collateral source rule in Illinois

2026Under the collateral source rule, “benefits received by the injured party from a source wholly independent of, and collateral to, the tortfeasor will not diminish damages otherwise recoverable from the tortfeasor.” Wilson v. Hoffman Group, Inc., 131 Ill. 2d 308, 320 (1989).

2025Wilson, 131 Ill. 2d at 320 . ¶ 29 As a substantive rule of damages, the collateral source rule bars a defendant from setting off or reducing a plaintiff’s compensatory award by the amount the plaintiff received from a collateral source.

2026In Arthur v. Catour, 216 Ill. 2d 72 (2005), the supreme court did not examine setoffs under the Act but instead addressed an issue relating to the collateral source rule, which “protects collateral payments made to or benefits conferred on the plaintiff by denying the defendant any corresponding offset or credit.” Id. at 78 .

2026In Arthur v. Catour, 216 Ill. 2d 72 (2005), the supreme court did not examine setoffs under the Act but instead addressed an issue relating to the collateral source rule, which “protects collateral payments made to or benefits conferred on the plaintiff by denying the defendant any corresponding offset or credit.” Id. at 78 .

2026Plaintiff’s other - 15 - 2026 IL App (2d) 240667 case, Wills v. Foster, 229 Ill. 2d 393 (2008), is likewise distinguishable as it also concerns the collateral source rule. ¶ 52 Plaintiff also argues that section 2(b) supports that a setoff should not be available to Centegra, as it provides that the right of contribution exists only in favor of a tortfeasor who has paid more than his pro rata share of the common liability, and the jury found Centegra solely liable for all the damages in this case.

2025If the collateral source will be subrogated for its payment to the plaintiff, this fact provides a secure basis for application of the collateral source rule” and “rebuts any argument that the plaintiff will reap the reward of a double recovery.”); accord Wills, 229 Ill. 2d at 399 (subrogation generally precludes double recovery in cases where the collateral source rule applies). ¶ 36 Finally, we recognize that List raises several additional arguments pertaining to the elements of recoverable damages in this case and to specific statements in the trial court’s ruling about the competency of ev

2005See Muranyi v. Turn Verein Frisch-Auf, 308 Ill.App.3d 213, 216 , 241 Ill.Dec. 505 , 719 N.E.2d 366 (1999) ( Peterson "rejected th[e] unconditional version of the collateral source rule"); see also 11 Ill.

2005See Muranyi v. Turn Verein Frisch-Auf, 308 Ill.App.3d 213, 216 , 241 Ill.Dec. 505 , 719 N.E.2d 366 (1999) ( Peterson "rejected th[e] unconditional version of the collateral source rule"); see also 11 Ill.

2016See, e.g., Bernier v. Burris, 113 Ill. 2d 219, 242 (1986) (explaining that [s]ection 2-1205 modifies the collateral source rule by allowing reductions for 'sums' received from collateral sources).

2005“Under the collateral source rule, benefits received by the injured party from a source wholly independent of, and collateral to, the tortfeasor will not diminish damages otherwise recoverable from the tortfeasor.” Wilson v. The Hoffman Group, Inc., 131 Ill. 2d 308, 320 (1989); see also Bernier v. Burris, 113 Ill. 2d 219, 242 (1986); 15 Ill.

2005“Under the collateral source rule, benefits received by the injured party from a source wholly independent of, and collateral to, the tortfeasor will not diminish damages otherwise recoverable from the tortfeasor.” Wilson v. The Hoffman Group, Inc., 131 Ill. 2d 308, 320 (1989); see Beaird v. Brown, 58 Ill.

2005"Under the collateral source rule, benefits received by the injured party from a source wholly independent of, and collateral to, the tortfeasor will not diminish damages otherwise recoverable from the tortfeasor." Wilson v. The Hoffman Group, Inc., 131 Ill.2d 308, 320 , 137 Ill.Dec. 579 , 546 N.E.2d 524 (1989); see Beaird v. Brown, 58 Ill.App.3d 18, 21 , 15 Ill.Dec. 583 , 373 N.E.2d 1055 (1978), quoting Bireline v. Espenscheid, 15 Ill.App.3d 368, 370 , 304 N.E.2d 508 (1973); 11 Ill.

2020Wills, 229 Ill. 2d at 400-01, 415 ; see Peterson, 76 Ill. 2d at 363 . ¶ 47 The problem with plaintiffs’ reliance here upon the collateral source rule is that the rule prescribes the methodology of awarding damages but does not prescribe rules for determining whether plaintiff has suffered an injury.

2020And in Peterson, 76 Ill. 2d at 356-57 , the plaintiff brought a negligence action against the defendant after an allegedly defective braking system in a car sold by the defendant caused an accident that killed his daughter and seriously injured his son, causing the son’s leg to be amputated. ¶ 49 The appellate court in the present case framed the issue before it as whether the collateral source rule applies in a case involving a purely economic injury. 2018 IL App (1st) 172894, ¶ 11 .

2025Signal Co., 184 Ill.

2001See American Fidelity Fire Insurance Co., 184 Ill.

2002This is an action in tort, and under the collateral source rule, “benefits received by an injured party from a source wholly independent of, and collateral to, a tortfeasor will not diminish damages otherwise recoverable from the tortfeasor.” First Midwest Trust Co. v. Rogers, 296 Ill.

2002“The rationale for the collateral source rule is that a wrongdoer should not benefit from expenditures made by the injured party, or take advantage of contracts or other relations which exist between the injured party and third persons.” (Emphasis added.) First Midwest Trust Co. v. Rogers, 296 Ill.

2005"Under the collateral source rule, benefits received by the injured party from a source wholly independent of, and collateral to, the tortfeasor will not diminish damages otherwise recoverable from the tortfeasor." Wilson v. The Hoffman Group, Inc., 131 Ill.2d 308, 320 , 137 Ill.Dec. 579 , 546 N.E.2d 524 (1989); see Beaird v. Brown, 58 Ill.App.3d 18, 21 , 15 Ill.Dec. 583 , 373 N.E.2d 1055 (1978), quoting Bireline v. Espenscheid, 15 Ill.App.3d 368, 370 , 304 N.E.2d 508 (1973); 11 Ill.

2005"Under the collateral source rule, benefits received by the injured party from a source wholly independent of, and collateral to, the tortfeasor will not diminish damages otherwise recoverable from the tortfeasor." Wilson v. The Hoffman Group, Inc., 131 Ill.2d 308, 320 , 137 Ill.Dec. 579 , 546 N.E.2d 524 (1989); see Beaird v. Brown, 58 Ill.App.3d 18, 21 , 15 Ill.Dec. 583 , 373 N.E.2d 1055 (1978), quoting Bireline v. Espenscheid, 15 Ill.App.3d 368, 370 , 304 N.E.2d 508 (1973); 11 Ill.

2000Smith v. General Casualty Co., 75 Ill.

2000Smith v. General Casualty Co. , 75 Ill.

2021See Jiles, 195 Ill.

2021In support of this proposition, the majority cites Jiles and American Fidelity Fire Insurance Co. The actual quote from Jiles is this: “[i]n contract law, the collateral- source rule will apply only where there has been an element of fraud, tort, or willfulness (in breaching a contract).” Jiles, 195 Ill.

2020App. 3d 791, 802 (1978); People v. Saiken, 49 Ill. 2d 504, 509 (1971); see Restatement of the Conflict of Laws § 597 (1934); see also Restatement of the Conflict of Laws § 597 cmt. a (stating that “the court at the forum applies the local rule of exclusion of evidence”). ¶ 32 To that end, the trial court correctly barred testimony regarding the reduced rates providers accepted for James’s medical treatment under the collateral source rule.

2019App. 3d 791, 802 (1978); People v. Saiken, 49 Ill. 2d 504, 509 (1971); see Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws § 597 (1934); see also Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws § 597 cmt. a (stating that “the court at the forum applies the local rule of exclusion of evidence”). ¶ 32 To that end, the trial court correctly barred testimony regarding the reduced rates providers accepted for James’ medical treatment under the collateral source rule.

2020Notably, in their motions for summary judgment and posttrial relief, defendants conceded that “[p]rocedural and evidentiary issues are governed by the law of the forum, in this case, the law of Illinois.” 4 And, in their brief, defendants acknowledge that the trial court’s rulings were consistent with Illinois law, which “prohibits a jury from knowing the reduced rates providers accept based on the collateral source rule.” Accordingly, we find no error. ¶ 33 Negligent Hiring and Retention ¶ 34 We also reject defendants’ claim that a company’s acceptance of vicarious liability for the alleged n

2019Regardless, the jury in this case was instructed to consider any evidence of Johnson’s prior convictions only insofar as it related to plaintiffs’ negligent hiring and retention claim against UACL. - 11 - No. 1-18-1525 ¶ 33 Negligent Hiring and Retention ¶ 34 We also reject defendants’ claim that a company’s acceptance of vicarious liability for the alleged negligence caused by its employee categorically relieves that company of any additional liability for negligent hiring and retention, finding their reliance on Sedam v. 2JR Pizza Enterprises, LLC, 84 N.E.3d 1174, 1179 (Ind. 2017), misplaced

2017Eichel v. New York Central Railway, 375 U.S. 253, 254 (1963); Sloas v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 616 F. 3d 380 , 387 n. 3 (4th Cir. 2010); Friedland v. TIC-The Industry Co., 566 F. 3d 1203, 1205-06 (1997) (defining collateral source rule). 5 Fringe benefits and insurance programs paid out to the employee by the employer cannot be set off under the collateral source rule because they are not considered double compensation for the same injury.

2017Co., 375 U.S. 253, 254 (1963); Sloas v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 616 F.3d 380 , 387 n.3 (4th Cir. 2010); Friedland v. TIC-The Industrial Co., 566 F.3d 1203, 1205-06 (10th Cir. 1997) (defining collateral source rule). 5 Fringe benefits and insurance programs paid out to the employee by the employer cannot be set off under the collateral source rule because they are not considered double compensation for the same injury.

2017Eichel v. New York Central Railway, 375 U.S. 253, 254 (1963); Sloas v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 616 F. 3d 380 , 387 n. 3 (4th Cir. 2010); Friedland v. TIC-The Industry Co., 566 F. 3d 1203, 1205-06 (1997) (defining collateral source rule). 5 Fringe benefits and insurance programs paid out to the employee by the employer cannot be set off under the collateral source rule because they are not considered double compensation for the same injury.

2017Co., 375 U.S. 253, 254 (1963); Sloas v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 616 F.3d 380 , 387 n.3 (4th Cir. 2010); Friedland v. TIC-The Industrial Co., 566 F.3d 1203, 1205-06 (10th Cir. 1997) (defining collateral source rule). 5 Fringe benefits and insurance programs paid out to the employee by the employer cannot be set off under the collateral source rule because they are not considered double compensation for the same injury.

2017Clark, 726 F. 2d 448 at 450-51 ; U.S. v. Price, 288 F. 2d 448, 450 (4th Cir. 1961).

2017Clark, 726 F.2d at 450-51 ; United States v. Price, 288 F.2d 448, 450 (4th Cir. 1961).

2015“The standard of review for the entry of summary judgment is de novo.” General Casualty Insurance Co. v. Lacey, 199 Ill. 2d 281, 284 (2002).

2014"The standard of review for the entry of summary judgment is de novo." General Casualty Insurance Co. v. Lacey, 199 Ill. 2d 281, 284 (2002).

2015Sterling Radio Stations, Inc. v. Weinstine, 328 Ill.

2014Sterling Radio Stations, Inc. v. Weinstine, 328 Ill.

2021Boden v. Crawford, 196 Ill.

2004Boden v. Crawford, 196 Ill.

2017Clark, 726 F. 2d 448 at 450-51 ; U.S. v. Price, 288 F. 2d 448, 450 (4th Cir. 1961).

1996Although the language of section 55 appears broad enough to swallow the collateral source rule, courts have limited its scope by focusing on the provision that the covered payments be made "on account of the injury.” Clark, 726 F.2d at 450 .

2016In Perry v. Larson, 794 F.2d 279, 286 (7th Cir. 1986), a case in which a sheriff's deputy brought a civil rights action against his employer, the Seventh Circuit refused to reduce the plaintiff's damages award by the amount of unemployment compensation benefits he received, reasoning that the defendant should not benefit simply because the state provides a means of helping those who are out of work.

1993In Perry v. Larson (7th Cir. 1986), 794 F.2d 279 , the defendant, a sheriff, wrongfully discharged plaintiff, a deputy, in violation of his civil rights.