State Of Washington v. Chad Chenoweth
v.
Chad Chenoweth
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 71520-8-
Respondent, v. CHAD CURTIS CHENOWETH, PUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant. FILED: June 22, 2015
Verellen, A.C.J. — Chad Chenoweth appeals his conviction for first degree incest committed against his son, who was 19 years old at the time. He contends that the trial court erred by admitting his wife's testimony in violation of the spousal privilege, admitting hearsay testimony about the son's disclosures, and instructing the jury that corroboration of the son's testimony was not required. Because the statutory exception to the spousal privilege for criminal proceedings involving "any child" of the spouses is not limited to minor children, the trial court properly admitted the wife's testimony. And because the son's disclosures were not offered for the truth of the disclosures but to show context for the investigation, this evidence was properly admitted. Finally, the court's instruction on noncorroboration was a correct statement of the law and did not amount to a comment on the evidence. Accordingly, we affirm. No. 71520-8-1/2
FACTS
Jainni and Chad Chenoweth married in 1991. Jainni1 already had a daughter at the time. She and Chenoweth then had a son, C.C, who was born in Washington in January 1992. After C.C. was born, the family moved to Idaho.
Jainni described C.C. as disabled and mentally slow. C.C. was placed in a special education program at school. He also attended counseling and was on medication for attention deficit hyperactivity disorder for a period of time.
When C.C. was 12, he was placed in a state school and hospital in Idaho for individuals with mental disorders. C.C. remained in that placement until age 18.
When C.C. was about 16 or 17, Jainni moved back to Washington. In 2010, C.C. moved in with Jainni and Chenoweth in Bow, Washington. C.C. stayed in a downstairs room and spent most of his time playing video games. He could not cook for himself and had to be reminded to shower and dress properly. He was unable to hold a job and received SSI benefits.
Chenoweth was working at an auto repair shop in Marysville at the time. In October 2011, Jainni was hospitalized for a few days and Chenoweth cared for C.C. In April 2012, Chenoweth moved out of the home but remained married to Jainni. In late summer 2012, C.C. also moved out to live with his sister.
Soon after he moved out, C.C. disclosed to Jainni that Chenoweth had raped him while she was hospitalized in October 2011 and he was in Chenoweth's care. C.C. told his mother that one day while he was playing video games at the house, Chenoweth came into the room, put C.C. face down on the bed and anally raped him. C.C. was 19
For ease of reference, we refer to Jainni Chenoweth by her first name. No. 71520-8-1/3 years old at the time. C.C. did not report the incident to anyone until he disclosed it to Jainni.
After the disclosure, Jainni advised C.C. to contact Adult Protective Services. Following a mental health evaluation, Adult Protective services referred C.C.'s case to the police and assigned him a social worker. A deputy from the county sheriff's office took the initial report from C.C, and the social worker interviewed C.C. about the incident. The social worker determined that C.C. was a vulnerable adult.
The State ultimately charged Chenoweth with one count of third degree rape by lack of consent and one count of first degree incest. The State also sought an exceptional sentence.
The case proceeded to trial and the jury heard testimony from C.C, his mother, his sister, the investigating deputy, the social worker, and the mental health assessor. Chenoweth did not testify. At the close of evidence, the court dismissed the third degree rape charge for insufficient evidence of lack of consent. The jury found Chenoweth guilty of first degree incest. The jury also returned special verdicts finding that Chenoweth knew or should have known C.C. was particularly vulnerable or incapable of resistance and that Chenoweth used his position of trust to facilitate commission of the crime. The court sentenced Chenoweth to 102 months, the top of the standard range.
Chenoweth appeals.
No. 71520-8-1/4
DISCUSSION
Spousal Privilege
Chenoweth contends that the trial court's admission of Jainni's testimony violated the spousal privilege. Chenoweth argues that because C.C. was not a minor, the exception to the privilege for proceedings involving a crime committed against "any child" of either spouse did not apply. We disagree.
Testimonial privileges are creatures ofstatute and should be strictly construed.[2] The spousal privilege statute is designed to encourage marital harmony.3 The statute both limits the competence of a spouse of a party to testify and provides a privilege for confidential communications between spouses.4 One exception is for testimony in "a criminal action or proceeding for a crime committed by said spouse or domestic partner against any child of whom said spouse or domestic partner is the parent or guardian."5 No. 71520-8-1/9
More importantly, the overriding purpose of the spousal privilege is to promote marital harmony.[21] Applying the statute to any child without regard to age is not contrary to the goal of marital harmony. If one spouse harms the parties' child, regardless of the child's age, there is no domestic harmony to protect. "When there is no domestic harmony to protect, we believe the policy supporting a spousal privilege does not merely pale; it withers and dies."22
In People v. McGraw. the California court came to a similar conclusion.23 There, the court interpreted a similar statute in a prosecution for the murder of the defendant's stepson, who was an adult. The California spousal privilege statute provided an exception for criminal proceedings in which one spouse is charged with a crime committed against "a child of either [spouse]."24 The court concluded that this exception was not limited to crimes committed against minor children and held that the defendant's wife was permitted to testify against him in a prosecution for the murder of her 22-year-old son. As the court explained:
Statutes must be given a reasonable and common sense construction that leads to a wise policy and avoids absurd results. Realistically, the word "child" connotes a family relationship without any age limitations. A person remains a child of one's parents throughout life, not simply until the age of majority is reached.
Our interpretation accords with the basic purpose of the marital communications privilege which is to preserve confidence and marital harmony between the spouses. Section 985, subdivision (a) is grounded No. 71520-8-1/11
So I will, this is a motion in limine, but I'll deny that motion and allow the State to present testimony as to a particular time frame that a complaint was made by the alleged victim and what, if anything, without specific words they encourage him to do or not doJ26'
At trial, Jainni, C.C.'s sister, the investigating officer, and a social worker all testified that C.C. told them about the allegations. A mental health assessor also testified that "[b]asically [C.C] said that his father had sexually abused him one time, and it occurred since his birthday that year, since January 2012."27 Each of these witnesses further testified about C.C.'s mental status, generally agreeing that he had some sort of developmental delay, or at least appeared to have the mental capacity of a child rather than an adult.
Chenoweth is correct that the disclosures were inadmissible under the fact of complaint exception to the hearsay rule because they were not timely made. The fact of complaint or hue and cry doctrine allows the prosecution in sex offense cases to present evidence that the victim complained to someone after the assault.[28] But "[t]he rule admits only such evidence as will establish that the complaint is timely made."29 The State attempts to interpret the case law as permitting any testimony establishing when the complaint was made, not only that a timely complaint was made.[30] But
26RP(Dec. [9], 2013) at 7-8.
No. 71520-8-1/12 No. 71520-8-1/13 is offered to show why an officer conducted an investigation, it is not hearsay and is admissible."35
Here, the witnesses simply testified that C.C. reported the "allegations" to them without reference to any specifics of the allegations.[36] This testimony was not offered for the truth of the allegations, but to show what the witnesses did next and to provide a basis for their testimony. At his mother's suggestion, C.C. contacted Adult Protective Services, he was referred for a mental health evaluation, and he told the mental health assessor that he had been sexually abused by his father. The case was then referred to the police and assigned to a social worker, who determined that he was a vulnerable adult. Thus, as in Iverson. C.C.'s disclosures were not hearsay because they were not offered for the truth of the disclosures, but to give context for the investigation. They also explained why the investigation was conducted, which was relevant to the determination that C.C. was "particularly vulnerable," a fact at issue in the special verdict finding submitted to the jury.[37]
35 id, at 337; see also Williams v. Dep't of Licensing. 85 Wn. App. 271, 280, 932 P.2d 665 (1997) (statement a military gate guard made to a police officer that the defendant smelled like alcohol gave a basis for the officer to detain the defendant for further investigation, was not offered for truth of the matter asserted, and was therefore admissible).
No. 71520-8-1/14
Chenoweth contends this testimony was irrelevant, citing State v. Edwards.38 There, the trial court permitted a detective to testify that a confidential informant told him that a person with the same first name as the defendant was dealing cocaine, over a hearsay objection. The court reversed on appeal, concluding that the statement was inadmissible hearsay as its only relevance was the truth of the statement.39 Here, there was no testimony about the content of the disclosures, so there was no "truth" to be asserted other than the fact that C.C. disclosed the allegations.[40] The trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Noncorroboration Instruction
Finally, Chenoweth challenges the following jury instruction as an impermissible comment on the evidence:
In order to convict a person of incest[,] it shall not be necessary that the testimony of the alleged victim be corroborated. The jury is to decide all questions of witness credibility.1411 Chenoweth acknowledges that RCW 9A.44.020(1) provides that testimony ofan alleged sex offense victim need not be corroborated, but he argues that the crime for which he was convicted, incest, does not fall within the statute. He contends that the court's instruction was an incorrect statement of the law and an impermissible comment on the evidence. We disagree.
38131 Wn. App. 611, 128 P.3d 631 (2006).
39 id, at 614-15.
No. 71520-8-1/15
Whether a jury instruction is legally correct is reviewed de novo.[42] "A jury instruction is not an impermissible comment on the evidence when sufficient evidence supports it and the instruction is an accurate statement of the law."43
RCW 9A.44.020(1) provides: "In order to convict a person of any crime defined in this chapter[,] it shall not be necessary that the testimony of the alleged victim be corroborated." Courts have upheld sex offense victim noncorroboration instructions as correct statements of the law under the statute.[44]
Chenoweth contends that the instruction given here was not a correct statement of the law because the crime of incest is defined in chapter 9A.64 RCW rather than chapter 9A.44 RCW. But the noncorroboration statute simply states that corroboration is not required in sex offenses defined in chapter 9A.44 RCW; it does not state that corroboration is required in all other cases. The lack of a reference to incest does not reveal a legislative intent to require corroborating evidence in an incest case. To the contrary, our case law expressly recognizes that, after the legislature abolished a former statute requiring corroboration in a variety of sex offenses, corroboration is not required in incest cases. As the court held in State v. Davis:
"[l]t is not necessary that there shall be actual corroboration of the prosecutrix in such [incest] cases, since there is no statute requiring it... . [T]he actual rule there declared by the court is such that the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecutrix is sufficient if the jury finds it to be true. Of the truth the jurors shall be the judges."'451 No. 71520-8-1/16 No. 71520-8-1/17 by persons other than the accused and the complaining witness, and not all such offenses are otherwise capable of corroboration."50
Because of such concerns in sex crimes, including incest and rape, it is permissible to instruct the jury that there is no corroboration requirement. There appears to be no comparable rationale to give such an instruction for other crimes. While we are concerned with the use of such an instruction even in sex crimes, we do not conclude that its use in this case was a comment on the evidence. The only witness who described the allegations of incest was the 19-year-old developmentally delayed child victim. There were no other witnesses to the incident.
We affirm the judgment and sentence.
WE CONCUR:
<&^J .
State v. Chenoweth. 71520-8-1
Becker, J. (concurring) — If the use of the noncorroboration instruction were a matter of first impression, I would hold it is a comment on the evidence and reverse the conviction. I agree with the committee on pattern jury instructions that the matter of corroboration is really a matter of sufficiency of the evidence. Many correct statements of the law are not appropriate to give as instructions. But we are bound by State v. Clayton. 32 Wn.2d 571, 202 P.2d 922 (1949), to hold that the giving of such an instruction is not reversible error. State v. Zimmerman. 130 Wn. App. 170, 182-83, 121 P.3d 1216 (2005). Accordingly, I must concur. l^cl^etg