actionable claim in Connecticut

1999"The mere use of the words `reckless' and `wanton' is insufficient to raise an actionable claim of reckless and wanton misconduct." Sheiman v. Lafayette Bank Trust Co. , 4 Conn. App. 39 , 46 (1985), citing Kostiuk v. Queally , 159 Conn. 91 , 94 (1970).

1998Despite notice from the local health director that the property contained toxic levels of lead (¶ 7), Melendez "took no steps to put the property into a habitable condition and this failure constitutes a willful, wanton and/or reckless disregard of the rights of the plaintiff." (¶ 8) "The mere use of the words `reckless' and `wanton' is insufficient to raise an actionable claim of reckless and wanton misconduct." Kostiuk v. Queally , 159 Conn. 91 , 94 , 267 A.2d 452 (1970).

2024Ed. 2d 753 (2010), and Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., supra, 551 U.S. 449 , and contend that ‘‘[l]imits or prohibitions on expenditures are burdens on political speech that are subject to strict scrutiny.’’ Emphasizing the ‘‘highly effective’’ rhetorical value in ‘‘summarily describ[ing]’’ a candidate’s views by reference to ‘‘a better known candidate appearing elsewhere on the ballot,’’ they claim that the commission’s enforcement of the statutes and regulations to the effect that ‘‘the mere mention of a nonopposing candidate’s name in campaign materials’’ const

2024The plaintiffs further contend that, even if viewed as a properly imposed condition on the accep- tance of public funds for participation in the program, the commission’s decision in this case violates the first amendment because, under Wisconsin Right to Life, the mere mention of another candidate’s name in a 10 The trial court rejected the plaintiffs’ characterization of ‘‘the prohibi- tions on the use of candidate committee funds to promote the cause of a candidate other than the one who established the committee as ‘content- based’ restrictions, i.e., ‘those that target speech based on its

2024The plaintiffs further contend that, even if viewed as a properly imposed condition on the accep- tance of public funds for participation in the program, the commission’s decision in this case violates the first amendment because, under Wisconsin Right to Life, the mere mention of another candidate’s name in a 10 The trial court rejected the plaintiffs’ characterization of ‘‘the prohibi- tions on the use of candidate committee funds to promote the cause of a candidate other than the one who established the committee as ‘content- based’ restrictions, i.e., ‘those that target speech based on its

2000Reckless and wanton misconduct is "conduct [that] tends to take on the aspect of highly unreasonable conduct, involving an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation where a high degree of danger is apparent." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bhinder v. Sun Company , Inc., 246 Conn. 223 , 243 , 717 A.2d 202 (1998).

2000Reckless and wanton misconduct is "conduct [that] tends to take on the aspect of highly unreasonable conduct, involving an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation where a high degree of danger is apparent." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bhinder v. Sun Company , Inc., 246 Conn. 223 , 243 , 717 A.2d 202 (1998).

2000"A specific allegation setting out the conduct that is claimed to be reckless or wanton must be made." Dumond v. Denehy , 145 Conn. 88 , 91 , 139 A.2d 58 (1958); see also Drisdelle v. Hartford , 3 Conn. App. 343 , 346 , 488 A.2d 465 , cert. denied, 196 Conn. 801 , 491 A.2d 1104 (1985).

2000"A specific allegation setting out the conduct that is claimed to be reckless or wanton must be made." Dumond v. Denehy , 145 Conn. 88 , 91 , 139 A.2d 58 (1958); see also Drisdelle v. Hartford , 3 Conn. App. 343 , 346 , 488 A.2d 465 , cert. denied, 196 Conn. 801 , 491 A.2d 1104 (1985).

1999"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. . . ." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Peter-Michael, Inc. v. Sea Shell Associates , 244 Conn. 269 , 270 , 709 A.2d 558 (1998).

1999"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. . . ." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Peter-Michael, Inc. v. Sea Shell Associates , 244 Conn. 269 , 270 , 709 A.2d 558 (1998).

1998In this state, reckless misconduct has been treated as meaning the same as wilful or wanton misconduct, Dubay v. Irish , 207 Conn. 518 , 532-33 , 542 A.2d 711 (1988), and all three terms mean "highly unreasonable conduct, involving an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation where a high degree of danger is apparent." Id ., quoting W.

1998In this state, reckless misconduct has been treated as meaning the same as wilful or wanton misconduct, Dubay v. Irish , 207 Conn. 518 , 532-33 , 542 A.2d 711 (1988), and all three terms mean "highly unreasonable conduct, involving an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation where a high degree of danger is apparent." Id ., quoting W.

1998Connecticut Light Power Co. v. Fleetwood, 124 Conn. 386 , 390-91 (1938).

1998One can only state an actionable claim for private nuisance "where one is injured in relation to a right which he enjoys by reason of his ownership of an interest in land . . . [This] includes all injuries to an owner or occupier in the enjoyment of the property of which he is in possession, without regard to the quality of the tenure." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Couture v. Board of Education , 6 Conn. App. 309 , 314 (1986); see also Webel v. Yale University , 125 Conn. 515 , 525 (1939).

1997CT Page 8789 While a failure to act under certain circumstances can constitute recklessness for some purposes, see Tessman v. Tiger Lee Construction Co., 228 Conn. 42 , 54-55 , 634 A.2d 870 (1993); 3 under established premises liability law, before a landlord can be held liable, even in negligence, for personal injury resulting from a hazardous condition of which he had actual notice, he must have had a reasonable opportunity to remedy the defective condition after notice.

1997CT Page 8789 While a failure to act under certain circumstances can constitute recklessness for some purposes, see Tessman v. Tiger Lee Construction Co., 228 Conn. 42 , 54-55 , 634 A.2d 870 (1993); 3 under established premises liability law, before a landlord can be held liable, even in negligence, for personal injury resulting from a hazardous condition of which he had actual notice, he must have had a reasonable opportunity to remedy the defective condition after notice.

1996"The mere use of the words `reckless' and `wanton' is insufficient to raise an actionable claim of reckless and wanton misconduct." Id. "[I]n order to award punitive or exemplary damages, evidence must reveal a reckless indifference to the rights of others or an intentional and wanton violation of those rights." Berry v. Loiseau, 223 Conn. 786 , 811 , 614 A.2d 414 (1993). "[T]he pleadings must allege and the evidence must show wanton or willful malicious misconduct, and the language contained in the pleadings must be sufficiently explicit to inform the court and opposing counsel that such dama

1996"The mere use of the words `reckless' and `wanton' is insufficient to raise an actionable claim of reckless and wanton misconduct." Id. "[I]n order to award punitive or exemplary damages, evidence must reveal a reckless indifference to the rights of others or an intentional and wanton violation of those rights." Berry v. Loiseau, 223 Conn. 786 , 811 , 614 A.2d 414 (1993). "[T]he pleadings must allege and the evidence must show wanton or willful malicious misconduct, and the language contained in the pleadings must be sufficiently explicit to inform the court and opposing counsel that such dama

1996"The mere use of the words `reckless' and `wanton' is insufficient to raise an actionable claim of reckless and wanton misconduct." Id. "[I]n order to award punitive or exemplary damages, evidence must reveal a reckless indifference to the rights of others or an intentional and wanton violation of those rights." Berry v. Loiseau, 223 Conn. 786 , 811 , 614 A.2d 414 (1993). "[T]he pleadings must allege and the evidence must show wanton or willful malicious misconduct, and the language contained in the pleadings must be sufficiently explicit to inform the court and opposing counsel that such dama

1996"The mere use of the words `reckless' and `wanton' is insufficient to raise an actionable claim of reckless and wanton misconduct." Id. "[I]n order to award punitive or exemplary damages, evidence must reveal a reckless indifference to the rights of others or an intentional and wanton violation of those rights." Berry v. Loiseau, 223 Conn. 786 , 811 , 614 A.2d 414 (1993). "[T]he pleadings must allege and the evidence must show wanton or willful malicious misconduct, and the language contained in the pleadings must be sufficiently explicit to inform the court and opposing counsel that such dama

1996"The mere use of the words `reckless' and `wanton' is insufficient to raise an actionable claim of reckless and wanton misconduct." Id. "[I]n order to award punitive or exemplary damages, evidence must reveal a reckless indifference to the rights of others or an intentional and wanton violation of those rights." Berry v. Loiseau, 223 Conn. 786 , 811 , 614 A.2d 414 (1993). "[T]he pleadings must allege and the evidence must show wanton or willful malicious misconduct, and the language contained in the pleadings must be sufficiently explicit to inform the court and opposing counsel that such dama

1996"The mere use of the words `reckless' and `wanton' is insufficient to raise an actionable claim of reckless and wanton misconduct." Id. "[I]n order to award punitive or exemplary damages, evidence must reveal a reckless indifference to the rights of others or an intentional and wanton violation of those rights." Berry v. Loiseau, 223 Conn. 786 , 811 , 614 A.2d 414 (1993). "[T]he pleadings must allege and the evidence must show wanton or willful malicious misconduct, and the language contained in the pleadings must be sufficiently explicit to inform the court and opposing counsel that such dama

1996To survive a motion to CT Page 2997 strike, the plaintiffs must plead actual facts which [support their claim] . . . not just conclusions." (Internal quotations marks omitted; citations omitted.) Keson v. Unkel, supra. Accordingly, the motion to strike count six is denied.

1995The defendant's exercise of discretion gives rise to an actionable exception to the doctrine of governmental immunity only where the defendant is negligent and "the duty to act is clear and unequivocal." Shore v. Stonington, supra. Moreover, the plaintiff has neither alleged nor established that § 22-238 imposed upon Riley any duty to the plaintiff and a breach of such duty.

1994The court in Mead v. Burns, 199 Conn. 651 , 509 A.2d 11 (1986), however, held that a single instance of unfair practices did not amount to an actionable claim under the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act (CUIPA).

1994The court in Mead v. Burns, 199 Conn. 651 , 509 A.2d 11 (1986), however, held that a single instance of unfair practices did not amount to an actionable claim under the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act (CUIPA).

1994"To survive a motion to strike, the plaintiffs `must plead actual facts which indicate the defendant[s] knowingly served an intoxicated person, not just conclusions." (Citations omitted.) Morin v. Kelly, supra. In the present action, the plaintiff has alleged, inter alia, that the defendant not only recklessly and wantonly procured beer in order to serve it to guests attending the party, but also served the beer to minor guests at the party, including plaintiff's decedent who became intoxicated.

1994In Quimby v. Kimberly Clark Corp., 28 Conn. App. 660 , 613 A.2d 838 (1992), the Appellate Court held that the standard used by the court in Mead v. Burns, supra, applied not only to CUIPA claims but to CUTPA claims as well.

1994In Quimby v. Kimberly Clark Corp., 28 Conn. App. 660 , 613 A.2d 838 (1992), the Appellate Court held that the standard used by the court in Mead v. Burns, supra, applied not only to CUIPA claims but to CUTPA claims as well.

1994"A claim for wanton and reckless conduct, which is unsupported by sufficient alleged facts to support it, is a mere conclusion of law and is subject to a motion to strike." Muckle v. Francis , 7 Conn. 1 .

1993General Statutes 42-110b (a) provides that "[n]o person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce." General Statutes 42-110g (c) provides in pertinent part that "[a]ny person who suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property . . . as a result of the use or employment of a method, act or practice prohibited by 42-110b , may bring an action . . . to recover actual damages." In determining whether a practice violates CUTPA, we use the following criteria: "(1) CT Page 5096 [W]hether the practice, without ne

1993General Statutes 42-110b (a) provides that "[n]o person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce." General Statutes 42-110g (c) provides in pertinent part that "[a]ny person who suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property . . . as a result of the use or employment of a method, act or practice prohibited by 42-110b , may bring an action . . . to recover actual damages." In determining whether a practice violates CUTPA, we use the following criteria: "(1) CT Page 5096 [W]hether the practice, without ne

1993"A cause of action claiming wanton and reckless misconduct is `separate and distinct' from a cause of action alleging negligence." Belanger v. Village Pub I, Inc., 26 Conn. App. 509 , 513 , 603 A.2d 1173 (1992), quoting Kostiuk v. Queally, 159 Conn. 91 , 94 , 267 A.2d 452 (1970).

1993"A cause of action claiming wanton and reckless misconduct is `separate and distinct' from a cause of action alleging negligence." Belanger v. Village Pub I, Inc., 26 Conn. App. 509 , 513 , 603 A.2d 1173 (1992), quoting Kostiuk v. Queally, 159 Conn. 91 , 94 , 267 A.2d 452 (1970).

1991Id. 477 .