91 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1964–2026 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Dias v. Adamsgreen2 sentences2006The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the action did not fall within the motor vehicle exception of § 31-293a because the plaintiffs injuries arose out of the special hazard of “working in an automotive repair bay performing 30 point test inspections on vehicles” and because the plaintiff therefore “was not facing the hazards encountered by the general public as motorists . . . ,” 6 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In reaching its conclusion, the trial court relied primarily on Fields v. Giron, 65 Conn. App. 771 , 783 A.2d 1097 , cert. denied, 2006The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the action did not fall within the motor vehicle exception of § 31-293a because the plaintiffs injuries arose out of the special hazard of “working in an automotive repair bay performing 30 point test inspections on vehicles” and because the plaintiff therefore “was not facing the hazards encountered by the general public as motorists . . . ,” 6 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In reaching its conclusion, the trial court relied primarily on Fields v. Giron, 65 Conn. App. 771 , 783 A.2d 1097 , cert. denied, | 3 | 7 |
State v. Browngreen2 sentences2011Thereafter, in State v. Brown, 22 Conn.App. 108, 109 , 575 A.2d 699 , cert. denied, 216 Conn. 811 , 580 A.2d 61 (1990), the Appellate Court held that a violation of § 14-227a "constituted a violation of that condition of [the defendant's] probation order forbidding [the defendant] from violating `any criminal law' of this state." Prior to reaching that conclusion, however, the Appellate Court, on the basis of the analysis in Kluttz , concluded that "for purposes of ... § 53a-24 (a), § 14-227a is a motor vehicle violation and not a `crime.'" Id., at 111, 575 A.2d 699 . 2011Thereafter, in State v. Brown, 22 Conn.App. 108, 109 , 575 A.2d 699 , cert. denied, 216 Conn. 811 , 580 A.2d 61 (1990), the Appellate Court held that a violation of § 14-227a "constituted a violation of that condition of [the defendant's] probation order forbidding [the defendant] from violating `any criminal law' of this state." Prior to reaching that conclusion, however, the Appellate Court, on the basis of the analysis in Kluttz , concluded that "for purposes of ... § 53a-24 (a), § 14-227a is a motor vehicle violation and not a `crime.'" Id., at 111, 575 A.2d 699 . | 2 | 4 |
Ferreira v. Pisaturogreen2 sentences2001At the same time it has accorded the injured employee, in addition to workers' compensation, the same remedy he would have against a member of the general public who caused a motor vehicle accident." Id., 359-60; see also Ferreira v. Pisaturo , 41 Conn. Sup. 326 , 329 , 574 A.2d 1324 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 55 , 573 A.2d 1216 (1990) (discussing the purpose of the motor vehicle exception in § 31-293a ). 2001At the same time it has accorded the injured employee, in addition to workers' compensation, the same remedy he would have against a member of the general public who caused a motor vehicle accident." Id., 359-60; see also Ferreira v. Pisaturo , 41 Conn. Sup. 326 , 329 , 574 A.2d 1324 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 55 , 573 A.2d 1216 (1990) (discussing the purpose of the motor vehicle exception in § 31-293a ). | 2 | 3 |
Illinois v. Vitalegreen2 sentences2011See, e.g., [ State v. Guckian, supra, at 202 , 627 A.2d 407 ] (motor vehicle violation is a crime for purposes of qualifying for drug treatment program); State v. Dukes, [supra, 209 Conn. at 122, 547 A.2d 10 ] (motor vehicle violation is a crime for purposes of a reasonable search of occupant of stopped vehicle); see also State v. Brown, [supra, 22 Conn.App. at 112 , 575 A.2d 699 ] (motor vehicle violation is a violation of criminal laws for purposes of determining whether condition of probation has been violated); State v. Kluttz, [supra, at 698-700 , 521 A.2d 178 ] (negligent homicide with a 2011See, e.g., [ State v. Guckian, supra, at 202 , 627 A.2d 407 ] (motor vehicle violation is a crime for purposes of qualifying for drug treatment program); State v. Dukes, [supra, 209 Conn. at 122, 547 A.2d 10 ] (motor vehicle violation is a crime for purposes of a reasonable search of occupant of stopped vehicle); see also State v. Brown, [supra, 22 Conn.App. at 112 , 575 A.2d 699 ] (motor vehicle violation is a violation of criminal laws for purposes of determining whether condition of probation has been violated); State v. Kluttz, [supra, at 698-700 , 521 A.2d 178 ] (negligent homicide with a | 2 | 2 |
Expressway Associates II v. Friendly Ice Cream Corp.green2 sentences2011Thereafter, in State v. Brown, 22 Conn.App. 108, 109 , 575 A.2d 699 , cert. denied, 216 Conn. 811 , 580 A.2d 61 (1990), the Appellate Court held that a violation of § 14-227a "constituted a violation of that condition of [the defendant's] probation order forbidding [the defendant] from violating `any criminal law' of this state." Prior to reaching that conclusion, however, the Appellate Court, on the basis of the analysis in Kluttz , concluded that "for purposes of ... § 53a-24 (a), § 14-227a is a motor vehicle violation and not a `crime.'" Id., at 111, 575 A.2d 699 . 2011Thereafter, in State v. Brown, 22 Conn. App. 108, 109 , 575 A.2d 699 , cert. denied, 216 Conn. 811 , 580 A.2d 61 (1990), the Appellate Court held that a violation of § 14-227a “constituted a violation of that condition of [the defendant’s] probation order forbidding [the defendant] from violating ‘any criminal law’ of this state.” Prior to reaching that conclusion, however, the Appellate Court, on the basis of the analysis in Kluttz , concluded that “for purposes of ... § 53a-24 (a), § 14-227a is a motor vehicle violation and not a ‘crime.’ ” Id., 111. | 1 | 4 |
State v. Brunorigreen2 sentences2011Thereafter, in State v. Brown, 22 Conn.App. 108, 109 , 575 A.2d 699 , cert. denied, 216 Conn. 811 , 580 A.2d 61 (1990), the Appellate Court held that a violation of § 14-227a "constituted a violation of that condition of [the defendant's] probation order forbidding [the defendant] from violating `any criminal law' of this state." Prior to reaching that conclusion, however, the Appellate Court, on the basis of the analysis in Kluttz , concluded that "for purposes of ... § 53a-24 (a), § 14-227a is a motor vehicle violation and not a `crime.'" Id., at 111, 575 A.2d 699 . 2011Thereafter, in State v. Brown, 22 Conn. App. 108, 109 , 575 A.2d 699 , cert. denied, 216 Conn. 811 , 580 A.2d 61 (1990), the Appellate Court held that a violation of § 14-227a “constituted a violation of that condition of [the defendant’s] probation order forbidding [the defendant] from violating ‘any criminal law’ of this state.” Prior to reaching that conclusion, however, the Appellate Court, on the basis of the analysis in Kluttz , concluded that “for purposes of ... § 53a-24 (a), § 14-227a is a motor vehicle violation and not a ‘crime.’ ” Id., 111. | 1 | 4 |
State v. Ortizgreen2 sentences2025See, e.g., State v. Ortiz, 29 Conn. App. 825, 835 , 618 A.2d 547 (1993) (‘‘in a prosecution for misconduct with a motor vehicle in violation of . . . § 53a-57, proof that the driver was under the influence of intoxicating liquor is neither necessary nor sufficient to warrant conviction because it is the driver’s mental state that is in issue’’). 2025See, e.g., State v. Ortiz, 29 Conn. App. 825, 835 , 618 A.2d 547 (1993) (‘‘in a prosecution for misconduct with a motor vehicle in violation of . . . § 53a-57, proof that the driver was under the influence of intoxicating liquor is neither necessary nor sufficient to warrant conviction because it is the driver’s mental state that is in issue’’). | 1 | 2 |
Davey v. Pepperidge Farms, Inc.green2 sentences2017In Davey v. Pepperidge Farms, Inc. , 180 Conn. 469 , 429 A.2d 943 (1980), our Supreme Court stated, in addressing the motor vehicle exception, that "[w]hile it is true that 'operation' is not defined in General Statutes § 14-1, 1 the cases clearly indicate that operation as it refers to a motor vehicle relates to the driving or movement of the vehicle itself or a circumstance resulting from the movement of the vehicle." (Footnote added.) Id., at 472, 429 A.2d 943 n.1. 2017In Davey v. Pepperidge Farms, Inc. , 180 Conn. 469 , 429 A.2d 943 (1980), our Supreme Court stated, in addressing the motor vehicle exception, that "[w]hile it is true that 'operation' is not defined in General Statutes § 14-1, 1 the cases clearly indicate that operation as it refers to a motor vehicle relates to the driving or movement of the vehicle itself or a circumstance resulting from the movement of the vehicle." (Footnote added.) Id., at 472, 429 A.2d 943 n.1. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Guckiangreen2 sentences2011In answering that question in the affirmative, this court nonetheless relied favorably on the Appellate Court's decision in Brown and assumed that § 14-227a "is a motor vehicle violation." Id., at 201, 627 A.2d 407 . 2011See, e.g., [ State v. Guckian, supra, at 202 , 627 A.2d 407 ] (motor vehicle violation is a crime for purposes of qualifying for drug treatment program); State v. Dukes, [supra, 209 Conn. at 122, 547 A.2d 10 ] (motor vehicle violation is a crime for purposes of a reasonable search of occupant of stopped vehicle); see also State v. Brown, [supra, 22 Conn.App. at 112 , 575 A.2d 699 ] (motor vehicle violation is a violation of criminal laws for purposes of determining whether condition of probation has been violated); State v. Kluttz, [supra, at 698-700 , 521 A.2d 178 ] (negligent homicide with a | 1 | 2 |
Ferreira v. Pisaturogreen2 sentences2001At the same time it has accorded the injured employee, in addition to workers' compensation, the same remedy he would have against a member of the general public who caused a motor vehicle accident." Id., 359-60; see also Ferreira v. Pisaturo , 41 Conn. Sup. 326 , 329 , 574 A.2d 1324 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 55 , 573 A.2d 1216 (1990) (discussing the purpose of the motor vehicle exception in § 31-293a ). 2001At the same time it has accorded the injured employee, in addition to workers' compensation, the same remedy he would have against a member of the general public who caused a motor vehicle accident." Id., 359-60; see also Ferreira v. Pisaturo , 41 Conn. Sup. 326 , 329 , 574 A.2d 1324 (1989), aff'd, 215 Conn. 55 , 573 A.2d 1216 (1990) (discussing the purpose of the motor vehicle exception in § 31-293a ). | 1 | 2 |
Stone v. East Coast Swappers, LLCgreen1 sentence2023See, e.g., Stone v. East Coast Swappers, LLC, 337 Conn. 589 , 606–607, 255 A.3d 851 (2020) (stating presump- tion); Plainville v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 178 Conn. 664 , 667–68, 425 A.2d 131 (1979) (emphasizing amendments to make state retirement system applicable to heart and hypertension benefits); Ducharme v. Putnam, 161 Conn. 135, 143 , 285 A.2d 318 (1971) (invalidating conclusive presumption in General Statutes (Rev. to 1969) § 7-433a); cf. McCoy v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 300 Conn. 144, 159 , 12 A.3d 948 (2011) (‘‘The plaintiff seems to assert that a breach of [General Statutes] | 1 | 1 |
| Mapp v. Ohiogreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Lugogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Caban v. Commissioner of Correctiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Auerbach v. Auerbachgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Jonesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Wrightgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Hankersongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Parkergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Colangelo v. Heckelmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Torresgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bishop v. Kelly
green
2 sentences1998Section 14-295 provides in pertinent part: "In any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury . . . the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section 14-218a , 14-219 , 14-222 , 14-227a , 14-230 , 14-234 , 14-237 , 14-239 or 14-240a , and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury. . . ." "An award of double [or treble] damages is appropriate when the defendant has deliberately or with reckl 1998Section 14-295 provides in pertinent part: "In any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury . . . the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section 14-218a , 14-219 , 14-222 , 14-227a , 14-230 , 14-234 , 14-237 , 14-239 or 14-240a , and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury. . . ." "An award of double [or treble] damages is appropriate when the defendant has deliberately or with reckl | 6 | 1994–2001 |
State v. Kluttz
green
2 sentences2011The first three sentences of the commentary point toward the conclusion that a motor vehicle violation is not an `offense.' The fourth sentence lends some support to the contrary conclusion, namely, that it is an `offense.' In this instance, we hesitate to draw any firm inferences as to legislative intent from this Delphic commentary." State v. Kluttz, supra, 9 Conn. App. at 694 n. 8, 521 A.2d 178 . 2011The first three sentences of the commentary point toward the conclusion that a motor vehicle violation is not an `offense.' The fourth sentence lends some support to the contrary conclusion, namely, that it is an `offense.' In this instance, we hesitate to draw any firm inferences as to legislative intent from this Delphic commentary." State v. Kluttz, supra, 9 Conn. App. at 694 n. 8, 521 A.2d 178 . | 4 | 1993–2018 |
State v. Dukes
green
2 sentences2011See, e.g., [ State v. Guckian, supra, at 202 , 627 A.2d 407 ] (motor vehicle violation is a crime for purposes of qualifying for drug treatment program); State v. Dukes, [supra, 209 Conn. at 122, 547 A.2d 10 ] (motor vehicle violation is a crime for purposes of a reasonable search of occupant of stopped vehicle); see also State v. Brown, [supra, 22 Conn.App. at 112 , 575 A.2d 699 ] (motor vehicle violation is a violation of criminal laws for purposes of determining whether condition of probation has been violated); State v. Kluttz, [supra, at 698-700 , 521 A.2d 178 ] (negligent homicide with a 2011While the majority does not dispute the correctness of Kluttz as it pertains to § 14-222a, they have not provided a textual basis for distinguishing §§ 14-222a and 14-227a in connection with the motor vehicle exception to the definition of offense under the Penal Code. [21] In addition to the decisions discussed in this opinion, the majority points to this court's decision in State v. Dukes, 209 Conn. 98 , 547 A.2d 10 (1988), as support for its construction. | 3 | 1994–2014 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2013Hodkoski, appeals from the judgment of conviction rendered against him after a jury trial on charges of criminal attempt to commit evasion of responsibility in the operation of a motor vehicle in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 and 14-224 (b), and operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor as a third or subsequent offender in violation of General Statutes § 14-227a (g) (3). 1 On appeal, the defendant makes the following claims: (1) that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress certain postarrest statements he made to the arresting polic 2013Hodkoski, appeals from the judgment of conviction rendered against him after a jury trial on charges of criminal attempt to commit evasion of responsibility in the operation of a motor vehicle in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 and 14-224 (b), and operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor as a third or subsequent offender in violation of General Statutes § 14-227a (g) (3). 1 On appeal, the defendant makes the following claims: (1) that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress certain postarrest statements he made to the arresting polic | 2 | 2013–2021 |
Maisenbacker v. Society Concordia
green
2 sentences2003In pertinent part, General Statutes § 14-295 states that: "In any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury . . . the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless CT Page 933 disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section . . . 4-222, . . . and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury, death or damage to property." Although that statute clearly makes the tortfeasor liable for double or treble damages, "Connecticut has a long-standing 2003In pertinent part, General Statutes § 14-295 states that: "In any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury . . . the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless CT Page 933 disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section . . . 4-222, . . . and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury, death or damage to property." Although that statute clearly makes the tortfeasor liable for double or treble damages, "Connecticut has a long-standing | 2 | 1997–2003 |
In re Investigation of the Grand Juror into Cove Manor Convalescent Center, Inc.
green
2 sentences1996General Statutes § 14-295 provides that "[i]n any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property, the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section 14-218a , 14-219 , 14-222 , 14-227a , 14-230 , 14-234 , 14-237 , 14-239 or 14-240a , and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury, death or damage to property." (Emphasis added.) In Jack v. Scanlon, 4 Conn. App 1994Rather, such damages are assessed based on the degree of the defendant's culpability." Jack v. Scanlon, 4 Conn. App. 451 , 455 , 495 A.2d 1084 , cert. denied, 197 Conn. 808 , 499 A.2d 59 (1985). | 2 | 1994–1996 |
Guaranty Bank & Trust Co. v. Dowling
green
2 sentences1996General Statutes § 14-295 provides that "[i]n any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property, the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section 14-218a , 14-219 , 14-222 , 14-227a , 14-230 , 14-234 , 14-237 , 14-239 or 14-240a , and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury, death or damage to property." (Emphasis added.) In Jack v. Scanlon, 4 Conn. App 1994Rather, such damages are assessed based on the degree of the defendant's culpability." Jack v. Scanlon, 4 Conn. App. 451 , 455 , 495 A.2d 1084 , cert. denied, 197 Conn. 808 , 499 A.2d 59 (1985). | 2 | 1994–1996 |
Jack v. Scanlon
green
2 sentences1996General Statutes § 14-295 provides that "[i]n any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property, the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section 14-218a , 14-219 , 14-222 , 14-227a , 14-230 , 14-234 , 14-237 , 14-239 or 14-240a , and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury, death or damage to property." (Emphasis added.) In Jack v. Scanlon, 4 Conn. App 1996General Statutes § 14-295 provides that "[i]n any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property, the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section 14-218a , 14-219 , 14-222 , 14-227a , 14-230 , 14-234 , 14-237 , 14-239 or 14-240a , and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury, death or damage to property." (Emphasis added.) In Jack v. Scanlon, 4 Conn. App | 2 | 1994–1996 |
Dumond v. Denehy
green
2 sentences1995In Dumond v. Denehy, 145 Conn. 88 , 91 (1958), the Supreme Court stated: There is a wide difference between negligence and a reckless disregard of the rights or safety of others, and a complaint should employ language explicit enough to clearly inform the court and opposing counsel that reckless misconduct is relied on. 1993Moreover, in the second count the plaintiff reiterates the same statutory violation, 14-218a prohibiting unreasonable speed, alleged in the first count, but labels this violation as "recklessness." As the Supreme Court said in Dumond v. Denehy, 145 Conn. 88 , 91 , 139 A.2d 58 (1958): "[W]e reiterate, and in so doing add emphasis to what we said in Brock v. Waldron, 127 Conn. 79 , 80 , 14 A.2d 713 : `[T]he complaint does not state with desirable accuracy a cause of action based on wanton misconduct. | 2 | 1993–1995 |
Brock v. Waldron
green
2 sentences1994The court agrees with the defendants that the second count lacks the required specificity that Rosario's conduct was wanton, deliberate or reckless. "[W]e reiterate, and in so doing add emphasis to what we said in Brock v. Waldron, 127 Conn. 79 , 80 , 14 A.2d 713 : [T]he complaint does not state with desirable accuracy a cause of action based on wanton misconduct. 1994The court agrees with the defendants that the second count lacks the required specificity that Rosario's conduct was wanton, deliberate or reckless. "[W]e reiterate, and in so doing add emphasis to what we said in Brock v. Waldron, 127 Conn. 79 , 80 , 14 A.2d 713 : [T]he complaint does not state with desirable accuracy a cause of action based on wanton misconduct. | 2 | 1993–1994 |
State v. Johnson
green
1 sentence2026“Whether a warrant satisfies the constitutional requirements of probable cause and particularity presents a question of law over which our review is plenary.” State v. Johnson, 354 Conn. 96, 122 , 349 A.3d 260 (2026). charges of carrying a pistol without a permit in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 29-35 (a) and illegal possession of a weapon in a motor vehicle in violation of General Statutes § 29-38 (a). 3 The defendant argues that article first, § 7, of the Connecticut con- stitution provides greater protection than the federal constitution for call-identifying information and | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Shea v. Brown
neutral
1 sentence2025Then, in Shea v. Brown, supra, 146 Conn. 631 , the issue was whether car dealers could be held liable for negligent entrustment when their salesman allowed a prospective buyer with a suspended driver’s license to borrow a motor vehicle for a test drive. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Jones
green
2 sentences2025Although the defendant argues that the present case is distin- guishable from other cases affirming a finding of crimi- nal negligence because he was not intoxicated; id.; bending over while driving; State v. Carter, supra, 64 Conn. App. 637–38; using a cell phone; State v. Luna, supra, 208 Conn. App. 52–53; or racing; State v. Jones, 92 Conn. App. 1, 9 , 882 A.2d 1277 (2005); nor did he cross a double yellow line when driving conditions were poor; State v. Gonsalves, supra, 137 Conn. App. 244–45; direct evidence of such an impairment, distraction, or dangerous behavior is not necessary for a 2025Although the defendant argues that the present case is distin- guishable from other cases affirming a finding of crimi- nal negligence because he was not intoxicated; id.; bending over while driving; State v. Carter, supra, 64 Conn. App. 637–38; using a cell phone; State v. Luna, supra, 208 Conn. App. 52–53; or racing; State v. Jones, 92 Conn. App. 1, 9 , 882 A.2d 1277 (2005); nor did he cross a double yellow line when driving conditions were poor; State v. Gonsalves, supra, 137 Conn. App. 244–45; direct evidence of such an impairment, distraction, or dangerous behavior is not necessary for a | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Burg v. Ne. Specialty Corp.
green
1 sentence2024State v. Marcus H., 190 Conn. App. 332, 337 , 210 A.3d 607 , cert. denied, 332 Conn. 910 , 211 A.3d 71 , cert. denied, U.S. , 140 S. Ct. 540 , 205 L. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Adesokan v. Bloomfield
green
1 sentence2024In Adesokan v. Bloomfield, 347 Conn. 416, 441 , 297 A.3d 983 (2023), our Supreme Court stated, ‘‘by its own terms, § 14- 283 (d) imposes . . . a negligence standard of care on emergency vehicle operators . . . .’’ ‘‘Section 14-283 provides the operators of emergency vehicles relief in certain discrete circumstances—such as the response to an emergency or the police pursuit of a fleeing law violator—from what ordinarily would be negligence per se, namely, the operation of a motor vehicle in violation of rules of the road such as speed limits and traffic control devices. . . . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Williams v. Massachusetts
green
1 sentence2024State v. Marcus H., 190 Conn. App. 332, 337 , 210 A.3d 607 , cert. denied, 332 Conn. 910 , 211 A.3d 71 , cert. denied, U.S. , 140 S. Ct. 540 , 205 L. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Amodeo v. United States
green
1 sentence2024State v. Marcus H., 190 Conn. App. 332, 337 , 210 A.3d 607 , cert. denied, 332 Conn. 910 , 211 A.3d 71 , cert. denied, U.S. , 140 S. Ct. 540 , 205 L. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Marcus H.
green
2 sentences2024State v. Marcus H., 190 Conn. App. 332, 337 , 210 A.3d 607 , cert. denied, 332 Conn. 910 , 211 A.3d 71 , cert. denied, U.S. , 140 S. Ct. 540 , 205 L. 2024State v. Marcus H., 190 Conn. App. 332, 337 , 210 A.3d 607 , cert. denied, 332 Conn. 910 , 211 A.3d 71 , cert. denied, U.S. , 140 S. Ct. 540 , 205 L. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Town of Plainville v. Travelers Indemnity Co. green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| McCoy v. Commissioner of Public Safety green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Ducharme v. City of Putnam
green
2 sentences2023See, e.g., Stone v. East Coast Swappers, LLC, 337 Conn. 589 , 606–607, 255 A.3d 851 (2020) (stating presump- tion); Plainville v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 178 Conn. 664 , 667–68, 425 A.2d 131 (1979) (emphasizing amendments to make state retirement system applicable to heart and hypertension benefits); Ducharme v. Putnam, 161 Conn. 135, 143 , 285 A.2d 318 (1971) (invalidating conclusive presumption in General Statutes (Rev. to 1969) § 7-433a); cf. McCoy v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 300 Conn. 144, 159 , 12 A.3d 948 (2011) (‘‘The plaintiff seems to assert that a breach of [General Statutes] 2023See, e.g., Stone v. East Coast Swappers, LLC, 337 Conn. 589 , 606–607, 255 A.3d 851 (2020) (stating presump- tion); Plainville v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 178 Conn. 664 , 667–68, 425 A.2d 131 (1979) (emphasizing amendments to make state retirement system applicable to heart and hypertension benefits); Ducharme v. Putnam, 161 Conn. 135, 143 , 285 A.2d 318 (1971) (invalidating conclusive presumption in General Statutes (Rev. to 1969) § 7-433a); cf. McCoy v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 300 Conn. 144, 159 , 12 A.3d 948 (2011) (‘‘The plaintiff seems to assert that a breach of [General Statutes] | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| State v. Ramos green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Davis green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Robles green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Hampton green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| H-K Props., LLC v. Town of Mansfield Planning & Zoning Comm'n neutral | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Correction neutral | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Robles green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Misenti v. Commissioner of Correction neutral | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Davis green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Kiriaka v. Alterwitz neutral | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Gerardi green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Rice green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Harrison green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Ensign-Bickford Realty Corp. v. Zoning Commission green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| State v. Young green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| State v. Trahan green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| In Re Jan Carlos D. green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Cantonbury Heights Condominium Ass'n v. Local Land Development, LLC green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.