clause, even if the jury is instructed to disregard the confession in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant.

163
People v. Gardeleyred
cal · 1996 · cited in 42 California opinions naming this issue, 2011–2022
2 sentences

2022Defendant points out that the decisional law at the time provided that an expert witness could testify as to the material that forms the basis of his or her opinion, even if it would otherwise be inadmissible. ( Gardeley, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 618-619; People v. Thomas (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1209-1210 (Thomas).) Defendant further notes that prior decisional law also held that because such testimony is not offered for the truth of the matter, but rather to explain the gang expert’s testimony, it did not violate the confrontation clause.

2022(Sanchez, at p. 686, fn. 13.) The Sanchez court specifically disapproved of People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 618-619 (Gardeley), disapproved in Sanchez at page 686, footnote 13, inasmuch as “it suggested an expert may properly testify regarding case-specific out-of-court statements without satisfying hearsay rules.” (Sanchez, at p. 686, fn. 13.) B.

142
Maryland v. Craiggreen
scotus · 1990 · cited in 39 California opinions naming this issue, 1992–2025
2 sentences

2023Defendant is correct that, as a general rule, the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees defendants “a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact.” (Coy v. Iowa (1988) 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (Coy); but see Maryland v. Craig (1990) 497 U.S. 836, 850 (Craig) [Sixth Amendment’s preference for face-to-face confrontation gives way when “necessary to further an important public policy” and “where the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured”].) In this case, we need not delve into Craig’s public policy exception beca

2023Defendant is correct that, as a general rule, the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees defendants “a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact.” (Coy v. Iowa (1988) 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (Coy); but see Maryland v. Craig (1990) 497 U.S. 836, 850 (Craig) [Sixth Amendment’s preference for face-to-face confrontation gives way when “necessary to further an important public policy” and “where the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured”].) In this case, we need not delve into Craig’s public policy exception beca

139
Pennsylvania v. Ritchiegreen
scotus · 1987 · cited in 17 California opinions naming this issue, 1992–2026
117
People v. Taultongreen
calctapp · 2005 · cited in 14 California opinions naming this issue, 2006–2021
114

Statutes the citing opinions construe

CA § Cal. Penal Code § 187 (356) CA § Cal. Evidence Code § 352 (270) CA § Cal. Evidence Code § 1200 (197) CA § Cal. Evidence Code § 353 (137) CA § Cal. Evidence Code § 1101 (112) CA § Cal. Evidence Code § 1230 (104) CA § Cal. Evidence Code § 801 (100) CA § Cal. Evidence Code § 210 (96) CA § Cal. Evidence Code § 1240 (85) CA § Cal. Evidence Code § 1291 (83) CA § Cal. Evidence Code § 240 (78) CA § Cal. Evidence Code § 1220 (54)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 1260 (1967–2026) TX 887 (1955–2026) IL 715 (1969–2026) WA 531 (1968–2026) CT 376 (1972–2026) OH 319 (1974–2026) MA 239 (1972–2026) PA 215 (1968–2026) GA 185 (1972–2026) MI 160 (1965–2026) NY 159 (1968–2026) NM 159 (1968–2026) MS 157 (1986–2026) FL 144 (1968–2026) AZ 143 (1968–2026) WI 138 (1972–2026) LA 121 (1969–2026) TN 120 (1972–2026) MN 116 (1974–2026) NC 113 (1978–2026) NJ 112 (1968–2026) CO 111 (1976–2026) DC 105 (1978–2025) MO 103 (1973–2025) IA 99 (1971–2026) KS 96 (1969–2026) MD 93 (1969–2026) IN 85 (1971–2025) VA 78 (1985–2026) AL 78 (1980–2026) OR 75 (1954–2025) HI 72 (1969–2026) KY 69 (1977–2026) AR 63 (1970–2026) NV 61 (1970–2026) SC 54 (1988–2026) ID 52 (1971–2024) OK 52 (1980–2023) WV 51 (1978–2026) AK 51 (1968–2026) RI 51 (1972–2026) SD 40 (1971–2026) WY 40 (1972–2026) UT 39 (1980–2025) ME 32 (1978–2026) MT 32 (1980–2026) NE 31 (1970–2026) VT 26 (1984–2018) DE 25 (1974–2026) NH 24 (1983–2024) ND 18 (1979–2020) VI 8 (2010–2026) PR 3 (1991–2024)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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