predecessor rule in California

2023(People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 411, 461-462 [with respect to a challenge to the witness certainty language in the predecessor instruction to CALCRIM No. 315, the defendant’s challenge to the inclusion of the certainty language was forfeited because the defendant did not request a modification of the instruction].) Defendant asserts if this court finds he forfeited his claim, he received ineffective assistance of counsel.

2021(People v. Sánchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 411, 461-462 [with respect to a challenge to the witness certainty language in the predecessor instruction to CALCRIM No. 315, the defendant’s challenge to the inclusion of the certainty language was forfeited because the defendant did not request a modification of the instruction].) A finding of forfeiture is especially appropriate where, as here, inclusion of the language on eyewitness certainty might have been beneficial to the defendant in that the evidence “involved many identifications, some certain, some uncertain,” and “[d]efendant would surely want

2025(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [California Supreme Court decisions are binding on lower courts under the principle of stare decisis].) Specifically, the California Supreme Court has held that CALJIC No. 2.50.01, the predecessor instruction to former CALCRIM No. 1191, was a correct statement of the law, explaining: “Nothing in the instructions authorized the jury to use the preponderance-of- the-evidence standard for anything other than the preliminary determination whether defendant committed a prior sexual offense . . . .” (People v. Reliford (2003) 29 Ca

2025(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [California Supreme Court decisions are binding on lower courts under the principle of stare decisis].) Specifically, the California Supreme Court has held that CALJIC No. 2.50.01, the predecessor instruction to former CALCRIM No. 1191, was a correct statement of the law, explaining: “Nothing in the instructions authorized the jury to use the preponderance-of- the-evidence standard for anything other than the preliminary determination whether defendant committed a prior sexual offense . . . .” (People v. Reliford (2003) 29 Ca

2025(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [California Supreme Court decisions are binding on lower courts under the principle of stare decisis].) Specifically, the California Supreme Court has held that CALJIC No. 2.50.01, the predecessor instruction to former CALCRIM No. 1191, was a correct statement of the law, explaining: “Nothing in the instructions authorized the jury to use the preponderance-of- the-evidence standard for anything other than the preliminary determination whether defendant committed a prior sexual offense . . . .” (People v. Reliford (2003) 29 Ca

2025(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [California Supreme Court decisions are binding on lower courts under the principle of stare decisis].) Specifically, the California Supreme Court has held that CALJIC No. 2.50.01, the predecessor instruction to former CALCRIM No. 1191, was a correct statement of the law, explaining: “Nothing in the instructions authorized the jury to use the preponderance-of- the-evidence standard for anything other than the preliminary determination whether defendant committed a prior sexual offense . . . .” (People v. Reliford (2003) 29 Ca

2020(See People v. Wright (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126, 1144 (Wright) [upholding CALJIC No. 2.92 in its entirety, including the certainty factor].) Given this precedent we reject the People’s forfeiture argument, as any objection to the certainty factor in CALCRIM No. 315 likely would have been futile.

2014On more than one occasion, our Supreme Court has rejected substantially the same argument that Weese makes here in the context of the predecessor instruction to CALCRIM No. 315, which stated that the jury should consider, among other factors, "[t]he extent to which the witness was either certain or uncertain of the identification." (CALJIC No. 2.92.) First, in People v. Wright (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126, 1141 (Wright), our Supreme Court generally approved all of the various eyewitness identification factors set forth in CALJIC No. 2.92, including certainty of identification, as long as they are set

2025(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [California Supreme Court decisions are binding on lower courts under the principle of stare decisis].) Specifically, the California Supreme Court has held that CALJIC No. 2.50.01, the predecessor instruction to former CALCRIM No. 1191, was a correct statement of the law, explaining: “Nothing in the instructions authorized the jury to use the preponderance-of- the-evidence standard for anything other than the preliminary determination whether defendant committed a prior sexual offense . . . .” (People v. Reliford (2003) 29 Ca

2025(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [California Supreme Court decisions are binding on lower courts under the principle of stare decisis].) Specifically, the California Supreme Court has held that CALJIC No. 2.50.01, the predecessor instruction to former CALCRIM No. 1191, was a correct statement of the law, explaining: “Nothing in the instructions authorized the jury to use the preponderance-of- the-evidence standard for anything other than the preliminary determination whether defendant committed a prior sexual offense . . . .” (People v. Reliford (2003) 29 Ca

1993(In re Simeth, supra, 40 Cal.App.3d at p. 985 (conc. opn. of Fleming, J.).) Prior to 1977, section 500 stated “[t]his chapter shall be known and may be cited as the ‘Amold-Kennick Juvenile Court Law.’ ” The Legislature in 1976 repealed and reenacted the entire juvenile court law in an effort to completely separate the statutory references to dependent children and wards of the juvenile court by nonsubstantive amendments.

1993All appellants are entitled to representation by counsel and, if indigent, the child and parent or guardian may have counsel appointed by the reviewing court." The rule was amended in 1993. [9] Diane L. asks this court to include indigent de facto parents within the group of those entitled to appointed counsel "as a logical extension of the existing caselaw." [10] Notably, although not cited by the majority in Simeth , the concurring opinion relied upon California Rules of Court, rule 251, the predecessor to rule 1435 (b). ( In re Simeth, supra, 40 Cal. App.3d at p. 985 (conc. opn. of Fleming,

2022Courts have uniformly applied the harmless error standard adopted in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 , when reviewing the erroneous use of CALJIC No. 2.62, the predecessor instruction to CALCRIM No. 361.

2014(People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1129 ; see also People v. Rodriguez (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1066-1068 [no constitutional infirmity in instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 361].) Courts have “rather uniformly” applied the harmless error standard adopted in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 , when reviewing the erroneous use of CALJIC No. 2.62, the predecessor instruction to CALCRIM No. 361.

2026(See Lester v. Lennane (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 536 , 556– 557 [construing former rule 13]; see also Good v. Miller (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 472 , 476–477 [noting that former rule 13 is the predecessor of rule 8.204(a)(2)(B)].) 10 Probate cases differ from civil actions because there is no “ ‘final judgment’ ” on which to anchor appealability.

2025First, it requires an appellant to make the preliminary and fundamental determination that the order appealed from is, in fact, an appealable order or judgment. [Citation.] Second, it demonstrates both to other parties and to the Court of Appeal, before work on the merits of a case [has] begun, why the order is appealable.’ (Lester v. Lennane (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 536, 556 , [].)” (Good v. Miller (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 472, 477 , italics added.) 6 Based on this deficiency alone, we would be not inclined to consider DeAguilera’s arguments, but the record and briefing include additional flaws th

2022(See People v. Lamer (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1472 .) The instruction did not direct the jury to draw an adverse inference; it expressly applied only if the jury found a failure to explain or deny evidence.

2020(People v. Lamer (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1472 .) It does not direct the jury to draw an adverse inference; it expressly applies only if the jury finds a failure to explain or deny evidence.

2016Rivas distinguished Foster because "[t]he wording of CALJIC No. 2.72 is quite different" and the predecessor instruction properly explained that identity was not an element of the crime, whereas CALCRIM No. 359 failed to do so. ( Rivas, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1429-1430.)6 We disagree with Rivas and believe the better view is expressed in People v. Rosales, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th 1254 , which reviewed the purpose of the corpus delicti rule, disagreed with Rivas, and held the third paragraph of CALCRIM No. 359 was not confusing: "It is . . . well established that a defendant's inculpatory

2015The instruction requires reconsideration.” (Rivas, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 1429 , fn. omitted.) Rivas was not swayed by the California Supreme Court’s endorsement of the validity of the predecessor instruction, CALJIC No. 2.72, in Foster, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1345 , because Rivas noted the predecessor instruction, unlike the current instruction, specifically stated identity was “not an element of the crime.” (Rivas, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 1429, fn. 8 .) 17 Rivas nevertheless found no constitutional violation or state law error warranting reversal.

2026(See Lester v. Lennane (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 536 , 556– 557 [construing former rule 13]; see also Good v. Miller (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 472 , 476–477 [noting that former rule 13 is the predecessor of rule 8.204(a)(2)(B)].) 10 Probate cases differ from civil actions because there is no “ ‘final judgment’ ” on which to anchor appealability.

2025First, it requires an appellant to make the preliminary and fundamental determination that the order appealed from is, in fact, an appealable order or judgment. [Citation.] Second, it demonstrates both to other parties and to the Court of Appeal, before work on the merits of a case [has] begun, why the order is appealable.’ (Lester v. Lennane (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 536, 556 , [].)” (Good v. Miller (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 472, 477 , italics added.) 6 Based on this deficiency alone, we would be not inclined to consider DeAguilera’s arguments, but the record and briefing include additional flaws th

2024(See People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142 , 148–149.) Moore argues that the note sent by the jury during deliberation shows that the jury was not unanimous in its theory of first degree murder and that at least one juror relied on a malice murder theory, and therefore “there was a reasonable likelihood that a juror – or jurors – would have found appellant guilty of only second degree murder based on subjective provocation.” Moore concedes that the court held in People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 880 (Rogers), that CALJIC 8.73, the predecessor instruction to CALCRIM 522, was a pinpoin

2015In Rogers, the high court agreed with the Attorney General that the predecessor instruction to CALCRIM No. 522 (CALJIC No. 8.73) was a pinpoint instruction because the provocation at issue "is relevant only to the extent it 'bears on the question' whether defendant premeditated and deliberated. [Citation.] Because [the instruction] relates the evidence of provocation to the specific legal issue of premeditation and deliberation, it is a 'pinpoint instruction' . . . and need not be given on the court's own motion." (Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 878 .) That reasoning applies equally to CALCRI

2020The predecessor instruction to CALCRIM No. 315, CALJIC No. 2.92, instructs the jury to consider any factor that “bear[s] upon the accuracy of the witness’ identification of the defendant, including, . . . [¶] . . . [¶] [t]he extent to which the witness is either certain or uncertain of the identification.” At the time of trial in this case, the California Supreme Court had 10 already upheld the inclusion of the certainty factor in CALJIC No. 2.92 on at least two occasions, in People v. Sánchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 411, 461-463 (Sánchez) and People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1231-1232 (John

2014Next, in People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1231-1232 , our Supreme Court rejected the defendant's argument that the portion of CALJIC No. 2.92 referring to 4 When a defendant fails to object to an instruction in the trial court, an appellate challenge to the instruction is cognizable only if defendant's substantial rights are implicated by the purportedly erroneous instruction.

2019The Stone court held a party challenging the assignment of a complex-case coordination judge (§ 404) pursuant to section 170.6 must file the challenge within 20 days after either the assignment of the judge ruling on the complex-case consolidation motion or the assignment of the judge to preside over the merits of the cases. ( Stone, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1146-1147, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 56 .) The court based its conclusion on the language of the predecessor to rule 3.516 and the process for assigning judges under the complex-case rules.

2019The Stone court held a party challenging the assignment of a complex-case coordination judge (§ 404) pursuant to section 170.6 must file the challenge within 20 days after either the assignment of the judge ruling on the complex-case consolidation motion or the assignment of the judge to preside over the merits of the cases. ( Stone, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1146-1147.) The court based its conclusion on the language of the predecessor to rule 3.516 and the process for assigning judges under the complex-case rules.

2019They are aware that if they intend to challenge this trial judge, they have 15 days to do so after making an appearance in the judge's department. 8 Philip Morris is similarly distinguishable. ( Philip Morris , supra , 71 Cal.App.4th 116 , 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 671 .) There, the plaintiffs timely filed a peremptory disqualification challenge under the predecessor to rule 3.516 in a complex-case coordination proceeding.

2019They are aware that if they intend to challenge this trial judge, they have 15 days to do so after making an appearance in the judge's department. 8 Philip Morris is similarly distinguishable. ( Philip Morris , supra , 71 Cal.App.4th 116 , 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 671 .) There, the plaintiffs timely filed a peremptory disqualification challenge under the predecessor to rule 3.516 in a complex-case coordination proceeding.

2017(See Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215 , 219, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 597 ( Condee ) [holding that rule 371, the predecessor to rule 3.1330, "does not require the petitioner to introduce the agreement into evidence or provide the court with anything more than a copy or recitation of its terms"].) The Grundel declarations met this requirement by providing the two different versions of the arbitration provision and stating that all class members signed at least one of those versions.

2017(See Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215 , 219, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 597 ( Condee ) [holding that rule 371, the predecessor to rule 3.1330, "does not require the petitioner to introduce the agreement into evidence or provide the court with anything more than a copy or recitation of its terms"].) The Grundel declarations met this requirement by providing the two different versions of the arbitration provision and stating that all class members signed at least one of those versions.

2014(People v. Saddler (1979) 24 Cal.3d 671, 681-683 [instructing jury with CALJIC No. 2.62, the predecessor instruction to CALCRIM No. 361, was error where defendant did not fail to explain or deny any adverse evidence].) Having decided the trial court erred in instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 361, we turn to the question of whether the error was prejudicial.

2013We begin our analysis by focusing on People v. Saddler (1979) 24 Cal.3d 671 (Saddler), which considered a predecessor instruction to CALCRIM No. 361, namely CALJIC No. 2.62.

2011(E.g., Jeffry v. Pounds[, supra,] 67 Cal.App.3d 6 , 12 . . . [barring quantum meruit recovery from the time that attorney undertook to represent a wife in her marital dissolution proceedings against her husband, the current client of the attorney’s law firm, in violation of former mle 5-102, a predecessor to rule 3-310]; Goldstein v. Lees (1975) 46 Cal.App 3d 614 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 253 ] [finding quantum meruit recovery inappropriate where former corporate counsel labored under a conflict of interest in representing a minority shareholder and director of his former client in a proxy battle, in vi

2004(E.g., Jeffry v. Pounds (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 6, 12 [ 136 Cal.Rptr. 373 ] [barring quantum meruit recovery from the time that attorney undertook to represent a wife in her marital dissolution proceedings against her husband, the current client of the attorney’s law firm, in violation of former rule 5-102, a predecessor to rule 3-310]; Goldstein v. Lees (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 614 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 253 ] [finding quantum meruit recovery inappropriate where former corporate counsel labored under a conflict of interest in representing a minority shareholder and director of his former client in a proxy

2004(Mills, supra, 186 Cal.App.3d at p. 128 ; see also Bobele v. Superior Court (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 708, 714 [ 245 Cal.Rptr. 144 ] [“Plaintiffs may not contact ex parte any current employees” of defendant organization].) However, as we noted in Snider , when rule 2-100 was enacted in 1988 to replace rule 7-103, the drafters rejected such a blanket prohibition.

2004(Mills, supra, 186 Cal.App.3d at p. 128 ; see also Bobele v. Superior Court (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 708, 714 [ 245 Cal.Rptr. 144 ] [“Plaintiffs may not contact ex parte any current employees” of defendant organization].) However, as we noted in Snider , when rule 2-100 was enacted in 1988 to replace rule 7-103, the drafters rejected such a blanket prohibition.

2026(See In re Marriage of Freeman (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1, 4, 9 (Freeman) [applying former rule 870.2, which is the predecessor to rule 3.1702, to a motion for fees under Family Code section 271 in a marital dissolution action and noting “it has been recognized that [former] rule 870.2 applies generally to all applications for attorney fees incurred on postjudgment appeals”].)10 Moreover, Ha cites no case for the proposition that rule 3.1702 does not apply to a marriage dissolution action, and we are not persuaded it does not.

2026(Freeman, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 5 .) Although Freeman involved a claim for attorney fees under Family Code section 271, the case still is instructive here because it applies former rule 870.2 (the predecessor to rule 3.1702) in a marriage dissolution action.