green
Positive treatment
33.2 score
Treatment trajectory · 2004 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2004
2015
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 24 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Harrington v. Commissioner of Social Security
Davidson v. Veneman, 317 F.3d 503, 506 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Herron v. Bowman, 788 F.2d 1127, 1130 (5th Cir. 1986)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Reed v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration
Davidson v. Veneman, 317 F.3d 503, 506 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Herron v. Bowman, 788 F.2d 1127, 1130 (5th Cir. 1986)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Rangel de Oliveira v. Bierman
The government has the burden to prove that its position was substantially justified “at all stages of the litigation.” Davidson v. Veneman, 317 F.3d 503, 506 (5th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Webb v. Commissioner of Social Security
Davidson v. Veneman, 317 F.3d 503, 506 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Herron v. Bowman, 788 F.2d 1127, 1130 (5th Cir. 1986)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
White v. Commissioner of Social Security
The government has the burden to prove that its position was substantially justified “at all stages of the litigation.” Davidson v. Veneman, 317 F.3d 503, 506 (5th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Agma Security Service, Inc. v. United States
“The burden of establishing ‘that the position of the United States was substantially justified,’ § 2412(d)(1)(A) indicates and courts uniformly have recognized, must be shouldered by the Government.” Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. at 414 (citing Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 567 (1988); Davidson v. Veneman, 317 F.3d 503, 506 (5th Cir. 2003); Lauer v. Barnhart, 321 F.3d 762, 764 (8th Cir. 2003)); Libas, Ltd. v. United States, 314 F.3d at 1365 ); see also Comm'r v. Jean, 496 U.S. at 165 . (“The ‘substantial justification’ requirement of the EAJA establishes a clear thresh…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Agma Security Service, Inc. v. United States
“The burden of establishing ‘that the position of the United States was substantially justified,’ § 2412(d)(1)(A) indicates and courts uniformly have recognized, must be shouldered by the Government.” Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. at 414 (citing Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 567 (1988); Davidson v. Veneman, 317 F.3d 503, 506 (5th Cir. 2003); Lauer v. Barnhart, 321 F.3d 762, 764 (8th Cir. 2003)); Libas, Ltd. v. United States, 314 F.3d at 1365 ); see also Comm'r v. Jean, 496 U.S. at 165 . (“The ‘substantial justification’ requirement of the EAJA establishes a clear thresh…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Palmer v. Commissioner of Social Security
(2×)
The Commissioner’s position is “substantially justified” when it is “justified in substance or in the main—that is, justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person” such that the position has a “reasonable basis in law and fact.” Davidson v. Veneman, 317 F.3d 503, 506 (5th Cir. 2003) (quotations omitted).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
McCary-Banister v. Kijakazi
Davidson v. Veneman, 317 F.3d 503, 506 (5th Cir. 2003).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Evans v. Commissioner of Social Security
Davidson v. Veneman, 317 F.3d 503, 506 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Herron v. Bowen, 788 F.2d 1127, 1130 (5th Cir. 1986)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Drin Sylejmani v. William Barr, U.S. Atty Gen
“This standard is not overly stringent, however, and the position of the government will be deemed to be substantially justified ‘if there is a genuine dispute . . . or if reasonable people could differ as to the appropriateness of the contested action.’” Davidson v. Veneman, 317 F.3d 503, 506 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Pierce, 487 U.S. at 565 ).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
DaSilva v. United States Citizenship & Immigration Services
Davidson v. Veneman, 317 F.3d 503, 506 (5th Cir.2003). .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Gate Guard Services L.P. v. Perez
“As a threshold matter, a plaintiff is a ‘prevailing party’ under the EAJA ‘if he succeeds on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit he sought in bringing suit.’ ” Davidson v. Veneman, 317 F.3d 503, 506 (5th Cir.2003) (quoting Sims v. Apfel, 238 F.3d 597, 599-600 (5th Cir.2001)) (internal alterations omitted).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Brabham v. O'Reilly Automotive, Inc.
Davidson v. Veneman, 317 F.3d 503, 508 (5th Cir.2003).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Sudo Properties, Inc. v. Terrebonne Parish Consolidated Government
Davidson v. Veneman, 317 F.3d 503, 508 (5th Cir.2003).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Johnson v. Fobbs
Davidson v. Veneman, 317 F.3d 503, 508 (5th Cir. 2003).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Lancer Insurance Co v. Rockmore
Davidson v. Veneman, 317 F.3d 503, 508 (5th Cir. 2003).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Cox
Davidson v. Veneman, 317 F.3d 503, 506 (5th Cir.2003) (“[The government] must show, based on the record[,] that it acted reasonably at all stages of the litigation.”).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Intervest Corp v. Martinez
Davidson v. Veneman, 317 F.3d 503, 505 (5th Cir.2003).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States Securities and Exchange Commission v. Nicholas A. Zahareas Tuschner & Company, Inc. John M. Tuschner Euroamerican Securities, S.A.
(2×)
The fact that the district court in this case found for the SEC is a factor weighing in the government's favor, but the district court's judgment "is not sufficient, in and of itself, to show that the Government's position was substantially justified." Davidson v. Veneman, 317 F.3d 503, 507 (5th Cir.2003).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
SEC v. John M. Tuschner
The fact that the district court in this case found for the SEC is a factor weighing in the government’s favor, but the district court’s judgment “is not sufficient, in and of itself, to show that the Government’s position was substantially justified.” Davidson v. Veneman, 317 F.3d 503, 507 (5th Cir. 2003).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Scarborough v. Principi
(2×)
See, e. g., Pierce v. Underwood, 487 *415 U. S. 552, 567 (1988); id., at 575 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Davidson v. Veneman, 317 F. 3d 503, 506 (CA5 2003); Lauer v. Barnhart, 321 F. 3d 762, 764 (CA8 2003); Libas, Ltd. v. United States, 314 F. 3d 1362, 1365 (CA Fed. 2003).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Rafael Dasilva v. U. S. Citizenship & Img Svc
(2×)
The district court denied DaSilva’s motion, finding that (1) DaSilva was not a prevailing party, and (2) USCIS’s position was substantially justified. 14 On appeal, DaSilva advances substantially the same arguments as he did in (2) that materially alters the relationship between the parties; and (3) modifies the defendant’s behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff at the time of the judgment or settlement.” Walker v. City of Mesquite, TX, 313 F.3d 246, 249 (5th Cir. 2002) (defining “prevailing party” under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 ); see also Othman v. Chertoff, 309 F. App�…
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
Rice v. Astrue
Underlying conclusions of law, however, are reviewed de novo.” (citations omitted)); see also Davidson v. Veneman, 317 F.3d 503, 505 (5th Cir.2003).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Davidson
v.
Veneman
v.
Veneman
01-60573.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Nov 19, 2002.
Unpublished
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH CIRCUIT
___________
No. 01-60573 ____________
CHARLES DAVIDSON, doing business as Davidson Farms, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus
ANN VENEMAN, Secretary Department of Agriculture, Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi USDC No. 5:96-CV-95-BiS
November 18, 2002 Before KING, Chief Judge, JONES and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges. BY THE COURT: After due consideration, we find that we do not have jurisdiction over all of the issues briefed in this case because the district court denied Davidson’s “motion for summary judgment awarding interest.” The interest issue has not been finally litigated in the district court. We are a court of limited jurisdiction, and a denial of summary judgment is not a final judgment. Palmer v. Johnson, 193 F.3d 346, 350 (5th Cir. 1999). We remand to the district court solely to decide this remaining issue and enter a final judgment. The clerk of this court is directed to return the record to the district court. Within sixty days after entry of this remand, the district court shall enter judgment. Once the district court has entered judgment, the clerk of the district court shall return the record, supplemented with the judgment, to this court for disposition of the appeal by this panel. The parties are not required to file a new notice of appeal, nor is further briefing required. For the foregoing reasons, we retain jurisdiction over this appeal and REMAND to the district court for proceedings consistent with this order.