burden-shifting framework in California

2024Lim Has Not Adduced Evidence that His Disability Played a Motivating Role in His Termination Because “direct evidence of intentional discrimination is rare, and . . . such claims must usually be proved circumstantially” (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 354 ), California courts generally employ the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792 ( 93 S.Ct. 1817 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 ) to FEHA-based discrimination and retaliation claims.

2023This is the three-part burden shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792 , 802–805 . . . adopted by California for use in FEHA cases. [Citations.]” (Khoiny v. Dignity Health (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 390 , 397–398.) When the burden is shifted back to the plaintiff, he or she must present evidence that the employer’s decision was motivated by prohibited discrimination. ( Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 353, 357; Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 377 [“A plaintiff’s burden is . . . to produce evidence that, taken as

2014“When a plaintiff alleges retaliatory employment termination either as a claim under FEHA or as a claim for wrongful employment termination in violation of public policy, and the defendant seeks summary judgment, California follows the burden- shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792 (McDonnell Douglas) to determine whether there are triable issues of fact for resolution by a jury. [Citation.]” (Loggins v. Kaiser Permanente Internat. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1108-1109 (Loggins).) “In the first stage, the ‘plaintiff must show (1) he or she engaged in a “prot

2014“When a plaintiff alleges retaliatory employment termination either as a claim under FEHA or as a claim for wrongful employment termination in violation of public policy, and the defendant seeks summary judgment, California follows the burden- shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792 (McDonnell Douglas) to determine whether there are triable issues of fact for resolution by a jury. [Citation.]” (Loggins v. Kaiser Permanente Internat. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1108-1109 (Loggins).) “In the first stage, the ‘plaintiff must show (1) he or she engaged in a “prot

2026Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar, at p. 849.) FEHA claims are analyzed under the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792 .

2026The United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 3 Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792 established a burden-shifting framework for trying claims of intentional employment discrimination cases based on circumstantial evidence. 14 The trial court issued written orders after hearing on each of the four posttrial motions.

2022IV Retaliation “[T]o establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the FEHA, a plaintiff must show (1) he or she engaged in a ‘protected activity,’ (2) the employer subjected the employee to an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link existed between the protected activity and the employer’s action.” (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1042 .) On a motion for summary judgment, California applies the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas to a claim for retaliation.

2017Code, § 1278.5, subd. (b)(1)(A).) In Yanowitz v. L'Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1042 , the California Supreme Court explained a retaliation claim is analyzed under the burden-shifting test originally articulated in McDonnell Douglas, supra, 411 U.S. 792 .

2026Religious Discrimination FEHA employment discrimination cases are analyzed under the “three-step process . . . based on the burden-shifting test . . . in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792 .” (Serri, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 860 ; see also § 12940, subd. (a).) “ ‘[T]he employer . . . has the initial burden to present admissible evidence showing . . . that the adverse employment action was based upon legitimate, nondiscriminatory factors.’ ” (Serri, at p. 861.) “If the employer meets its initial burden, the burden shifts to the employee to ‘demonstrate a triable issue by p

2025Thus, by successive steps of increasingly narrow focus, the test allows discrimination to be inferred from facts that create a reasonable likelihood of bias and are not satisfactorily explained.’ [Citation.]” (Serri, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 860 .) Under the three-part burden-shifting test, the plaintiff employee has the initial burden to make a prima facie case of discrimination. “[A] plaintiff’s prima facie burden is minimal. ‘The amount [of evidence] that must be produced in order to create a prima 3 Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to the Government Code. 10 facie c

2025In that seminal case “clarify[ing] the [California] law that [California] courts must apply in ruling on motions for summary judgment,” the court interpreted the principal portions of the summary judgment statute and outlined the burden-shifting framework. ( Aguilar, supra, at p. 843 .) As relevant here, the court considered section 437c, subdivision (b)(2), which explains how a party 5 opposing a summary judgment motion must support its opposition. ( Aguilar, supra, at p. 843 .) The court construed this subdivision as providing that “any adverse party may oppose” a motion for summary judgment

2025In that seminal case “clarify[ing] the [California] law that [California] courts must apply in ruling on motions for summary judgment,” the court interpreted the principal portions of the summary judgment statute and outlined the burden-shifting framework. ( Aguilar, supra, at p. 843 .) As relevant here, the court considered section 437c, subdivision (b)(2), which explains how a party 5 opposing a summary judgment motion must support its opposition. ( Aguilar, supra, at p. 843 .) The court construed this subdivision as providing that “any adverse party may oppose” a motion for summary judgment

2026(De Jung, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 550 .) “Direct evidence is evidence which, if believed, proves the fact of discriminatory animus without inference or presumption.” (Ibid.) “ ‘Where a plaintiff offers direct evidence of discrimination that is believed by the trier of fact, the defendant can avoid liability only by proving the plaintiff would have been subjected to the same employment decision without reference to the 27 unlawful factor.’ ” (Trop v. Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1133, 1145 .) The District’s motion for summary judgment proceeded under the assumpt

2025(DeJung v. Superior Court (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 533, 549 .) Where, as here, a plaintiff relies 14 on circumstantial evidence, California courts apply the burden- shifting test established by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792 (McDonnell Douglas) to analyze federal employment discrimination claims.

2020(Patten v. Grant Joint Union High School Dist. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1378, 1384 (Patten); see also Akers v. County of San Diego (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1453 [(Akers)].)” (Mokler, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 138 .) “Second, retaliation may be proved by direct evidence. ‘Where a plaintiff offers direct evidence of discrimination that is believed by the trier of fact, the defendant can avoid liability only by proving the plaintiff would have been subjected to the same employment decision without reference to the unlawful factor.’ (Morgan v. Regents of University of California (2000) 88 Cal.

2007“Where a plaintiff offers direct evidence of discrimination that is believed by the trier of fact, the defendant can avoid liability only by proving the plaintiff would have been subjected to the same employment decision without reference to the unlawful factor.” (Morgan v. Regents of University of California (2000) 88 Cal.App.4th 52, 67-68 [ 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 652 ] (Morgan).) Where direct evidence of retaliation is shown, the burden shifting analysis imposed in circumstantial evidence cases does not apply.

2025Thus, by successive steps of increasingly narrow focus, the test allows discrimination to be inferred from facts that create a reasonable likelihood of bias and are not satisfactorily explained.’ [Citation.]” (Serri, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 860 .) Under the three-part burden-shifting test, the plaintiff employee has the initial burden to make a prima facie case of discrimination. “[A] plaintiff’s prima facie burden is minimal. ‘The amount [of evidence] that must be produced in order to create a prima 3 Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to the Government Code. 10 facie c

1999Code, § 12941, subd. (a); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.) 3 As with actions under federal antidiscrimination legislation, a plaintiff alleging discriminatory termination under California’s antidiscrimination statutory scheme must be able to survive the burden-shifting analysis set *806 forth by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792, 802-804 [ 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824-1825 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 ] {McDonnell Douglas). {Caldwell v. Paramount Unified School Dist. (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 189, 195-196 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 448 ].) By applying McDonnell Douglas'

2017Code, § 12940, subd. (a).) 4 Cornell's claim of disability discrimination is subject to the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792 , 93 S.Ct. 1817 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 ( McDonnell Douglas ). ( Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317 , 354, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 352 , 8 P.3d 1089 ; Wills v. Superior Court (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 143 , 159, 125 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 *926 Wills ).) Under that framework, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that " 'he or she (1) suffered from a disability, or was regarded as suffering

2017Code, § 12940, subd. (a).) 4 Cornell's claim of disability discrimination is subject to the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792 , 93 S.Ct. 1817 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 ( McDonnell Douglas ). ( Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317 , 354, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 352 , 8 P.3d 1089 ; Wills v. Superior Court (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 143 , 159, 125 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 *926 Wills ).) Under that framework, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that " 'he or she (1) suffered from a disability, or was regarded as suffering

1999Code, § 12941, subd. (a); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.) 3 As with actions under federal antidiscrimination legislation, a plaintiff alleging discriminatory termination under California’s antidiscrimination statutory scheme must be able to survive the burden-shifting analysis set *806 forth by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792, 802-804 [ 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824-1825 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 ] {McDonnell Douglas). {Caldwell v. Paramount Unified School Dist. (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 189, 195-196 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 448 ].) By applying McDonnell Douglas'

1999Code, § 12941, subd. (a); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.) 3 As with actions under federal antidiscrimination legislation, a plaintiff alleging discriminatory termination under California’s antidiscrimination statutory scheme must be able to survive the burden-shifting analysis set *806 forth by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792, 802-804 [ 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824-1825 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 ] {McDonnell Douglas). {Caldwell v. Paramount Unified School Dist. (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 189, 195-196 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 448 ].) By applying McDonnell Douglas'

2024(Serri v. Santa Clara University (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 830, 860 (Serri), citing Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 354-355 & Reeves v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 95, 111 (Reeves).) This test “reflects the principle that direct evidence of intentional discrimination is rare, and that such claims must usually be proved circumstantially.

2016(See, e.g., Guz [v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000)] 24 Cal.4th [317,] 354-355 [(Guz)]; Reeves v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 95, 111 (Reeves).) . . . [¶] . . . [U]nder the first step of the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff may raise a presumption of discrimination by presenting a ‘prima facie case,’ the components of which vary depending upon the nature of the claim . . . . ( Reeves, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at pp. 111-112.) ‘A satisfactory showing to this effect gives rise to a presumption of discrimination which, if unanswered by the employer, is mandatory—it requires

2022(Kelly v. Stamps.com Inc. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1088 , 1097–1098.) By presenting such evidence, the employer shifts the burden to the plaintiff to present evidence that the employer’s decision was motivated at least in part by prohibited discrimination.7 ( Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 353, 357.) The accommodation, as we have concluded that there is a factual dispute as to the essential functions of Schoensiegel’s position. 7 This burden-shifting test is derived from the three-stage burden-shifting test established by the United States Supreme Court for use at trial in cases involving claims,

2015(Id., subd. (p)(2); Romano v. Rockwell Internat., Inc., supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 487 .) Once the defendant has made such a showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action or defense. ( Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 849, 853.) In the employment discrimination context, case law has refined the foregoing burden-shifting analysis to incorporate the three-stage McDonnell Douglas test used to 11 try discrimination claims.5 (See Kelly v. Stamps.com Inc. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1097 (Kelly); Scotch v. Art Institute of C

2015(Id., subd. (p)(2); Romano v. Rockwell Internat., Inc., supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 487 .) Once the defendant has made such a showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action or defense. ( Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 849, 853.) In the employment discrimination context, case law has refined the foregoing burden-shifting analysis to incorporate the three-stage McDonnell Douglas test used to 11 try discrimination claims.5 (See Kelly v. Stamps.com Inc. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1097 (Kelly); Scotch v. Art Institute of C

2014(Yanowitz, at p. 1042 [adopting the burden-shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, supra, 411 U.S. at pp. 802-805].) If the employer produces a legitimate business reason for the adverse employment action, “the presumption of retaliation ‘“‘drops out of the picture,’”’ and the burden shifts back to the employee to prove intentional retaliation.” (Yanowitz, at p. 1042; see also Scotch v. Art Institute of California (2009) 9 It is undisputed Martinez had issued counseling letters to employees of other races. 13 173 Cal.App.4th 986, 1004 .) Chaney contends he suffered retaliation f

2023Myers v. Dignity Health (2019) 44 Cal.App.5th 301 , 318-319 [summary judgment affirmed where plaintiff “failed to provide admissible evidence to create a triable issue of fact” to show adverse employment action].) Plaintiffs also argue that the trial court was required to deny summary adjudication of their whistleblowing retaliation claim under Labor Code section 1102.5 because the County did not invoke the proper burden-shifting standard set forth in Lawson, supra, 12 Cal.5th 703 .

2023Myers v. Dignity Health (2019) 44 Cal.App.5th 301 , 318-319 [summary judgment affirmed where plaintiff “failed to provide admissible evidence to create a triable issue of fact” to show adverse employment action].) Plaintiffs also argue that the trial court was required to deny summary adjudication of their whistleblowing retaliation claim under Labor Code section 1102.5 because the County did not invoke the proper burden-shifting standard set forth in Lawson, supra, 12 Cal.5th 703 .

2015The burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792 (McDonnell Douglas), which we will discuss, “presupposes that the employer has a single reason for taking an adverse action against the employee and that the reason is either discriminatory or legitimate.” (Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203, 215 (Harris).) 2 I Procedural History On November 17, 2011, plaintiff filed a complaint for wrongful retaliation.

2014(Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203, 232 (Harris);4 Guz, supra, at pp. 353, 357 .) The stronger the employer’s showing of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the stronger the plaintiff’s evidence must be in order to create a reasonable inference of a discriminatory motive.5 ( Guz, supra, at p. 362 & fn. 25.) This same burden-shifting analysis also applies to a count for retaliation if the employer presents evidence of a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for an adverse employment action.

2023There is. 28 Under CFRA, it is “an unlawful employment practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of, or the attempt to exercise, any right provided under this section.” (§ 12945.2, subd. (q); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 11094, subd. (b).) “A CFRA interference claim ‘“consists of the following elements: (1) the employee’s entitlement to CFRA leave rights; and (2) the employer’s interference with or denial of those rights.”’” (Soria, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 601 ; accord, Moore v. Regents of University of California, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 250 .) “An inter

2023There is. 28 Under CFRA, it is “an unlawful employment practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of, or the attempt to exercise, any right provided under this section.” (§ 12945.2, subd. (q); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 11094, subd. (b).) “A CFRA interference claim ‘“consists of the following elements: (1) the employee’s entitlement to CFRA leave rights; and (2) the employer’s interference with or denial of those rights.”’” (Soria, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 601 ; accord, Moore v. Regents of University of California, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 250 .) “An inter

2020(Patten v. Grant Joint Union High School Dist. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1378, 1384 (Patten); see also Akers v. County of San Diego (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1453 [(Akers)].)” (Mokler, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 138 .) “Second, retaliation may be proved by direct evidence. ‘Where a plaintiff offers direct evidence of discrimination that is believed by the trier of fact, the defendant can avoid liability only by proving the plaintiff would have been subjected to the same employment decision without reference to the unlawful factor.’ (Morgan v. Regents of University of California (2000) 88 Cal.

2015(Akers v. County of 15 San Diego (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1453 ; Dudley v. Department of Transportation (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 255, 261 .) In reviewing summary judgment of a retaliation claim, we bear in mind the burden-shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792 to determining if triable issues of fact exist for resolution by a jury.

2023This is the three-part burden shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792 , 802–805 . . . adopted by California for use in FEHA cases. [Citations.]” (Khoiny v. Dignity Health (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 390 , 397–398.) When the burden is shifted back to the plaintiff, he or she must present evidence that the employer’s decision was motivated by prohibited discrimination. ( Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 353, 357; Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 377 [“A plaintiff’s burden is . . . to produce evidence that, taken as

2015In March 5 Though this burden shifting framework “drops from the picture” once a case is submitted to the jury, the analysis is to be applied “at preliminary stages of litigation, such as summary judgment and nonsuit, where the shifting burdens of proof and persuasion permit a sequential analysis of the parties’ evidentiary offerings.” (Horsford, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 375 .) 6 Immediately after the holiday party, on December 22, 2010, Plaintiff complained to human resources about Marquez’s conduct; however, at the time, he did not suggest Marquez’s actions were racially motivated.

2024If the managing spouse fails to meet this burden, the court should charge the managing spouse with the assets according to the prima facie showing.” (Id. at p. 1267.) The Margulis court went on to explain how it reached this burden shifting evaluation. ( Margulis, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1267–1269.) It determined that “ ‘[c]ourts may alter the normal allocation of the burden of proof’ based on considerations of fairness and policy.” (Id. at p. 1267.) The court recognized that fundamental fairness is central to the analysis and “ ‘ “determining the incidence of the burden of proof . . . ‘

2024If the managing spouse fails to meet this burden, the court should charge the managing spouse with the assets according to the prima facie showing.” (Id. at p. 1267.) The Margulis court went on to explain how it reached this burden shifting evaluation. ( Margulis, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1267–1269.) It determined that “ ‘[c]ourts may alter the normal allocation of the burden of proof’ based on considerations of fairness and policy.” (Id. at p. 1267.) The court recognized that fundamental fairness is central to the analysis and “ ‘ “determining the incidence of the burden of proof . . . ‘

2023Once the plaintiff has made the required showing, the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that it would have taken the action in question for legitimate, independent reasons even had the plaintiff not engaged in protected activity.” (Lawson v. PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 703, 718 (Lawson); § 1102.6.) We note that Lawson overruled earlier authority, including authority from this court, which had applied the burden-shifting standard articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792 to whistleblower retaliation c

2022Invoking a line of authority that traces back to Patten v. Grant Joint Union High School Dist. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1378 (Patten), the district court applied the three-part burden-shifting framework laid out in McDonnell Douglas, supra, 411 U.S. 792 to evaluate Lawson’s section 1102.5 claim.

2026(Espejo v. Southern California Permanente Medical 3 Because CMG and plaintiffs use this burden-shifting framework, we assume without deciding it applies here. 6 Group (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1058 (Espejo), citing Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218 ; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330.) “For this step, ‘it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.’ ” (Gamboa, at p. 165.) If the arbitration agreement is not disputed, “then nothing more is required for the moving party to meet its burden of persuasion.” (Ibid.) But, “[

2024(Espejo v. 7 Because both NAF and Dyer use this burden-shifting framework, we assume without deciding it applies here. 5 Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1058 , citing Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218 ; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330.) “For this step, ‘it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.’ ” (Gamboa, at p. 165.) If the arbitration agreement is not disputed, “then nothing more is required for the moving party to meet its burden of persuasion.” (Ibid.) But, “[i]f the m

2024The prevailing party bears the initial burden of establishing prima facie entitlement to the recovery of costs, which it meets if its verified cost bill “‘appears proper on its face.’” (Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 855 ; Ladas v. California State Auto.

2022The prevailing party bears the initial burden of establishing prima facie entitlement to the recovery of costs, which it meets if its verified cost bill “‘appears proper on its face.’” (Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 855 ; Ladas v. California State Auto.