collateral source rule in Colorado

2017“The purpose of the collateral source rule was to prevent the defendant from receiving credit for such compensation and thereby reduce the amount payable as damages to the injured party.” Van Waters & Rogers, Inc. v. Keelan, 840 P.2d 1070, 1074 (Colo. 1992). 6 ¶ 12 Section 13-21-111.6 abrogates the common law collateral source rule except as to benefits received as the result of a contract.

2016Our courts, however, have addressed similar issues. ¶36 In Van Waters & Rogers, Inc. , 840 P.2d at 1074 , the Colorado Supreme Court analyzed the breadth of the collateral source rule and the contract exception.

2021Colo. Branch v. Gardenswartz , 242 P.3d 1080, 1083 ( Colo. 2010 ) ( noting that the collateral source rule prevented the tortfeasor from standing in the plaintiff 's shoes and enjoying the same discounted medical rates that the plaintiff 's insurer received ) .

2021See id. ; see also Crossgrove , ¶ 16 , 276 P.3d at 566 ( noting that the collateral source rule prevents a tortfeasor from "benefitting from the plaintiff 's purchase of insurance" ) . ¶64 Accordingly, I believe that the collateral source rule applies here, and under that rule's express language, the fact or amount of workers' compensation benefits paid by United would be inadmissible in any action by Scholle against Delta.

1996A. At common law, the collateral source rule provided that “compensation or indemnity received by an injured party from a collateral source, wholly independent of the wrongdoer and to which he has not contributed, will not diminish the damages otherwise recoverable from the wrongdoer.” Kistler v. Halsey, 173 Colo. 540, 545 , 481 P.2d 722, 724 (1971).

1996A. At common law, the collateral source rule provided that “compensation or indemnity received by an injured party from a collateral source, wholly independent of the wrongdoer and to which he has not contributed, will not diminish the damages otherwise recoverable from the wrongdoer.” Kistler v. Halsey, 173 Colo. 540, 545 , 481 P.2d 722, 724 (1971).

2012See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Crossgrove, 2012 CO 31, ¶ 12 , 276 P.3d 562 (released concurrently with this opinion); see also, Volunteers of Am. v. Gardenswartz, 242 P.3d 1080 , 1083-84 (Colo.2010); Moyer v. Merrick, 155 Colo. 73, 80 , 392 P.2d 653, 656-57 (1964) (since money received from a pension plan to which an employee had contributed was within the collateral source rule, evidence of receipt by plaintiff of pension benefits in an action for damages resulting from the defendant's negligence was inadmissible); Carr v. Boyd, 123 Colo. 350, 356-57 , 229 P.2d 659, 663 (1951) ("Benefits receiv

2012See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Crossgrove, 2012 CO 31, ¶ 12 , 276 P.3d 562 (released concurrently with this opinion); see also, Volunteers of Am. v. Gardenswartz, 242 P.3d 1080 , 1083-84 (Colo.2010); Moyer v. Merrick, 155 Colo. 73, 80 , 392 P.2d 653, 656-57 (1964) (since money received from a pension plan to which an employee had contributed was within the collateral source rule, evidence of receipt by plaintiff of pension benefits in an action for damages resulting from the defendant's negligence was inadmissible); Carr v. Boyd, 123 Colo. 350, 356-57 , 229 P.2d 659, 663 (1951) ("Benefits receiv

2025See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Crossgrove , 2012 CO 31, ¶ 25, 276 P.3d 562, 568 (concluding that the amount paid by an insurer is inadmissible under the pre-verdict evidentiary component of the collateral source rule). ¶43 For these reasons, we conclude that the discovery at issue is not relevant to any argument regarding the retroactive application of our decision in Harvey . 3.

2025See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Crossgrove , 2012 CO 31, ¶ 25, 276 P.3d 562, 568 (concluding that the amount paid by an insurer is inadmissible under the pre-verdict evidentiary component of the collateral source rule). ¶43 For these reasons, we conclude that the discovery at issue is not relevant to any argument regarding the retroactive application of our decision in Harvey . 3.

2016Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in Evans, the contract exception to the collateral source rule does not preclude a setoff here. ¶64 I am not persuaded otherwise by Calderon’s contention that Evans is distinguishable because there, the insurer employed (and thus was vicariously liable for the negligence of) two of the tortfeasors, see id. at 1222 , whereas here, American Family had no relationship with the uninsured driver.

2008Group, P.C. v. Evans, 926 P.2d 1218, 1230 (Colo.1996). *712 The contract exception to the collateral source rule is "broad enough to cover contracts for which a plaintiff gives some form of consideration, whether it be in the form of money or employment services, with the expectation of receiving future benefits in the event they become payable under the contract." Van Waters & Rogers, Inc. v. Keelan, 840 P.2d 1070, 1079 (Colo.1992) (holding that employment contract fell within the contract exception and that employee's damages award therefore could not be set off by the disability benefits he

2016Co., 375 U.S. 253, 254 , 84 S.Ct. 316 , 11 L.Ed.2d 307 (1968)); see also Berg v. United States, 806 F.2d 978, 986 (10th Cir.1986) {concluding that Medicare benefits are a collateral source that should not reduce a plaintiffs award). 4 42 We align with these cases in concluding that, under these cireumstances, PERA disability benefits also constitute a collateral source not required to be offset from a damage award. 148 DHS does not argue against, or even mention, the application of the collateral source rule.

2016Co. , 375 U.S. 253, 254 (1963)); see also Berg v. United States , 806 F.2d 978, 986 (10th Cir. 1986) (concluding that Medicare benefits are a collateral source that should not reduce a plaintiff’s award). ¶42 We align with these cases in concluding that, under these circumstances, PERA disability benefits also constitute a collateral source not required to be offset from a damage award. ¶43 DHS does not argue against, or even mention, the application of the collateral source rule.

2012See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Crossgrove, 2012 CO 31, ¶ 12 , 276 P.3d 562 (released concurrently with this opinion); see also, Volunteers of Am. v. Gardenswartz, 242 P.3d 1080 , 1083-84 (Colo.2010); Moyer v. Merrick, 155 Colo. 73, 80 , 392 P.2d 653, 656-57 (1964) (since money received from a pension plan to which an employee had contributed was within the collateral source rule, evidence of receipt by plaintiff of pension benefits in an action for damages resulting from the defendant's negligence was inadmissible); Carr v. Boyd, 123 Colo. 350, 356-57 , 229 P.2d 659, 663 (1951) ("Benefits receiv

2012See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Crossgrove, 2012 CO 31, ¶ 12 , 276 P.3d 562 (released concurrently with this opinion); see also, Volunteers of Am. v. Gardenswartz, 242 P.3d 1080 , 1083-84 (Colo.2010); Moyer v. Merrick, 155 Colo. 73, 80 , 392 P.2d 653, 656-57 (1964) (since money received from a pension plan to which an employee had contributed was within the collateral source rule, evidence of receipt by plaintiff of pension benefits in an action for damages resulting from the defendant's negligence was inadmissible); Carr v. Boyd, 123 Colo. 350, 356-57 , 229 P.2d 659, 663 (1951) ("Benefits receiv

2016Co., 375 U.S. 253, 254 , 84 S.Ct. 316 , 11 L.Ed.2d 307 (1968)); see also Berg v. United States, 806 F.2d 978, 986 (10th Cir.1986) {concluding that Medicare benefits are a collateral source that should not reduce a plaintiffs award). 4 42 We align with these cases in concluding that, under these cireumstances, PERA disability benefits also constitute a collateral source not required to be offset from a damage award. 148 DHS does not argue against, or even mention, the application of the collateral source rule.

2016Co. , 375 U.S. 253, 254 (1963)); see also Berg v. United States , 806 F.2d 978, 986 (10th Cir. 1986) (concluding that Medicare benefits are a collateral source that should not reduce a plaintiff’s award). ¶42 We align with these cases in concluding that, under these circumstances, PERA disability benefits also constitute a collateral source not required to be offset from a damage award. ¶43 DHS does not argue against, or even mention, the application of the collateral source rule.

2018And to prove that value, the amount paid for medical services is “some evidence of their reasonable value.” Id. ¶ 11 But what happens if evidence of the amount paid would disclose a collateral source, thus risking that the jury could improperly reduce the damages award for that reason? ¶ 12 In Crossgrove, ¶ 20, the supreme court resolved this tension by holding that “the pre-verdict evidentiary component of the collateral source rule prevails in collateral source cases to bar the admission of the amounts paid for medical services.” It explained: 4 Admitting amounts paid evidence for any purpos

2012Resolving the Tension between the Collateral Source and Reasonable Value Rules ¶ 19 We recognize the tension between the pre-verdict evidentiary component of the collateral source rule that controls this case and the reasonable value rule stated in Kendall v. Hargrave, 142 Colo. 120, 123 , 349 P.2d 993, 994 (Colo.1960).

2010The wrongdoer cannot reap the benefit of a contract for which the wrongdoer paid no compensation." Acuar v. Letourneau, 260 Va. 180 , 531 S.E.2d 316, 323 (2000) (emphasis added) (holding that, under the collateral source rule, tortfeasor may not reduce a plaintiff's award by the amounts written off by plaintiff's healthcare providers).

2010The wrongdoer cannot reap the benefit of a contract for which the wrongdoer paid no compensation." Acuar v. Letourneau, 260 Va. 180 , 531 S.E.2d 316, 323 (2000) (emphasis added) (holding that, under the collateral source rule, tortfeasor may not reduce a plaintiff's award by the amounts written off by plaintiff's healthcare providers).

2021By excluding collateral source information entirely, the rule ensures that tortfeasors will not escape liability simply because the injured party had the foresight to obtain a benefits provider to offset the risk of unexpected medical expenses. ¶19 In 2010 , the General Assembly codified the pre-verdict evidentiary component of the common law collateral source rule by enacting section 10-1-135 (10) (a) , which provides that " [t] he fact or amount of any collateral source payment or benefits shall not be admitted as evidence in any action against an alleged third- party tortfeasor." See Jeppse

2019Our supreme court has explained that, if either party is to receive a windfall, “the rule awards it to the injured plaintiff who was wise enough or fortunate enough to secure compensation from an independent source, and not to the tortfeasor, who has done nothing to provide the compensation and 7 seeks only to take advantage of third-party benefits obtained by the plaintiff.” Id. ¶ 20 In 2010, the General Assembly codified the collateral source rule’s pre-verdict evidentiary component in section 10-1-135(10)(a), which provides in pertinent part: “The fact or amount of any collateral source pay

2016But, under the collateral source rule, "[t]he plaintiff may receive benefits from the defendant himself which, because of their nature, are not considered double compensation for the same injury but [are] deemed collateral." McLaughlin , ¶59 (citation omitted).

2016But, under the collateral source rule, "[t]he plaintiff may receive benefits from the defendant himself which, because of their nature, are not considered double compensation for the same injury but [are] deemed collateral." McLaughlin , ¶59 (citation omitted).

2016But, under the collateral source rule, "[the plaintiff may receive benefits from the defendant himself which, because of their nature, are not considered double compensation for the same injury but [are] deemed collateral " McLaughlin, ¶ 59 (citation omitted). . 'This is so because "public policy favors giving the plamtlff a double recovery rather than allowing a wrongdoer to enjoy reduced Hability simply because the plaintiff received compensation "from an independent source," Id. (quoting Green, 59 F.3d at 1032 ). 44 In addition, our conclusion -may not always result in a windfall to plainti

2016This is so because "public policy favors giving the plaintiff a double recovery rather than allowing a wrongdoer to enjoy reduced liability simply because the plaintiff received compensation from an independent source." Id. (quoting Green , 59 F.3d at 1032 ). ¶44 In addition, our conclusion may not always result in a windfall to plaintiffs because they may have to subrogate PERA for the funds.

2018While the exact intent of the General Assembly in enacting this statute has confounded Colorado courts for years, compare Simon v. Coppola, 876 P.2d 10, 17-18 (Colo. App. 1993), with id. at 20-25 (Briggs, J., specially concurring), at a minimum, it preserves the common law collateral source rule, at least in some respects. ¶ 19 In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Crossgrove, the supreme court resolved some of this confusion and explained that the General Assembly enacted this statute to both reduce double recoveries resulting from applications of the collateral source rule and to prevent a defendant f

2018While the exact intent of the General Assembly in enacting this statute has confounded Colorado courts for years, compare Simon v. Coppola, 876 P.2d 10, 17-18 (Colo. App. 1993), with id. at 20-25 (Briggs, J., specially concurring), at a minimum, it preserves the common law collateral source rule, at least in some respects. ¶ 19 In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Crossgrove, the supreme court resolved some of this confusion and explained that the General Assembly enacted this statute to both reduce double recoveries resulting from applications of the collateral source rule and to prevent a defendant f

2012See Van Waters, 840 P.2d at 1075 ; see also, e.g., Powell v. Brady, 30 Colo.App. 406 , 496 P.2d 328, 332-33 (1972) ("The collateral source doctrine, as applied in Colorado, provides that damages recoverable for a wrong are not diminished because the injured party has been wholly or partially indemnified or compensated for his loss by insurance effected by him and to which the wrongdoer did not contribute."). 112 The common law doctrine also applied pre-verdiet to bar evidence of collateral source benefits because such evidence could lead the fact-finder to improperly reduce the plaintiff's dam

2012See Van Waters, 840 P.2d at 1075 ; see also, e.g., Powell v. Brady, 30 Colo.App. 406 , 496 P.2d 328, 332-33 (1972) ("The collateral source doctrine, as applied in Colorado, provides that damages recoverable for a wrong are not diminished because the injured party has been wholly or partially indemnified or compensated for his loss by insurance effected by him and to which the wrongdoer did not contribute."). ¶ 12 The common law doctrine also applied pre-verdict to bar evidence of collateral source benefits because such evidence could lead the fact-finder to improperly reduce the plaintiff's da

2018Even so, after taking his own exhaustive tour of both federal statutes and regulations, he responds that under Barnett v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 843 P.2d 1302 (Colo. 1993), Medicare is a collateral source, which triggers the evidentiary limitation in section 10-1-135(10)(a) and is subject to the contract exception of section 13-21-111.6. ¶ 16 But must we take an equally deep dive into federal statutes and regulations to decide the narrow question whether the trial 7 court properly applied the collateral source rule, both pre-verdict and post-verdict?

2013Co., 843 P.2d 1302, 1309-10 (Colo.1993); see also Haralampo-poulos, -- P.3d at -- (assuming, without deciding, that the collateral source rule applies to Medicare and Medicaid benefits); Green v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R.

2010Under the collateral source rule, she is entitled to all benefits resulting from her contract. 818 A.2d 974, 985 (D.C.2003) (internal citations omitted).

2010Under the collateral source rule, she is entitled to all benefits resulting from her contract. 818 A.2d 974, 985 (D.0.2003) (internal citations omitted).

1992Englewood v. Bryant, 100 Colo. 552, 554 , 68 P.2d 913, 914-15 (1937) (medical expenses gratuitously paid by county or state are not properly allowable in suit against city).

1992Englewood v. Bryant, 100 Colo. 552, 554 , 68 P.2d 913, 914-15 (1937) (medical expenses gratuitously paid by county or state are not properly allowable in suit against city).

1991See Kistler v. Halsey, 173 Colo. 540 , 481 P.2d 722 (1971); Isbill Associates, Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 666 P.2d 1117 (Colo.App.1983).

1988See Isbill Associates, Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 666 P.2d 1117 (Colo.App.1983).

2026See id.; see also Haueter v. Peguillan, 586 P.2d 403, 404 (Utah 1978) (when sellers of real property procured a title insurance policy for the buyer, that same policy was reissued to the buyer’s assignee, and the assignee suffered a loss covered by the policy, the sellers were not “so isolated from the insurance relationship as to bring the collateral source doctrine into play”).

2026We’re not persuaded. ¶ 35 “Under Colorado’s common law collateral source rule, ‘[c]ompensation or indemnity received by an injured party from a collateral source, wholly independent of the wrongdoer and to which [the wrongdoer] has not contributed, will not diminish the damages otherwise recoverable from the wrongdoer.’” Ronquillo v. EcoClean Home Servs., Inc., 2021 CO 82, ¶ 13 (emphasis added) (alteration in original) (quoting Colo. Permanente Med.

2025See id.

2021Co. , 865 P.2d 893, 902 ( Colo. App. 1993 ) ( concluding that workers' compensation benefits fall within the contract exception to the collateral source rule and thus are not to be set off from a judgment against a tortfeasor ) .