Eichel v. New York Cent. R.R., 375 U.S. 253 (1963). · Go Syfert
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Eichel v. New York Cent. R.R., 375 U.S. 253 (1963). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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Payments received under a disability pension are inadmissible to mitigate damages or to prove a plaintiff is malingering (collateral source rule).

An employee injured by a railroad's negligence brought an action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. The respondent sought to introduce evidence that the petitioner was receiving disability pension payments under the Railroad Retirement Act to impeach the petitioner's testimony regarding the permanency of his injuries and his motive for not returning to work. The trial court excluded this evidence. The court holds that the receipt of collateral social insurance benefits involves a substantial likelihood of prejudicial impact, as a jury may improperly use such evidence to mitigate damages. Because the risk of misuse outweighs the probative value, the evidence is properly excluded.

1,061 citation events (356 in the last 25 years) across 98 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Torres v. Metro-North R.R. Co., No. 1:20-cv-10782, 2023 WL 2088174 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2023)
Treatment trajectory · 1963 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1963 1994 2026
How cited ↗
Cited for
At page 255 Excluding evidence of collateral benefits to prevent jury prejudice48 citing cases“receipt of collateral social insurance benefits involves a substantial likelihood of prejudicial impact.”10 citing courts quote it · Neutral (citing treatments of this passage) · also cited as 11 L. Ed. 2d at 309
  • Torres v. Metro-North R.R. Co., No. 1:20-cv-10782, 2023 WL 2088174 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2023). 2 cites
    ([P]etitioner’s receipt of collateral social insurance benefits involves a substantial likelihood of prejudicial impact.)
  • Cannon v. Licking Cnty. Ohio, No. 2:17-cv-00004, 2019 WL 5543032 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 25, 2019).
    (In our view the likelihood of misuse by the jury clearly outweighs the value of [disability pension payment] evidence)
  • Gallagher v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd., 883 A.2d 550 (Pa. 2005).published 6 cites
    ([W]e must recognize that the petitioner's receipt of collateral social insurance benefits involves a substantial likelihood of prejudicial impact.)
  • Cole v. Barnhart, 293 F. Supp. 2d 1234 (D. Kan. 2003).published 3 cites
    “lilt would violate the spirit of the federal statutes if the receipt of disability benefits under the railroad retirement act ... were considered as evidence of malingering by an employee asserting a claim under the fed…”
  • Stefanopoulos v. Barnhart, 183 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (D. Kan. 2002).published 3 cites
    “it would violate the spirit of the federal statutes if the receipt of disability benefits under the railroad retirement act ... were considered as evidence of malingering by an employee asserting a claim under the feder…”
  • Simmonds v. Massanari, 160 F. Supp. 2d 1235 (D. Kan. 2001).published 3 cites
    “it would violate the spirit of the federal statutes if the receipt of disability benefits under the railroad retirement act ... were considered as evidence of malingering by an employee asserting a claim under the feder…”
  • Negron-Adames v. Dorado Health, Inc., No. 3:21-cv-01077 (D.P.R. Sept. 18, 2023).
    Co., 375 U.S. 253, 255 (1963).
  • Lupia v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., No. 1:21-cv-11077 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2023).
    ([P]etitioner’s receipt of collateral social insurance benefits involves a substantial likelihood of prejudicial impact.)
  • Lee v. Dennison, No. 2:19-cv-01332 (D. Nev. Jan. 17, 2023).
    (stating that evidence the plaintiff is receiving benefits from a 15 collateral source is prejudicial)
  • Pepin v. Wisconsin Cent. Ltd., No. 2:19-cv-00042 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2021).
    Co., 375 U.S. 253, 255 (1963)).
Show 38 more citing cases
At page 254 Exclusion of collateral source benefits evidence in personal injury cases16 citing casesconcluding that Medicare benefits are a collateral source that should not reduce a plaintiff’s award2 citing courts put it this way · 14 listed here
  • Livesay, No. 4:24-cv-00422 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 1, 2026).
    Co., 375 U.S. 253, 254 (1963)).
  • Ragan v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., No. 1:21-cv-00068 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 4, 2023).
    He contends that Eichel v. New York Central Railroad requires excluding this evidence. 375 U.S. 253, 254 (1963).
  • Anchondo-Galaviz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 1:18-cv-01322 (D. Colo. Feb. 8, 2021).
    In light of the fact that Ms. Anchondo-Galaviz remains fully liable for the medical services she received, any probative value of the amounts-paid evidence is greatly outweighed by its potential to cause unfair prejudice and confuse or mis…
  • Andrews v. Norfolk S. R.R. Corp., 2017 IL App (1st) 153007.published
    Co., 375 U.S. 253, 254 (1963); Sloas v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 616 F.3d 380 , 387 n.3 (4th Cir. 2010); Friedland v. TIC-The Industrial Co., 566 F.3d 1203, 1205-06 (10th Cir. 1997) (defining collateral source rule). 5 Fringe benefits and…
  • Andrews v. Norfolk S. R.R. Corp., 2017 IL App (1st) 153007, 77 N.E.3d 1028.published
    Eichel v. New York Central Railway, 375 U.S. 253, 254 (1963); Sloas v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 616 F. 3d 380 , 387 n. 3 (4th Cir. 2010); Friedland v. TIC-The Industry Co., 566 F. 3d 1203, 1205-06 (1997) (defining collateral source rule).…
  • Dep't of Human Servs. v. State Pers. Bd., 2016 COA 37, 371 P.3d 748.published 2 cites
    (concluding that Medicare benefits are a collateral source that should not reduce a plaintiff’s award)
  • Herzog Transit Servs., Inc. v. United States R.R. Ret. Bd., 624 F.3d 467 (7th Cir. 2010).published 2 cites
    Co., 375 U.S. 253, 254 (1963) (per curiam) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 10 Those with fewer than ten years of service (or five years accruing after 1995) are covered by the Social Security system. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1401 . 10 No. 0…
  • CSX Transp., Inc. v. Miller, 46 So. 3d 434 (Ala. 2010).published 2 cites
    The RRA `is substantially a Social Security Act for employees of common carriers.' Eichel [v. New York Central R.R., 375 U.S. 253, 254 (1963)].
  • Aumand v. Dartmouth Hitchcock Med. Ctr., 611 F. Supp. 2d 78 (D.N.H. 2009).published
    Co., 375 U.S. 253, 254-55 (1963); Proctor v .
  • Kotler v. Nat. RR Passenger Corp., 954 A.2d 514 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008).published
    In sum, the prohibition against admitting collateral source benefits evidence in a FELA trial is necessitated by the "likelihood of misuse [of such evidence] by the jury[, which] clearly outweighs the value of this evidence." Eichel, supra…
Show 4 more citing cases
  • Lund v. San Joaquin Valley R.R., 71 P.3d 770 (Cal. 2003).published
    Co. (1963) 375 U.S. 253, 254 [ 11 L.Ed.2d 307 , 84 S.Ct. 316 ] (Eichel)).
  • Stephen A. Arneson v. Shirley S. Chater, No. 96-4183 (8th Cir. Nov. 7, 1997).published
    (stating "[r]espondent does not dispute that it would be highly improper for the disability pension payments to be considered in mitigation of" petitioner's damages)
  • CSX Transp., Inc. v. Levant, 410 S.E.2d 299 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991).published 2 cites
    Co., 375 U. S. 253, 254 (84 SC 316, 11 LE2d 307) (1963) citing New York, N. H. &c.
  • Morse v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 41 Cal. Comp. Cases 1072 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).published
    The Supreme Court first noted the conceded impropriety of considering the disability pension payments in mitigation of plaintiff’s damages, 4 saying in this connection ( 375 U.S. at p. 254 [11 L.Ed.2d at pp. 308-309]): “ ‘The Railroad Reti…
lilt would violate the spirit of the federal statutes if the receipt of disability benefits under the Railroad Retirement Act ... were considered as evidence of malingering by an employee asserting a claim under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act.no pin page on record · 3 citing cases listed
  • Cole v. Barnhart, 293 F. Supp. 2d 1234 (D. Kan. 2003).published 3 cites
    (lilt would violate the spirit of the federal statutes if the receipt of disability benefits under the Railroad Retirement Act ... were considered as evidence of malingering by an employee asserting a claim under the Fe…)
  • Stefanopoulos v. Barnhart, 183 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (D. Kan. 2002).published 3 cites
    (it would violate the spirit of the federal statutes if the receipt of disability benefits under the Railroad Retirement Act ... were considered as evidence of malingering by an employee asserting a claim under the Fede…)
  • Simmonds v. Massanari, 160 F. Supp. 2d 1235 (D. Kan. 2001).published 3 cites
    (it would violate the spirit of the federal statutes if the receipt of disability benefits under the Railroad Retirement Act ... were considered as evidence of malingering by an employee asserting a claim under the Fede…)
84 S. Ct. at 444 cited at this page1 citing case
84 S. Ct. at 419 holding that evidence of payment under a “disability pension” was not admissible on the issue of whether plaintiff was malingering1 citing case1 citing court put it this way
84 S. Ct. at 414 cited at this page1 citing case
  • Proctor v. Castelletti, 911 P.2d 853 (Nev. 1996).published 2 cites
    Id., 375 U.S. at 317 , 84 S.Ct. at 414 (footnote omitted).
11 L. Ed. 2d at 308 cited at this page1 citing case
Other citing cases1 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Eichel
v.
New York Central Railroad Co.
480.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Dec 16, 1963.
Published opinion
375 U.S. 253
1963 U.S. LEXIS 3
Arnold B. Elkind and Richard C. Machcinski for petitioner., Gerald E. Dwyer for respondent.
Harlan, Douglas.
Cited by 280 opinions  |  Published
4 passages pin-cited by 5 cases
Pinpoint authority: #14,427 of 633,719
Citer courts: D. Kansas (9) · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (6) · S.D. Ohio (1)

Lead Opinion

Per Curiam.

Petitioner, who had been employed by respondent New York Central Railroad for 40 years, brought this action against respondent under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 35 Stat. 65, as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 51 et seq., in the District Court for the Southern District of New York. The complaint alleged that in 1960, as a result of respondent’s negligence, petitioner suffered a permanently disabling injury. The jury returned a verdict of $51,000 for petitioner and the District Court entered judgment in accordance with that verdict. Respondent offered evidence that petitioner was receiving $190 a month in disability pension payments under the Railroad Retirement Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 309, as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 228b (a) 4.[*254] This evidence was offered for the purpose of impeaching the testimony of petitioner as to his motive for not returning to work and as to the permanency of his injuries. The trial court excluded the evidence in response to the objection of petitioner’s counsel. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding it prejudicial error to exclude the evidence of the disability pension, and remanded “for a new trial, limited, however, to the issues of injury and resulting damages . . . .” 319 F. 2d 12, 14. The court affirmed the judgment “as to the determination of negligence.” Ibid. We grant certiorari and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Respondent does not dispute that it would be highly improper for the disability pension payments to be considered in mitigation of the damages suffered by petitioner. Thus it has been recognized that:

“The Railroad Retirement Act is substantially a Social Security Act for employees of common carriers. . . . The benefits received under such a system of social legislation are not directly attributable to the contributions of the employer, so they cannot be considered in mitigation of the damages caused by the employer.” New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. Leary, 204 F. 2d 461, 468, cert. denied, 346 U. S. 856.[1]

Respondent argues that the evidence of the disability payments, although concededly inadmissible to offset or mitigate damages, is admissible as bearing on the extent and duration of the disability suffered by petitioner. At the trial counsel for respondent argued that the pension would show “a motive for [petitioner’s] not continuing[*255] work, and for his deciding not to continue going back to work after the last accident.” On the basis of this argument the Court of Appeals concluded that the disputed evidence should have been admitted because: “Its substantial probative value cannot reasonably be said to be outweighed by the risk that it will . . . create substantial danger of undue prejudice through being considered by the jury for the incompetent purpose of a set-off against lost earnings.” 319 F. 2d, at 20.

We disagree. In our view the likelihood of misuse by the jury clearly outweighs the value of this evidence.[2] Insofar as the evidence bears on the issue of malingering, there will generally be other evidence having more probative value and involving less likelihood of prejudice than the receipt of a disability pension. Moreover, it would violate the spirit of the federal statutes if the receipt of disability benefits under the Railroad Retirement Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 309, as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 228b (a) 4, were considered as evidence of malingering by an employee asserting a claim under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. We have recently had occasion to be reminded that evidence of collateral benefits is readily subject to misuse by a jury. Tipton v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., Inc., 375 U. S. 34.[3] It has long been recognized that evidence showing that the defendant is insured creates a substantial likelihood of misuse.[4] Similarly, we must recognize that the petitioner’s receipt of collateral social insurance benefits involves a substantial likelihood of prejudicial impact. We hold therefore that the District Court properly excluded the evidence of disability pay[*256] ments. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

Mr. Justice Douglas concurs in the result.
1

See Sinovich v. Erie R. Co., 230 F. 2d 658, 661; Page v. St. Louis S. R. Co., 312 F. 2d 84, 94. See also Gregory and Kalven, Cases and Materials on Torts (1959), pp. 480-482; McCormick, Damages (1935), p. 310, n. 2; Comment, 38 Mich. L. Rev. 1073.

2

Cf. McCormick, Evidence (1954), c. 19; 2 Wigmore, Evidence (1940), § 282a.

3

See Kalven, The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 Ohio St. L. J. 158, 169.

4

See notes 1-3, supra.

Concurrence in Part

Mr. Justice Harlan,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

Once again, I am obliged to record' my view that cer-tiorari should not have been granted in a case of this kind, involving only a question of the admissibility of evidence in a suit under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 35 Stat. 65, as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 51. See my dissenting opinion in Tipton v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., Inc., earlier this Term, ante, p. 37.

On the merits, I agree with the majority that the judgment below should be reversed, but for different reasons. Whether or not evidence that the petitioner was receiving disability pension payments under the Railroad Retirement Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 307, as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 228a, should have been admitted depends on a balance between its probative bearing on the issue as to which it was offered, in this case the respondent’s claim that petitioner was a malingerer, and the possibility of prejudice to the petitioner resulting from the jury’s consideration of the evidence on issues as to which it is irrelevant. When a balance of this sort has to be struck, it should, except in rare instances, be left to the discretion of the trial judge, subject to review for abuse. See Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 45; Model Code of Evidence, Rule 303. It is he who is in the best position to weigh the relevant factors, such as the value of the disputed evidence as compared with other proof adducible'to the same end and the effectiveness of limiting instructions. Believing that[*257] this rule should have been followed here, I concur in reversing the judgment below, which not only held the evidence not inadmissible as a matter of law but also directed its admission on retrial.

For the same reasons, however, I dissent from the majority’s holding that the evidence is required to be excluded. I see no reason why evidentiary questions should be given different treatment when they arise in an F. E. L. A. case than when they arise in other contexts.