confrontation clause in California

2026Confrontation Clause Lara argues the admission of Enrique’s statement in the emergency room violates the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution,8 which provides that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .” Unlike his argument regarding spontaneous statements, Lara does point to an intervening change in law regarding the confrontation clause—specifically, Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 , which was decided after Lara’s trial and direct appeal.

2026Like any other hearsay evidence, it must be properly admitted through an applicable hearsay exception.” (Id. at p. 684, fn. omitted.) Moreover, where a “prosecution expert seeks to relate testimonial hearsay, there is a confrontation clause violation unless (1) there is a showing of unavailability and (2) the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” (Id. at p. 686; see generally Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 .) At least one California Court of Appeal has concluded that Sanchez extends to case-specific hearsay admitted through cross-examination of expert witnesses.

2026J. confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment prohibits the use of hearsay evidence.” (People v. Cage (2007) 40 Cal.4th 965, 969 (Cage).) Crawford held that the confrontation clause prohibits the admission of hearsay that is testimonial “if the declarant neither takes the stand at trial nor was otherwise available for cross-examination by the accused.” (Cage, at p. 969.) Hearsay that is nontestimonial does not implicate the confrontation clause and is unaffected by Crawford.

2025Rubio’s argument that admission of Celina’s journal entry violated his right to confrontation fails because he has not shown Celina’s statements in the entry were testimonial under Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 68-69 , which requires that “the statement must have been given and taken primarily for the purpose ascribed to testimony—to establish or prove some past fact for possible use in a criminal trial.” (People v. Cage (2007) 40 Cal.4th 965, 984 , italics omitted; see People v. Lopez (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1028, 1065-1066 [murder victim’s “recording of the day’s events in her private

2026“The Crawford court ‘“dramatically departed’” from confrontation clause precedent, which had generally permitted statements of unavailable 8 Lara also refers to the California Constitution but includes no separate analysis of its provisions or their application here. 11 witnesses to be admitted at trial so long as these statements were reliable enough.” (People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169 , 1195.) Instead, “Crawford held the confrontation clause ‘prohibits “admission of testimonial statements of . . . witness[es] who did not appear at trial unless [the witness] was unavailable to testify, a

2025This suggests E.M.’s first statement, and by necessity her second statement inside the business’s office, were testimonial. ( Davis, supra, 547 U.S. at pp. 829–830; Roberts, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 478; Kerley, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at pp. 551–552.) However, as discussed below, we need not decide whether the statements were admitted in violation of the confrontation clause because assuming so, the error is harmless. b.

2026Prior to Crawford, the admission at trial of a witness’s or declarant’s hearsay statements did not violate the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment if the witness or declarant was unavailable and the statements had adequate “ ‘indicia of reliability,’ ” meaning they fell within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” or bore “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” (Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 66 , overruled by Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. 36 .) In Crawford, the high court “announced a new standard for determining when the 94 PEOPLE v. BERTSCH and HRONIS Opinion of the Court by

2024Code, § 1291, subd. (a)(2).) [The California Supreme Court has] held this exception permits an unavailable witness’s preliminary hearing testimony to be admitted at trial. [Citations.]” (Wilson, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 290 .) The United States Supreme Court has held that “ ‘ “[a] witness is not ‘unavailable’ for purposes of . . . the exception to the confrontation requirement unless the prosecutorial authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain his [or her] presence at trial.” ’ (Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 74 .) California law is in accord.

2026(Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at pp. 678-679.) We next address the People’s contention that no Confrontation Clause violation occurred because defendant could have questioned the deputy who told Snyder to “Google” defendant “and watch the video” and could have questioned the person on the radio who “‘said the same thing’” as Deputy Kabluyen and told him they were calling medical attention for defendant despite his denial “‘so when he does it again.’” That defendant could have asked other witnesses about the 2015 incident to attack the deputies’ credibility is beside the point.

2026Van Arsdall held that whether a Confrontation Clause violation is harmless “depends upon a host of factors,” but identified five specific factors that are “readily accessible to reviewing courts”: (1) “the importance of the witness’ testimony in the prosecution’s case,” (2) “whether the testimony was cumulative,” (3) “the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points,” (4) “the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted,” and (5) “the overall strength of the prosecution’s case.” (Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 684 .) Her

2026Absent a confrontation clause violation, we evaluate prejudice stemming from the allowance of expert testimony in violation of Sanchez under the standard set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 (Watson), which requires reversal if “it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.” (Id. at p. 836; see also Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 698 [improper admission of nontestimonial hearsay 16 Although we reject the application of the confrontation clause to Kelly hearings, we express no opinion as to whet

2026Absent a confrontation clause violation, we evaluate prejudice stemming from the allowance of expert testimony in violation of Sanchez under the standard set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 (Watson), which requires reversal if “it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.” (Id. at p. 836; see also Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 698 [improper admission of nontestimonial hearsay 16 Although we reject the application of the confrontation clause to Kelly hearings, we express no opinion as to whet

2026(Castaneda-Prado, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 1283.) “‘[T]he constitutionally improper denial of a defendant’s opportunity to impeach a witness for bias, like other [c]onfrontation [c]lause errors, is subject to Chapman harmless-error analysis.’ (Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 684 , citing Chapman v. California [(1967)] 386 U.S. 18, 24 [(Chapman)].) ‘The correct inquiry,’ [therefore,] ‘is whether, assuming that the damaging potential of the cross-examination were fully realized, a reviewing court might nonetheless say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’” (Castaneda-Prad

2026At the conclusion of the evidence, the court revisited that ruling and reaffirmed its ruling on the admissibility of the statements made during the Perkins operation because they showed a conspiracy. (i) Standards of Review and Prejudice “We review a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion.” (People v. Ng (2022) 13 Cal.5th 448, 540 , citing People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 725 .) Where evidence is erroneously admitted as a matter of state law, the test for harmless error is set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson).) “However,

2026(Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673 , 678–679 (Van Arsdall).) The Supreme Court has held that a violation of the confrontation clause occurs when a defendant is barred “from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness, and thereby ‘to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors . . . could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.’” (Id. at p. 680.) 13 However, trial courts “retain wide latitude insofar as the [c]onfrontation [c]lause is concerned to impose reasonable lim

2026(See People v. Quartermain, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 623–624) [“notwithstanding the confrontation clause, a trial court may restrict” examination of witnesses on the grounds stated in Evidence Code section 352].) With respect to defense counsel’s request to recall mother, even if the trial court erred in disallowing questioning her about the alleged threesome with Hernandez and Tommy, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Watson and Chapman given the substantial evidence of guilt.

2016(Roberto V., supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1373-1374.) We apply the standards of Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. 36 , which clarify that the confrontation clause "does not bar admission of a statement so long as the declarant is present at trial to defend or explain it." (Id. at p. 59, fn. 9; California v. Green, supra, 399 U.S. at pp. 158, 168; People v. Cage (2007) 40 Cal.4th 965, 991 .) Doe was present at trial and her prior statements were admissible under a state law exception to the hearsay rule, Evidence Code section 1360.

2015(Id. at p. 59.)” (People v. Lopez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 569, 576 .) 19 Jane Doe did, in fact, testify at trial, which would ordinarily foreclose a confrontation clause challenge to the admission of testimonial hearsay. “[W]hen the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements.” (Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 59, fn. 9 , citing California v. Green (1970) 399 U.S. 149, 162 (Green); see also People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 413 .) However, defendant contends Jane Doe te

2023(Maryland v. Craig (1990) 497 U.S. 836, 844, 847-850 .) “The central concern of the confrontation clause ‘is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact.’ [Citation.] This 16 concern is satisfied when the witness: (1) is physically present for his or her testimony; (2) testifies under oath; (3) is subject to cross-examination; and (4) may have his or her demeanor observed by the trier of fact.” (People v. Bharth (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 801 , 814.) Accordingly, a defe

2023(Maryland v. Craig (1990) 497 U.S. 836, 844, 847-850 .) “The central concern of the confrontation clause ‘is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact.’ [Citation.] This 16 concern is satisfied when the witness: (1) is physically present for his or her testimony; (2) testifies under oath; (3) is subject to cross-examination; and (4) may have his or her demeanor observed by the trier of fact.” (People v. Bharth (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 801 , 814.) Accordingly, a defe

2024In short, while Sims’s argument suggests that every criminalist involved in the processing of forensic evidence must testify to comport with the confrontation clause, neither Lopez nor Ogaz supports his position.9 We 9 To the contrary, in Lopez, a lab assistant, Brian Constantino, “prepared the [blood] sample for testing,” and “a second analyst, Jorge Peña, prepared the sample and conducted a blood-alcohol analysis by means of a gas chromatograph.” (Lopez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 598 (dis. opn. of Liu, J.).) Yet, our high court found no confrontation clause violation although neither Constanti

2022There is no “degree of formality or solemnity” (Lopez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 581 ) in a conversation between two inmates on 4 Additionally, the confrontation clause “does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.” (Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 59, fn. 9 .) This aspect of the analysis, however, is not at issue here; there is no dispute that Navarrette’s statements to the informant were offered for their truth. 7 a jail recreation yard, even if one of those inmates is secretly an informant.

2026“The confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that ‘[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right … to be confronted with the witnesses against him.’ ” (People v. Fletcher (1996) 13 Cal.4th 451, 455 .) In Crawford, the United States Supreme Court “held that, in general, admission of ‘testimonial’ statements of a witness who was not subject to cross-examination at trial violates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation, unless the witness is unavailable, and t

2023Defendant’s counsel did, however, argue that defendant “was not given a full and fair opportunity to cross-examine . . . [the CI] at trial.” We find this sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal. 11 In Perkins, the United States Supreme Court held “that an undercover law enforcement officer posing as a fellow inmate need not give Miranda [v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 ] warnings to an incarcerated suspect before asking questions that may elicit an incriminating response.” (Perkins, supra, 496 U.S. at p. 300 .) 18 In any event, the admission of defendant’s conversation with the CI did not i

2026“The confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that ‘[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right … to be confronted with the witnesses against him.’ ” (People v. Fletcher (1996) 13 Cal.4th 451, 455 .) In Crawford, the United States Supreme Court “held that, in general, admission of ‘testimonial’ statements of a witness who was not subject to cross-examination at trial violates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation, unless the witness is unavailable, and t

2025A criminal defendant has a “fundamental constitutional right to a fair opportunity to present a defense.” (Crane v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 683, 687 .) “Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment [citation], or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, [citations], the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’ ” (Id. at p. 690.) The confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, applicable to the states through the due process clause o

2025This objection “presented legal issues different from those underlying an objection that the admission of testimony would violate the confrontation clause.” (Redd, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 730, fn. 19 .) The authorities defendant raises in reply do not persuade us otherwise.

2024(See People v. Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 730 [defendant’s assertion that admission of out-of-court identifications violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses was forfeited by the failure to raise an objection below]; People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1028, fn. 19 [“We reiterate that defendants have forfeited this confrontation clause claim by failing to raise it below. [Citations.]”]; People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 186 [“Defendant 19 has not preserved his claim for review. . . .

2018(See id . at pp. 627, 147 Cal.Rptr.3d 527 , 286 P.3d 442 (conc. opn. of Werdegar, J.); id . at p. 635, fn. 3, 147 Cal.Rptr.3d 527 , 286 P.3d 442 (dis. opn. of Corrigan, J.).) However, the Dungo court concluded the evidence upon which the expert relied-the autopsy report of another pathologist-did not violate the confrontation clause because the report was not testimonial. ( Dungo , at pp. 620-621, 147 Cal.Rptr.3d 527 , 286 P.3d 442 .) The Dungo court acknowledged that the United States Supreme Court had not agreed on a definition of "testimonial," but further noted "two critical components" ha

2018(See id . at pp. 627, 147 Cal.Rptr.3d 527 , 286 P.3d 442 (conc. opn. of Werdegar, J.); id . at p. 635, fn. 3, 147 Cal.Rptr.3d 527 , 286 P.3d 442 (dis. opn. of Corrigan, J.).) However, the Dungo court concluded the evidence upon which the expert relied-the autopsy report of another pathologist-did not violate the confrontation clause because the report was not testimonial. ( Dungo , at pp. 620-621, 147 Cal.Rptr.3d 527 , 286 P.3d 442 .) The Dungo court acknowledged that the United States Supreme Court had not agreed on a definition of "testimonial," but further noted "two critical components" ha

2026(Pointer v. Texas (1965) 380 U.S. 400, 403 .) “[T]here has traditionally been an exception to the confrontation requirement where a witness is unavailable and has given testimony at previous judicial proceedings against the same defendant which was subject to cross- examination by that defendant.” (Barber v. Page (1968) 390 U.S. 719, 722 .) When prior testimony is at issue, “the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross- examination.” (Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 68 .) “This traditional exception is codified in the Cal

2025Code, § 686.) It is equally well settled that the right of cross-examination is the primary interest secured by the confrontation guarantee and an essential safeguard of a fair trial.” (People v. Brock (1985) 38 Cal.3d 180 , 188–189.) Accordingly, “to deprive an accused of the right to cross-examine the witnesses against him is [also] a denial of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process of law.” (Pointer v. Texas (1965) 380 U.S. 400, 405 .) “Although important, the constitutional right of confrontation is not absolute.” (People v. Herrera (2010) 49 Cal.4th 613, 621 (Herrera).) “[T]h

2025Crawford “does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.” (Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 59, fn. 9 ; accord Williams v. Illinois (2012) 567 U.S. 50 , 57–58 [the confrontation clause “has no application to out-of-court statements that are not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted”].) During his testimony, Rand first cited “an assault” for the purpose of explaining why he classified defendant as “a law violator” and how defendant came to his attention.

2020By its terms, the confrontation clause provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.) In 2004, the high court “adopted a fundamentally new interpretation of the confrontation right” (Williams, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 64 ) and held that “[w]here testimonial evidence is at issue,” the confrontation clause “demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” (Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 10 PEOPLE v. PEREZ Opinion of the Court

2024“In Bruton, the United States Supreme Court held that the admission into evidence at a joint trial of a nontestifying codefendant’s confession implicating the defendant violates the defendant’s right to cross-examination guaranteed by the confrontation clause, even if the jury is instructed to disregard the confession in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant.” (People v. Burney (2009) 47 Cal. 4th 203, 230 ; Bruton, supra, 391 U.S. at pp. 127-128, 135-137.) People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 is the “state analogue” to Bruton.

2023Moving for a separate trial, Elias asserted that because Daniel would not be testifying, this evidence (1) violates Elias’s rights under the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment, citing People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 (Aranda), Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 (Bruton), and Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 (Crawford); and (2) is inadmissible hearsay. 13 2.

2025(See People v. Ramirez Ruiz (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 809 , 825; People v. Nelson (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1453, 1466 .) The trial court did not err by concluding Lee’s statements were not testimonial under the circumstances. “‘[S]tatements made to someone who is not principally charged with uncovering and prosecuting criminal behavior are significantly less likely to 15 be testimonial than statements given to law enforcement officers.’” (Rangel, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1214 .) This is because “the confrontation clause addresse[s] the specific concern of ‘[a]n accuser who makes a formal statement to

2025(Gutierrez, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 824 .) In short, even if the trial court erred in admitting E.M.’s statements to Baroni and Pisching under the confrontation clause, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given E.M.’s statements to McSherry and Spano identifying the perpetrator in terms that describe one’s romantic partner, the evidence that she was married to and living with defendant, and the strength of the physical evidence connecting defendant to the crime.

2026(Pointer v. Texas (1965) 380 U.S. 400, 403 .) “[T]here has traditionally been an exception to the confrontation requirement where a witness is unavailable and has given testimony at previous judicial proceedings against the same defendant which was subject to cross- examination by that defendant.” (Barber v. Page (1968) 390 U.S. 719, 722 .) When prior testimony is at issue, “the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross- examination.” (Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 68 .) “This traditional exception is codified in the Cal

2025Code, § 686.) It is equally well settled that the right of cross-examination is the primary interest secured by the confrontation guarantee and an essential safeguard of a fair trial.” (People v. Brock (1985) 38 Cal.3d 180 , 188–189.) Accordingly, “to deprive an accused of the right to cross-examine the witnesses against him is [also] a denial of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process of law.” (Pointer v. Texas (1965) 380 U.S. 400, 405 .) “Although important, the constitutional right of confrontation is not absolute.” (People v. Herrera (2010) 49 Cal.4th 613, 621 (Herrera).) “[T]h

2022Defendant points out that the decisional law at the time provided that an expert witness could testify as to the material that forms the basis of his or her opinion, even if it would otherwise be inadmissible. ( Gardeley, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 618-619; People v. Thomas (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1209-1210 (Thomas).) Defendant further notes that prior decisional law also held that because such testimony is not offered for the truth of the matter, but rather to explain the gang expert’s testimony, it did not violate the confrontation clause.

2020(See People v. Hill (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1104 , 1127–1128 (Hill); People v. Sisneros (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 142 , 153–154; People v. Cooper (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 731 , 746–747; People v. Fulcher (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 41, 57 ; People v. Thomas (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1202 , 1209–1210.) Subsequently, in Williams, the high court held in a four- one-four decision that a lab technician’s testimony regarding work performed by another lab was not admitted to prove the truth of the matter and, alternatively, the underlying outside lab report, which was not admitted into evidence, was not testimonia

2024Analysis Stelmach’s argument that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her in limine motion centers on the assertion that defense counsel, in arguing DNA laboratory reports are not testimonial hearsay and do not implicate the confrontation clause, cited Geier, supra, 41 Cal.4th 555 , which she asserts was overruled by Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (2009) 557 U.S. 305 (Melendez-Diaz).

2024Analysis Stelmach’s argument that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her in limine motion centers on the assertion that defense counsel, in arguing DNA laboratory reports are not testimonial hearsay and do not implicate the confrontation clause, cited Geier, supra, 41 Cal.4th 555 , which she asserts was overruled by Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (2009) 557 U.S. 305 (Melendez-Diaz).

2025A criminal defendant has a “fundamental constitutional right to a fair opportunity to present a defense.” (Crane v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 683, 687 .) “Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment [citation], or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, [citations], the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’ ” (Id. at p. 690.) The confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, applicable to the states through the due process clause o

2024In the words of the Hammon court, the Reber line of authority incorrectly “believed the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment . . . , as interpreted in Davis v. Alaska (1974) 415 U.S. 308 . . . , required pretrial disclosure of privileged information when the defendant’s need for the information outweighed the patient’s interest in confidentiality.

2026Waiver of Right to Be Present “A criminal defendant, broadly stated, has a right to be personally present at trial under various provisions of law, including the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment itself; section 15 of article I of the California Constitution; and sections 977 and 1043.” (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 741 .) However, “a defendant may waive his right to be present at his trial by being disru

2026At the conclusion of the evidence, the court revisited that ruling and reaffirmed its ruling on the admissibility of the statements made during the Perkins operation because they showed a conspiracy. (i) Standards of Review and Prejudice “We review a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion.” (People v. Ng (2022) 13 Cal.5th 448, 540 , citing People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 725 .) Where evidence is erroneously admitted as a matter of state law, the test for harmless error is set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson).) “However,

2022In People v. Blacksher (2011) 52 Cal.4th 769 (Blacksher), our Supreme Court, relying upon Bryant, identified six factors to consider in determining whether statements made during police questioning were for the “ ‘primary purpose of creating an out-of- court substitute for trial testimony’ that implicates the confrontation clause.” (Id. at p. 813.) They are: (1) an objective evaluation of the circumstances of the encounter and the statements and actions of the individuals involved in the encounter; (2) whether the statements were made during an ongoing emergency or under circumstances that rea

2021(Davis, at pp. 819-821, 829-830.) 12 In Blacksher, our Supreme Court “identified six factors to consider in determining whether statements made in the course of police questioning were for the ‘ “primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony” that implicates the confrontation clause.’ (Blacksher, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 813 .) These are (1) an objective evaluation of the circumstances of the encounter and the statements and actions of the individuals involved in the encounter; (2) whether the statements were made during an ongoing emergency or under circumstances t

2015The trial court asked: “[E]verybody is objecting to . . . the use of the word we, right?” Defendant’s counsel said: “Correct.” 6 Moore’s counsel argued that under Aranda/Bruton and “the Lilly case” (Lilly v. Virginia (1999) 527 U.S. 116 [ 144 L.Ed.2d 117 ] (Lilly)), even if Conley’s statement was a declaration against interest, the confrontation clause (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.) barred its use against her client if it could not be redacted to eliminate any reference to him.

2015The trial court asked: “[E]verybody is objecting to . . . the use of the word we, right?” Defendant’s counsel said: “Correct.” 6 Moore’s counsel argued that under Aranda/Bruton and “the Lilly case” (Lilly v. Virginia (1999) 527 U.S. 116 [ 144 L.Ed.2d 117 ] (Lilly)), even if Conley’s statement was a declaration against interest, the confrontation clause (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.) barred its use against her client if it could not be redacted to eliminate any reference to him.

2020(See People v. Hill (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1104 , 1127–1128 (Hill); People v. Sisneros (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 142 , 153–154; People v. Cooper (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 731 , 746–747; People v. Fulcher (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 41, 57 ; People v. Thomas (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1202 , 1209–1210.) Subsequently, in Williams, the high court held in a four- one-four decision that a lab technician’s testimony regarding work performed by another lab was not admitted to prove the truth of the matter and, alternatively, the underlying outside lab report, which was not admitted into evidence, was not testimonia

2018(See People v. Sisneros (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 142 , 153-154, 94 Cal.Rptr.3d 98 [noting the holding from Thomas in the context of a gang expert testifying about witness intimidation by the gang and the expert's consideration of the fact that an accessory refused to take the oath and testify in front of the jury; the court observed that the accessory "never offered any statement, much less a testimonial statement," and rejected the confrontation clause claim on this basis]; People v. Ramirez (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1422 , 1427, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 96 [rejecting defendant's confrontation clause claim