Smith instruction in Connecticut

2016Id.

2016Id.

2013Our Supreme Court has indicated that a Smith instruction may be warranted when the “suggestion [has been] made to the jury that it should acquit the defendant because he reasonably interpreted ambiguous conduct by the complainant to indicate her consent.” State v. Jeffrey, 220 Conn. 698, 719 , 601 A.2d 993 (1991) (Smith instruction not warranted where defendant’s theory of case was that complainant had fabricated story of being forced to engage in sexual activity), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1224 , 112 S. Ct. 3041 , 120 L.

2013Our Supreme Court has indicated that a Smith instruction may be warranted when the “suggestion [has been] made to the jury that it should acquit the defendant because he reasonably interpreted ambiguous conduct by the complainant to indicate her consent.” State v. Jeffrey, 220 Conn. 698, 719 , 601 A.2d 993 (1991) (Smith instruction not warranted where defendant’s theory of case was that complainant had fabricated story of being forced to engage in sexual activity), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1224 , 112 S. Ct. 3041 , 120 L.

2013Our Supreme Court has indicated that a Smith instruction may be warranted when the “suggestion [has been] made to the jury that it should acquit the defendant because he reasonably interpreted ambiguous conduct by the complainant to indicate her consent.” State v. Jeffrey, 220 Conn. 698, 719 , 601 A.2d 993 (1991) (Smith instruction not warranted where defendant’s theory of case was that complainant had fabricated story of being forced to engage in sexual activity), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1224 , 112 S. Ct. 3041 , 120 L.

2013Our Supreme Court has indicated that a Smith instruction may be warranted when the “suggestion [has been] made to the jury that it should acquit the defendant because he reasonably interpreted ambiguous conduct by the complainant to indicate her consent.” State v. Jeffrey, 220 Conn. 698, 719 , 601 A.2d 993 (1991) (Smith instruction not warranted where defendant’s theory of case was that complainant had fabricated story of being forced to engage in sexual activity), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1224 , 112 S. Ct. 3041 , 120 L.

2013Our Supreme Court has indicated that a Smith instruction may be warranted when the “suggestion [has been] made to the jury that it should acquit the defendant because he reasonably interpreted ambiguous conduct by the complainant to indicate her consent.” State v. Jeffrey, 220 Conn. 698, 719 , 601 A.2d 993 (1991) (Smith instruction not warranted where defendant’s theory of case was that complainant had fabricated story of being forced to engage in sexual activity), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1224 , 112 S. Ct. 3041 , 120 L.

2013Our Supreme Court has indicated that a Smith instruction may be warranted when the “suggestion [has been] made to the jury that it should acquit the defendant because he reasonably interpreted ambiguous conduct by the complainant to indicate her consent.” State v. Jeffrey, 220 Conn. 698, 719 , 601 A.2d 993 (1991) (Smith instruction not warranted where defendant’s theory of case was that complainant had fabricated story of being forced to engage in sexual activity), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1224 , 112 S. Ct. 3041 , 120 L.

2019But we certainly are not prepared to say, as a matter of law, that, whatever added costs might be entailed by a quick telephone call or a letter from one's physician, or a policy requiring office staff to double check that they are reporting test results accurately, they are too onerous relative to the human, financial, and public health costs associated with a false negative report. 22 Cf. Reisner v. Regents of the University of California , supra, 31 Cal. App. 4th at 1200 , 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 518 (it is not unreasonable to expect physicians to give additional warning or warnings).

2019But we certainly are not prepared to say, as a matter of law, that, whatever added costs might be entailed by a quick telephone call or a letter from one's physician, or a policy requiring office staff to double check that they are reporting test results accurately, they are too onerous relative to the human, financial, and public health costs associated with a false negative report. 22 Cf. Reisner v. Regents of the University of California , supra, 31 Cal. App. 4th at 1200 , 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 518 (it is not unreasonable to expect physicians to give additional warning or warnings).

2013In addition to the model criminal jury instruction from the judicial branch website that the court intended to give to the jury; see Connecticut Criminal Jury Instructions (4th Ed. 2010) § 7.1-1, available at http://www.jud.ct.gov/JI/criminal/ part7/7.1-l.htm (last visited July 18, 2013) (copy contained in the file of this case in the Appellate Court clerk’s office); 3 the defendant proposed adding to the instruction language first articulated by our Supreme Court in State v. Smith, 210 Conn. 132 , 554 A.2d 713 (1989) (Smith instruction), to inform the jury on the issue of consent. 4 The court

2013In addition to the model criminal jury instruction from the judicial branch website that the court intended to give to the jury; see Connecticut Criminal Jury Instructions (4th Ed. 2010) § 7.1-1, available at http://www.jud.ct.gov/JI/criminal/ part7/7.1-l.htm (last visited July 18, 2013) (copy contained in the file of this case in the Appellate Court clerk’s office); 3 the defendant proposed adding to the instruction language first articulated by our Supreme Court in State v. Smith, 210 Conn. 132 , 554 A.2d 713 (1989) (Smith instruction), to inform the jury on the issue of consent. 4 The court

2013Even if we were to agree with the defendant on the merits, which we do not, we are an intermediate appellate court whose function is to apply the law—not make new law. “[I]t is manifest to our hierarchical judicial system that [the Supreme Court] has the final say on matters of Connecticut law and that the Appellate Court and Superior Court are bound by [its] precedent.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Commissioner of Public Safety v. Freedom of Information Commission, 137 Conn. App. 307, 324 , 48 A.3d 694 , cert. granted on other grounds, 307 Conn. 918 , 54 A.3d 562 (2012).

2013Even if we were to agree with the defendant on the merits, which we do not, we are an intermediate appellate court whose function is to apply the law—not make new law. “[I]t is manifest to our hierarchical judicial system that [the Supreme Court] has the final say on matters of Connecticut law and that the Appellate Court and Superior Court are bound by [its] precedent.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Commissioner of Public Safety v. Freedom of Information Commission, 137 Conn. App. 307, 324 , 48 A.3d 694 , cert. granted on other grounds, 307 Conn. 918 , 54 A.3d 562 (2012).

2013State, 121 Nev. 759 , 121 P.3d 592 (2005), the defendant urges us to convert the discretionary Smith instruction into a mandatory charge that must be given every time the issue of consent is raised in a sexual assault prosecution.

2013State, 121 Nev. 759 , 121 P.3d 592 (2005), the defendant urges us to convert the discretionary Smith instruction into a mandatory charge that must be given every time the issue of consent is raised in a sexual assault prosecution.

2012Indeed, at the habeas trial, Caine agreed with the statement by counsel for the respondent, the commissioner of correction, that if the jury believed the petitioner’s version of events, “there was no ambiguity as to whether or not the victim was consenting . . . .” The mere fact that the petitioner raised a consent defense at trial is insufficient to require a Smith instruction. “[0]ur Supreme Court has not held that such an instruction is constitutionally mandated whenever the defense of consent is raised in sexual assault cases.” State v. Blango, 103 Conn. App. 100, 118 , 927 A.2d 964 , cert

2012Indeed, at the habeas trial, Caine agreed with the statement by counsel for the respondent, the commissioner of correction, that if the jury believed the petitioner’s version of events, “there was no ambiguity as to whether or not the victim was consenting . . . .” The mere fact that the petitioner raised a consent defense at trial is insufficient to require a Smith instruction. “[0]ur Supreme Court has not held that such an instruction is constitutionally mandated whenever the defense of consent is raised in sexual assault cases.” State v. Blango, 103 Conn. App. 100, 118 , 927 A.2d 964 , cert

2012Indeed, at the habeas trial, Caine agreed with the statement by counsel for the respondent, the commissioner of correction, that if the jury believed the petitioner’s version of events, “there was no ambiguity as to whether or not the victim was consenting . . . .” The mere fact that the petitioner raised a consent defense at trial is insufficient to require a Smith instruction. “[0]ur Supreme Court has not held that such an instruction is constitutionally mandated whenever the defense of consent is raised in sexual assault cases.” State v. Blango, 103 Conn. App. 100, 118 , 927 A.2d 964 , cert

2012Indeed, at the habeas trial, Caine agreed with the statement by counsel for the respondent, the commissioner of correction, that if the jury believed the petitioner’s version of events, “there was no ambiguity as to whether or not the victim was consenting . . . .” The mere fact that the petitioner raised a consent defense at trial is insufficient to require a Smith instruction. “[0]ur Supreme Court has not held that such an instruction is constitutionally mandated whenever the defense of consent is raised in sexual assault cases.” State v. Blango, 103 Conn. App. 100, 118 , 927 A.2d 964 , cert

2008Turning to the second part of the Smith test, which is whether the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect, “[w]e recognize that this balancing process is an inherently difficult one, and will reverse the trial court’s decision only when it is manifest that an abuse of discretion or an injustice has occurred.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 287 . “[W]e do not . . . requirfe] a trial court to use some talismanic phraseology in order to satisfy this balancing process.

2008Turning to the second part of the Smith test, which is whether the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect, “[w]e recognize that this balancing process is an inherently difficult one, and will reverse the trial court’s decision only when it is manifest that an abuse of discretion or an injustice has occurred.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 287 . “[W]e do not . . . requirfe] a trial court to use some talismanic phraseology in order to satisfy this balancing process.

2008Rather ... in order for this test to be satisfied, a reviewing court must be able to infer from the entire record that the trial court considered the prejudicial effect of the evidence against its probative nature before making a ruling.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. James G., 268 Conn. 382, 395 , 844 A.2d 810 (2004).

2008Rather ... in order for this test to be satisfied, a reviewing court must be able to infer from the entire record that the trial court considered the prejudicial effect of the evidence against its probative nature before making a ruling.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. James G., 268 Conn. 382, 395 , 844 A.2d 810 (2004).

2002“Directed verdicts are historically not favored and can be upheld on appeal only when the jury could not have reasonably and legally reached any other conclusion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Domogala v. Molin, 57 Conn. App. 525, 527 , 749 A.2d 676 (2000).

2002“Directed verdicts are historically not favored and can be upheld on appeal only when the jury could not have reasonably and legally reached any other conclusion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Domogala v. Molin, 57 Conn. App. 525, 527 , 749 A.2d 676 (2000).

2002“Unless it is definitely expressed in the lease, the circumstances of the particular case determine whether the lessor has reserved control of the premises or whether they were under the exclusive dominion of the tenant, and it becomes a question of fact and is a matter of intention in the light of all the significant and attendant facts which bear on the issue.” Panaroni v. Johnson, 158 Conn. 92, 98 , 256 A.2d 246 (1969).

2002“Unless it is definitely expressed in the lease, the circumstances of the particular case determine whether the lessor has reserved control of the premises or whether they were under the exclusive dominion of the tenant, and it becomes a question of fact and is a matter of intention in the light of all the significant and attendant facts which bear on the issue.” Panaroni v. Johnson, 158 Conn. 92, 98 , 256 A.2d 246 (1969).

2000Under these circumstances the allegations of the plaintiffs do not comprise "a group of related acts which went to make up one entire course of conduct and constit[uting] a single transaction." Goggins v. Fawcett , supra, 145 Conn. at 711 .

2000Under these circumstances the allegations of the plaintiffs do not comprise "a group of related acts which went to make up one entire course of conduct and constit[uting] a single transaction." Goggins v. Fawcett , supra, 145 Conn. at 711 .

1997General Statutes § 52-572n (a) provides: "A product liability claim as provided in sections 52-240a , 52-240b , 52-572m to 52-572r , inclusive, and 52-577a may be asserted and shall be in lieu of all other claims against product sellers, including actions of negligence, strict liability and warranty, for harm caused by a product." "[O]ur products liability statute, General Statutes § 52-572n (a), provides the exclusive remedy for a claim falling within its scope, thereby denying a claimant the option of bringing common law causes of action for the same claim." Winslow v. Lewis-Shepard, Inc., 2

1997General Statutes § 52-572n (a) provides: "A product liability claim as provided in sections 52-240a , 52-240b , 52-572m to 52-572r , inclusive, and 52-577a may be asserted and shall be in lieu of all other claims against product sellers, including actions of negligence, strict liability and warranty, for harm caused by a product." "[O]ur products liability statute, General Statutes § 52-572n (a), provides the exclusive remedy for a claim falling within its scope, thereby denying a claimant the option of bringing common law causes of action for the same claim." Winslow v. Lewis-Shepard, Inc., 2

1997Smith. "[C]ontrary to the holding in Atkinson v. Berloni, supra, 23 Conn. App. 325 , a third party plaintiff, outside the context of workers' compensation law, need not establish the existence of CT Page 6488 an independent legal relationship between itself and the alleged indemnitor as a condition for recovery on the basis of a common law claim for indemnity." Skuzinski v. Bouchard Fuels, Inc., 240 Conn. 694 , 701-02 , (1997).

1997Smith. "[C]ontrary to the holding in Atkinson v. Berloni, supra, 23 Conn. App. 325 , a third party plaintiff, outside the context of workers' compensation law, need not establish the existence of CT Page 6488 an independent legal relationship between itself and the alleged indemnitor as a condition for recovery on the basis of a common law claim for indemnity." Skuzinski v. Bouchard Fuels, Inc., 240 Conn. 694 , 701-02 , (1997).

1995Counts three and six — recklessness In Smith's memorandum in support, she argues that a plaintiff cannot "simply add the words `reckless' or `recklessness' to allegations of conduct which is elsewhere termed negligent." Smith cites Dumond v. Denehy , 145 Conn. 88 , 139 A.2d 58 (1958) and D.

1995Counts three and six — recklessness In Smith's memorandum in support, she argues that a plaintiff cannot "simply add the words `reckless' or `recklessness' to allegations of conduct which is elsewhere termed negligent." Smith cites Dumond v. Denehy , 145 Conn. 88 , 139 A.2d 58 (1958) and D.

1992Under Practice Book 152, the function of a motion to strike "`is to test the legal sufficiency of a pleading.'" (Citation omitted.) Ferryman v. Groton, 212 Conn. 138 , 142 , 561 A.2d 432 (1989).

1992Under Practice Book 152, the function of a motion to strike "`is to test the legal sufficiency of a pleading.'" (Citation omitted.) Ferryman v. Groton, 212 Conn. 138 , 142 , 561 A.2d 432 (1989).

1986In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 , 90 S. Ct. 1068 , 25 L.

1986In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 , 90 S. Ct. 1068 , 25 L.