Dumond v. Denehy, 139 A.2d 58 (Conn. 1958). · Go Syfert
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Dumond v. Denehy, 139 A.2d 58 (Conn. 1958). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 4× by 4 distinct cases, 1995–2026 · 2 courts · …a specific allegation setting out the conduct that is claimed to be reckless or wanton must be made. at p. 91 ✓
cited 3× by 3 distinct cases, last quoted 1993 · …as the supreme court said in dumond v. denehy, 145 conn. 88 , 91 , 139 a.2d 58 (1958): ⚠ not in text
220 citation events (57 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Smith v. Brayboy (ctd, 2019-09-30)
Treatment trajectory · 1960 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1960 1993 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 18 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Smith v. Brayboy (4×) also: Cited as authority (rule)
D. Conn. · 2019 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
briefly the plaintiff's claim in this respect can be summarized as follows: the use of the word 'reckless'. . .
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Gilman v. Shames (2×)
Conn. App. Ct. · 2019 · signal: see, e.g. · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence low
simply using the word 'reckless' or 'recklessness' is not enough. a specific allegation setting out the conduct that is claimed to be reckless or wanton must be made.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Di Teresi v. Stamford Health System, Inc. (2×)
Conn. App. Ct. · 2013 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence low
a specific allegation setting out the conduct that is claimed to be reckless or wanton must be made
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mar Jennings v. Citibank, N.A.
D. Conn. · 2026 · confidence medium
Conn. Mar. 31, 2006) (quoting Dumond v. Denehy, 145 Conn. 88, 91 (1958)). “‘A specific allegation setting out the conduct that is claimed to be reckless or wanton must be made.’” Id. (quoting Dumond, 145 Conn. at 91 ).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Harris v. City of New Haven
D. Conn. · 2025 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 532 (1988); Dumond v. Denehy, 145 Conn. 88, 91 (1958).
discussed Cited "see" Rosina v. Bilides B. E., No. Cv 02-0462976 S (Dec. 3, 2002) (2×)
Conn. Super. Ct. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Dumond v. Denehy, 145 Conn. 88 , 91 , 139 A.2d 58 (1958).
cited Cited "see" Wood v. American Medical Response, No. Cv 99 0588557 S (May 28, 2002)
Conn. Super. Ct. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Dumond v. Dennehy , 145 Conn. 88 (1958).
discussed Cited "see" Bello v. Barden Corp. (2×)
D. Conn. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See id. (quoting Dumond v. Denehy, 145 Conn. 88, 91 , 139 A.2d 58, 59 ).
discussed Cited "see" Hanchar v. Silver Hill Hospital, No. Cv98 0163502 (Feb. 29, 2000) (2×)
Conn. Super. Ct. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Dumond v. Denehy, 145 Conn. 88 , 91 , 139 A.2d 58 (1958) (where the complaint does not specifically allege the conduct that is claimed as reckless, the plaintiff has not adequately stated a cause of action for recklessness).
discussed Cited "see" Doe v. Veterans Memorial Medical Center, No. Cv 97 0571265 S (Jul. 6, 1998) (2×)
Conn. Super. Ct. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
Counts Four, Five, and Six In these counts Doe 1 alleges that the defendants Parker, Quintillani and Zemke were reckless when they placed Doe 1 in an intensive, highly demanding, aggressive and abusive group therapy program during which they engaged in aggressive and confrontational tactics against Doe 1 thereby creating an "extreme and unreasonable risk that Doe 1 would suffer sever physical and psychological trauma." "`There is a wide difference between negligence and a reckless disregard of the rights or safety of others, and a complaint should employ language explicit enough to clearly inf…
discussed Cited "see" Weinberg v. Bogacki, No. Cv96 0154426 S (Jun. 27, 1997) (2×)
Conn. Super. Ct. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See Dumond v. Denehy, 145 Conn. 88 , 91 , 139 A.2d 58 (1958).
discussed Cited "see" Jones v. Albee, No. Cv93 0349998 (Nov. 3, 1993) (2×)
Conn. Super. Ct. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
"There is a substantial difference between negligence and wilful or malicious conduct, and a complaint should employ language explicit enough to inform the court and opposing counsel clearly that wilful or malicious conduct is being asserted." Warner v. Leslie-Elliott Constructors, Inc., supra, at 237; see Dumond v. Denehy, 145 Conn. 88 , 90 , 139 A.2d 58 (1958).
discussed Cited "see" Warner v. Leslie-Elliott Constructors, Inc. (2×)
Conn. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
See Dumond v. Denehy, 145 Conn. 88, 91 , 139 A.2d 58 (1958); Brock v. Waldron, 127 Conn. 79, 80 , 14 A.2d 713 (1940).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Northrup v. Witkowski (2×)
Conn. App. Ct. · 2017 · signal: see also · confidence low
This court held that "[m]erely using the term 'recklessness' to describe conduct previously alleged as negligence is insufficient as a matter of law." Id. ; see also Dumond v. Denehy , 145 Conn. 88 , 91, 139 A.2d 58 (1958) ("[t]here is a wide difference between negligence and a reckless disregard of the rights or safety of others, and a complaint should employ language explicit enough to clearly inform the court and opposing counsel that reckless misconduct is relied on" [internal quotation marks omitted] ).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Fantin v. Hite, No. 32 83 10 (Nov. 12, 1997)
Conn. Super. Ct. · 1997 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Dumond v. Denehy , 145 Conn. 88 , 91 (1958).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Foxworth v. Juliano, No. Cv93 052 42 37 S (Nov. 4 1993)
Conn. Super. Ct. · 1993 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Dumond v. Denehy, supra at 91 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Landes v. Anchor's Away Seafood, No. 56640 (Apr. 27, 1992) (2×)
Conn. Super. Ct. · 1992 · signal: see also · confidence low
However, the court stated that while: [W]e recognize that a number of our prior decisions have stated generally that `[i]t is well established that causes of action for negligence and "wilful or malicious conduct" are separate and distinct causes of action.' Warner v. Leslie-Elliot CT Page 3968 Constructors, Inc. 194 Conn. 129 138 479 A.2d 231 (1984); see also Dumond v. Denehy, 145 Conn. 88 , 91 , 139 A.2d 58 (1958); Brock v. Waldron, 127 Conn. 79 , 80 , 14 A.2d 713 (1943). . . [W]e question the applicability of the proposition here because none of the cases cited involved a relation back clai…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Dubay v. Irish (2×)
Conn. · 1988 · signal: see also · confidence low
We recognize that a number of our prior decisions have stated generally that “[i]t is well established that causes of action for negligence and ‘wilful or malicious conduct’ are separate and distinct causes of action.” Warner v. Leslie-Elliott Constructors, Inc., 194 Conn. 129, 138 , 479 A.2d 231 (1984); see also Dumond v. Denehy, 145 Conn. 88, 91 , 139 A.2d 58 (1958); Brock v. Waldron, 127 Conn. 79, 80 , 14 A.2d 713 (1940).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Frederick L. Dumond, Administrator D.B.N. (Estate of Donald P. Dumond)
v.
Richard Denehy Et Al.
Supreme Court of Connecticut.
Feb 4, 1958.
139 A.2d 58
1958 Conn. LEXIS 152
Milton M. Koshoff, for the appellant (plaintiff)., Walter J. Sullivan, with whom, on the brief, was Joseph V. Fay, Jr., for the appellees (defendants).
Baid-Win, Dady, King, Mukphy, Murphy, Wynne.
Cited by 116 opinions  |  Published
2 passages pin-cited by 2 cases
Pinpoint authority: bottom 91%
Citer courts: Connecticut Appellate Court (4)
Murphy, J.

The plaintiff’s decedent, Donald Dumond, died almost instantly on June 11, 1954, after his automobile had been in collision with one oper[*89] ated by the defendant Richard Denehy. The decedent’s administrator brought suit against Denehy and his father, the owner of the automobile, to recover for Dumond’s death. Upon the trial of the case, the jury returned a verdict for the defendants which the trial eourt refused to set aside. From the judgment entered thereon, the plaintiff has appealed.

Error has been assigned as to certain portions of the charge as given and as to the failure of the court to charge as requested. Because of the narrow scope of the appeal, it can be properly treated without detailed recitation of the facts which were claimed to have been proved.

Upon arraignment in criminal eourt, Richard Denehy, hereinafter called the defendant, pleaded guilty to a charge of negligent operation of a motor vehicle so as to cause loss of human life. Cum. Sup. 1955, § 1316d. Evidence of this plea and the finding of guilty thereon was admitted in the instant case. The plaintiff requested the court to charge that as a result of the plea the defendant was negligent as a matter of law; that his negligence was as a matter of law the proximate cause of the death of Dumond; that contributory negligence would not be a defense in such a situation; and that therefore the verdict should be for the plaintiff. The trial court instructed the jury that the plea of guilty to the criminal charge could be considered by them as an admission by the defendant that he was negligent and that his negligence was a proximate cause of Dumond’s death; that such an admission was inconsistent with the defendant’s present claim that he was not negligent; that the defendant could explain his reason for pleading guilty and that such a plea did not conclusively establish responsibility for the collision. In thus charging the jury, the trial court was correct. Brad [*90] ley v. Niemann, 137 Conn. 81, 83, 74 A.2d 876; Moulin v. Bergeron, 135 Conn. 443, 445, 65 A.2d 478; Perry v. Simpson Waterproof Mfg. Co., 40 Conn. 313, 317.

In rather ambiguous language, the plaintiff requested the court to charge on reckless driving and reckless and wanton misconduct and that contributory negligence is not a defense to the reckless operation of a motor vehicle. The court did not comply with the request. To determine whether the court erred, we must examine the pleadings and ascertain whether the plaintiff alleged a cause of action in reckless misconduct.

The plaintiff tried the case under a substituted complaint to which contributory negligence had been pleaded by the defendants as a special defense. The plaintiff alleged that the collision and death “were caused by the negligence, carelessness and recklessness of the defendants” and then detailed twelve specific allegations, eleven of which were in negligence. The other invoked the last clear chance doctrine, which was not applicable to this case. In subsequent paragraphs of the complaint, reference was made to the negligence, recklessness and carelessness of the defendants, “as above alleged,” in connection with the death of Dumond, the appointment of the administrator of his estate and the expenses which followed the collision and death. Briefly, the plaintiff’s claim in this respect can be summarized as follows : The use of the word “reckless” or “recklessness” in a complaint, without any specific allegation of conduct which is either reckless or wanton, is sufficient to require a charge on reckless or wanton misconduct.

In Mooney v. Wabrek, 129 Conn. 302, 307, 27 A.2d 631, we said that we could not hold the allegations of the complaint insufficient to justify submission of the[*91] issue of recklessness to the jury, in view of the fact that the defendant made no objection to the charge until after the verdict was rendered. Error, however, was found in that case (p. 308) in submitting to the jury the issue of reckless misconduct as a basis for removing the defense of contributory negligence, because the plaintiff’s claims of proof were insufficient. We reiterate, and in so doing add emphasis to, what we said in Brock v. Waldron, 127 Conn. 79, 80, 14 A.2d 713: “[T]he complaint does not state with desirable accuracy a cause of action based on wanton misconduct. There is a wide difference between negligence and a reckless disregard of the rights or safety of others, and a complaint should employ language explicit enough to clearly inform the court and opposing counsel that reckless misconduct is relied on.” The complaint in the instant case fell far short of alleging a cause of action for reckless or wanton misconduct. Simply using the word “reckless” or “recklessness” is not enough. A specific allegation setting out the conduct that is claimed to be reckless or wanton must be made. The court did not err in not charging the jury as requested.

The other assignments of error are not pursued in the brief and are treated as abandoned. Somers v. Hill, 143 Conn. 476, 480, 123 A.2d 468.

There is no error.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.