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Cal. CodesPenal CodePart 1. Of Crimes and PunishmentsTitle 1. Of Persons Liable to Punishment for Crime

Cal. Penal Code § 26 (2026)

Edition and currency
leginfo export of Sept. 26, 2026 (applied Oct. 1, 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTleginfo export of Sept. 26, 2026 (applied Oct. 1, 2026) cited 1938–2026 312citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 312 opinions since 1938, 33 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (One) (5 cases).

All persons are capable of committing crimes except those belonging to the following classes:

One—Children under the age of 14, in the absence of clear proof that at the time of committing the act charged against them, they knew its wrongfulness.

Two—Persons who are mentally incapacitated.

Three—Persons who committed the act or made the omission charged under an ignorance or mistake of fact, which disproves any criminal intent.

Four—Persons who committed the act charged without being conscious thereof.

Five—Persons who committed the act or made the omission charged through misfortune or by accident, when it appears that there was no evil design, intention, or culpable negligence.

Six—Persons (unless the crime be punishable with death) who committed the act or made the omission charged under threats or menaces sufficient to show that they had reasonable cause to and did believe their lives would be endangered if they refused.

The 20 cases that cite Cal. Penal Code § 26 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENPeople v. Cottone, 57 Cal. 4th 269 (2013).
cites § 26 26×subsections: (One) 20×cited by 101 cases
Where it cites § 26
“First, if the proffered conduct occurred before the defendant had reached the age of 14, must the prosecution establish that the defendant knew the conduct was wrongful and was thus capable of committing a crime, as required by Penal Code section 26, paragraph One (Penal Code…”
The case’s holding
The trial court determines whether a defendant appreciated the wrongfulness of prior sexual conduct to establish the capacity for criminal intent before admitting such evidence.
Later courts cite it for
“permits evidence that the defendant committed other sexual offenses to prove his propensity to commit the charged sexual offenses.” · 3 citing courts
2
GREENPeople v. Manuel L., 7 Cal. 4th 229 (1994).
cites § 26 42×cited by 44 cases
Where it cites § 26
“Penal Code section 26 articulates a presumption that a minor under the age of 14 is incapable of committing a crime.”
The case’s holding
The prosecution satisfies due process by proving a minor under fourteen appreciated the wrongfulness of their conduct through clear and convincing evidence rather than beyond a reasonable doubt.
Later courts cite it for
“appreciated the wrongfulness of the charged conduct at the time it was committed.” · 2 citing courts
3
GREENNino v. Gladys R., 1 Cal. 3d 855 (1970).
cites § 26 26×cited by 222 cases
Where it cites § 26
“( People v. Pallares (1952) 112 Cal. App.2d Supp.”
The case’s holding
A hate crime statute applies narrowly to offenders motivated by unnatural or abnormal sexual interest or intent (primary purpose of protecting children from sexual offenders).
Later courts cite it for
“in the absence of clear proof that at the time of committing the act charged against them, they knew its wrongfulness.” · 10 citing courts
4
GREENPeople v. Anderson, 28 Cal. 4th 767 (2002).
cites § 26 6×cited by 113 cases
Where it cites § 26
“Since its adoption in 1872, Penal Code section 26 [3] has provided: "All persons are *592 capable of committing crimes except those belonging to the following classes: [¶] .”
The case’s holding
Duress is not a defense to any form of murder.
Later courts cite it for
“duress can, in effect, provide a defense to murder on a felony-murder theory by negating the underlying felony. if one is not guilty of the underlying felony due to duress, one cannot be guilty of felony murder based on that felony.” · 4 citing courts
5
GREENPeople v. Snyder, 32 Cal. 3d 590 (1982).
cites § 26 8×cited by 75 cases
Where it cites § 26
“As we stated in an early case: "It is an emphatic postulate of both civil and penal law that *593 ignorance of a law is no excuse for a violation thereof.”
The case’s holding
A mistake regarding one's legal status as a convicted felon is a mistake of law that does not constitute a defense to possessing a concealable firearm.
Later courts cite it for
“the elements of the offense proscribed by section 12021 are conviction of a felony and ownership, possession, custody or control of a firearm capable of being concealed on the person.” · 2 citing courts
6
GREENPeople v. Micheal B., 149 Cal. App. 3d 1073 (Ct. App. 1983).
cites § 26 18×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 26
“) (2) The other evidence against appellant does not constitute "clear proof" that at the time of the shooting appellant understood the wrongfulness of the act charged against him, as required by Penal Code section 26, subdivision One.”
Later courts cite it for
“a persuasive constitutional and statutory argument can be made that the 'clear proof' standard mandated by penal code section 26, subdivision one, means proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” · 1 citing court
7
GREENPeople v. Lewis, 26 Cal. 4th 334 (2001).
cites § 26 2×cited by 476 cases
Where it cites § 26
“On appeal, defendant argues that because there was no indication the juvenile court in 1975 found clear proof that defendant knew the wrongfulness of the murder, he lacked the capacity to commit the crime (Pen. Code, § 26); thus, evidence of Rogers’s murder should not be…”
The case’s holding
A witness's capacity to perceive and recollect events is a matter of personal knowledge for the jury to determine rather than a prerequisite for competency.
Later courts cite it for
“a trial court's failure to instruct on accomplice liability under section 1111 is harmless if there is sufficient corroborating evidence in the record. 'corroborating evidence may be slight, may be entirely circumstantial, and need not be sufficient to establish every element of the charged offense. ' the evidence is sufficient if it tends to connect the defendant with the crime in such a way as to satisfy the jury that the accomplice is telling the truth.” · 11 citing courts
8
GREENPeople v. Vieira, 35 Cal. 4th 264 (2005).
cites § 26 2×cited by 439 cases
Where it cites § 26
“Duress and Malice Penal Code section 26 declares duress to be a perfect defense against criminal charges when the person charged "committed the act or made the omission charged under threats or menaces sufficient to show that they had reasonable cause to and did believe their…”
The case’s holding
A trial court's refusal to include a specific question in a jury questionnaire is not error if counsel has the opportunity to raise the issue during voir dire.
Later courts cite it for
“a defendant generally is entitled to benefit from amendments that become effective while his case is on appeal.” · 8 citing courts
9
GREENFare v. Ramon M., 22 Cal. 3d 419 (1978).
cites § 26 8×cited by 34 cases
Where it cites § 26
“Penal Code section 26 codifies the rarely used defense of idiocy as well as the better known defense of insanity.”
The case’s holding
The American Law Institute standard governs the defense of idiocy, exempting defendants from criminal responsibility if a mental defect prevents them from appreciating criminality or conforming conduct to the law.
Later courts cite it for
“the 'mental age' of the average adult under present norms is approximately 16 years and 8 months” · 3 citing courts
10
GREENPeople v. Morales, 25 Cal. 4th 34 (2001).
cites § 26 2×cited by 378 cases
Where it cites § 26
“(Pen.Code, § 26, subd. 6; see People v. Bacigalupo (1991) 1 Cal.”
The case’s holding
A conviction is not reversed for prosecutorial misconduct unless it is reasonably probable that a more favorable result would have been reached without the misconduct.
Later courts cite it for
“a prosecutor's conduct violates the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution when it infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process.” · 15 citing courts
11
GREENPeople v. Brooks, 3 Cal. 5th 1 (2017).
cites § 26 1×cited by 546 cases
Where it cites § 26
“) In assessing the defendant's claim of error, Mayberry first looked to Penal Code section 26, which provides that a person committing a charged act or omission under a mistake of fact that disproves any criminal intent is not criminally liable for that offense.”
The case’s holding
To sustain a special circumstance finding of kidnapping-murder, the evidence must support a reasonable inference that the defendant acted with an independent felonious purpose for the kidnapping.
Later courts cite it for
“it is axiomatic that a case is not authority for an issue that was not considered.” · 12 citing courts
12
GREENPeople v. Anderson, 51 Cal. 4th 989 (2011).
cites § 26 2×cited by 272 cases
Where it cites § 26
“(5) Penal Code section 26 states the statutory defense: "All persons are capable of committing crimes except those belonging to the following classes: [¶] .”
The case’s holding
Robbery requires proof of a purposive connection between the force or fear used and the felonious taking of personal property.
Later courts cite it for
“robbery is larceny with the aggravating circumstances that 'the property is taken from the person or presence of another' and 'is accomplished by the use of force or by putting the victim in fear of injury.” · 10 citing courts
13
GREENPeople v. Kelly, 10 Cal. 3d 565 (1973).
cites § 26 8×cited by 88 cases
Where it cites § 26
“2d 705 ], we said: "Unconsciousness is a complete, not a partial, defense to a criminal charge (Pen. Code, § 26, subd. 5), and, although voluntary intoxication may at times amount to unconsciousness, yet it can only have the effect of negating specific intent, the applicable…”
The case’s holding
Insanity under the M'Naughton test denotes a mental condition rendering a person incapable of understanding the nature of an act or distinguishing right from wrong.
Later courts cite it for
“insanity, under the california m'naughton test, denotes a mental condition which renders a person incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his act, or incapable of distinguishing right from wrong in relation to that act.” · 3 citing courts
14
GREENPeople v. Scott, 146 Cal. App. 3d 823 (Ct. App. 1983).
cites § 26 6×cited by 37 cases
Where it cites § 26
“Four) of Penal Code section 26 includes among persons incapable of committing a crime, “Persons who committed the act or made the omission charged under an ignorance or mistake of fact, which disproves any criminal intent.”
The case’s holding
A person acting under a mistake of fact caused by involuntary intoxication lacks the requisite intent for a crime requiring specific intent.
Later courts cite it for
“through misfortune or by accident, when it appears there was no . . . general intent . . . ,” · 2 citing courts
15
GREENVictor Eugene Rios v. Teresa Rocha, 299 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2002).
cites § 26 2×subsections: (4) 2×cited by 161 cases
Where it cites § 26
“Cal.Penal Code § 26(4). The level of unconsciousness “need not reach the physical dimensions commonly associated with the term (coma, inertia, incapability of locomotion or manual action, and so on); it can exist .”
The case’s holding
A defense attorney's failure to conduct a reasonable investigation or consider potentially exculpatory evidence constitutes deficient performance under the ineffective assistance of counsel standard.
Later courts cite it for
“failure to satisfy either prong of the strickland test obviates the need to consider the other.” · 26 citing courts
16
GREENPeople v. Cindy E., 83 Cal. App. 3d 393 (Ct. App. 1978).
cites § 26 6×cited by 31 cases
Where it cites § 26
“Appellant contends that the orders of the juvenile court must be reversed because (1) there was no showing that appellant knew the wrongfulness of her acts as required by Penal Code section 26, subdivision One, (2) a photographic identification of appellant was impermissibly…”
The case’s holding
A child aged 13 may be adjudicated a ward when conduct and statements during and after the offense clearly show she knew her acts were wrong.
cites § 26 6×cited by 28 cases
Where it cites § 26
“237-238); and (2) since an under 14 year old "is probably legally incapable [under Pen. Code, § 26] of violating section 288" ( 181 Cal.”
The case’s holding
Preventing and detecting child abuse is a compelling government interest that can justify state regulation of medical clinics, including reporting and record requirements.
Later courts cite it for
“presumed to know the meaning given statutes by the courts” · 2 citing courts
18
GREENPeople v. Nieves, 11 Cal. 5th 404 (2021).
cites § 26 1×cited by 148 cases
Where it cites § 26
“417 ; see also Penal Code, § 26.) However, “[w]hen a person renders himself or herself unconscious through voluntary intoxication and kills in that state, the killing is attributed to his or her negligence in self-intoxicating to that point, and is treated as involuntary…”
The case’s holding
A trial court must instruct the jury on a lesser included offense whenever evidence supporting that offense is substantial enough to merit consideration.
Later courts cite it for
“a trial court must instruct the jury on a lesser included offense, whether or not the defendant so requests, whenever evidence that the defendant is guilty of only the lesser offense is substantial enough to merit consideration by the jury.' the obligation to give an instruction on lesser included offenses exists even when a defendant expressly objects to it.” · 3 citing courts
19
GREENSmith v. Mitchell P., 22 Cal. 3d 946 (1978).
cites § 26 4×cited by 52 cases
Where it cites § 26
“The issue arose because section 26 was applicable on its face only to "crimes" and had not been affirmatively incorporated into the Juvenile Court Law.”
The case’s holding
The requirement for accomplice testimony to be corroborated is not constitutionally based and does not apply to juvenile court wardship proceedings.
Later courts cite it for
“the accomplice testimony rule is not constitutionally based.” · 2 citing courts
20
GREENPeople v. Tobias, 25 Cal. 4th 327 (2001).
cites § 26 2×cited by 86 cases
Where it cites § 26
“The decision in Stoll rejected a similar contention when it concluded the minor victim could not legally consent to sexual intercourse, even though the minor was more than 14 years of age and thus, pursuant to Penal Code section 26, was deemed capable of committing a crime.”
The case’s holding
A minor engaged in an incestuous relationship with an adult is a victim rather than an accomplice, making accomplice jury instructions unnecessary.
Later courts cite it for
“implicitly acknowledged that, in some cases at least, a minor may be capable of giving legal consent to sexual relations.” · 7 citing courts

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
193819822026

One bar per 2 years. Tallest: 34 cases in 2014–2015. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Cal. Ct. App.224Cal.62Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct.69th Cir.5S.D. Cal.3Mass.2Mich.22d Cir.1

The 8 courts with the most citing cases, of 15 courts in all.

By subsection
(3)1 case
Traylor v. State, 43 S.W.3d 725 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2001).
(4)1 case
Victor Eugene Rios v. Teresa Rocha, 299 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2002).“Cal.Penal Code § 26(4). The level of unconsciousness “need not reach the physical dimensions commonly associated with the term (coma, inertia, incapability of locomotion or manual action, and so on); it can exist .”
(6)2 cases
People v. Gorgol, 122 Cal. App. 2d 281 (Ct. App. 1953).
In re Nourn, 145 Cal. App. 4th 820 (Ct. App. 2006).
(7)2 cases
Tully v. State, 730 P.2d 1206 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986).
United States v. Pete Mitchell, 725 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1983).
(One)5 cases
People v. Cottone, 57 Cal. 4th 269 (2013).“First, if the proffered conduct occurred before the defendant had reached the age of 14, must the prosecution establish that the defendant knew the conduct was wrongful and was thus capable of committing a crime, as required by Penal Code section 26, paragraph One (Penal Code…”
In re Charles N., No. A138332 (Cal. Ct. App. June 5, 2014).
In re J.R. ca2/2, No. B263729 (Cal. Ct. App. May 12, 2016).
People v. Vang, No. F069322 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2015).
People v. Clark, No. C076864 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2016).

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Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: leginfo export of Sept. 26, 2026 (applied Oct. 1, 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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