Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 324 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. 1959). · Go Syfert
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Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 324 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. 1959). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
Quick Summary

A summary judgment that does not dispose of all parties and issues in a pending suit is interlocutory and not appealable unless the trial court orders a severance.

The trial court grants a summary judgment against petitioners on one phase of a case involving two separate causes of action, without ordering a severance. Petitioners argue the judgment is final and appealable because it disposes of all issues in one severable cause of action. The court holds that finality should not depend on whether the action is severable as to issues, parties, or causes of action. The court applies the rule that a summary judgment which does not dispose of all parties and issues in the pending suit is interlocutory and not appealable unless a severance of that phase is ordered by the trial court. Because no severance was ordered, the judgment is interlocutory, and the right of appeal arises only when the judgment merges into a final judgment disposing of the whole case.

363 citation events (55 in the last 25 years) across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Hervey v. Flores, 975 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1998)
Treatment trajectory · 1959 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1959 1992 2026
How cited ↗
Cited for
324 S.W.2d at 201 Right to appeal interlocutory summary judgment19 citing casesabsent order of severance, party against whom interlocutory summary judgment has been rendered will have right to appeal when and not before the same is merged in final judgment disposing of entire case1 citing court put it this way · 17 listed here
  • Abiodun Henri Lagoye v. Ricardo Pina, No. 14-02-01001-CV (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 14, 2005).published
    A In the absence of an order of severance, a party against whom such an interlocutory summary judgment has been rendered will have his right of appeal when and not before the same is merged in a final judgment disposing of the whole case.…
  • Telisa Marie Robinson v. State, No. 07-04-00358-CR (Tex. App.—Amarillo Jan. 4, 2005).published
    P. 301, the order determining Carson to be a vexatious litigant was not severed, see Pierce v. Reynolds, 329 S.W.2d 76, 78 (Tex. 1959) and Pan American Petroleum Corporation v. Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Company, 160 Tex. 198 , 324 S.W.2d 20…
  • Carson v. Walker, 134 S.W.3d 300 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2003).published
    P. 301, the order determining Carson to be a vexatious litigant was not severed, see Pierce v. Reynolds, 160 Tex. 198 , 329 S.W.2d 76, 78 (1959) and Pan American Petroleum Corporation v. Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Company, 159 Tex. 550 , 324…
  • Arthur Carson v. David Walker, Pete Lopez, Jr., George Utters, Texas Tech Med. Branch (Clements Unit) TDCJ-ID & the Clements Unit Law Library, No. 07-01-00402-CV (Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug. 27, 2003).unpublished
    P. 301, the order determining Carson to be a vexatious litigant was not severed, see Pierce v. Reynolds, 329 S.W.2d 76, 78 (Tex. 1959) and Pan American Petroleum Corporation v. Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Company, 160 Tex. 198 , 324 S.W.2d 20…
  • Spencer Lucas v. Burleson Publ'g Co., Inc., D/B/A Burleson Star, James Moody, Sally Ellertson, Shelley Grant, 39 S.W.3d 693 (Tex. App.—Waco 2001).published
    Id. at 201.
  • Gilchrist v. Bandera Elec. Coop., Inc., 924 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996).published 2 cites
    Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 159 Tex. 550 , 324 S.W.2d 200, 200 (1959); see also City of Beaumont, 751 S.W.2d at 492 ; Teer v. Duddlesten, 664 S.W.2d 702, 704 (Tex.1984).
  • Mikulich v. Perez, 915 S.W.2d 88 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996).published 2 cites
    Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 159 Tex. 550 , 324 S.W.2d 200, 200 (1959); see also City of Beaumont, 751 S.W.2d at 492 ; Teer v. Duddlesten, 664 S.W.2d 702, 704 (Tex.1984).
  • Mafrige v. Ross, 866 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. 1994).published
    Id. at 201.
  • Rodriguez v. Gill, 849 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1993).published 2 cites
    Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 159 Tex. 550 , 324 S.W.2d 200, 200 (1959); see also City of Beaumont, 751 S.W.2d at 492 ; Teer v. Duddlesten, 664 S.W.2d 702, 704 (Tex.1984).
  • Robinson v. Chiarello, 806 S.W.2d 304 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1991).published
    Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 159 Tex. 550 , 324 S.W.2d 200, 201 (1959).
Show 7 more citing cases
  • City of Beaumont v. Guillory, 751 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1988).published
    Teer v. Duddlesten, 664 S.W.2d 702, 704 (Tex.1984); Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 159 Tex. 550 , 324 S.W.2d 200, 201 (1959).
  • Christensen v. Harkins, 740 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1987).published
    Pan American Petroleum Corporation v. Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Company, 159 Tex. 550 , 324 S.W.2d 200, 200-01 (1959) (per curiam).
  • Zellers v. Barthel, 727 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1987).published
    Houston Health Clubs v. First Court of Appeals, 722 S.W.2d 692 (Tex.1986) (per curiam); Teer v. Duddlesten, 664 S.W.2d 702, 704 (Tex.1984); Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 159 Tex. 550 , 324 S.W.2d 200, 201 (1…
  • Iris Dunham v. Charles Elizondo, Sharon Elizondo, Kenneth E. Davison & Bruce Elfant, Constable, No. 03-97-00771-CV (Tex. App.—Austin July 16, 1998).unpublished
    (absent order of severance, party against whom interlocutory summary judgment has been rendered will have right to appeal when and not before the same is merged in final judgment disposing of entire case)
  • Shaw v. Shaw, 835 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. App.—Waco 1992).published 2 cites
    See Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 159 Tex. 550 , 324 S.W.2d 200, 201 (1959); Wright, 274 S.W.2d at 674 .
  • Farris v. Raynor, 589 S.W.2d 172 (Tex. App. 1979).published
  • Wayne Traywick v. Houston Freightliner, No. 14-22-00065-CV (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 29, 2022).published
324 S.W.2d at 200 Summary judgment appealability requires final judgment on all issues13 citing casesIn our opinion a summary judgment which does not dispose of all parties and issues in the pending suit is interlocutory and not appealable unless a severance of that phase of the case is ordered by the trial court.1 citing court put it this way
  • Hervey v. Flores, 975 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1998).published 4 cites
    (In our opinion a summary judgment which does not dispose of all parties and issues in the pending suit is interlocutory and not appealable unless a severance of that phase of the case is ordered by the trial court.)
  • Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191 (Tex. 2001).published 4 cites
    Coal & Oil Co., 159 Tex. 550 , 324 S.W.2d 200 , 200 (1959) ("[A] summary judgment which does not dispose of all parties and issues in the pending suit is interlocutory and not appealable unless a severance of that phase of the case is orde…
  • In Re Dynamic Health, Inc., 32 S.W.3d 876 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000).published
    Id. at 200-01 (citations omitted).
  • Gilchrist v. Bandera Elec. Coop., Inc., 924 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996).published 2 cites
    Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 159 Tex. 550 , 324 S.W.2d 200, 200 (1959); see also City of Beaumont, 751 S.W.2d at 492 ; Teer v. Duddlesten, 664 S.W.2d 702, 704 (Tex.1984).
  • Mikulich v. Perez, 915 S.W.2d 88 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996).published 2 cites
    Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 159 Tex. 550 , 324 S.W.2d 200, 200 (1959); see also City of Beaumont, 751 S.W.2d at 492 ; Teer v. Duddlesten, 664 S.W.2d 702, 704 (Tex.1984).
  • Julius Drew, Sr. v. Edward J. Dwyer, No. 03-93-00528-CV (Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 2, 1994).unpublished
    Petroleum Co. , 324 S.W.2d at 200-1.
  • Rodriguez v. Gill, 849 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1993).published 2 cites
    Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 159 Tex. 550 , 324 S.W.2d 200, 200 (1959); see also City of Beaumont, 751 S.W.2d at 492 ; Teer v. Duddlesten, 664 S.W.2d 702, 704 (Tex.1984).
  • Krenek v. Texstar North Am., Inc., 787 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1990).published
    Chase, 33 Sup.Ct.J. at 279; Pan American, 324 S.W.2d at 200.
  • Christensen v. Harkins, 740 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1987).published
    Pan American Petroleum Corporation v. Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Company, 159 Tex. 550 , 324 S.W.2d 200, 200-01 (1959) (per curiam).
  • Teer v. Duddlesten, 664 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. 1984).published 2 cites
    Pan American Petroleum Corp., 324 S.W.2d at 200-01.
Show 3 more citing cases
159 Tex. at 550 “when and not before the same is merged in a final judgment disposing of the whole case.”5 citing cases6 citing courts quote it
  • Hervey v. Flores, 975 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1998).published 4 cites
    “In our opinion a summary judgment which does not dispose of all parties and issues in the pending suit is interlocutory and not appealable unless a severance of that phase of the case is ordered by the trial court.”
  • Joan DeYoung, Stephen DeYoung, M.D., & David DeYoung v. William L. Maynard, Individually & as of the Est. of Judy Page Maynard, & Maynard Props., L.P., No. 01-15-00260-CV (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 17, 2015).published 2 cites
    ([A] summary created in determining summary judgment finality, the Court judgment which does not dispose of all parties and issues in concludes that the solution is to maintain the principle of the the pending suit is i…)
  • in Re George Green & Garlan Green, No. 03-14-00725-CV (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 20, 2015).published 2 cites
    ([A] summary lower courts, operating as a trap for unwary litigants, and judgment which does not dispose of all parties and issues in consistently bringing about arguably unjust and oftentimes the pending suit is interl…)
  • Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191 (Tex. 2001).published 4 cites
    ([A] summary judgment which does not dispose of all parties and issues in the pending suit is interlocutory and not appealable unless a severance of that phase of the case is ordered by the trial court.)
  • Newco Drilling Co. v. Weyand, 960 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. 1998).published 2 cites
    ([A] party against whom ... an interlocutory summary judgment has been rendered will have his right of appeal when ... the same is merged in a final judgment disposing of the whole ease.)
Other citing cases4 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Pan American Petroleum Corporation Et Al
v.
Texas Pacific Coal and Oil Company, Et Al.
A-7237.
Texas Supreme Court.
May 13, 1959.
Published opinion
324 S.W.2d 200
1959 Tex. LEXIS 573
L. A. Thompton, of Tulsa Okla., J. K. Smith, of Fort Worth, Turner, Rodgers, Winn, Surlock & Terry, Lon Sailers, of Dallas and Frank Ashby, of Midland, for petitioners., Stubbeman, McRae, Sealy & Laughlin, of Midland, Hudson, Keltner & Sarsgard and Joe Bruce Cunningham, of Fort Worth, for respondents.
Per Curiam.
Cited by 150 opinions  |  Published
3 passages pin-cited by 3 cases
Pinpoint authority: #4,759 of 633,719
Citer courts: Texas Supreme Court (6) · Court of Appeals of Texas (2)
PER CURIAM:

The Court of Civil Appeals has dismissed petitioners’ appeal, holding that the summary judgment granted by the trial court in favor of respondents and against petitioners on one phase of the case is interlocutory and not appealable. 320 S.W. 2d 915. No severance was ordered by the trial court, but petitioners say that the case involves two entirely separate, severable and independent causes of action, and that the summary judgment disposes of all issues and parties involved in one cause of action. They argue that under such circumstances the granting of the motion for summary judgment effectively severed the two causes of action by implication, and that the judgment is therefore final and appealable.

While there is authority for the argument advanced by petitioners, Richards v. Smith, Texas Civ. App., 239 S.W. 2d 724 (wr. ref. n.r.e.), Riggs v. Bartlett, Texas Civ. App., 310 S.W. 2d 690 (wr. ref. n.r.e.), we do not think the finality and hence the appealability of a judgment should be made to turn upon whether the action is severable as to issues, as to parties, or as to causes of action. The confusion and uncertainty involved in the application of such a rule outweigh any advantages which might result therefrom. In our opinion a summary judgment which does not dispose of all parties and issues in the pending suit is interlocutory and not appealable unless a severance of that phase of the case is ordered by the trial court. Gallaher v. City Transp. Co., Texas Civ. App., 262 S.W. 2d 807 (wr. ref.); Myers v. Smitherman, Texas Civ. App., 279 S.W. 2d 173 (no writ). In the absence of an order of severance a party against whom such an interlocutory summary judgment has been rendered will have his right of appeal when and not before the same is merged in a final judgment disposing of the whole case.

The application for writ of error is refused, No Reversible Error.

[*552] Opinion delivered May 13, 1959.

Associate Justice Hamilton not sitting.