IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS
FROM THE SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT FORT WORTH
IN CAUSE NUMBER 02-13-00221-CR
AND FROM THE 16TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT DENTON COUNTY, TEXAS IN CAUSE NUMBER F-2011-0993-D
PAUL JOHNSON
Criminal District Attorney March 6, 2015 Denton County, Texas CATHERINE LUFT Assistant Criminal District Attorney Chief, Appellate Division ANDREA R. SIMMONS Assistant Criminal District Attorney State Bar No. 24053478 1450 East McKinney Denton, Texas 76209 (940) 349-2600 FAX (940) 349-2751 [email protected]
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
Appellee ....................................................... JUAN BLEA
DAWN MOORE
1504 East McKinney Street Suite 200 Denton, Texas 76209 APPELLATE COUNSEL DENVER McCARTY 1512 East McKinney Street Suite 200 Denton, Texas 76209 TRIAL COUNSEL Appellant ... ....... ...................... ..................... THE STATE OF TEXAS
PAUL JOHNSON
Criminal District Attorney CATHERINE LUFT Assistant Criminal District Attorney Chief, Appellate Division ANDREA R. SIMMONS Assistant Criminal District Attorney State Bar No. 24053478 1450 East McKinney Denton, Texas 76209 (940) 349-2600 FAX (940) 349-2751 APPELLATE COUNSEL MICHAEL GRAVES DUSTIN GOSSAGE Assistant Criminal District Attorneys TRIAL COUNSEL
TABLE OF CONTENTS
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL ....................................................... ii-iv INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................. v-vi STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ............................................ 1-2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................. 1 STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY ....................................................... 2 GROUND FOR REVIEW ......................................................................................... 2 ARGUMENTS ........................................................................................................... .
Applied properly, the settled principles of an evidentiary sufficiency analysis prevent the appellate courts from becoming a thirteenth juror ......... 3 Bodily injury versus serious bodily injury ...................................................... 4 The majority opinion was wrong as the jury could have reasonably inferred that absent medical treatment, the injury to the complainant's lungs and liver could have resulted in a substantial risk of death. Furthermore, the evidence was sufficient to support seriously bodily injury where the complainant suffered from a protracted impairment of the functioning of her body as a result of the assault ................................. 4 PRAYER FOR RELIEF ............................................................................................ 9 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ............................ .......................................... 10 lll CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................ 10 APPENDICES:
A Blea v. State, No. 02-13-00221-CR, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 113 7 (Tex. App. -Fort Worth Feb. [5], 2015, pet. filed)
IV
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Statutes, Rules and Codes Page Tex. Penal Code Ann. § l.07(a)(8) (Vernon 2013) ...... .. .. .... .. .. ............................... .. 4 Tex. Penal Code Ann. §1.07(a)(46) (Vernon 2013) .. .. .......................................... .4-5 Cases Barrera v. State 820 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. App.- Corpus Christi 1991, pet. refd) ............................. 7
Blea v. State No. 02-13-00221-CR, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 1137 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth Feb. [5], 2015, pet. filed) .................................................................... 2, 8
Brown v. State 605 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980) .. ......................................... 7
Dewberry v. State 4 S.W.3d 735 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) .............................................. .. ................... 3
Dobbs v. State 434 S.W.3d 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) .. ............................................................. 8
Hernandez v. State 161 S.W.3d 491 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) ............................................................ 8-9
Hooper v. State 214 S.W.3d 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) ................ .. .. .... ...... .. ................................... 3
Jackson v. State 399 S.W.3d 285 (Tex. App. - Waco 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.)) .......................... . 7 v Jackson v. Virginia 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979) ......................................... 3
Laster v. State 275 S.W.3d 512 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) ............................................................... 3
Moore v. State 739 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) ........................................................... 4, 7
Nash v. State 123 S.W.3d 534 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, pet. ref d) ................................... 4
Patterson v. State No. 11-06-00209-CR, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 1525 (Tex. App.- Eastland 2008, pet. ref d) (not designated for publication) .................................... 7
Thomas v. State 444 S.W.3d 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) ................................................................... 8
Whatley v. State 445 S.W.3d 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) ............................................................... 8
Wilson v. State 139 S.W.3d 104 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2004, pet. refd) .................................... 7
Winfrey v. State 323 S.W.3d 875 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) .. ............................................................. 8
Vl
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS
JUAN BLEA § APPELLANT § § v. § No. § THE STATE OF TEXAS, § APPELLEE §
STATE'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS:
Comes now the State, by and through its Assistant District Attorney, and respectfully urges this Court to grant discretionary review of the above-named cause.
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
Because the issues presented to this Honorable Court for review are narrow in scope, the State does not believe that oral argument will be helpful to the Court in determining whether the Court of Appeals erred.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with, and found guilty of, the first-degree felony offense of aggravated assault, family violence, and sentenced to five years imprisonment. The majority opinion released by the Second Court of Appeals held that the evidence supporting "serious" bodily injury was insufficient, and reversed and remanded the case to the trial court. The majority opinion ordered the trial court to (1) modify its judgment to delete the first-degree felony conviction of aggravated assault of a family member and to instead reflect a second-degree felony conviction for aggravated assault of a family member through the use of a deadly weapon and (2) conduct a new trial on punishment. Justice Livingston filed a dissenting opinion.
STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY
After a jury found appellee guilty of the first-degree felony offense of aggravated assault against a family member, the Second Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the trial court's judgment of conviction, specifically finding the evidence insufficient to support "serious" bodily injury (Appendix A [Blea v. State, No. 02-13-00221-CR, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 1137 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth Feb. [5], 2015, pet. filed)]).
GROUND FOR REVIEW
Did the Second Court of Appeals improperly apply the standard for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in analyzing whether the complainant suffered serious bodily injury?
ARGUMENTS
Applied properly, the settled principles of an evidentiary sufficiency analysis prevent the appellate courts from becoming a thirteenth juror.
In assessing the legal sufficiency of the evidence under Jackson v. Virginia, a reviewing court "consider[ s] all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine[s] whether, based on that evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational juror could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007 (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2788- 89, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979)). A reviewing court' s role is not to become a thirteenth juror, and it should not reevaluate the weight and credibility of the record evidence and substitute its judgment for that of the fact-finder. Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Instead, a reviewing court defers to "the responsibility of the trier of fact to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13 (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19). This same standard applies equally to circumstantial and direct evidence. Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 517-18 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). A reviewing court's role on appeal is "restricted to guarding against the rare occurrence when a factfinder does not act rationally." Id. at 518.
Bodily injury versus serious bodily injury.
"Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § l.07(a)(8) (Vernon 2013). "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § l.07(a)(46) (Vernon 2013) (emphasis added). The Texas Legislature intended that there be a meaningful difference or distinction between the different definitions for "bodily injury" and "serious bodily injury," because the Penal Code provides definitions for each. See Nash v. State, 123 S.W.3d 534, 538-39 (Tex. App.- Fort Worth 2003, pet. ref'd) (citing Moore v. State, 739 S.W.2d 347, 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
The majority opinion was wrong as the jury could have reasonably inferred that absent medical treatment, the injury to the complainant's lungs and liver could have resulted in a substantial risk of death. Furthermore, the evidence was sufficient to support seriously bodily injury where the complainant suffered from a protracted impairment of the functioning of her body as a result of the assault.
Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and allowing the jury to draw reasonable inferences, the facts relating to the injury to the complainant's lungs were sufficient for the jury to find that without treatment the complainant faced a substantial risk of death based upon her injuries to the lung and/or liver. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §1.07(a)(46). Furthermore, the evidence was sufficient to show that the complainant sustained a serious bodily injury based upon the suffering from a protracted impairment of the functioning of her body. See Id. Specifically, appellee hit the complainant in the face, hit and kicked her in the side and ribs, and said he was going to kill her (2 R.R. at 30, 32-33, 50). According to the complainant's written statement, taken after the assault by appellee but prior to being transported to the hospital, she was in "a ton of pain" after the assault (2 R.R. at 36). The complainant said that she had pain in her chest and back and that it felt like something was broken or terribly injured (2 R.R. at 37). When the ambulance arrived, she could not breathe very well (2 R.R. at 33, 36-37, 39, 43).
Tim Adamo, the responding officer from the Carrollton Police Department, testified that the complainant was having a hard time breathing when he arrived (2 R.R. at 118, 126). Officer Adamo also testified that the complainant was in quite a bit of pain when and was holding her ribs, chest, and stomach area while seated on the couch (2 R.R. at 115, 117-18). Appellee's father testified that the complainant looked pretty bad and could not walk (2 R.R. at 84-85).
Kristie Brown, nurse practitioner at Parkland Memorial Hospital, testified that the complainant suffered injuries to her liver and chest (2 R.R. at 61-62). The complainant also had bruising to the left side of her face and abdomen, two fractured ribs, and fractures to the maxillary sinuses (2 R.R. at 63-65). Her lung collapsed (this is called a pneumothorax), and when Nurse Brown met the complainant, a procedure had already been done to help with her breathing (2 R.R. at 64-65, 67). The complainant's mother clarified that the complainant had a chest tube inserted to assist with her breathing but that it was removed before she was discharged from the hospital (2 R.R. at 97, 104-05, 107-08, 110). Nurse Brown testified that injuries to the lungs are treated seriously and that a person could die from lack of oxygen (2 R.R. at 66-67). She elaborated by saying that:
"if you have a box and a balloon blown up inside the box and the balloon shrinks over time, there is air between the box and the balloon, that is a pneumothorax. Most of the time, the lungs should be expanded in our chest and touching the sides of the box, but when the lung collapses, it's just like a balloon that has a small leak in it and collapses down. When that occurs, the patient, Justina, can have trouble breathing and it can affect blood pressure, vital signs that we look at" (2 R.R. at 64-65).
Nurse Brown further testified that mJunes to the liver are also treated seriously (2 R.R. at 66-67). And although the complainant's liver was always functioning, a patient could bleed to death quickly due to such an injury (2 R.R. at 65-66, 68-69). In fact, the complainant was originally not allowed to walk because she could start bleeding (2 R.R. at 68).
The complainant's mother testified that the complainant was in a lot of pain and had a lot of bruising (2 R.R. at 94-95). She was hospitalized for four days, but after she was released, she was still in a lot of pain and couldn't walk (2 R.R. at 108-09). When the complainant was able to walk again, she was still in pain ( R.R.
at 109-10). Her job duties changed when she returned to work because she could not lift over twenty-five pounds for at least one month after the assault per doctor's orders. And the complainant did not work for approximately one month after the assault (2 R.R. at 109-10).
Whether or not an mJury constitutes senous bodily injury must be determined on a case-by-case basis. Moore, 739 S.W.2d at 352. The relevant inquiry as to this issue is the extent of the injuries as inflicted, not after the effects have been ameliorated by medical treatment. See Jackson v. State, 399 S.W.3d 285, 291 (Tex. App. - Waco 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.)); Wilson v. State, 139 S.W.3d 104, 106 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2004, pet. refd) (citing Brown v. State, 605 S.W.2d 572, 575 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980)); Barrera v. State, 820 S.W.2d 194, 196 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, pet. ref d); see also Patterson v. State, No. 11-06-00209-CR, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 1525, at *8 (Tex. App.- Eastland 2008, pet. ref d) (not designated for publication) (testimony by emergency room physician sufficient to show that pneumothorax, common with broken ribs, created a substantial risk of death).
Moreover, the Second Court of Appeals improperly resolved conflicts in witnesses' testimony against the jury's verdict. For example, the majority opinion noted contradicting testimony as to the changes in duties at the complainant's job and whether those changes were related to her injuries, and inconsistent testimony by the complainant's mother as to how long it took before the complainant could walk; the majority found a lack of evidence as to the complainant being unable to control her oxygenation, and pointed out that although the complainant testified that she suffered a lacerated liver, no other evidence of such was presented (although there was evidence which allowed an inference of such) (Appendix A [Blea v. State, No. 02-13-00221-CR, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 1137 at* 8-12 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth Feb. [5], 2015, pet. filed)]).
A jury's verdict in evidentiary sufficiency issues are weighed in favor of affirming a judgment of conviction. See Winfrey v. State, 323 S.W.3d 875 , 879 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Settled principles aimed at preventing appellate courts from becoming a thirteenth juror include: considering the evidence, along with reasonable inferences from the evidence, in the light most favorable to the verdict; deferring to the factfinder's exclusive role to resolve conflicts in the evidence, and to judge the credibility of the witnesses; assessing incriminating evidence cumulatively rather than requiring each fact to directly support guilt; allowing for circumstantial evidence alone to support a conviction; and recognizing that a factfinder is free to accept or reject any or all of the testimony of any witness (see Appendix A, Livingston's Dissent, citing Whatley v. State, 445 S.W.3d 159, 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); Thomas v. State, 444 S.W.3d 4, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); Dobbs v. State, 434 S.W.3d 166, 170 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); Hernandez v. State, 161 S.W.3d 491, 500-01 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)). Here, the majority improperly acted as a thirteenth juror.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
For the reasons stated herein, the State prays this Court will grant review in this case in order to permit full briefing on the Court of Appeals' erroneous application of the standard of review.
Respectfully submitted, PAUL JOHNSON Criminal District Attorney Denton County, Texas CATHERINE LUFT Assistant Criminal District Attorney Chief, Appellate Division
ANDREA R. SIMMONS
Assistant Criminal District Attorney State Bar No. 240534 78 1450 East McKinney Denton, Texas 76209 (940) 349-2600 FAX (940) 349-2751
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
The State certifies that the State's Petition for Discretionary Review in the instant cause contains a word count of 1916, said count being generated by the computer program Microsoft Word that was used to prepare the document.
, ANDREA R. SIMMONS
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
A true copy of the State's Petition for Discretionary Review has been sent by United States Mail, postage prepaid, to counsel for Appellee, Dawn A. Moore, BOSWELL & MOORE, 1504 East McKinney Street, Suite 200, Denton, Texas 76209, on this, the 3rd day of March 2015.
ANDREA R. SIMMONS
APPENDIX A
[Blea v. State, No. 02-13 -00221-CR, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 1137 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth Feb. [5], 2015, pet. filed)]
Page I
Lexis Nexis® I of I DOCUMENT
JUAN BLEA, APPELLANT v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, STATE
NO. 02-13-00221-CR
COURT OF APPEALS OF TEXAS, SECOND DISTRICT, FORT WORTH
2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 1137
February 5, 2015, Delivered February 5, 2015, Opinion Filed NOTICE: PLEASE CONSULT THE TEXAS requires both serious bodily injury and the use of a RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE FOR CIT A- deadly weapon. 3 In this case, the indictment alleged that TION OF UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS . Appellant's hand was a deadly weapon. Appellant brings a single issue on appeal, challenging the sufficiency of PRIOR HISTORY: [*I] FROM THE 362ND the evidence that he caused the complainant serious bod- DISTRICT COURT OF DENTON COUNTY. TRIAL ily injury rather than bodily injury as well as the suffi- COURT NO. F-2011 -0993-D. TRIAL COURT JUDGE: ciency of the evidence that he used hi s hand as a deadly HON. SHERRY SHIPMAN. weapon. Because the evidence is insufficient to show that [*2] Appellant caused serious bodily injury but sufficient to show that he used his hand as a deadly COUNSEL: FOR APPELLANT: DAWN A. MOORE, weapon, we reverse the trial court's judgment and re- BOSWELL & MOORE, P.C., DENTON, TEXAS . mand this case to the trial court with instructions ( 1) to modify the judgment to delete the conviction for FOR STATE: PAUL JOHNSON, CRIMINAL DIS- first-degree felony aggravated assault of a family mem- TRICT ATTORNEY ; CATHERINE LUFT, CHIEF OF ber and to instead reflect a conviction for second-degree THE APPELLATE SECTION; ANDREA R. SIM- fe lony aggravated assault of a fami ly member, based on MONS, MICHAEL GRAYES, DUSTIN GOSSAGE, Appellant's use of a deadly weapon, and (2) to conduct a ASSISTANT CRIMINAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS new trial on punishment for the second-degree felony .' FOR DENTON COUNTY, DENTON, TEXAS.