ineffective assistance of counsel claim in Georgia

2026See Clark v. State, 321 Ga. 732, 737 (2025) (“To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, an appellant bears the burden of showing both that trial counsel’s performance was professionally deficient and that he was prejudiced as a result of that deficient performance.” (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984)); Clark v. State, 307 Ga. 537 , 543–44 (2019) (rejecting an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim where the appellant argued that comments were inadmissible but made “no argument, much less a sufficient showing, that the trial court erred in concluding that trial c

2026As we have explained, “[t]o prevail on an ineffective- assistance-of-counsel claim, a defendant must show deficient per- formance by trial counsel and resulting prejudice.” Zayas v. State, 319 Ga. 402, 409 (2024) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668, 687 (1984)).

2026“Whether to seek severance is a matter of trial strategy, and in the absence of evidence to the contrary, counsel’s decisions are presumed to be strategic and thus insufficient to support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” Green v. State, 302 Ga. 816 , 35 819 (2018) (citation omitted).

2026“Whether to seek severance is a matter of trial strategy, and in the absence of evidence to the contrary, counsel’s decisions are presumed to be strategic and thus insufficient to support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” Green v. State, 302 Ga. 816 , 35 819 (2018) (citation omitted).

2009See Fargason v. State, 266 Ga. 463 (4) ( 467 SE2d 551 ) (1996) (“To prove an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must show that trial counsel performed defi-ciently and that the result of the trial would have been different but for the deficiency.”).

2009See Fargason v. State, 266 Ga. 463 (4) ( 467 SE2d 551 ) (1996) (“To prove an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must show that trial counsel performed defi-ciently and that the result of the trial would have been different but for the deficiency.”).

2025See Hampton v. State, 302 Ga. 166 , 168–69 (2017) (“[T]his Court has equated the prejudice step of the plain error standard with the prejudice prong for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.”).

2023See also Hampton v. State, 302 Ga. 166, 168-169 (2) ( 805 SE2d 902 ) (2017) (The Georgia Supreme Court “has 12 equated the prejudice step of the plain error standard with the prejudice prong for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.”). 4.

2021But our Supreme Court has explained that “we are not limited in our assessment of the objective reasonableness of lawyer performance to the subjective reasons offered by trial counsel for his conduct.”55 Put another way, when considering an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, the proper assessment is “an inquiry into the objective reasonableness of counsel’s performance, not counsel’s subjective state of mind.”56 Indeed, if a reasonable lawyer “might have done what the actual lawyer did—whether for the same reasons given by the actual lawyer or different reasons entirely—the actual 55 Sha

2021But our Supreme Court has explained that “we are not limited in our assessment of the objective reasonableness of lawyer performance to the subjective reasons offered by trial counsel for his conduct.”55 Put another way, when considering an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, the proper assessment is “an inquiry into the objective reasonableness of counsel’s performance, not counsel’s subjective state of mind.”56 Indeed, if a reasonable lawyer “might have done what the actual lawyer did—whether for the same reasons given by the actual lawyer or different reasons entirely—the actual 55 Sha

2021The question is whether an attorney’s representation amounted to incompetence under ‘prevailing professional norms,’ not whether it deviated from best practices or most common custom.” Id. at 105 (IV) (quoting Strickland, 466 U. S. at 690 ); see also Crouch v. State, 305 Ga. 391, 400 (3) ( 825 SE2d 199 ) (2019) (“[T]rial counsel’s performance is judged according to an objective standard of reasonableness, considering all the circumstances from counsel’s perspective at the time of the challenged conduct, and in the light of prevailing professional norms.”).6 Therefore, “a tactical decision will

2021The question is whether an attorney’s representation amounted to incompetence under ‘prevailing professional norms,’ not whether it deviated from best practices or most common custom.” Id. at 105 (IV) (quoting Strickland, 466 U. S. at 690 ); see also Crouch v. State, 305 Ga. 391, 400 (3) ( 825 SE2d 199 ) (2019) (“[T]rial counsel’s performance is judged according to an objective standard of reasonableness, considering all the circumstances from counsel’s perspective at the time of the challenged conduct, and in the light of prevailing professional norms.”).6 Therefore, “a tactical decision will

2020See State v. Abernathy, 289 Ga. 603, 611 (5) ( 715 SE2d 48 ) (2011) (“[B]ecause [the appellant] did not raise an objection to this procedure at trial, the issue of closure may only be raised in the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

2020See State v. Abernathy, 289 Ga. 603, 611 (5) ( 715 SE2d 48 ) (2011) (“[B]ecause [the appellant] did not raise an objection to this procedure at trial, the issue of closure may only be raised in the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

2021In Shah, the Supreme Court of Georgia reaffirmed that “reckless conduct may be a lesser included offense of cruelty to children, if the harm to the child resulted from criminal negligence rather than malicious or willful conduct.” (Punctuation and 6 See Martin v. State, 298 Ga. 259, 277-278 (6) (c) ( 779 SE2d 342 ) (2015) (equating the third, harm prong of the plain error standard with the prejudice required to establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 694 ( 104 SCt 2052 , 80 LE2d 674) (1984)), disapproved on other grounds by Willis v.

2021In Shah, the Supreme Court of Georgia reaffirmed that “reckless conduct may be a lesser included offense of cruelty to children, if the harm to the child resulted from criminal negligence rather than malicious or willful conduct.” (Punctuation and 6 See Martin v. State, 298 Ga. 259, 277-278 (6) (c) ( 779 SE2d 342 ) (2015) (equating the third, harm prong of the plain error standard with the prejudice required to establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 694 ( 104 SCt 2052 , 80 LE2d 674) (1984)), disapproved on other grounds by Willis v.

2012See id. at 783 (II) (D); Strickland, 466 U. S. at 687 (holding that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim can succeed only upon a showing of both deficient performance and prejudice of constitutional proportions); Smith v. Francis, 253 Ga. 782, 783 (1) ( 325 SE2d 362 ) (1985).

2012See id. at 783 (II) (D); Strickland, 466 U. S. at 687 (holding that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim can succeed only upon a showing of both deficient performance and prejudice of constitutional proportions); Smith v. Francis, 253 Ga. 782, 783 (1) ( 325 SE2d 362 ) (1985).

2018Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 , 687-688 (III) (A), 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 8 Mitchell failed to question his trial counsel on this point at the hearing on his motion for new trial, and "trial counsel's decisions are presumed to be strategic and thus insufficient to support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Bright v. State , 292 Ga. 273 , 275 (2) (a), 736 S.E.2d 380 (2013).

2018Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 , 687-688 (III) (A), 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 8 Mitchell failed to question his trial counsel on this point at the hearing on his motion for new trial, and "trial counsel's decisions are presumed to be strategic and thus insufficient to support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Bright v. State , 292 Ga. 273 , 275 (2) (a), 736 S.E.2d 380 (2013).

2025Structural error Sors argues that trial counsel failed to pursue his preferred defense of actual innocence and his preferred strategy in support of that defense, and that this amounts to structural error, which requires no showing of prejudice.1 But see Reid v. State, 286 Ga. 484, 488 (3) (c) ( 690 SE2d 177 ) (2010) (where structural errors are “raised in the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, prejudice will not be presumed”).

2025Structural error Sors argues that trial counsel failed to pursue his preferred defense of actual innocence and his preferred strategy in support of that defense, and that this amounts to structural error, which requires no showing of prejudice.1 But see Reid v. State, 286 Ga. 484, 488 (3) (c) ( 690 SE2d 177 ) (2010) (where structural errors are “raised in the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, prejudice will not be presumed”).

2024Watts v. State, 308 Ga. 455, 460 (2) (841 SE2d 686) (2020) (decisions about what questions to ask on cross- examination are quintessential trial strategy and rarely constitute ineffective assistance); Romer v. State, 293 Ga. 339, 344 (3) (a) (745 SE2d 637) (2013) (counsel’s tactical decision will not form the basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim unless it was “so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have chosen it” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

2024Watts v. State, 308 Ga. 455, 460 (2) (841 SE2d 686) (2020) (decisions about what questions to ask on cross- examination are quintessential trial strategy and rarely constitute ineffective assistance); Romer v. State, 293 Ga. 339, 344 (3) (a) (745 SE2d 637) (2013) (counsel’s tactical decision will not form the basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim unless it was “so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have chosen it” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

2020“Whether to object to a particular part of a prosecutor’s closing argument is a tactical decision, and counsel’s decision not to make an objection must be patently unreasonable to rise to the level of deficient performance.” Smith, 296 Ga. at 735-736 (2) (b) (citations and punctuation omitted). “[I]n the absence of evidence to the contrary, counsel’s decisions are presumed to be strategic and thus insufficient to support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” Washington v. State, 285 Ga. 541, 543 (3) (a) (i) ( 678 SE2d 900 ) (2009).

2017See Washington v. State, 285 Ga. 541, 543 (3) (a) (i) ( 678 SE2d 900 ) (2009) (“[I]n the absence of evidence to the contrary, counsel’s decisions are presumed to be strategic and thus insufficient to support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.”). 5 With respect to Benton’s fifth allegation, failure to prepare for trial, Benton claims that his counsel’s lack of preparedness was shown by her failure to cross-examine one of the eyewitnesses, Lakesi Moore, about whether she actually saw the shooting and whether she held potential bias for having previously sought compensation for her testi

2016“But invoking the words ‘tactics’ and ‘strategy’ does not automatically immunize trial counsel against a claim that a tactical decision or strategic maneuver was an unreasonable one no competent attorney would have made under the same circumstances. ‘Tactics’ and ‘strategy’ provide no talismanic protection against an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” Benham v. State, 277 Ga. 516, 518 ( 591 SE2d 824 ) (2004) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2016“But invoking the words ‘tactics’ and ‘strategy’ does not automatically immunize trial counsel against a claim that a tactical decision or strategic maneuver was an unreasonable one no competent attorney would have made under the same circumstances. ‘Tactics’ and ‘strategy’ provide no talismanic protection against an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” Benham v. State, 277 Ga. 516, 518 ( 591 SE2d 824 ) (2004) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2020See generally Wesley v. State, 286 Ga. 355, 356 ( 689 SE2d 280 ) (2010) (to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must show counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency resulted in prejudice to the defendant).

2020See generally Wesley v. State, 286 Ga. 355, 356 ( 689 SE2d 280 ) (2010) (to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must show counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency resulted in prejudice to the defendant).

2017When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, "we accept the trial court's factual findings and credibility determinations unless clearly erroneous, but we independently apply the legal principles to the facts." Suggs v. State , 272 Ga. 85 , 88 (4), 526 S.E.2d 347 (2000).

2017When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, "we accept the trial court's factual findings and credibility determinations unless clearly erroneous, but we independently apply the legal principles to the facts." Suggs v. State , 272 Ga. 85 , 88 (4), 526 S.E.2d 347 (2000).

2026Moreover, Appellant failed to question her trial counsel about this issue at the motion for new trial hearing, and “[i]n the absence of evidence to the contrary, 8 counsel’s decisions are presumed to be strategic and thus insufficient to support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” Mitchell v. State, 290 Ga. 490, 492 (4)(a) ( 722 SE2d 705 ) (2012) (citation and punctuation omitted). (c) Finally, Appellant alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately respond “to the prosecutor’s improper and misleading statements of law during closing argument.” However, Appellan

2026Moreover, Appellant failed to question her trial counsel about this issue at the motion for new trial hearing, and “[i]n the absence of evidence to the contrary, 8 counsel’s decisions are presumed to be strategic and thus insufficient to support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” Mitchell v. State, 290 Ga. 490, 492 (4)(a) ( 722 SE2d 705 ) (2012) (citation and punctuation omitted). (c) Finally, Appellant alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately respond “to the prosecutor’s improper and misleading statements of law during closing argument.” However, Appellan

2023“This Court has equated the prejudice step of the plain error standard with the prejudice prong for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” Jackson, 306 Ga. at 84 (4) (b) (citation and punctuation omitted); see also id. at 84-85 (4) (b) (holding that, even assuming that trial counsel performed deficiently in not requesting an accomplice- corroboration instruction, the appellant had not shown prejudice for the reasons explained in reviewing the absence of that instruction for plain error).

2023“This Court has equated the prejudice step of the plain error standard with the prejudice prong for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” Jackson, 306 Ga. at 84 (4) (b) (citation and punctuation omitted); see also id. at 84-85 (4) (b) (holding that, even assuming that trial counsel performed deficiently in not requesting an accomplice- corroboration instruction, the appellant had not shown prejudice for the reasons explained in reviewing the absence of that instruction for plain error).

2025See Bozzie, 302 Ga. at 711 (4) (b) (noting that “[t]he prejudice step of the plain-error standard is equivalent to the prejudice prong for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim”). 26 establish prejudice.

2024“The prejudice step of the plain-error standard is equivalent to the prejudice prong for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” Bozzie v. State, 302 Ga. 704, 711 (4) (b) (808 SE2d 671) (2017).

2012To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a criminal defendant must show that his counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance so prejudiced him that there is a reasonable likelihood that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the trial would have been different.6 “The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.”7 We are not required to address both the deficient performance and prejudice prongs of the test if the defendant has made an insufficient showing on either one of them, and “a court need not determine whether

2012To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a criminal defendant must show that his counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance so prejudiced him that there is a reasonable likelihood that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the trial would have been different.6 “The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.”7 We are not required to address both the deficient performance and prejudice prongs of the test if the defendant has made an insufficient showing on either one of them, and “a court need not determine whether

2016In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Payne “must show that trial counsel’s performance fell below a reasonable standard of conduct and that there existed a reasonable probability that the outcome of the case would have been different had it not been for counsel’s deficient performance.” Scott v. State, 290 Ga. 883, 889 (7) ( 725 SE2d 305 ) (2012) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 ( 104 S. Ct. 2052 , 80 LE2d 674) (1984)).

2016In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Payne “must show that trial counsel’s performance fell below a reasonable standard of conduct and that there existed a reasonable probability that the outcome of the case would have been different had it not been for counsel’s deficient performance.” Scott v. State, 290 Ga. 883, 889 (7) ( 725 SE2d 305 ) (2012) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 ( 104 S. Ct. 2052 , 80 LE2d 674) (1984)).

2012See Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809, 811-812, n. 1 ( 642 SE2d 56 ) (2007) (holding that the combined effect of trial counsel’s deficiencies should be considered); Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440-441 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993) (noting that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim can be resolved based solely on a lack of prejudice without addressing the separate question of whether trial counsel actually performed deficiently).

2012See Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809, 811-812, n. 1 ( 642 SE2d 56 ) (2007) (holding that the combined effect of trial counsel’s deficiencies should be considered); Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440-441 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993) (noting that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim can be resolved based solely on a lack of prejudice without addressing the separate question of whether trial counsel actually performed deficiently).

2020“Whether to object to a particular part of a prosecutor’s closing argument is a tactical decision, and counsel’s decision not to make an objection must be patently unreasonable to rise to the level of deficient performance.” Smith, 296 Ga. at 735-736 (2) (b) (citations and punctuation omitted). “[I]n the absence of evidence to the contrary, counsel’s decisions are presumed to be strategic and thus insufficient to support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” Washington v. State, 285 Ga. 541, 543 (3) (a) (i) ( 678 SE2d 900 ) (2009).

2019See Gilmer, 339 Ga. App. at 594 (2) (“In reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance, we give deference to the trial court’s factual findings and credibility determinations unless clearly erroneous, but we review a trial court’s legal conclusions de novo.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 40 See Smith, 296 Ga. at 733 (2); Gilmer, 339 Ga. App. at 594 (2); Glass, 255 Ga. App. at 403-404 (10) (g). 24 More importantly, when considering an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, “[t]he proper assessment is an inquiry into the objective reasonableness of counsel’s performance, not counsel’s sub

2022See also Robinson v. State, 278 Ga. 31, 36 (2) (d) (597 SE3d 386) (2004) (“As a general rule, matters of reasonable trial tactics and strategy, whether wise or unwise, do not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

2022See also Robinson v. State, 278 Ga. 31, 37 (3) (d) ( 597 SE2d 386 ) (2004) (“As a general rule, matters of reasonable trial tactics and strategy, whether wise or unwise, do not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

2019See Barrett , supra, 292 Ga. at 179-180 (3) (C) (5), 733 S.E.2d 304 ; Hampton v. State , 302 Ga. 166 , 168-169 (2), 805 S.E.2d 902 (2017) ("[T]his Court has equated the prejudice step of the plain error standard with the prejudice prong for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.") (citation omitted). 3.

2019See Barrett , supra, 292 Ga. at 179-180 (3) (C) (5), 733 S.E.2d 304 ; Hampton v. State , 302 Ga. 166 , 168-169 (2), 805 S.E.2d 902 (2017) ("[T]his Court has equated the prejudice step of the plain error standard with the prejudice prong for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.") (citation omitted). 3.

2025See Lupoe, 300 Ga. at 242 (2) (c) (concluding that trial counsel’s failure to file a motion to sever could not support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim because “the trial court would not have abused its discretion in denying it”). (b) In Chapman’s final enumeration, he claims that “[t]rial counsel was ineffective in assisting [him] at trial” because counsel was “unprepared and ineffective . . . due to not reviewing the discovery materials or investigating possible defenses.” Even assuming that Chapman could demonstrate deficient performance, he cannot demonstrate prejudice.

2023Further, “[w]hether to seek severance is a matter of trial strategy, and in the absence of evidence to the contrary, counsel’s decisions are 13 presumed to be strategic and thus insufficient to support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” Lupoe v. State, 300 Ga. 233, 241 (2) (c) (794 SE2d 67) (2016) (citations and punctuation omitted).

2022In other words, hindsight has no place in an assessment of the performance of trial counsel, and a lawyer second-guessing his own performance with the benefit of hindsight has no significance for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.16 15 Keener, 301 Ga. at 850 (2) (citation and punctuation omitted). 16 Williams v. State, 358 Ga. App. 152 , 155 (a) ( 853 SE2d 383 ) (2021) (citation and punctuation omitted). 9 (d) Demeritte asserts that collectively trial counsel’s deficiencies prejudiced his defense and justified a new trial.

2019It is well settled that "hindsight has no place in an assessment of the performance of trial counsel, and a lawyer second-guessing his own performance with the benefit of hindsight has no significance for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim." Keener v. State , 301 Ga. 848 , 850 (2), 804 S.E.2d 383 (2017) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2012See Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809, 811-812, n. 1 ( 642 SE2d 56 ) (2007) (holding that the combined effect of trial counsel’s deficiencies should be considered); Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440-441 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993) (noting that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim can be resolved based solely on a lack of prejudice without addressing the separate question of whether trial counsel actually performed deficiently).

2012See Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809, 811-812, n. 1 ( 642 SE2d 56 ) (2007) (holding that the combined effect of trial counsel’s deficiencies should be considered); Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440-441 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ) (1993) (noting that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim can be resolved based solely on a lack of prejudice without addressing the separate question of whether trial counsel actually performed deficiently).