Clausell v. Hobart Corp., 515 So. 2d 1275 (Fla. 1987). · Go Syfert
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Clausell v. Hobart Corp., 515 So. 2d 1275 (Fla. 1987). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
66 citation events (56 in the last 25 years) across 7 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Williams v. Am. Optical Corp., 985 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)
Treatment trajectory · 1987 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1987 2006 2026
How cited ↗
Cited for
At page 1276 Defining substantive vested rights versus mere expectation17 citing casesexplaining that “[a] substantive vested right is an immediate right of present enjoyment, or a present fixed right of future enjoyment” and “[t]o be vested a right must be more than a mere expectation based on an anticipation of the continuance of an existing law; it must have become a title, legal…12 citing courts put it this way
  • Williams v. Am. Optical Corp., 985 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).published 2 cites
    See § 2.01, Fla. Stat. (2007) ("The common laws of England with the exception hereinafter mentioned are declared to be of force in this state; provided the common law be not inconsistent with the acts of the Legislature of this state [e.s.…
  • Promontory Enter., Inc. v. S. ENGIN. & CONTRACT., INC., 864 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004).published
    (To be vested, a right must be more than a mere expectation based on anticipation of the continuance of an existing law....)
  • Campus Commc'ns, Inc. v. Earnhardt, 821 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002).published
    (To be vested, a right must be more than a mere expectation based on anticipation of the continuance of an existing law ....)
  • Florida Dep't of Law Enf't v. Angel Garcia, No. 4D2025-2547 (Fla. 4th DCA Sept. 2, 2026).published
    “A substantive vested right is an immediate right of present enjoyment, or a present fixed right of future enjoyment”
  • City of Doral, Etc. v. Pedro Cabrera, No. 3D2025-0363 (Fla. 3d DCA June 17, 2026).published
    “To be vested a right must be more than a mere expectation based on an anticipation of the continuance of an existing law; it must have become a title, legal or equitable, to the present or future enforcement of a demand”
  • John R. Secrist v. Elizabeth A. Secrist, 421 So. 3d 781 (Fla. 5th DCA 2025).published
    “A substantive vested right is an immediate right of present enjoyment, or a present fixed right of future enjoyment”
  • Stockdale v. Stockdale, 409 So. 3d 163 (Fla. 1st DCA 2025).published
    “A substantive vested right is an immediate right of present enjoyment, or a present fixed right of future enjoyment”
  • Swift Response, LLC v. Routt, 401 So. 3d 640 (Fla. 1st DCA 2025).published
    (explaining that “[a] substantive vested right is an immediate right of present enjoyment, or a present fixed right of future enjoyment” and “[t]o be vested a right must be more than a mere expectation based on an antici…)
  • Ferretti v. Nova Se. Univ., Inc., 586 F. Supp. 3d 1260 (S.D. Fla. 2022).published
    “a mere expectation based on an anticipation of the continuance of an existing law”
  • State v. Goldberg, 85 A.3d 231 (Md. 2014).published 2 cites
    (�To be vested a right must be more than a mere expectation based on an anticipation of the continuance of an existing law; it must have become a title, legal or equitable, to the present or future enforcement of a dema…)
Show 7 more citing cases
  • M.D. v. United States, 745 F. Supp. 2d 1274 (M.D. Fla. 2010).published
    Moreover, a “vested right must be ‘more than a mere expectation based on an anticipation of the continuance of an existing law.’ ” Id. citing Clausell v. Hobart Corp., 515 So.2d 1275, 1276 (Fla.1987), cert, denied, 485 U.S. 1000 , 108 S.Ct…
  • Est. of McCall v. United States, 663 F. Supp. 2d 1276 (N.D. Fla. 2009).published
    “more than a mere expectation based on an anticipation of the continuance of an existing law”
  • Sch. Bd. of Miami-dade Cty. v. Carralero, 992 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008).published
    In re Will of Martell, 457 So.2d 1064, 1067 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).'" Clausell v. Hobart Corp., 515 So.2d 1275, 1276 (Fla.1987) (quoting Lamb v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 631 F.Supp. 1144, 1149 (S.D.Fla. 1986)). "`To be vested a right…
  • DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Hurst, 949 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007).published 2 cites
    “A substantive vested right is an immediate right of present enjoyment, or a present fixed right of future enjoyment”
  • Notami Hosp. of Florida, Inc. v. Bowen, 927 So. 2d 139 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).published
    “A statute [2] is not unconstitutionally retrospective in its operation unless it impairs a substantive, vested right”
  • Lakeland Reg'l Med. Ctr. Inc. v. Ahca, 917 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).published
    (holding that application of statute to bar pending cause of action did not violate due process, citing and quoting extensively from Lamb)
  • Power v. Power, 864 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004).published
    “an immediate right of present enjoyment, or a present fixed right of future enjoyment”
At page 1275 a person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of the common law2 citing cases1 citing court put it this way
  • Williams v. Am. Optical Corp., 985 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).published 2 cites
    (a person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of the common law)
  • Raphael v. Shecter, 18 So. 3d 1152 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009).published
    Optical Corp., 985 So.2d 23, 30 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008); see also Clausell v. Hobart Corp., 515 So.2d 1275, 1275-76 (Fla.1987).
Other citing cases1 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Alberto CLAUSELL, et al., Petitioners,
v.
HOBART CORPORATION, Respondent.
70566.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Dec 3, 1987.
Published opinion
515 So. 2d 1275
1987 Fla. LEXIS 2544
1987 WL 2364
Grimes.
Cited by 35 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 86%
Citer courts: District Court of Appeal of Fl… (1)

Joel S. Perwin of Podhurst, Orseck, Parks, Josefsberg, Eaton, Meadow & Olin, P.A., and Spence, Payne, Masington, Grossman & Needle, P.A., Miami, for petitioners.

James E. Tribble and Anthony D. Dwyer of Blackwell, Walker, Fascell & Hoehl, Miami, for respondent.

GRIMES, Justice.

We review Clausell v. Hobart Corp., 506 So.2d 1160 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), to answer three certified questions of great public importance. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. The certified questions are as follows:

I. WHETHER THE LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENT OF SECTION 95.031(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (1983), ABOLISHING THE STATUTE OF REPOSE IN PRODUCT LIABILITY ACTIONS, SHOULD BE CONSTRUED TO OPERATE RETROSPECTIVELY AS TO A CAUSE OF ACTION WHICH ACCRUED BEFORE THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE AMENDMENT?
II. IF NOT, WHETHER THE DECISION OF PULLUM v. CINCINNATI, INC., 476 So.2d 657 (FLA. 1985), APPEAL DISMISSED, 475 U.S. 1114, 106 S.CT. 1626, 90 L.ED.2D 174 (1986), WHICH OVERRULED BATTILLA v. ALLIS CHALMERS MFG. CO., 392 So.2d 874 (FLA. 1980), APPLIES SO AS TO BAR A CAUSE OF ACTION THAT ACCRUED AFTER THE BATTILLA DECISION BUT BEFORE THE PULLUM DECISION?
III. WOULD THE APPLICATION OF PULLUM, TO BAR A CAUSE OF ACTION THAT ACCRUED AFTER THE BATTILLA DECISION BUT BEFORE THE PULLUM DECISION, DEPRIVE THE PLAINTIFF OF A RIGHT OF DUE PROCESS GUARANTEED BY THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION?

Id. at 1160-61. We recently answered the first question in the negative and the second question in the affirmative in Melendez v. Dreis & Krump Manufacturing Co., 515 So.2d 735 (Fla. 1987).

With reference to the third certified question, Clausell argues that the retroactive application of Pullum to his cause of action violates his right to due process under the United States Constitution. We find this claim unfounded. Several years ago in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 88, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 2638, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978), the United States Supreme Court noted that "[o]ur cases have clearly established that `[a] person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of the common[*1276] law.'" See also Ducharme v. Merrill-National Laboratories, 574 F.2d 1307, 1309 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1002, 99 S.Ct. 612, 58 L.Ed.2d 677 (1978) ("it is well settled that a plaintiff has no vested right in any tort claim for damages under state law"). More recently, in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982), the Court acknowledged that a cause of action is a species of property but pointed out that the state remained free to create substantive defenses or immunities for use in adjudication.

The Federal District Court in Lamb v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 631 F. Supp. 1144 (S.D.Fla. 1986), rejected the very argument advanced by Clausell when it stated:

While the instant Plaintiff correctly posits that a statute may not be retroactively applied to deprive a party of a vested right, such a situation simply does not exist here. "A statute is not unconstitutionally retrospective in its operation unless it impairs a substantive, vested right. A substantive vested right is an immediate right of present enjoyment, or a present fixed right of future enjoyment." In re Will of Martell, 457 So.2d 1064, 1067 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). "To be vested a right must be more than a mere expectation based on an anticipation of the continuance of an existing law; it must have become a title, legal or equitable, to the present or future enforcement of a demand." Division of Workers' Compensation v. Brevda, 420 So.2d 887, 891 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (emphasis added). The Plaintiff in the instant case had no vested contract or property right prior to the Pullum decision; instead Plaintiff was merely pursuing a common law tort theory to recover damages.

631 F. Supp. at 1149.

Another federal district court reached the same conclusion in Eddings v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 635 F. Supp. 45 (N.D.Fla. 1986), when it said:

Pullum, receding from Battilla, held the statute was not unconstitutional. No cause of action was created by the statute and Battilla vested in plaintiffs no cause of action. It removed the bar of the statute to plaintiffs' assertion of a cause of action. But plaintiffs had, at most, a mere expectation that they had a cause of action they could pursue, and a subsequent decision, holding the statute to be constitutional, could not and does not deprive them of any vested rights.

Id. at 47.

Section 95.031 provided a defense to a cause of action rather than creating a cause of action. In Battilla the court simply held section 95.031(2) unconstitutional as applied to the facts of that case. When Pullum was decided, the statute became valid ab initio and was restored to its operative force. Since Clausell had no vested right in his cause of action, he suffered no deprivation of due process under the United States Constitution. Consequently, we answer the third certified question in the negative and approve the decision of the district court of appeal.

It is so ordered.

McDONALD, C.J., and OVERTON, EHRLICH, SHAW, BARKETT and KOGAN, JJ., concur.